Haven't we been here before?

History is best ignored when a Wall Street Journal columnist frames an argument in favor of strengthening the hegemony of Ma Bell, and darn ‘ole past precedent gets in the way of the writer’s “facts.”

Gordon Crovitz is a media and information industry adviser and executive, including former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, executive vice president of Dow Jones and president of its Consumer Media Group.  But today he’s unofficially, unabashedly AT&T.

In a column published this week, Crovitz hosts a whine and cheese festival on behalf of poor and abused AT&T, whose multi-billion dollar takeover of T-Mobile is in tatters. Crovitz places the blame squarely on the government for ruining everything:

How soon we forget the risks of overregulation: Last week, the Federal Communications Commission flexed the same muscle it once used to quash market forces in the phone industry to quash market forces in the wireless industry.

Today’s AT&T, a spinoff from the original, needs more spectrum to catch up with market leader Verizon, also a Ma Bell descendant, to support iPhones, Androids and other devices that feature video and sophisticated apps. It wants to buy T-Mobile, a division of a German company, which doesn’t have the resources to compete in the United States on its own. But the FCC decided to apply antitrust theory from the industrial era and claims to know better than wireless companies how they should operate their businesses.

AT&T’s proposed acquisition is best understood as a private-sector solution to a government-created problem. The FCC has not been able to get Congress to approve auctions to reallocate spectrum to wireless from less valuable uses. AT&T wants T-Mobile’s bandwidth so it can extend the latest fourth-generation network to 97% of the country from 80% and improve its spotty service in congested areas.

Under laws dating to the 1920s, the FCC gets to decide if a merger is in the “public interest,” a vague standard for top-down decision making. Government is the last institution in this era of fast technological innovation to act as if it has the information and power to dictate how change happens.

Crovitz apparently prefers AT&T and its phone pal Verizon Wireless dictate how “change happens,” because the two companies control the vast majority of wireless telecommunications in the United States.  Both also charge near-identical prices for near-identical levels of service.  AT&T & VZW are completely comfortable with that status quo, especially if disruptive competitor T-Mobile is dealt with in the usual industry manner (merger/buyout).

There is nothing vague about the FCC report that condemns the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile for the anti-competitive monstrosity it represents.  In hundreds of pages Crovitz evidently never read, a careful and credible argument against the deal was laid out for all to examine.  That evidence is far more persuasive than AT&T’s heavily-redacted filings the public was not authorized to see (for ‘competitive reasons’), and a multi-million-dollar-a-holler public relations distortion strategy based on hollow promises.

Playing Catch-Up With Verizon Wireless?  Hardly.

AT&T hardly needs to “catch up” with Verizon Wireless.  Both companies own wireless spectrum they have warehoused for “future use.”  As a backdrop to the merger, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has already indicated the agency is hard at work carefully re-allocating spectrum to make more room for wireless services.  The “bandwidth crisis” AT&T talks about is a convenient argument for a merger, until you realize T-Mobile’s mostly-urban wireless network won’t help AT&T achieve its goal of rural wireless expansion.  T-Mobile has never provided service in rural America and never will.

Crovitz attempts to leverage Verizon Wireless’ recent deal with America’s largest cable companies as an argument for the AT&T and T-Mobile merger, suggesting that deal was a game changer.  What goes unsaid is the fact AT&T could have pursued that deal for themselves.  Did they?  No.  Despite AT&T’s public relations spin, the proposed merger with T-Mobile is much more than a spectrum acquisition. As the FCC and the Justice Department have argued, this merger is about ridding AT&T of a competitor willing to offer more services at lower prices.  That forces AT&T to respond in kind to compete, and consumers have benefited greatly from that competition. Verizon Wireless is hardly competition at all considering both companies price services nearly identically.  Beyond that is Sprint, already saddled with the financial albatross Clearwire and questions about its long term viability in a duopolistic wireless market.

Crovitz is wrong on his other “facts” as well:

Deutsche Telekom is hardly short on cash.  The company has plenty of resources and could bolster T-Mobile USA to compete if it saw fit.  It doesn’t, preferring to focus on its more lucrative European markets.  Instead of selling the operation on the open market to other players, which could include foreign providers interested in competing in the high-priced American market, it elected to be courted by AT&T.

Overconfident AT&T

Henry De Lamar Clayton, Jr.: Author of the Clayton Act

The merger illustrates AT&T’s unparalleled level of overconfidence it could deal with regulators and consumer groups who would certainly object to the deal.  The company has since spent millions it could have used to improve its network on campaign-contribution-fueled support building on Capitol Hill, a shameless dollar-a-holler astroturf campaign that pays off non-profit groups to sing the deal’s praises, and an expensive ad campaign to sucker Americans into thinking reduced competition will somehow deliver lower prices and better service.

Even former Republican FCC Chairman Kevin Martin would have likely paused over such an obvious monopoly-building operation.  The Obama Administration’s FCC chairman — Julius Genachowski –  while often too timid for our tastes, at least knows when it is time to join the chorus of opposition.

The FCC doesn’t pretend to tell AT&T how to run its business.  It does, however, serve the public interest by providing checks and balances to unfettered corporate power.  While the Wall Street Journal‘s world view of capitalism would have been favored by the most egregious robber barons, history has taught us that when big corporations get a stranglehold on vital industries, the entire economy can suffer.

Crovitz would have us ignore the massive corporate abuses of 100 years ago that eventually provoked Congress into trust-busting legislative reform, breaking up the monopolies and oligopolies that presided over the railways, early telecommunications networks, and industrial raw materials like oil and steel.  Restrained competition brought monopoly prices and blockades against would-be competitors.  What was true then is still true now, only the technology has changed.

In 1911, the economy was powered in part by railroads, which transported goods and raw materials.  Telecommunications networks like the telegraph and early telephone helped conduct business and coordinated the movement of goods.  In 2011′s growing digital economy, telecommunications increasingly represents the railroads, telegraph, and telephone all combined-into-one.  Some of America’s richest tech companies depend on broadband and communications to fuel demand for their products.  Allowing AT&T to control the largest part of that pipeline could be disastrous to everyone but that company and their shareholders.

History Repeats Itself

In 1914, the Clayton Act was passed to put a stop to increasing anti-competitive activity and abusive market tactics.  Amazingly, the problems being solved a century ago are back with a vengeance today, all thanks to the endless drumbeat for deregulation, which has fueled mergers, acquisitions, and increased concentration of market power.  That Act cracked down on:

• Price discrimination: selling products and services at different prices to similarly situated buyers;
• Tying and exclusive-dealing contracts: sales on condition that the buyer sign exclusive contracts that force an end to dealing with the seller’s competitors;
• Corporate mergers: acquisitions of competing companies to reduce competition; and
• Interlocking directorates: Boards of directors of competing companies, packed with common members.

Today’s laissez-faire attitude towards government checks and balances helped provoke the Great Recession, corporate scandals of epic proportions, and a revolving door in Washington where regulators end up working for the companies they used to regulate. Just ask former FCC chairman Michael Powell. Three years ago he worked for us.  Today he works for Big Cable’s largest lobbying group — the National Cable & Telecommunications Association.  FCC Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker went to work for Comcast shortly after green-lighting their super-merger with NBC-Universal.

It’s All About the Money. Always.

The only thing stopping AT&T from providing wireless nirvana to rural America is its own unwillingness to spend money on behalf of customers to upgrade its network.  The company claims it didn’t see the value of spending nearly $4 billion needed to deliver expansive 4G service, but suddenly had no trouble at all finding nearly ten times that amount to purchase T-Mobile USA.

Did AT&T suddenly win PowerBall?

AT&T saw crushing a competitor Job #1.  Central Idaho’s 4G service could wait.

Crovitz later notes AT&T “was unusually blunt” criticizing the FCC report, a classic case of protesting too much.  The company got caught with its rhetorical pants down, with a series of evolving arguments for a deal that never made the first bit of sense once you began to dig deeper into their case.

In the end, Mr. Crovitz wants you to blame Big Government for AT&T’s pervasive dropped-call problem that its competitors don’t seem to have.

It’s not the company that owns and runs the network, it is that Obama and his nasty henchmen at the FCC who are responsible!  Who knew?

Bloomberg News reports the FCC found AT&T failed to demonstrate any real public benefit of its merger with T-Mobile USA.  (2 minutes)

Verizon Communications and AT&T together represent the largest providers of legacy copper wire landline phone service in the United States.  Over the past ten years, the traditional landline business has taken a beating as consumers increasingly turn their backs on the technology Alexander Graham Bell helped invent more than 100 years ago.  No utility service faces more customer defections than the phone company, and providers are increasingly rewriting their business models or lobbying to abandon unprofitable service areas altogether.

For some customers, investments in network improvements have brought advanced fiber optics straight to the home.  But in smaller communities, customers are making due with a deteriorating network phone companies no longer want to maintain.

The Glorious Growth Years

Back in the late 1980s, before most of us realized there was an Internet (or that you might be able to access it from home), the concept of connecting computers together to share information meant buying a 300-1200bps modem and using your home phone line to dial up hobbyist computer bulletin boards, CompuServe, PeopleLink, Delphi, GEnie, and QuantumLink.

Landline service was never perfect, but it worked reliably enough to make and receive phone calls and connect to low speed data networks.  As the 1990s arrived, an explosion in data and wireless services would bring both growth and unprecedented challenges for traditional telephone companies. Businesses demanded access to additional phone lines to power dedicated data lines and fax machines.  Residential customers wanted extra phone lines as well, mostly to keep data traffic off the primary house line. It was the era of frenzied area code splits, cell phones for all, and talk America could even run out of seven digit phone numbers to assign to all of the new lines.

NYNEX is today known as Verizon

As revenue and earnings exploded with the installation of new voice, data, and fax lines, Wall Street investors soon took notice.  Sleepy and safe phone company stocks were suddenly hot, and a deregulation-fueled consolidation frenzy soon resulted as phone companies merged and acquired one another.  Among the Bell System operating companies, familiar names like NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Southwestern Bell, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, and US West were gone, replaced by AT&T, Qwest, and Verizon.  Independent phone companies were not immune to the merger and acquisition game.  Today’s largest independent phone companies including Frontier Communications, CenturyLink, FairPoint, and Windstream have all grown mostly through buyouts of other providers.

