All of these media and content companies may be up for grabs.

Could Rupert Murdoch become the next owner of CNN? Will Verizon consider buying out the owner of more than a dozen cable networks, or the Walt Disney Company, owner of ABC?

Since 1983, media moguls have assembled annually in posh Sun Valley, Idaho to talk business. But never have they met while several huge consolidation and merger deals are on the table among their colleagues. Comcast acquiring Time Warner Cable and AT&T buying out DirecTV are both seen as game-changers among Wall Street bankers and the media elite, leaving many self-consciously pondering whether they are no longer big enough to stay competitive in a consolidated media world.

The Wall Street Journal and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution both report that at least one huge merger deal could emerge as a result of this week’s conference. Among the most likely buyers is FOX CEO Rupert Murdoch, who is reportedly looking to buy a major content company.

The most likely target is Time Warner (Entertainment), former owner of Time Warner Cable. After spinning off its money-losing magazine unit, TW has become much more focused on content and distribution – exactly what Murdoch is looking for. Time Warner owns New Line Cinema, HBO, Turner Broadcasting System, The CW Television Network, Warner Bros., Kids’ WB, Cartoon Network, Boomerang, Adult Swim, CNN, DC Comics, Warner Bros. Animation, Cartoon Network Studios, Hanna-Barbera, MLB Network and Castle Rock Entertainment. In fact, altogether the company owns or controls dozens of television channels which could all soon fall into the hands of Murdoch.

A Murdoch acquisition would be the last death-blow for Ted Turner’s Turner Broadcasting System, which launched CNN, TBS, and TNT and is now a division within Time Warner. Murdoch’s Fox News Channel was launched as a conservative alternative to CNN’s perceived left-leaning reporting. A Murdoch buyout would either deliver bipartisan profits to the media mogul or allow him to shut down the network or relaunch it under the Fox News brand.

Such an acquisition would not be cheap. Time Warner is worth as estimated $62 billion.

A Murdoch buyout would be especially troublesome for those already upset with corporate media consolidation. Murdoch would end up controlling three major U.S. networks – FOX, CW, and MyNetworkTV, multiple cable news channels, dozens of local television stations in major media markets, and more cable networks than most people can count. In fact, the assembled list of Murdoch-owned media properties is enormous:

Murdoch: The next owner of CNN?

Adult Swim, Boomerang, Cartoon Network, CNN Worldwide, HLN, Inside CNN Tour & Store, TBS, TCM, TheSmokingGun.com, TNT, truTV, Turner Sports, Fox Business Network, Fox News, Star India, YES Network, Twentieth Century Fox, Fox 2000 Pictures, Fox Searchlight Pictures, Fox International Productions, Twentieth Century Fox Television, Fox Home Entertainment, Shine Group, Twentieth Century Fox Animation, The Sun, The Times, The Sunday Times, Times Literary Supplement, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Post, The Australian, The Daily Telegraph (Australia), The Sunday Telegraph (Australia), The Herald Sun, The Sunday Herald Sun, The Courier Mail, The Sunday Mail, The Advertiser, NT News, The Sunday Territorian, The Sunday Times (Australia), The Sunday Tasmanian, Mercury, Warner Bros. Pictures, Warner Bros. Pictures International, New Line Cinema, Warner Home Video, Warner Bros. Advanced Digital Services, Warner Bros. Interactive Entertainment, Warner Bros. Technical Operations, Warner Bros. Anti-Piracy Operations, Warner Bros. Television Group, Warner Bros. Television, Telepictures Productions, Warner Horizon Television, Warner Bros. Animation, Warner Bros. Domestic Television Distribution, Warner Bros. International Television Distribution, Warner Bros. International Television Production, Warner Bros. International Branded Services, Studio 2.0, The CW Television Network, DC Entertainment, Warner Bros. Theatre Ventures, HarperCollins General Books Group, HarperCollins Children’s Books Group, HarperCollins Christian Publishers, HarperCollins UK, HarperCollins Canada, HarperCollins Australia/New Zealand, HarperCollins India, FX, FXX, FXM, National Geographic Channel, Nat Geo WILD, Nat Geo Mundo, FSN, FOX Sports 1, FOX Sports 2, FOX Soccer Plus, FOX College Sports, FOX Deportes, FOX Life, Baby TV, Fox Broadcasting Company, Sky 1, Sky Atlantic, Sky Living, Sky Arts, Sky Sports, Sky Movies, Sky News, Sky Deutschland, Sky Italia, MyNetworkTV, MundoFox, FOX International Channels, Fox Sports Enterprises, HBO, HBO On Demand, HBO GO, Cinemax, Cinemax on Demand, MAX GO, HBO2, HBO Signature, HBO Family, HBO Comedy, HBO Zone, HBO Latino, More Max, Action Max, Thriller Max, 5 Star Max, Max Latino, Outer Max, Movie Max, Barron’s, MarketWatch, Factiva, Dow Jones Risk & Compliance, Dow Jones VentureSource, All Things Digital, Amplify, News America Marketing, and Storyful.

Murdoch has already shown a willingness to spend big. He has recently taken an ownership interest in the up and coming Vice Media, popular with the under 30-viewing crowd. He also spent $415 million to buy romance novel publisher Harlequin Enterprises.

But Murdoch may not be the only one shopping for a deal. The Wall Street Journal offered a shopping list:

• Small cable network owners: Nobody just owns three or four cable networks these days. Content conglomerates like CBS, Disney, Time Warner and Comcast own 15, 30, or even 40 different channels. Smaller players are ripe for the picking. Chief among them include Scripps Networks Interactive (Food Network, HGTV), AMC Networks (AMC, IFC, Sundance), and Crown Media (Hallmark).
• Small studios: Owning a small Hollywood studio is quaint, but Wall Street investment bankers think the time is long past to sell out to larger corporate entities who can better leverage distribution of their releases, easy enough if you own your own theater chain, pay cable network, broadcast stations, and basic cable outlets.

Both phone companies are attending Sun Valley for the first time.

In addition to buyout offers from the largest networks around, Discovery Networks is also in the mood to grow larger at the urging of its board of directors, which includes Dr. John Malone, CEO of Liberty Global. Malone is behind much of the cheerleading to consolidate the cable industry and helped spark the Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal when his partly owned Charter Communications sought a takeover of Time Warner Cable itself.

Wall Street bankers love even better the idea of selling Discovery to a new owner – Disney.

For the first time, phone companies AT&T and Verizon are also in attendance at Sun Valley, and analysts don’t believe the CEOs are there for summer vacation.

Jimmy Schaeffler, chairman of media and telecom consulting firm Carmel Group, says Verizon has been most lacking in the content ownership department and “needs something else right now” as rivals bulk up. AT&T’s acquisition of DirecTV only underlines that sentiment among many Wall Street analysts who think Time Warner (Entertainment) could be an option if Verizon isn’t outbid by Murdoch.

All of this shopping has caused alarm for some, including CNN’s media reporter Brian Stelter who declared, “I will eat my remote control … in fact, I will eat my copy of the New York Post … if Murdoch becomes the owner of CNN.” 

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WSJ Digits Media Consolidation 7-7-14.flv[/flv]

The Wall Street Journal’s ‘Digits’ explores the ongoing consolidation of media creators and distributors. This year’s media conference in Sun Valley could spark more merger deals. (5:02)

AT&T’s Magic Fiber Fairy brings fiber to you, if you approve AT&T’s business agenda.

If it wins approval from regulators to buy satellite TV provider DirecTV, AT&T says it will have enough money to afford to expand its gigabit fiber network Gigapower U-verse to an extra two million homes.

That bit of non-sequitur was the highlight of AT&T’s regulatory filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. AT&T claims money for the fiber expansion will come from anticipated savings from programming volume discounts AT&T will get combining DirecTV’s 20.3 million customers with AT&T’s 5.7 million U-verse TV subscribers.

AT&T expects cost synergies to exceed $1.6 billion annual run-rate by three years after closing.  These savings will begin in the first year after closing, ramp up over four years and grow with the addition of video subscribers thereafter.  It is anticipated that at least 40% of these total synergies will be realized by year two after closing.  These synergies are conservative and derived from items such as programming cost reductions, operational efficiencies and reductions in redundant broadcast infrastructure.  Programming cost reductions are the most significant part of the expected cost synergies.  At this time, AT&T’s U-verse content costs represent approximately 60% of its subscriber video revenues.  With the scale this transaction provides, we estimate AT&T’s U-verse content costs after the completion of the transaction will be reduced by approximately 20% or more as compared with our forecasted standalone content costs.

AT&T believes that despite perennially increasing programming costs, especially for popular over-the-air and cable networks, the 20 percent of anticipated savings will give AT&T enough money to vastly expand its fiber network.