The Bottom Drops Out

The rapid growth years of the traditional wired phone line came to an end around the same time as the dot.com crash and accompanying recession from 2000-2002.  While cell phone growth would continue, new competitors — especially cable-delivered “digital phone” service and other Voice Over IP providers like Vonage seriously cut into market share and revenue.  The need for additional phone lines to access the Internet subsided with the growth of DSL and cable broadband.  As household income stagnated, choices began to be made about where to cut back, and the traditional landline was a popular favorite.  Why pay for both a landline and a cell phone?  The cell phone stayed, the landline went.  Even dedicated fax machines are increasingly deemed unnecessary in an e-mail world.

The growing realization that the traditional copper wire telephone line was at risk of being the next “horse and buggy business” forced companies to consider a handful of options: ride out the landline declines and lower shareholder expectations, transform their existing networks to sustain new products like faster broadband and television service to give customers reasons to stay, or transition focus on business customers who bring more revenue.

AT&T and Verizon have adopted all three strategies, depending on where customers happen to live.

AT&T: If You are Still Waiting for DSL From Us, Forget It

In October, John J. Stephens, chief financial officer and executive vice-president at AT&T made it clear to investors the company’s interest in growing its legacy wired business had come to an end.  The company had lost landline customers for years, most switching to cell phone alternatives, sometimes sold by AT&T itself.  Spending enormous sums to upgrade AT&T’s copper landline network just didn’t make financial sense in every area.  Instead, AT&T split its operating territories in two: those suitable for upgrades to the company’s U-verse/IP platform, and those in smaller communities who will soon find themselves pushed to switch to AT&T wireless service instead.  That makes the prospects for customers still waiting for wired DSL service from AT&T pretty dim.

“We’ll continue to focus on transforming [existing] DSL lines into high speed [U-verse].” Stephens said. “In those areas where we don’t have U-verse, I think our plans have been fairly clear. We expect to have an LTE [wireless mobile broadband] rollout to 97% of the country. [...] We believe that’s going to be able to provide a wireless solution at a high speed, good quality, good cost on a profitable basis for us. That’s the long-term solution to the non-U-verse areas.”

AT&T’s lobbyists have signaled this agenda for years, pressing state and federal lawmakers to get rid of “universal service” requirements that mandate reliable, basic landline telephone service to any customer in their service area who requests it.  AT&T wants the definition of “basic telephone service” expanded to allow the company the option of discontinuing its landline network and selling rural residents cell phone service instead.  The expense associated with maintaining AT&T’s degrading copper wire network is always cause for grumbling on Wall Street, most recently after this year’s repair costs from storms that impacted some of AT&T’s service areas.  Storm damages brought outages in the southern United States, flooded regions along the Mississippi, and rained-out areas of California.

Those problems were exacerbated when AT&T’s repairs don’t always correct the problems.  Repeated outages blamed on inadequate repairs and investment brought negative publicity for the phone company, as well as a number of requests to disconnect service as customers find other providers.

In places where AT&T will never deploy U-verse, AT&T has been content asking lawmakers to ease up on the phone company, urging that minimum service standards and oversight be abolished, along with the power of regulators to fine the company for repeated transgressions.  AT&T argues increased competition makes regulation unnecessary.

AT&T: Wants to eliminate universal service for rural America.

AT&T’s bean counters have calculated investment in U-verse only makes sense in urban-suburban areas.  In more distant suburbs and rural areas, the return on investment isn’t fast enough to justify spending money up-front on service improvements.  Maintaining the decades-old landline network doesn’t make much sense to AT&T either.  Instead, the company sees wireless service as the best prospect to serve its rural customers (and deliver the company higher profits from the more expensive service plans that come with the phones).

“What I see happening with LTE and data is just a huge growth opportunity,” said Ralph de la Vega, CEO and president of AT&T Mobility & Consumer Markets. “We mentioned today that our smartphones now make up 52% of our postpaid base. But I think the way we need to think about smartphones in the future is the smartphone is going to equal the phone in the future. It will be 100% in the next 2 or 3 years. These devices are so good and the costs are coming down so much that I think in the future, you could look at close to 100% penetration.”

Some customers may find AT&T penetrating their wallets, but for the phone company, better days may be ahead:

• Moving customers to the wireless platform exposes them to higher revenue, higher-priced wireless service plans;
• Basic cell phones, which come with lower-priced voice plans are being increasingly replaced with smartphones which come with required, extra-cost data plans;
• Getting rid of the rural landline network slashes AT&T’s upkeep costs and holds customers in place with two-year service contracts common with wireless phones.

Consumers happy with their existing landline service may be less than impressed with AT&T’s cellular network coverage, its dropped call-problem, and the company’s alternative for rural broadband – heavily usage-capped and expensive LTE network access.  AT&T sells wired DSL plans for as little as $14.95 a month with a 150GB usage limit.  AT&T’s wireless LTE network will cost considerably more and is accompanied with usage limits a fraction of that amount.

Verizon: A Tale of Two Networks

Big Red has two wired landline networks: screaming fast FiOS fiber to the home for some, slow speed DSL over a decrepit copper wire network for everyone else.

Verizon is less opaque than AT&T regarding which service areas it treats as valued assets and which aren’t worth the time of day.  The company began selling off its undesirable customers several years ago, starting with Hawaii.  Northern New England was next, followed by several former GTE territories Verizon acquired in 2000.

While Verizon enjoyed the proceeds of the tax-free transactions, most of the impacted customers did not.  Hawaiian Telcom floundered for a few years with bad service and an outrageous debt load before declaring bankruptcy.  Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont suffered through a year-long transition to buyer FairPoint Communications, complete with poor service and notoriously inaccurate billing before that company also declared bankruptcy.  Former Verizon customers in the Pacific Northwest, Indiana, and West Virginia (among others) are coping with Frontier Communications own billing and service problems.

The FairPoint Trust called the $2.3 billion acquisition of Verizon’s New England operations “disastrous.”  It also echoed what Verizon obviously understood itself: its landline operation in New England had been allowed to deteriorate into “inferior assets that had no future.”

Frontier Communications itself judged the network it purchased from Verizon in West Virginia in need of serious upgrades and repairs.  Critics of the deal called Verizon’s West Virginia network “a technical disaster area.”

But while Verizon is capable of landline neglect, it is also the only major phone company delivering true fiber-to-the-home service over its award winning (and expensive to build) FiOS network.

The feast or famine approach Verizon has used for capital investments has resulted in amazing service for some, a loss of reliable service to many others.

FiOS has allowed Verizon to remain a serious player, particularly in the northeast, despite the onslaught of competition from Cablevision, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable.  Average revenues earned from FiOS customers are much higher than what the company earns from customers on its copper wire telephone network.

Some Verizon shareholders have never liked the price for the company’s fiber future.  When the economy tanked in late 2008, an indefinite suspension of FiOS expansion soon followed, leaving Verizon’s network expansion plans in limbo.  The company is still slowly completing the portion of its fiber network promised under existing agreements, but has avoided introducing the service in new cities and towns.  At the same time, Verizon is loathe to maintain investment in its antiquated copper wire landline network, which in some areas was supposed to be retired in favor of FiOS.

Bistro Chat Noir: Reliable Verizon phone service is not on the menu.

As long as Verizon’s older network can be held together, with fingers crossed, customers still have a dial tone.  But when things start to fail, customers are in for serious headaches.  They are popping aspirin almost daily at Bistro Chat Noir, a prestigious French restaurant along Madison Avenue on Manhattan’s Upper East Side.  If you plan to dine there, it is best to bring cash.  Even if the management wanted to take your Visa or Mastercard, the restaurant’s phone lines are out so often, they can’t easily process your payment.

These days, the resourceful owners rely on a neighbor’s graciously shared Wi-Fi connection (presumably powered by competitor Time Warner Cable) to process credit card transactions manually.

Waiting for FiOS

The New York Times wrote Verizon’s atrocious level of service isn’t isolated to one bistro:

“Obviously, this is not the way we want to do business,” said Ms. Latapie, who has started giving clients her personal cellphone number to avoid missing reservations when the restaurant’s phone is not performing properly. “When people can’t get through, I tell them it’s Verizon. And if they live in this area, they know — because they have the same problem.”

However irritating, sporadic utility failures are not uncommon. But along a a stretch of Madison Avenue in what is arguably the city’s most expensive shopping and eating district, phone and Internet blackouts have become a nightmarish routine of life for many expensive restaurants, stores and hotels.

For weeks now, mundane tasks — making dinner reservations and paying for purchases by credit card — have become a frustrating challenge.

“We are in the highest rent district in North America and we don’t have communication,” said Jillian Wright, whose spa on East 66th Street is on the second floor of a brownstone building and not ideal for walk-ins. Ms. Wright said she was losing clients daily, and her spa’s phone number goes straight to a voicemail message apologizing to clients for Verizon’s service.

The service failures have affected dozens of businesses, primarily in the East 60s along Madison Avenue. The scope of the problem varies, with some businesses having no phone or Internet service at all for the past several weeks and others experiencing blackouts that last days or a few hours.

Meetings with Verizon officials have deteriorated into spin-and-excuse sessions where company officials promise results but continue to deliver lousy service.  It turns out the problem is Verizon’s ancient copper wiring found underneath the streets in the area.  Just two feet away from Verizon’s cables are steam heating pipes, which warm the tunnels and create major condensation problems.  Couple that with water runoff from the streets above — salt-laden in the winter time — and you have a recipe for corrosion that destroys reliable phone service.

Eventually, Verizon plans to wire FiOS fiber across a large section of Madison Avenue, but with the company’s unwillingness to invest appropriate sums to get the job done, business and residential customers are simply kept waiting.

Or they can switch to Time Warner Cable, and many are.

Your Telephone Is Temporarily Out of Service…

A traditional overhead phone cable is packed with cable pairs for neighborhood phone service

Verizon’s service woes are not just for big city dwellers.  Residents in Virginia are coping with Verizon landline problems in suburban neighborhoods, too.  Verizon employees openly admit they are fighting a losing battle with management to replace defective cables and equipment that should have been replaced years ago.  Management keeps winning and customers keep losing.

“When we come to this area, we dread it,” admits Alex Long, a cable splicer at Verizon for 22 years.

Long just pulled up to a pole off Burksdale Road in Norfolk and found nothing he had not seen many times before  — untrimmed tree branches overgrown into the overhead wires.  The branches had managed to rub the phone cable’s insulation down to bare copper wire.

As a result, whenever it rains, telephone service in the neighborhood becomes sporadic.  If tree branches don’t knock service out, cable-chewing squirrels do.  The lines, the equipment, and the technology is well past its prime, but Verizon management insists repair crews fix what is already there instead of replacing it with something better.  It’s all a matter of money, and Verizon wants to spend as little as possible on its copper landline network.