“The economics of this transaction will allow the combined company to upgrade two million additional locations to high-speed broadband with Gigapower FTTP (fiber to the premise) and expand our high-speed broadband footprint to an additional 13 million locations where AT&T will be able to offer a pay TV and high-speed broadband bundle,” AT&T wrote.

On AT&T’s budget, the company can send you this really nice star ceiling kit, but it won’t pay for gigabit broadband.

Before announcing its intent to buy DirecTV, AT&T already promised to expand Gigapower U-verse to up to 100 cities, while telling investors it anticipated flat spending on network improvements. On Tuesday, AT&T went further and dramatically cut investments in its wireline network to a level that raised concerns for the financial security of several of its vendors, including those supplying fiber optic cable and equipment.

AT&T predicted savings from the merger will amount to $1.6 billion a year, but not until three years after the merger closes. There are questions whether this amount is enough to fund the kind of fiber expansion AT&T promises.

In 2012, AT&T committed to expanding U-verse to 8.5 million more customer locations at a cost of $6 billion. That investment paid for AT&T’s less-costly fiber to the neighborhood service. Based on AT&T’s figures, the cost to deploy fiber into each neighborhood, while still utilizing existing copper wiring to bring service into each home, was $705 per home or business.

AT&T Gigapower U-verse requires AT&T to spend considerably more to extend fiber service directly to each premises it intends to serve. Google is spending approximately $4,000 to reach each home with fiber optics in Kansas City. But AT&T’s math suggests it only has to spend about $800 per home (based on the $1.6 billion savings figure it expects to begin receiving in 2017) for decommissioning the remaining copper and extending U-verse fiber for each of two million customer homes passed. What does AT&T know that Google does not?

But wait. AT&T is also committing to use that $1.6 billion to expand traditional fiber to the neighborhood U-verse to 13 million additional homes as well. That means AT&T has a budget that limits it to $106 per home for a combined 15 million new locations passed. That amount is enough for a fiber optic star ceiling kit or a really nice fiber strand light fixture, but it isn’t nearly enough to bring gigabit broadband to AT&T customers.

One thing is certain: AT&T will not be passing on any cost savings to customers in the form of lower bills. AT&T’s proposed investment is a blatant appeal to regulators with promises of broadband expansion the company has already made and shows few signs of actually delivering.

AT&T’s claim it wants to expand gigabit fiber to the home service to as many as 100 cities nationwide requires closer inspection on news this week it has slashed spending on its wireline business.

Investors knocked AT&T’s share price today as they learned earnings from AT&T’s wired networks will be lower than expected.

TheStreet reported this morning the spending cuts are so significant, they are creating a financial risk for a number of AT&T’s major vendors.

Research firm Jefferies issued a research note warning that AT&T’s spending cuts began last month and seem to be ongoing. As a result the companies that have the most exposure to AT&T’s wireline business are at increased financial risk. Those suppliers include optical fiber equipment manufacturer Alcatel-Lucent, as well as Ciena, Juniper, ADTRAN, Finisar, and JDS Uniphase. As a result, all but Finisar saw their share prices drop significantly in morning trading.

Earlier today, AT&T reported it was ahead of schedule to complete its Project VIP expansion of its 4G LTE wireless and U-verse networks. As U-verse expansion nears an end, vendor orders may be in decline. Wall Street analysts see no evidence AT&T is preparing to spend much on any other expansion efforts, including fiber to the home service.

As Broadband Reports’ notes, without significant capital to invest in fiber upgrades, they are not going to happen.

These cuts make it hard to take the company’s claims of meaningful 1 Gbps fiber expansion seriously as there’s simply no budget cordoned off for such a project (“Project VIP” funds are already in use on other efforts). While AT&T has the press believing they’re deploying 1 Gbps to “up to 100 cities,” AT&T’s shrinking CAPEX tells a different story entirely.

Fiber to the home service is more costly than AT&T U-verse’s fiber to the neighborhood service because it requires a fiber cable be brought directly to each home or business — a more costly endeavor that requires careful cable burial or overhead drop line replacement, as well as the possibility of in-home wiring adjustments. Considering the billions spent on U-verse expansion to date, at least as much will be required to upgrade to fiber to the home service and there are no signs AT&T is ready to invest in anything beyond press releases.

“Comcast Corp.’s bid to buy Time Warner Cable Inc. may be the opening act for a yearlong festival of telecommunications deals that would alter Internet, phone and TV service for tens of millions of Americans.” — Bloomberg News, May 14, 2014

Wall Street analysts remain certain Comcast and Time Warner Cable won’t be the only merger on the table this year as the $45 billion dollar deal is expected to spark a new wave of consolidation, further reducing competitive choice in telecom services for most Americans.

While the industry continues to insist that the current foundation of deregulation is key to investment and competition, the reality on the ground is less certain.

Let’s review history:

For several decades, the cable industry has avoided head-on competition with other cable operators. They argue the costs of “overbuilding” cable systems into territories already serviced by another company is financially impractical and reckless. But that did not stop telephone companies like AT&T and Verizon from overhauling portions of their networks to compete, and in at least some communities another provider has emerged to offer some competition. Some wonder if AT&T was willing to spend billions to upgrade their urban landline network to provide U-verse, why won’t cable companies spend some money and compete directly with one another?

The answer is simple: They can earn a lot more by limiting competition.

When only a few firms account for most of the sales of a product, those firms can sometimes exercise market power by either explicitly or implicitly coordinating their actions. Coordinated interaction is especially suspect where all firms seem to charge very similar prices and few, if any, are willing to challenge the status quo.

Since the 1980s, the telecommunications industry has been deregulated off and on to a degree not seen since the pioneer days of telephone service. That was the era when waves of mergers created near-monopolies in the oil, railroad, energy, tobacco, steel and sugar industries. By the late 1890s, evidence piled up that proved reducing the number of providers in a market leads to higher prices and poor service. The abuses eventually led to the passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and later the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914.

Here is what happened when the cable industry was reined in during the early 1990s, only to be deregulated again.

The generation of political leaders that dominated Washington during the 1980s developed selective amnesia about economic history and dismantled many of the regulatory protections established to protect consumers, arguing competition would keep markets in check. In the broadband and cable business, that has not proved as successful as the industry represents.

At the heart of the problem is the 1996 Telecommunications Act, signed into law by President Bill Clinton. The sweeping law is littered with lobbyist landmines for consumers and their interests. Under the guise of increasing competition, the 1996 law actually helped reduce competition by removing regulatory oversight and, perhaps unintentionally, sparking an enormous rampage of industry consolidation followed by price increases. The Bush Administration kept the war on consumers going with the appointment of Michael Powell (now the CEO of the cable industry’s lobbying group) to chair the Federal Communications Commission. Under Powell, non-discriminatory access to networks by competitors was curtailed, and Powell’s FCC gave carte blanche to the cable industry’s plan to cluster its territories into large regional monopolies and a tight national oligopoly. The FCC’s own researchers quietly admitted in the early 2000s “clustering raised prices.”

By January 2001, cable operators had settled on rate increases that averaged three times the rate of inflation. While the national inflation rate hovered around 1%, cable companies routinely raised basic cable rates an average of 7% annually. Powell declared rising cable rates were not a consumer problem and adopted the industry’s classic talking point that rate increases reflect the “value of the programming” found on cable. In fact, even as cable customers grew increasingly angry about rate increases, Powell told three different reporters he wanted to further relax the FCC’s involvement in cable pricing. (McClintock, Pamela, “Powell: No Cable Coin Crisis” Variety, April 30, 2001; Hearn, Ted. “Powell: Value Matters in Cable Rates,” Multichannel News, March 13, 2002; Powell Press Conference, February 8, 2001; Dreazen, Yochi. “FCC Chairman Signals Change, Plans to Limit Intervention,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2001.)

Economists reviewing data found in publicly available corporate balance sheets soon found evidence that the “increased programming costs”-excuse for rate increases did not hold water. The less competition or number of choices available to consumers in the market unambiguously lead to higher prices. It has remained true since Consumers’ Union revealed the financial trickery in 2003:

The cable industry will claim that programming costs are driving prices up. While programming costs have certainly risen, a close look at the numbers shows that rising program costs account for only a small part of the rising rates.

If costs were really the cause of rising prices, then the cable industries’ operating margins – the difference between its revenues and costs — would not be rising. The facts are just the opposite. Operating margins have been increasing dramatically since 1997. The operating margin for the industry as a whole will reach $18.8 billion per year in 2002, $7 billion more than it was in 1997. Operating revenues per subscriber have increased dramatically over that period, from $208 per year to $273. That is, after taking out all the operating costs, including programming costs, cable operators have increased their take per subscriber by over 30 percent.

[…] The ability of cable operators to raise rates and increase revenues, even with rising programming costs, stems from the market power they have at the point of sale. They would not be able to raise prices and pass program price increases through if they did not have monopoly power.