Long’s experiences were the highlight of a piece published by the Virginian-Pilot, which has heard complaints from readers about dreadful Verizon phone service across the region.

The repairman discloses Verizon technicians have known about the bad cable for at least five years, but requests to replace it have been repeatedly rejected.

“The cable’s totally shot,” Long told the newspaper. “It needs to be replaced, and the company’s budget doesn’t allow for it. That’s what engineering keeps telling us.”

In Hampton Roads, Va., it is a case of the fiber haves and have nots.  The parts of Hampton Roads that have been upgraded to Verizon’s fiber to the home network are virtually trouble-free in comparison to neighborhoods where copper cables still deliver service.  Verizon’s legacy network is of such concern, the Virginia State Corporation Commission has increasingly taken a close look at the level of service Verizon is providing in non-FiOS areas.

William Irby, director of the commission’s Division of Communications, has heard plenty of concerns that Verizon is neglecting their copper network in favor of FiOS fiber.

Verizon’s copper wire neglect might not be such a big problem had the company provided a date certain for upgrade relief.  But with FiOS expansion also stalled, some cities are now wondering if Verizon is abandoning them.

Boston is one of them.

Left Behind: The Cities Without FiOS

Verizon FiOS is well-known in eastern Massachusetts.  There are those who have it and those who want it.  Verizon had been aggressively pursuing franchise agreements with 111 communities across the state until the company announced it was putting on the brakes and ceasing further expansion efforts in new areas.  That leaves Boston and other communities like Quincy behind because they didn’t sign agreements with the company fast enough.

Verizon FiOS customers get the good life: $90 a month for a triple-play package with a $300 Visa debit card reward for signing up.

“If you’ve got FiOS, lucky you,” shares Quincy resident Roger Jones. “If you don’t, good luck.”

Jones says Verizon has left Quincy with a neglected landline network the company doesn’t seem interested in maintaining, much less replacing with fiber optics.

“The company believed in fiber optics because they saw the opportunities fiber could deliver, like additional revenue from selling TV channels,” Jones says. “But then Wall Street caught up to them and said it was all too much.  I might even understand that, except they won’t spend a nickle maintaining what they already have either, unless the regulators twist their arms and threaten fines over the bad service.”

Jones says his Verizon phone line was out three times earlier this year.

“Three strikes and they were out — I switched to Comcast,” Jones says. “A Verizon repair guy that came to my house the third time said all of his relatives switched to Comcast because service got to be so unreliable with Verizon’s old network.”

Back on Burksdale Road in Norfolk, Long was trying to track down another customer’s phone troubles — a loud hum on their line.  Hours later, Long decided it was a futile effort and began looking for an unused replacement pair of good wires he could switch to for the customer.  With the growing number of Verizon customers disconnecting their landline service permanently, that task gets easier every day.

Long told the newspaper it was no surprise Burksdale Road customers were experiencing problems.  Closures which were designed to protect the cable where it splits off individual phone lines were supposed to be water and air-tight.  Instead, he was working with a deteriorating rubber enclosure that showed its age after years of service.  Unfortunately, he explains, Burksdale Road customers will simply have to make due.

Not only won’t Long be able to replace the deteriorating infrastructure he finds, he’ll be forced to improvise with Verizon’s latest cost-cutting solution for wet cables — covering them with sheeting that resembles a plastic garbage bag.  Even that is nothing new for Burksdale Road.  Several houses down, a cable “rain-slicker” was already tightly wrapped around a section of cable where the rubber closure had gone missing altogether.

After getting the dial tone back, Long handed the customer his business card with his direct number and apologized.

“You may have problems again,” he said, advising the customer to call him directly the next time his phone line stops working.

Verizon better hope the customer doesn’t call the local cable company to switch providers or disconnect his landline altogether.

On September 13, most PBS stations will premiere a new documentary, “Bill McGowan, Long Distance Warrior” exploring the many trials and tribulations of MCI Corporation, the long distance and e-mail provider that was instrumental in breaking up Ma Bell’s monopoly in telephone service.

A preview of PBS’ Long Distance Warrior, which premieres on most PBS stations Sept. 13  (3 minutes)

For those under 30, “MCI” may not mean much.  The company that helped pioneer competitive long distance calling was absorbed into the Worldcom empire in 1997, where it continued to provide service until a major corporate accounting scandal brought Worldcom down in 2002.  Most of what was left was eventually sold to Verizon Communications in 2005.

Remarkably, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was founded all the way back in 1963, but not as a provider of telephone services.  That MCI sought to build a network of microwave relay stations between Chicago and St. Louis to provide uninterrupted two-way radio service for some of the nation’s largest trucking and shipping companies.

The Bell System

By the late 1960s, William G. McGowan, an investor and venture capitalist from New York won a seat on MCI’s board of directors and part ownership of a newly-envisioned version of MCI — one that would provide businesses with a range of telecommunications products, including long distance telephone connections.  With many American corporations maintaining branch and regional offices, connecting them together was a potentially very lucrative business, especially if MCI could deliver the service at prices cheaper than what the monopoly Bell System was charging.

With their microwave relay network, now expanding across the country, MCI could distribute long distance phone calls cheaply and efficiently, if they could find a way to connect that network to Bell’s local phone system.  After all, it does little good to offer long distance service if you cannot connect calls to the businesses’ existing telephone equipment.

That’s where AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies objected.  For them, only calls originating on and delivered over their own network should be allowed.  MCI, as an interloper, was seeking to use the network AT&T built and paid for.  It’s an argument that has echoed more than 30 years later, when AT&T’s then-CEO Ed Whitacre objected to outside Internet content providers “using AT&T’s pipes for free.”

On the occasion of MCI’s 20th anniversary, the company produced this retrospective exploring the difficult times competing with AT&T and the Bell System.  (9 minutes)

MCI's best argument: AT&T's long distance bills

McGowan confronted arguments from AT&T executives who warned that competitive long distance would destroy the business model of America’s Bell System, which provided affordable local phone service to all 50 states, in part subsidized by long distance telephone rates, mostly paid by its commercial customers.  Tamper with that, they warned, and local phone bills would be forced to soar to make up the difference.

MCI called that argument a scare tactic, and suggested instead that AT&T’s monopoly had grown inefficient, bloated, expensive, and resistant to innovation and change.  MCI could deliver a substantially less expensive service and would force AT&T to increase its own efficiency to compete.  AT&T wasn’t interested in that argument and sued, repeatedly, to keep MCI out of its business.

By 1984, federal courts declared AT&T a monopoly worthy of a break-up, and opened the door to MCI’s long distance network.  By that time, MCI was already thinking about evolving itself beyond a business long distance provider, whose network was largely idle after business hours.  Because most Americans were accustomed to making long distance calls at night when rates were substantially lower, MCI developed new residential long distance service plans that encouraged customers to use that idle network at night and on weekends.

One of MCI’s most memorable ads features a sobbing mother who reached out and touched her son over long distance a little too much.  (1 minute)

Thus began more than a decade of heavy advertising and competition for the long distance telephone market.  With equal access rules in place, consumers could choose their own long distance phone company and shop for the one with the lowest rates.  Competitors like Sprint, WilTel, LDDS, RCI, LCI, and yes, even AT&T all pitched their own calling plans.

MCI also pioneered MCI Mail, one of the first commercial electronic mail systems.  The original concept had businesses typing letters on a computer terminal, printed on standard paper at an MCI office closest to the destination, and then mailed in an envelope through the U.S. Post Office.  This poor-man’s version of a telex or telegram worked for businesses that wanted overnight delivery, but not at the prices charged by shippers like Federal Express.  In larger cities, MCI Mail could offer businesses delivery of their electronic communications within four hours, something closer to a traditional telegram of days gone-by.

MCI Mail’s hard copy deliveries wouldn’t last long, of course.  As the 1980s progressed, the fax machine and the more familiar all-electronic e-mail we think of today became firmly established.  As MCI Mail became less relevant, the company innovated into offering low priced telex services, mass-faxing, and data backhaul services to provide connectivity for online networks.

WIBW explores a new concept in communications — something called ‘electronic mail,’ a service that bewildered consumers in the early 1980s.  This report from 1984.  (2 minutes)

Bill McGowan: Would not approve of AT&T's plans to restore the glory days of the past.

AT&T, in contrast, was still getting over the loss of its local Bell Operating Companies — the regional phone companies most Americans did business with, and the loss of revenue earned from renting telephone equipment.  For years, AT&T long distance was branded as a quality leader, not a price leader.  It maintained its enormous market share partly through consumer indifference — customers who did not initially choose a new long distance carrier remained with AT&T, the default choice.

It took only about a decade after the Bell break-up for telecom industry lobbyists to begin advocating for enough deregulation to allow many of those former Baby Bells to re-combine through mergers and acquisitions.  The result is today’s AT&T, formed from its long distance unit, BellSouth, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Nevada Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Wisconsin Bell, and Southern New England Telephone.  Its largest competitor is Verizon Communications, which itself resulted from a combination of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE, and what was left of MCI after Worldcom was through with it.

McGowan’s fight was a personally costly one.  A workaholic, McGowan routinely put in 15 hour work days and drank up to 20 cups of coffee daily.  His heart finally had enough and McGowan succumbed to a heart attack in 1992 at age 64.  But he leaves a legacy and two decades of fighting to break up AT&T’s monopoly, which he always believed was bad for consumers and business (unless you were AT&T, of course).  That’s an important message as AT&T strengthens its resolve to acquire one of its significant competitors in the profitable wireless market — T-Mobile.  McGowan would have never approved.

“The Computer Chronicles,” a production of KCSM-TV, spent a half hour in June 1987 showing off electronic e-mail service from MCI and how consumers and businesses using something called a “modem” could connect their home computers with online databases and services to exchange information and communications back and forth.  And for those business travelers on the road, away from their office computers, Speech Plus offered a product that could still keep you “connected,” by reading your e-mail to you over the phone.  In 1987, outside of commercial pay networks like CompuServe, Delphi, PeopleLink and QuantumLink, most Americans with modems used them to connect to typically-free hobbyist-run computer bulletin board systems.  Widespread access to “the Internet” would take another 5-6 years.  (29 minutes)

The thin horizontal line found in this chart represents the rate of inflation. The individual bars show just how high Tennessee cable operators raised their rates from 1986-1989, when deregulation allowed them to charge "sky is the limit" prices. (click to enlarge)

On this Memorial Day, we thought it might be a good time to look back to years past when legislators were forced to deal with a deregulated cable industry that immediately went on a rate hike spree that was unprecedented even for oil companies.