Consumers’ Union also foreshadows what will happen if another wave of industry consolidation takes hold the way it did over a decade earlier:

While the cable industry has certainly increased capital expenditures to upgrade its plants, it has actually sunk a lot more capital into another activity – mergers and acquisitions.

It is the outrageous prices that have been paid to buy each other out and consolidate the industry that is helping to drive the rate increases. Between 1998, when the first mega merger between cable operators was announced, and 2001, when the last big merger was announced, cable companies spent over a quarter of a trillion dollars buying each other out. In those four years, they spent almost six times as much on mergers and acquisitions as they did on capital expenditures to upgrade their systems. At the same time, the average price paid per subscriber more than doubled.

When a cable operator pays such an outrageous price, the previous owner is reaping the financial rewards of his monopoly power. The acquiring company can only pay such a high price by assuming that his monopoly power will allow him to continue to increase prices. Monopoly power is being bought and sold and borrowed against. The new cable operator, who has paid for market power, may insist that the debt he has incurred to obtain it is a real cost on his books. That may be correct in the literal sense (he owes someone that money) but that does not make it right, or the abuse of market power legal.

Fast-forwarding to 2014, economist and Temple professor Joel Maxcy said the same basic economic truths still exist today with Comcast’s merger with Time Warner Cable.

“My concern is the merger and the consolidation of the cable and internet delivery system for consumers and what will happen to internet and cable rates and choices,” Maxcy said, voicing his hesitancy about a deal that merges the nation’s two largest cable providers. “As that industry has gotten more consolidated over time, we have seen rates go up. The answer from them is that we’ve got more choices. Are we better off or not better off? I don’t know, but certainly rates have gone up at a much faster rate than the inflation rate. The result of more monopoly power is always higher prices and less choices and it seems that this merger moves in that direction.”

“The threat from non-network content providers is a concern for the cable industry,” Maxcy added.

“We’re moving to a situation where we don’t need cable, but we still need the internet and the cable companies are the ones that have control of that,” he said. “Consolidating them together makes them more competitive against the outside forces, but the other argument makes the whole thing less competitive so they’ll have more ability to control the access to Netflix, YouTube and the like. People that may develop other similar sorts of services will have a hard time getting the access they would like to purchase those.”

Chris Stigall spoke with economist and Temple professor Joel Maxcy on Talk Radio 1210 WPHT in Philadelphia about Comcast’s attempt to purchase Time Warner Cable and what that means for consumers. Feb. 18, 2014 (12:10)
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Verizon’s FiOS expansion is still as dead as Francisco Franco.

Verizon is prepared to watch up to 30% of their copper landline customers drift away because the company is adamant about no further expansion of its FiOS fiber to the home network.

Fran Shammo, chief financial officer at Verizon, told attendees of the Jefferies Global Technology, Media & Telecom Conference that Verizon will complete the buildout of its fiber network to a total of about 19 million homes, and that is it.

“Look, we will continue to fulfill our FiOS license franchise agreements,” Frammo said. “[We will] cover about 70% of our legacy footprint. So 30%, we are not going to cover. That is where we are still going to have copper.”

That is bad news for Verizon customers stuck with the company’s copper network because Verizon isn’t planning any further significant investments in it.

“We will continue to harvest that copper network and those customers and keep them as long as we can,” Frammo said. “But we will not be building FiOS out for those areas.”

In fact, Frammo admitted ongoing cost-cutting at Verizon’s landline division is allowing the company to shift more money and resources to its more profitable wireless network.

Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam doesn’t want to spend money on non-FiOS areas when more can be made from its wireless network.

“It is also taking cost structure out,” Frammo said.  “As I mentioned, the migration of copper to fiber has been very big for us. Our Lean Six Sigma projects have really significantly helped us in our capital investment in the wireline which is why I can put more money into the wireless side of the business.”

Verizon has shifted an increasing proportion of its capital investments towards its wireless division year after year, while cutting ongoing investment in wireline. Ratepayers are not benefiting from this arrangement, and critics contend Verizon landline customers are effectively subsidizing Verizon’s wireless networks.

Verizon will still complete the FiOS buildouts it committed to earlier, particularly in New York City, but it is increasingly unlikely Verizon will ever start another wave of fiber upgrades.

In fact, Michael McCormack, the Jefferies’ Wall Street analyst questioning Shammo at the conference foreshadowed what is more likely to happen to Verizon’s legacy copper customers.

“We have talked extensively in the past about the non-FiOS areas and I guess in my second reincarnation as a banker, I will try to help you get rid of those assets,” said McCormack.