In 1984, cable television companies won the right of complete rate deregulation, arguing government involvement in the cable business was retarding investment, harming innovation, and killing jobs.  By keeping the cable industry free of government regulation, the industry promised improved service, more innovation, and even the potential for more competition.  The importance of this drive to deregulation was underlined with a flood of campaign contributions from some of the biggest players in the industry.

In the mid-1980s, that lineup included the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the cable industry lobbying group led by James Mooney.  Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)’s John Malone — dubbed Darth Vadar of a Cable Cosa Nostra by then Sen. Albert Gore, Jr., and an assortment of cable industry executives from companies like Warner-Amex, Sammons Cable, Cablevision, and a variety of other operators large and small.

TCI would later become AT&T Cable and then eventually evolve into today’s Comcast.  Warner-Amex is today Time Warner Cable.  Sammons joined dozens of other medium-sized multiple cable system operators in selling out to larger players — in this case TCI.  Cablevision sold off most of its systems outside of the metropolitan New York City region to companies like Time Warner Cable.

After winning near-complete deregulation, Americans saw the start of a relentless series of rate increases Tony Soprano would not have attempted.  Called “price adjustments” or a benign “pricing reset” by cable lobbyists, what used to be an average rate for basic cable amounting to just over $11 per month rapidly increased to $16, $19, $25, $29, $35, $45, $50, $55, and now today’s frequently seen $60 threshold for a basic cable package.

What used to be an exciting new product in the late 1970s and early 1980s was now rapidly becoming a highly consolidated handful of corporate empires that promised to be money machines for shareholders.  At one point, adding up the number of corporate entities that were parented under TCI, including local and regional cable systems, programming distributors, cable networks, and other entities generated a printout more than six feet in length.

The mid-to-late 1980s were the cable industry’s glory years, with unfettered rate increases sometimes resulting in more than doubling customer bills.  Members of Congress got an earful from irate consumers who noticed even with the higher prices, the quality of service received deteriorated markedly.  Many cable systems simply left an answering machine on their service and support line.  Others left local cable offices locked and closed for business.

There were many reasons for the deterioration:

• Investors saw the best possible returns buying and selling existing cable systems, not investing -in- them;
• Some cable systems changed hands 3-4 times in just a few years, leading to staffing shortages, billing chaos, and confusion;
• Some small operators saw no need to invest in aging cable systems when their value was skyrocketing during the consolidation era.  They waited for a buyout offer and cashed out of the business;
• There was no enforcement agency capable of stopping the abusive business practices;
• There was almost no competition.

Before becoming part of the Comcast empire, Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation's largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

Competition in the cable industry was a rarity in the 1980s, but a handful of communities did have more than one cable operator, with lower rates and better service the result.  But pressure from investors forced most of these competitive anomalies to either divide into respective monopoly service territories, or forced one company to sell their business to the other.  Competition and rate wars were bad for business.

The satellite dish industry was the only national competitor to cable television at this time.  Before DirecTV and DISH, rural and suburban homeowners erected often enormous backyard satellite dishes of up to 12 feet in diameter.  Capable of receiving hundreds of channels with better picture quality, home satellite offered an experience somewhat familiar to those with large rooftop antennas.  Rotate the dish slightly and enjoy two dozen or more channels on each respective satellite.  More than three million Americans eventually installed satellite dishes, even with the entry cost of installation and assembly, which could run several thousand dollars.  For rural Americans, it often meant the difference between some television and none at all.

Never tolerant of competition, the satellite industry came under a withering attack on all fronts:

• Cable programming was scrambled and either unavailable to satellite dishowners at any price, or sold at prices similar to what cable subscribers would pay, even though home dishowners owned and maintained their own equipment;
• Most cable networks at that time were either owned outright or tacitly subject to cable industry pressure not to sell programming at steep discounts;
• Premium cable channels often sold programming to satellite dishowners at prices higher than those paid by cable subscribers;
• Home dishowners were required to purchase their own decoder box outright, at a cost exceeding $300 — an enormous price at a time when most people paid less than $20 a month for basic cable service;
• Cable companies encouraged or defended town zoning laws which required would-be dishowners to purchase expensive permits, hide their dishes from view (and sometimes viewable signals in the process), or ban their use outright;
• In the case of networks owned by TCI, consumers with satellite dishes often had to buy the programming from their nearest TCI cable system and be billed by them.  So much for avoiding the cable company.

Then-Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.) got into the fight against unregulated cable when cable rates in his home state of Tennessee more than doubled.

The worst abuses, and corresponding distortions from the cable industry, occurred from 1987-1992.  More than a dozen pieces of legislation attempted to correct the over-deregulation of the industry, but campaign contributions to both parties meant years of failed attempts.  Some of the worst anti-consumer officials included Sen. Tim Wirth (D-Colorado) who happened to represent the state where the vast majority of large cable companies were headquartered at that time, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), who read industry talking points and was skeptical about stories of cable abuse, and Sens. Bob Packwood (R-Washington) and Bob Dole (R-Kansas) who didn’t like government regulation and thought the abuses would be self-correcting if consumers cancelled service.

Many of the heroes of the cable fight of the last generation remain familiar names.  Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee) was perhaps the industry’s greatest foe.  He began the fight as a congressman in the mid-1980s and carried the battle all the way through 1993, when he became vice president under the Clinton Administration.  Other notables included Sen. Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky), who is a far cry from today’s two senators in Kentucky.  Ford heard complaints about Kentucky cable companies almost daily.  Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who wasted no time calling the cable industry an outrageous unregulated monopoly. Sen. John Danforth (R-Missouri) railed against the cable industry and was instrumental in helping pass legislation in 1992 that finally ended the worst abuses.

What the cable industry promoted and defended in 1987 for cable television will haunt you when you consider they are appealing for the same types of “hands-off” policies for broadband today.  Only now they are joined by the nation’s largest phone companies.  In the early 1990s, the telephone companies were threatening to compete with the cable industry and the two were considered foes.  But once an industry player becomes well-established, they defend their right to raise rates, restrict service, and retard any additional competition.

To give you a taste of what the abuses were like, and the industry’s efforts to excuse them, we present coverage of a Senate hearing held in November, 1989 pitting cable industry titans against would-be competitors and government officials from towns and cities trying to deal with a cable “bad actor” in their midst.  Some of the most interesting parallels come in the very last video as you watch Chuck Dawson, representing consumers and independent satellite dealers, detailing the schemes by the cable industry to kill off any threats.  Pay particular attention as he discusses the lies the industry will tell to predict the imminent failure of its then-newest competitor — the home satellite dish industry.  It’s a game plan they’ve used again fighting off community broadband.

QUBE's "revolutionary" interactive wired remote control, from 1978 (courtesy: QUBE-tv.com)

Happy Thanksgiving to all Stop the Cap! readers.

While we take a break from our usual reports, let’s turn the clock all the way back to 1978, an era before broadband (or dial-up for the most part) and even before most of the basic cable networks know today existed.  Cable television was not even an option yet in many communities, although discussions about the concept were well underway.

In Columbus, Ohio Warner Cable constructed an experimental two-way cable system called QUBE, which brought 30,000 homes in the city access to interactive, locally-produced programming.  Viewers could vote on different topics, share their opinions, answer quizzes, and order individual pay-per-view movies — a new concept for most people back then.

Cable television in 1978 didn’t deliver CNN, TNT, ESPN, or any of dozens of other cable networks that are household names today.  Instead, most delivered clear signals of broadcast television stations received over the air from a master antenna mounted high above the local cable company, supplemented with text-based information channels running newswires, sports scores, financial tickers, weather and other wire service reports.  Locally produced government, public access and educational programming covered much of the rest of the channel lineup.  Cable radio hooked up to home stereos and delivered improved FM radio reception and some privately run cable radio stations.

QUBE was no different in this respect.  The bulk of the programming people watched came from local broadcasters and imported stations from Indianapolis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Athens — all selected from a wired remote control.  It total, QUBE carried 30 channels, 10 of which were premium or pay per view.  The concept was so revolutionary, some folks traveled from miles around to record sample programming off the system and share copies of videotapes with other cable enthusiasts.

QUBE was not a financial success for Warner, however.  The costs to produce interactive programming, building brand new cable systems, and purchasing the equipment to run them, caused Warner to accumulate $875 million in total debt by 1983.  It abandoned the concept a few years later because new cable networks and superstations were rapidly signing on, creating a huge number of new viewing options that effectively drowned out the locally-produced interactive shows.  Cable would remain a one-way medium, at least for awhile.

Watching the enthusiasm of Ray Glasser, who produced the video included below, all over a 30-channel cable system was fascinating, as was watching the assortment of television stations sampled from more than 30 years ago.  And check out those supermarket prices listed on one of the text channels Ray previews.  After a series of sales and ownership transfers, Warner Cable still exists in Columbus.  But today, we know it better as Time Warner Cable.

A video tour of Warner Cable’s QUBE system in Columbus, Ohio, produced in 1978 by Ray Glasser.  (50 minutes)

Today’s merger between CenturyTel (soon to be CenturyLink) and Qwest will combine 10 million Qwest customers and 7 million from CenturyTel into a single company serving 37 states in every region of the country except the northeast and much of California and Nevada.  CenturyLink gains access to Qwest’s highly valued portfolio of services sold to business customers and Qwest gets a partner that can help manage its $11.8 billion debt and help grow the last remaining Baby Bell, formerly known as US West, into a national player capable of withstanding ongoing erosion of landline service.

The deal will impact consumers and businesses, and will challenge regulatory authorities to consider the implications of ongoing consolidation in the traditional telephone service marketplace.  It brings implications for broadband service strategies for both companies, which we’ll explore in greater detail.

Breaking Up Was Too Hard to Do, So Let’s Put It Back Together

Ultimately, the genesis of this, and most of the other big telecom deals that we’ve witnessed over the past few years comes from the 1996 Communications Act, which deregulated large parts of the telecommunications industry and triggered a massive wave of consolidation that is still ongoing.  That legislation was the antithesis of the 1984 court ruling which ultimately led to the breakup of AT&T and the Bell System monopoly in 1984.  When President Clinton signed the 1996 bill into law, it allowed much of the Bell System to eventually recombine into two major entities:

• AT&T ultimately pieced itself back together with the acquisitions of:

BellSouth — serving the southeastern United States

Ameritech — serving the upper Midwest

SBC/Southwestern Bell — serving Texas and several southern prairie states

Pacific Telesis — serving California and Nevada

• Verizon became a regional powerhouse by combining:

NYNEX — serving New England and New York

Bell Atlantic — serving mid-Atlantic states

Qwest Tower - Denver

The remaining orphaned Baby Bell was US West, which comprised Mountain Bell serving the Rocky Mountain states, Northwestern Bell which covered the Dakotas, Minnesota, the prairie states not covered by SBC, and Pacific Northwest Bell which managed service for Oregon, Washington, and northern Idaho.  US West was subjected to a hostile takeover in 2000 by an upstart telecommunications company that was laying fiber optic cable in the late 1990s alongside the railways its owner, Philip Anschutz, also happened to own.  Qwest assumed control of US West that summer and rechristened it with its own name.  Owned by a Bell outsider, Qwest has always been the company that didn’t quite fit with the rest.

The company gained respect for its enormous fiber backbone that weaves across many American cities, including several in the northeast.  It is best known for its services to business customers.  On the residential side, the story is less impressive.  The company’s customer service record is spotty and the company has accumulated an enormous amount of legacy debt left over from earlier acquisitions.  Despite the company’s repeated efforts to find a partner, it took until today for it to finally find one.  There are several reasons for this:

1. Qwest’s service area is notoriously rural and expensive to serve.  Outside of its corporate headquarters in Denver, the majority of its service area is either mountainous or rural.  Even today, Qwest serves only 10 million residential customers, almost matched by CenturyTel’s own seven million largely rural customers scattered across the country.
2. Qwest’s history has been littered with financial scandals, starting with a series of deals with disgraced Enron from 1999-2001.  That was followed with charges of fraud and insider trading in 2005.
3. Qwest does not own its own wireless division and its previous efforts to deliver television service to customers were largely unsuccessful.  That made Qwest’s ability to withstand erosion in its core business – landline phone service, more difficult.
4. Qwest’s debt is downright frightening for would-be suitors.

Why Does CenturyTel Want to Buy Qwest?

CenturyTel claims such a transaction allows a combined company to become a larger player on the national scene.  By combining Qwest’s good reputation in the business telecommunications sector with combined efforts to deliver broadband products including high speed Internet, the company thinks the combination can’t be beat.  CenturyTel envisions packages of video entertainment, data hosting and managed services, as well as fiber to cell tower connectivity and other high bandwidth services to deliver replacement revenue lost from disconnected landlines.  It also believes it can realize cost savings from the merger and keep the company relevant on a stage dominated by Verizon, AT&T, and a few large cable companies.

But there are other reasons.  For the three super-sized independent phone companies that Americans are growing increasingly familiar with — Frontier Communications, Windstream Communications, and CenturyTel, their business models depend on their ability to constantly engage in deal-making and acquisitions.  All three companies have built their businesses on investors who see their stocks as “investment grade” financial instruments that dependably return a dividend back to shareholders.  As we’ve seen in countless quarterly financial results conference calls, all three companies are preoccupied answering questions from Wall Street about the all-important dividend.  TV personalities like Jim Cramer has specifically recommended these telecom stocks based, in part, on their dividend payout.  If that dividend dramatically shrunk or stopped, the share price for all three stocks would likely plummet.

One of the side effects of companies dependent on dividend payouts is their constant need to be on the lookout for additional merger and acquisition opportunities.  Here’s how it works.  Let’s say CenturyTel’s debt load and reduced revenue, caused by customer defections to cell phones or cable phone service, delivered a bad fiscal quarter for the company.  Cash flow was down, and company officials simply couldn’t keep the dividend payout at the same level as the previous quarter.  Since many people hold CenturyTel stock specifically because of the dividend, a downward turn in that payout could cause some to sell their shares, driving the stock price downwards.

CenturyTel is still digesting a previous merger with EMBARQ, which led it to rechristen the company CenturyLink

One way around this is to seek out a new merger or acquisition target.  By bringing two companies together, preferably one with a healthy cash flow, suddenly the big picture changes.  Your balance sheet now reflects the combined revenue from both companies, which incidentally makes the percentage of debt versus revenue look a lot healthier.  Cash flow immediately improves, especially if you can slash redundant costs.  Come next quarter, that dividend payout is right back up in healthy territory.

Sometimes companies become so preoccupied with their dividend and corresponding stock price, it can lead them to pay out more in dividends than a company earns in revenue.  While that’s great for investors, it is unsustainable in the long run.

Many critics of telecommunications companies employing this strategy claim it’s evidence that a company is biding time and unwilling to invest in innovation for the future.  Some also believe dividend payouts shortchange customers because they can eventually bleed a company’s ability to invest in service improvements, research and development, and capital investments to maintain their network and expand service.

As consolidation continues, the number of new buyout opportunities begins to shrink, and one shudders to think what happens when there is no one else to buy.  How long is this business model sustainable?

Both CenturyTel and Qwest also recognize the impact of ongoing disconnections from landline service, now averaging 10 percent of their customers a year.  Those departing customers are now relying on their cell phones or alternative calling services like cable company “digital phone” service or broadband-based calling from companies like Vonage or Skype.

The one service they hope can stem customer defections is broadband.  Unfortunately, telephone companies are increasingly losing ground against their cable modem competitors, who have an easier time increasing broadband speeds for customers now seeking online video and other high bandwidth applications.

Of course, one of the benefits of being a “rural phone company” is the fact cable competition is often unlikely.  In fact, some of the lowest erosion rates for landline service are in rural communities where the telephone company is the only game in town.  There is plenty of money still to be made offering high priced slow speed DSL service in communities with no cable competitor and spotty wireless broadband that is often slower and usage-limited.

All three of these big independent players are well aware of this, and maintaining a strong position in relatively slow speed DSL service also protects another revenue stream — Universal Service Fund revenue given to rural providers to equalize telephone rates.  CenturyTel recognizes the increasing likelihood much of that money will be diverted to stimulating broadband expansion, something the phone company is more than willing to do if it means preserving their subsidies.

The new combined Qwest-CenturyTel company hopes the merger can help both survive obsolescence.

For Qwest, a debt reduction may make it possible to spend more to deliver fiber-to-the-curb service, similar to AT&T U-verse.  That could increase broadband speeds and prompt them to reconsider their earlier decision to abandon IPTV in the western half of the country.

CenturyTel can continue to offer traditional DSL service with a more incremental upgrade approach in its more rural service areas, but tap into Qwest’s fiber network to reduce backhaul expenses and potentially pick up new business customers by offering Qwest-branded business services.  Company officials strongly hinted that, at least for now, CenturyTel’s existing customers will continue to find the video portion of their “triple play” package delivered by DirecTV satellite service, so no IPTV for them.

CenturyTel and Qwest's combined local service areas

What Does This Mean for Employees of Both Companies?

Mergers like this always generate great excitement over “cost savings” made possible by the merger.  Much of these savings typically come from employee expenses.  When you hear “cost savings,” think layoffs and pay cuts for all but top management.  Based on past precedent, Qwest employees can anticipate some serious job losses if this transaction closes, especially in the business office.  The combined company will be henceforth known as CenturyLink, with headquarters remaining in Monroe, Louisiana.  That is potentially bad news for Qwest’s employees in Denver.

The transaction is expected to generate annual operating cost savings (which CenturyTel calls “synergies”) of approximately $575 million, which are expected to be fully realized three to five years following closing.  The transaction also is expected to generate annual capital expenditure “synergies” of approximately $50 million within the first two years after close.  That means spending less on infrastructure improvements.

Billing and customer service are traditionally handled by CenturyTel when a company joins the CenturyTel family.  North Carolina customers can attest to that as EMBARQ, an earlier CenturyTel target, finally moves to CenturyTel’s billing system in the coming weeks.

For the sake of pushing the merger through state regulatory agencies, cutbacks in unionized technicians who handle service installations, repairs, and maintain the lines are not expected.  The Communications Workers of America issued a statement today that mildly acknowledged the merger announcement, saying the union “looked forward to serious negotiations with both companies” regarding employment security and assurances of aggressive high speed broadband rollout throughout both companies’ territories.

How the combined CenturyTel-Qwest company stacks up against other independent phone companies. (Q-Qwest, CTL-CenturyTel, FTR-Frontier, WIN-Windstream)

What Does This Mean for Qwest and CenturyTel Customers?

In the short term, nothing.  This merger will take at least a year to complete, assuming regulatory approval in every state where a review is required by state officials.  In 2011, should the merger be approved, Qwest customers can anticipate transition headaches as the Denver-based company winds down operations in favor of CenturyTel.  Billing and customer service will both be impacted.  Long term plans for major projects are likely to be stalled until the merger settles into place.  CenturyTel business customers will eventually see Qwest’s strong business products line become available in many CenturyTel service areas.  Eventually, some larger CenturyTel-served cities may find Qwest’s more advanced DSL service arriving on the scene delivering faster speeds.

Although CenturyTel has hinted it may review whether it’s now large enough to operate its own wireless mobile division, for the near term, expect the partnership to resell Verizon Wireless service to continue.

What is the View of Stop the Cap! on the CenturyTel-Qwest Merger?

Generally speaking, most of the industry consolidation that has been fueled by a deregulatory framework established by the Clinton Administration has not benefited consumers anywhere near the level promised by deregulation advocates.  The three largest independent phone company consolidators — Frontier, Windstream, and CenturyTel are spending more time and resources looking for new acquisitions and schemes to pay out dividends than they are working to enhance service in their respective service areas.  Smaller independent phone companies are deploying fiber to the home networks and answer to the communities where they work and live.  From companies like Frontier, we get Internet Overcharging schemes combined with slow DSL service, tricks and traps from “price protection agreements” that automatically renew, rate increases, and cost cutting.  Windstream plagues some of their customers with extended service outages, and CenturyTel’s promised broadband speeds often don’t deliver.

Unfortunately, bigger is not always better in telecommunications.  While the biggest players like Verizon seek to discard rural American customers, getting one of these three companies instead doesn’t always represent progress.  Our regulators are too often satisfied with basic answers to questions about broadband and service improvements that come with few details and deadlines.  It is just as important to ask what kind of broadband service a company will bring, at what speeds and price, and what usage limits, if any, will accompany the service.

Companies engaged in these mergers hope regulators don’t pin them down to specific service commitments and standards, which could harm the financial windfall these deals bring to a select few.  But they must be the first thing on the table, guaranteeing that customers also get the enjoy the “synergies” these deals are supposed to bring.

Milton, Vermont

Jesse and his nearby neighbors on the west side of Milton are frustrated.  They live just 20 minutes away from Burlington, the largest city in the state of Vermont.  Despite the proximity to a city with nearly 40,000 residents, there is no cell phone coverage in western Milton, no cable television service, and no DSL service from FairPoint Communications.  For this part of Milton, it’s living living in 1990, where dial-up service was one’s gateway to the Internet.

Jesse and his immediate neighbors haven’t given up searching for broadband service options, but they face a united front of intransigent operators who refuse to make the investment to extend service down his well-populated street.

“After many calls to Comcast, they eventually sent us an estimate for over $17,000 to bring service to us, despite being less than a mile from their nearest station,” Jesse tells Vermont Public Radio.  “They also made it very clear that there was no plan at any point in the future, 2010 or beyond, to come here unless we paid them the money.”

Jesse and his neighbors want to give Comcast money, but not $17,000.

For at least 15 percent of Vermonters, Jesse’s story is their story.  Broadband simply remains elusive and out of reach.

Three years ago, Vermont’s Republican governor Jim Douglas announced the state would achieve 100 percent broadband coverage by 2010, making Vermont the nation’s first “e-State.”

Vermont Public Radio reviewed the progress Vermont is making towards becoming America’s first e-State. (January 20, 2010) (30 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

Gov. Douglas

In June 2007 the state passed Act 79, legislation that established the Vermont Telecommunications Authority to facilitate the establishment and delivery of mobile phone and Internet access infrastructure and services for residents and businesses throughout Vermont.

The VTA, under the early leadership of Bill Shuttleworth, a former Verizon Communications senior manager, launched a modest broadband grant program to incrementally expand broadband access, often through existing service providers who agreed to use the money to extend service to unserved neighborhoods.

The Authority also acts as a clearinghouse for coordinating information about broadband projects across the state, although it doesn’t have any authority over those projects.  Lately, the VTA has been backing Google’s “Think Big With a Gig” Initiative, except it promotes the state as a great choice for fiber, not just one or two communities within Vermont.

Vermont used this video to promote their bid to become a Google Fiber state.  (2 minutes)

Some of the most dramatic expansion plans come from the East Central Vermont Community Fiber Network.  ECFiber, a group of 22 local municipalities, in partnership with ValleyNet, a Vermont non-profit organization, is planning to implement a high-capacity fiber-optic network capable of serving 100% of homes and businesses in participating towns with Internet, telephone and cable television service.  In 2008, the group coalesced around a proposal to construct a major fiber-to-the-home project to extend broadband across areas that often don’t even have slower speed DSL.

The ECFiber project brought communities together to provide the kind of broadband service private companies refused to provide. Vermont Public Radio explores the project and the enthusiasm of residents hopeful they will finally be able to get broadband service. (March 8, 2008) (24 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

ECFiber's Partner Communities

The Vermont towns, which together number roughly 55,000 residents, decided to build their own network after FairPoint Communications and local cable companies refused to extend the reach of their services.  Providers claim expanding service is not financially viable.  For residents like sheep farmer Marian White, interviewed by The Wall Street Journal, that means another year of paying $60 a month for satellite fraudband, the speed and consumption-limited satellite Internet service.

White calls the satellite service unreliable, especially in winter when snow accumulates on the dish.  Unlike many broadband users who vegetate for hours browsing the web, White actually gets an exercise routine while trying to get her satellite service to work.

“I open a window and I take a pan of water and, a cup at a time, I launch warm water at the satellite dish until I have melted all the snow off the dish,” Ms. White says. “It works.”

Other residents treat accessing the Internet the same way rural Americans plan a trip into town to buy supplies.

Kathi Terami from Tunbridge makes a list of things to do online and then, once a week, travels into town to visit the local public library which has a high speed connection.  Terami downloads Sesame Street podcasts for her children, watches YouTube links sent by her sister, and tries to download whatever she thinks she might want to see or use over the coming week.

A fiber to the home network like ECFiber would change everything for small town Vermonters.  The implications are enormous according to project manager Tim Nulty.

“People are truly afraid their communities are going to die if they aren’t on the communications medium that drives the country culturally and economically,” he says. “It’s one of the most intensely felt political issues in Vermont after health care.”

Despite the plan’s good intentions, one obstacle after another has prevented ECFiber from making much headway:

• The VTA rejected the proposal in 2008, calling it unfeasible;
• Plans over the summer and fall of 2008 to approach big national investment banks ran head-on into the sub-prime mortgage collapse, which caused banks to stop lending;
• An alternative plan to build the network with public debt financing, using smaller investors, collapsed along with Lehman Brothers on September 14, 2008;
• An attempt by Senator Pat Leahy (D-Vermont) to insert federal loan guarantees into the stimulus bill in February 2009 was thwarted by partisan wrangling;
• Attempts to secure federal broadband grant stimulus funding has been rejected by the Commerce Department;
• Opposition to the plan and objections over its funding come from incumbent providers like FairPoint, who claim the project is unnecessary because they will provide service in those areas… eventually.

For the indefinite future, it appears Ms. White will continue to throw warm cups of water out the window on cold winter mornings.

Vermont Edition takes a comprehensive look at where the state stands in broadband and wireless deployment. (April 8, 2009) (46 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

For every Tunbridge resident with a story about life without broadband, there are many more across Vermont living with hit or miss Internet access.

Take Marie from Middlesex.

Most residents in more rural areas of Vermont get service where they can from FairPoint Communications

“I am in Middlesex, about a half-mile off Route 2, and five minutes from the Capitol Building. Yet up until just recently, we had no sign of high-speed Internet. I understand that my neighbors just received DSL a few weeks ago, but when I call FairPoint, they tell me it’s still not available at my house, which is a few hundred yards up the hill. Hopefully, they’re wrong and I’ll see DSL soon,” she says.

Marie is pining for yesterday’s broadband technology — FairPoint’s 1.5Mbps basic DSL service, now considered below the proposed minimum speeds to qualify for “broadband” in the National Broadband Plan.  For Marie, it’s better than nothing.

Geryll in Goshen also lacks DSL and probably wouldn’t want it from FairPoint anyway.

“We have barely reliable landline service. A tech is at my house at least three times per year. I was told the lines are so old they are decaying. Using dial-up is impossible. I use satellite which is very expensive and is in my opinion only one step up from dial-up. I am limited to downloads and penalized if I reach my daily limit,” he says.

Many Vermonters acknowledge Douglas’ planned 100-percent-broadband-coverage-by-2010 won’t come close to achievement and many are highly skeptical they will ever see the day where every resident who wants broadband service can get it.

Chip in Cabot is among them, jaded after six years of arguments with FairPoint Communications and its predecessor Verizon about obtaining access to DSL.  It took a cooperative FairPoint engineer outside of the business office to finally get Chip service.  His neighbors were not so lucky, most emphatically rejected for DSL service from an intransigent FairPoint:

“I laughed when Governor Douglas announced his e-State goal “by 2010″ three years ago. Now I’m thinking I should have made some bets on this claim. It took years of legal battles and a zoning variance to obtain partial cell coverage here in Cabot. Large parts of the town still do not have any cell coverage. Governor Douglas can perhaps be forgiven – he has no technical knowledge, and as a politician would be expected to be wildly optimistic about such “e-State” claims. The Vermont Telecommunications Authority and the Department of Public Service should know better however. We’re talking about rural areas where there is no financial incentive to provide either DSL or cell service. It will take a huge amount of money to provide service to those remaining parts of the state. I’m not optimistic.”

The Wall Street Journal chronicled the challenges Vermonters face when broadband is unavailable to them.  ECFiber may solve these problems.  Some of the stories in our article are reflected in this well-done video.  (3/2/2009 — 4 Minutes)

Today marks the first anniversary of news that Time Warner Cable planned to expand an Internet Overcharging scheme being tested in one Texas city to four additional cities within its service area.

Residents of Rochester, New York, the Triad Region surrounding Greensboro, North Carolina, as well as Austin and San Antonio, Texas first learned of the planned expansion of so-called “metered broadband” from a Business Week article dated March 31st, which has since accumulated more than 450 comments to date:

Web users, the meter is running. In a strategy that’s likely to rankle consumers but be copied by competitors, Time Warner Cable is pressing ahead with a plan to charge Internet customers based on how much Web data they consume. Starting next month, the company will introduce tiered pricing in several markets.

In April, Time Warner Cable will begin collecting information on its customers’ Internet use in the Texas cities of Austin and San Antonio and in Rochester, N.Y. Consumption billing will begin in those cities later this summer. In Greensboro, N.C., the billing changes will begin sooner. Spun off from Time Warner this month, Time Warner Cable had been testing a plan to meter Internet usage in Beaumont, Tex., since last year.

Proposed pricing models created by Time Warner Cable would have tripled broadband bills to an unprecedented $150 a month for consumers seeking the same level of broadband service they enjoyed a month earlier.  For a cable industry that was used to pushing through rate increases well above the annual rate of inflation, such an enormous rate increase was unprecedented, even for them.

For consumers willing to ration their broadband use, the news was slightly better — you’d still pay more for less service, and be exposed to overlimit fees and penalties should you exceed your monthly allowance, which was as low as a 1 GB per month for one proposed plan.

While residents of Beaumont, Texas had to endure these prices for several months prior to the announced expansion of experimental Overcharging, once news hit tech-savvy cities in Texas, New York, and North Carolina, an all-out consumer rebellion began.  Residents in Austin met with city officials to discuss alternatives to a cable company that threatened Austin’s high tech status.  For residents in Rochester, already coping with a 5 GB usage allowance for Frontier Communication’s DSL service, it was a clear-cut case of monopolistic greed.  In North Carolina, working to transition its way towards a digital economic future, an Internet rationing plan would hurt the economy of the entire Triad region.  San Antonio residents were equally unimpressed with the cable operator as well, demanding alternative providers.

Former Congressman Eric Massa (D-NY)

Consumers banded together on Stop the Cap! and other consumer-oriented websites to coordinate the pushback effort.  Protests were held, the media was engaged, and at least in New York, the politicians were not going to sit back in Time Warner Cable’s favor.  Former Rep. Eric Massa expressed outrage at the company for its new pricing plan and Senator Chuck Schumer personally called Time Warner Cable CEO Glenn Britt.

A few lapdogs in the trade press and “dollar a holler” astroturf groups praised Time Warner Cable’s price gouging plans.  One even went as far as to suggest Time Warner Cable “took one for the team” — referring to a cable industry just waiting to test some Internet Overcharging of their own.

Time Warner Cable dispatched some of their social media minions to try and explain away the outrageous price increases, offering to “listen” to consumers with suggestions about how to “improve the plan.”  One, like TWCAlex offered “proof” consumers wanted this kind of pricing.  The disingenuousness of the effort rivaled Lord Haw Haw’s Germany Calling propaganda broadcasts on the Reichssender Hamburg.  Company officials ignored the overwhelming consensus that consumers didn’t want metered or capped service and then weeks later those who did submit comments were notified they were “deleted without being read.”

Meanwhile, Rep. Massa’s office began drafting legislation to ban the unprecedented pricing schemes, culminating in a bill introduced in 2009 to ban unjustified usage caps and metered billing.

On April 9th, Landel Hobbs, Chief Operating Officer of Time Warner Cable, issued a recitation of the reasons why Time Warner Cable felt justified in exposing customers to up to 150 percent rate hikes — reasons we’ve managed to debunk over the past year’s coverage:

With the ever-increasing flood of content on the Internet, bandwidth consumption is growing exponentially. That’s a good thing; however, there are costs associated with this increased Internet usage. Here at Time Warner Cable, consumption among our high-speed Internet subscribers is increasing by about 40% a year. As a facilities based provider, we’ve built a network that must be maintained and upgraded. We have increasing variable costs and we have to continue to invest in the network itself.

As we’ve since proven, Hobbs statements to the public obscure the facts in his own company’s financial reports which are remarkably consistent quarter after quarter: revenues for broadband service are increasing while the costs to provide it are falling.  In fact, broadband is rapidly becoming the most important element of the cable industry’s quest for fat profits.  Time Warner Cable, as well as others, have plenty of financial resources from the billions in profits they earn from broadband every year to provide cost-effective upgrades that benefit them as well as consumers at today’s flat rate prices.

Just a few weeks ago, Hobbs told investors consumers are so devoted to their broadband service, the company could raise broadband prices anytime they like.  Funny how “increasing costs” never came into the discussion there.

This is a common problem that all network providers are experiencing and must address. Several other providers have instituted consumption based billing, including all major network providers in Canada and others in the U.K., New Zealand and elsewhere. In the U.S., AT&T has begun two consumption based billing trials and other providers including Comcast, Charter and Cox are using varying methods of monitoring and managing bandwidth consumption.

As Stop the Cap! has illustrated repeatedly, such consumption billing schemes are despised by consumers -and- most countries see them as hampering their digital economy.  Australia and New Zealand have government initiatives to improve broadband service to the point where consumption billing and usage caps are a distant memory.  Canada’s usage based billing schemes come from market concentration, particularly from Bell which is by far the largest wholesale supplier of bandwidth in the country.  Their quest for profits, along with a compliant regulatory body (the CRTC) has made such ripoff pricing commonplace.  The result on Canada’s broadband rankings are clear as the country continues to fall further behind other OECD nations.  Canadians do not want such pricing, but when a duopoly is allowed to exist unfettered by appropriate oversight, the end result is always the same – higher prices for poorer service.  In the United Kingdom, several flat rate plans are available, with more on the way as the UK embarks on its own Digital Economy plan.

There are other reasons why such consumption billing schemes are in place in other countries – namely insufficient international capacity to move traffic back and forth outside of the region.  That too is being addressed.

That other cable operators are overcharging consumers or limiting their usage is hardly a surprise considering insufficient competition in the marketplace makes that possible.  However, Comcast’s 250 GB limit is far more generous than anything Time Warner Cable proposed, Cox rarely enforces their limits, and Charter recently announced it had abandoned theirs.

For good reason. Internet demand is rising at a rate that could outpace capacity within a few years. According to industry analysts, the infrastructure may not be able to accommodate the explosion of online content by 2012. This could result in Internet brownouts. It will take a lot of money to fix the problem. Rather than raising prices on all customers or limiting usage, we think the fairest approach is to move to a tiered model in which users pay more if they use more.

Hobbs’ reliance on the “exaflood” or the “zettabyte” theory of Internet brownouts comes courtesy of the prostituting, industry-backed Discovery Institute — the people who will cough up bought and paid for “research studies” that say anything the buyer wants them to say and Cisco, which makes a handsome buck off selling broadband network equipment to providers they panic with stories of Internet data tsunamis and brownouts.

Hobbs

Two weeks after the Business Week article, Senator Schumer flew to Rochester and joined a few of our local Stop the Cap! members and myself to announce the end of the nightmare — no more Internet Overcharging consumers in any of the three states. Even Beaumont was soon freed from the ripoff pricing experiment.

But Time Warner Cable promised that one day, they could be back with the same schemes, after “educating their customers.”  Stop the Cap! has spent the last year assembling an extensive record of just how unjustified these pricing schemes really are, and we’ve been educating consumers about how an duopolistic broadband industry is seeking to monetize and control as many aspects of America’s online experience as possible.

We’ve exposed dozens of astroturf and other industry-backed groups trying to peddle the broadband industry agenda, often trying to hide who is paying the bills.  Whether it’s scare stories about broadband brownouts, fear that oversight and regulation will drive away investment and reduce service, or the need to stop Net Neutrality — it’s all designed to protect provider profits, not help consumers.

There is nothing fair about Internet Overcharging schemes.  There has never been a true consumption billing scheme that charged consumers nothing if they didn’t use the service, and the prices being charged for consumption above one’s allowance are often several thousand percent above actual cost.  Indeed the CEO of Crown Fibre Holdings CEO Graham Mitchell, admitted the truth about such pricing schemes when he told Techday that where ISP’s engage in such pricing schemes, they don’t make their money in providing access to broadband; they make it out of data caps.

We have no illusion providers won’t be back for a second bite at your wallets, which is why the education effort continues.  Over the last year, we’ve expanded our coverage to promote better broadband, and to expose bad actors among the broadband cable, telephone, wireless, and satellite industry.  We’ll continue to expose lobbying efforts to legislate away oversight, consumer protection, and limit potential competition.  Stop the Cap! also continues to fight for improved rural broadband that moves beyond today’s satellite fraudband that delivers woefully slow, heavily limited and expensive service.  We’ll also coordinate efforts to push back whenever Internet Overcharging schemes appear on the horizon, and we won’t let go until such language is banished from customer agreements and Acceptable Use Policies, whether they are formally enforced or not.

One year later, America’s broadband users are safer from such schemes, but not yet safe.  Thanks to all of our readers for staying engaged.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, seen here during his years as New York's governor

Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Watching the debate raging through the 1920s was one Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was elected governor of New York in 1928 on a reformist agenda.  Like many other states, New Yorkers had a problem with their electric companies.  They charged too much, didn’t provide sufficient capacity, and ignored rural areas.

Roosevelt started his political life following in the philosophical (and political) footsteps of his fifth cousin Theodore, the 26th president of the United States.  FDR believed in individualist progressive ideals — improving privately held utilities but steering clear of advocating public ownership.

Roosevelt’s immediate predecessor, Al Smith, spent the 1920s in Albany arguing with the Republican state legislature over who would develop New York’s hydro power resources, which could deliver substantially lower-priced electricity from Buffalo to Long Island.  The legislature wanted the state’s private power companies to develop the resource, with a public service commission reviewing and, where necessary, regulating rates.  Smith wanted the state to build the plants as public utilities, arguing endless lawsuits by private power companies had made rate regulation meaningless.

Early into his term as governor, Roosevelt picked up where Smith left off, advocating first for the construction of a hydroelectric dam on the St. Lawrence River in upstate New York.  The legislature promptly said no.  Roosevelt refused to let go and expanded his proposal to also include the possibility of municipally-owned local power companies, delivering needed power without a profit incentive.

In upstate and western New York, firmly Republican territory, local newspapers blasted Roosevelt’s proposal, occasionally calling him a socialist conniver, an enemy of free enterprise, and dragging big state government into the lives of ordinary citizens.

Electric companies across the state joined the chorus of upstate opposition, but also quietly made preparations to counter Roosevelt’s proposal, just in case it began to catch on.

Roosevelt’s initial efforts to argue his position did not make much headway upstate, because he had to rely on newspapers to deliver his message — the same newspapers that rebutted him at every turn.  Direct mailing letters to voters was expensive and took a long time to create and distribute.  Roosevelt instead turned to the new medium of radio, speaking to residents statewide about issues like electrification.  Radio directly reached listeners and bypassed the newspaper filter, and it allowed the governor to deliver a populist message in terms every consumer could understand — high rates.

Roosevelt lit a fire for reform when he compared what state residents were paying for electricity compared to those on the other side of Lake Ontario, in Canada.  Canada had provincial power, owned and operated by the government.

Roosevelt told listeners that in a “modernized house” (one served by higher voltage lines capable of supporting large electric appliances), residents of Ontario paid just $3.40 a month in electric bills.  But in Westchester County, the same service cost $25.63.  It was $19.95 in New York City and $13.50 in Rochester.

Double-crossing Roosevelt With the Help of ‘The House of Morgan’

The electric companies soon saw the results of those price comparisons as voters demanded better prices.  Republicans began shifting toward Roosevelt’s plan.  For the power companies, it was time for “Plan B.”  Quietly meeting with J.P. Morgan Bank in the summer of 1929, three major upstate New York power companies planned to merge into one giant company: Mohawk Hudson Power Corporation.

The modern day Mohawk Hudson Power Company was Niagara-Mohawk, which has since been purchased by National Grid.

Mohawk Hudson Power Corporation incorporated:

• Buffalo, Niagara & Eastern Power Corp.: Served 500 cities and towns including Buffalo.  Niagara Falls supplied most of its power;
• Northeastern Power Corp.: Served communities along Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence;
• Mohawk Hudson Power Corp.: Served Albany, Schenectady, Utica, Syracuse, and many other communities.

With such a merger, Roosevelt’s original plan to let upstate power companies compete to offer the best possible rates for hydro power were dashed.  In fact, the power companies loved Roosevelt’s plan because as a combined entity, they’d profit handsomely from state taxpayers paying to construct hydro generating stations, saving them the trouble.  Then as a monopoly cartel, they’d set rates artificially high, pocketing the proceeds. J.P. Morgan Bank would also get paid handsomely for helping make it all possible.

To add insult to injury, just two months later, Mohawk Hudson acquired another state giant — Frontier Power Corporation, which in the words of Time magazine, “set Roosevelt agog.”

Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York (Democrat) declared that the fact that 80% of New York State is now served by one hydro-electric corporation made it necessary for him once again to urge the Legislature (Republican) to create a body of public trustees to develop St. Lawrence water power for the people.

Roosevelt’s experience with the House of Morgan and the power utility trusts would be a lesson he would never forgive or forget.  In fact, it culminated in his broadened vision to consider power an integral part of economic redevelopment after the start of the Great Depression later that year.

Roosevelt’s New Deal

Americans only came to terms with the impact of the Great Depression in 1930, months after the stock market crashed.  What initially hurt Wall Street soon spread across the country in waves of bank failures, massive unemployment, a credit crunch, and rampant homelessness, poverty, and despair.  What was bad in the city could be much worse in rural America.

Services for rural Americans were few and far between, and electric power was absolutely not one of them.  The economic benefits of the boom years usually never made it to rural communities in the first place.  Banks did manage to turn an excellent business convincing rural farmers to mortgage their farms in return for ready cash to acquire farm equipment, pay transportation costs to bring crops to market, and obtain other necessities.  When the bust years arrived, more than a few farmers found themselves foreclosed and evicted from their own farms, seized by lenders to recoup their loans.

After witnessing thousands of farmers and other rural Americans displaced from their homes, Roosevelt embarked on wide-ranging reforms for rural America.  One of the most important was rural electrification, designed to guarantee electricity to any rural American that wanted it.  Through the New Deal, rural Americans would experience the benefits of modernization first-hand — bolstering farm production and development, increasing economic development, improving health and safety, and most importantly, make rural living economically self-sustainable.

After learning from his years as governor of New York, Roosevelt established some core principles for his rural-focused New Deal electrification program:

• Full electrical modernization of households defined the standard for quality of life, no matter where the households resided.
• Electrical modernization of farm productive processes, within the framework of planned production and marketing, would lower farm costs and return farms to prosperity.
• Electricity must be affordable to all households in quantities required for electrical modernization. Publicly owned and private utilities, lightened of their false capitalization by public regulation and the breakup of holding companies, would provide inexpensive electricity.
• Cheap electricity would make the redistribution of population and industry possible, because it could be transmitted long distances and sold at near cost to rural consumers.

President Roosevelt speaks to residents in Tupelo, Mississippi, the first city to benefit from the Tennessee Valley Authority

The mostly rural and poor Tennessee Valley region, covering 80,000 square miles in the southeastern United States, including almost all of Tennessee and parts of Mississippi, Kentucky, Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia was an obvious first choice for rural electrification.  Tupelo, Mississippi was the first community to sign onto Roosevelt’s ambitious Tennessee Valley Authority plan to bring cheap power to a deprived region.

The results of electrification at reasonable prices were… electric.  Widespread poverty wasn’t solved overnight, but evidence of social transformation was at hand.  Americans from coast to coast were modernizing their homes, bringing in new electric appliances which fueled pre-war manufacturing, retail sales, and helped bring down unemployment.  Many businesses were thrilled to participate in New Deal programs, which included stimulus spending to help Americans improve their homes.

The impact of New Deal programs for electricity development exist in every American home.  The refrigerator replaced an ice-block powered icebox.  Hand scrubbed laundry in a sink now agitated in a washing machine.  The radio was made commonplace where electricity to power it was available.  Mixers, blenders, toasters, and other small appliances made their entrance with the advent of widespread electric power.  But the impacts go even further.  Technology as Freedom, by Ronald Tobey, notes:

The New Deal in domestic electrical modernization worked an invisible revolution. The New Deal shifted the majority of American families to an asset strategy for economic security through state-enframed home ownership of electrically modern dwellings. Geographic mobility declined. Unrestrained domination of local politics by a locally resident real estate elite ended. Material accumulation based in the owner-occupied home created unprecedented material affluence. The dwellings modernized their occupants, as households rebuilt their social and labor relations around new technologies. Minority groups previously locked out of affluence gained the keys to their future. The New Deal created the 1950s.

Is ubiquitous broadband the electrification challenge of our age?  Naysayers claim fast broadband is only useful for downloading entertainment products, often illegally.  They suggest economic development doesn’t require fast broadband — any version of broadband is good enough.  Worse yet, government involvement in it is suspect, according to these critics.

But after weeks of witnessing countless communities compete for Google’s Think Big With a Gig broadband project, it’s clear the clamor for affordable, fast broadband service is far more important than the naysayers would suggest.

William Randolph Hearst

The Progressive Movement of the 1900s-1920s

After the reform-driven progressive movement of the early 20th century was finished taking on the railroads, they turned their attention to so-called “utility services.”  These were telephone, energy, and water providers.

The progressive movement of the early 1900s split into at least two camps:

• Individualist Progressives — Most people in this camp belonged to Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressive Party, also known as the Bull Moose Party.  The Progressive party was made up mostly of disaffected centrists who left the Republican Party after Roosevelt failed to secure the 1912 Republican nomination for president.  A rift had developed between Roosevelt and then-president Taft over how much energy should be devoted to breaking up corrupt big business and corrupt politicians.  The Progressive Party believed the Republicans had developed an unholy alliance with big business, monopoly trusts, and corrupt politicians on the state and federal level.  These individualist progressives believed in a well-regulated capitalist system, and with respect to energy companies, they demanded honoring the services and pricing promised consumers.  Once those conditions were met, government should stay out of it.  These progressives opposed abusive trusts and monopolies and supported competition.  The Progressive Party had support in states like New York, Illinois, California, Michigan, and Pennsylvania — all states with a heavy manufacturing business base that suffered from monopoly abuses.
• Reformist Progressives — Reformist progressives believed essential services should be in the hands of public trusts or municipalities, operated as non-profit “utilities” answering to the communities they served.  They were major advocates for municipal utility projects, and believed it was immoral for important services to be left in the hands of for-profit businesses, much less trusts and monopolies.  Many reformist progressives rallied behind the newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, who loudly advocated radical reform in his newspapers.  Hearst even formed the Municipal Ownership League, a local party in New York City, whose primary goal was to force for-profit utilities out of the marketplace — turning services over to municipalities to run for “the public good.”  Reformist progressives often applied moral values to private enterprise, suggesting an improved capitalist model required companies to also consider the social good of operating in the public interest.

Where individualist progressives had control, rate regulation and oversight was the usual model when dealing with electric companies.  California and Wisconsin, fed up with the railroad abuses, saw many similarities in  electric monopolies.  In the end, they applied the same rate regulation philosophy used with the railways for all utility services.  Both states regulated rates charged based on their perception of fair pricing.  Beyond that, they tended to leave private providers alone.  New York’s governor Charles Evans Hughes was an individualist progressive who advocated regulatory crackdowns on monopolies who abused the terms and conditions under which they offered service.  Once they met that obligation, Hughes believed the free market would manage to sort out the rest.

That was all fine and well for communities already served by electric companies, but what about vast numbers of smaller communities bypassed for electric service?

Defenders of the free market, and the companies themselves argued that only through deregulation would providers get sufficient investment to expand their service areas into previously unserved communities.  Apply rate regulation and other government interference and investors will look elsewhere.

Reformist progressives disputed this assertion, believing hunger for quick profit was responsible for the disinterest in serving rural communities, where construction costs were higher and rapid return on investment was unlikely.  Besides, they argued, since most of these companies provided monopoly service, it wasn’t as if they faced imminent price-cutting competition.

Reformers advocated bypassed communities should form their own municipally-run electric companies or cooperatives, managed by local government and answerable to local ratepayers.  This solution was attractive to many communities, especially the growing number of planned new communities that came during the boom years of the 1920s.

As municipal power attracted attention, some in the private power sector balked.  Not only were these companies delivering good service to customers, they were often doing it at far lower prices.  Many large utility companies and their allies made municipal power a political issue, attacking the concept as anti-American.  Their argument: Public money should never be spent to construct services traditionally provided by private companies, even when those companies had yet to wire those communities for service.

Charles Evans Hughes

As political lobbying for bans on municipal power projects grew more intense, newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst declared all-out war on the electric monopolies.  Hearst advocated that electricity be a delivered only through not-for-profit municipally-run utility companies.

Hearst even went as far to seek the governor of New York’s office several times in the early 1900s, to implement his progressive reforms.  Hearst’s platform included advocacy of public power delivered for the social good. That meant companies would extend service to outlying areas as soon as practical instead of when it was grossly profitable.  Power companies would charge a fair price for good service.  Companies would also advocate for customer safety and work with government to define safety regulations instead of reflexively opposing them at every turn.

In one of several runs for office, his opponent was the aforementioned then-current governor Charles Evans Hughes, who promptly went on the attack.

Hughes had one word for Hearst’s reform views: Socialism

Governor Hughes told the Republican Club of New York in 1908, “Our government is based upon the principles of individualism and not upon those of socialism…. It was founded to attain the aims of liberty, of liberty under law, but wherein each individual for the development and the exercise of his individual powers might have the freest [sic ] opportunity consistent with the equal rights of others.”

Hearst lost the governor’s race each time he ran, and was outmaneuvered by the private industries he sought to reform.  In fact, the industry managed to outwit regulatory advocates at every turn.

For example, since states were permitted only to regulate commerce within its borders, giant national electricity holding companies, also known as “trusts,” typically escaped such regulation by opening headquarters out of state, which allowed them to ignore local and state regulations.  In Riverside, California, Southern Sierras Power Company was able to ignore California state regulations because its head offices were in Denver, Colorado.  That kept pesky state officials out of Sierras’ books to verify whether the rates it charged were fair.

When regulators sought to construct a formula for fair regulated pricing, creative bookkeeping and debt structuring made even confiscatory rates permissible.  Companies learned to use business regulations against the regulators.  For instance, when a regulator believed rates could be lowered, power companies increased their debt obligations, at least on paper.  They paid outrageous administrative fees to the holding companies they themselves often quietly controlled.  Or they used creative accounting tricks to make it appear free cash was obligated to satisfy investors who held company debt and had to be repaid under government rules within a limited time frame.  Companies were able to “prove” to regulators their current rates were fair, and there was no leeway to reduce them.

Only after municipal power companies began providing service at dramatically lower, and sustainable prices did suspicion reach a fever pitch that regulators were being played.

Tomorrow: A “New Deal” for Americans