“Somehow in the last 100 years, every time there is a problem of getting more spectrum, there is a technology that comes along that solves that problem. Every two and a half years, every spectrum crisis has gotten solved, and that’s going to keep happening. We already know today what the solutions are for the next 50 years.” — Martin Cooper, inventor of the portable cell phone

Despite the fear-mongering by North America’s wireless phone companies that a spectrum crisis is at hand — one that threatens the viability of wireless communications across the continent, some of the most prominent industry veterans dispute the public policy agenda of phone companies like AT&T, Verizon, Bell, and Rogers.

Martin Cooper ought to know.  He invented the portable cell phone, and remains involved in the wireless industry today.  Cooper shrugs off cries of spectrum shortages as a problem well-managed by technological innovation.  In fact, he’s credited for Cooper’s Law: The ability to transmit different radio communications at one time and in the same place has grown with the same pace since Guglielmo Marconi’s first transmissions in 1895. The number of such communications being theoretically possible has doubled every 30 months, from then, for 104 years.

National Public Radio looks back at the earliest car phones, which weighed 80 pounds and operated with vacuum tubes. Innovation, improved technology, and lower pricing turned an invention for the rich and powerful into a device more than 300,000,000 North Americans own and use today. (April 2012) (3 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

A traditional car phone from the 1960s.

The earliest cell phones have been around since the 1940s.  St. Louis was the first city in the United States to get Mobile Telephone Service (MTS).  It worked on three analog radio channels and required an operator to make calls on the customer’s behalf. By 1964, direct dialing from car phones became possible with Improved Mobile Telephone Service (IMTS), which also increased the number of radio channels available for calls.

In the 1970s, popular television shows frequently showed high-flyers and private detectives with traditional looking phones installed in their cars.  But the service was obscenely expensive.  The equipment set customers back $2-4,000 or was leased for around $120 a month.  Local calls ran $0.70-1.20 per minute.  That was when a nice home was priced at $27,000, a new car was under $4,000, gas was $0.55/gallon, and a first run movie ticket was priced at $1.75.

With many cities maintaining fewer than a dozen radio channels for the service, only a handful of customers could make or receive calls at a time.  The first “spectrum crisis” arrived by the late 1970s, when car phones became the status symbol of the rich and powerful (the middle class had pagers). Customers found they couldn’t make or receive calls because the frequencies were all tied up.  Some cities even rationed service by maintaining waiting lists, not allowing new customers to have the technology until an existing one dropped their account.

Instead of demanding deregulation and warning of wireless doomsday, the wireless industry innovated its way out of the era of MTS altogether, switching instead to a “cellular” approach developed in part by the Bell System.

In the 1970s, when the first cell phone “spectrum crisis” erupted, the Bell System innovated its way out the the dilemma without running to Congress demanding sweeping deregulation.  This documentary, produced by the Bell System, explores AMPS — analog cell phone service, and how it transformed Chicago’s mobile telephone landscape back in 1979.  (9 minutes)

“Arguing that the nation could run out of spectrum is like saying it was going to run out of a color.” David P. Reed, one of the original architects of the Internet

Instead of one caller tying up a single IMTS radio frequency capable of reaching across an entire city, the Bell System deployed lower-powered transmitters in a series of hexagonal “cells.”  Each cell only served callers within a much smaller geographic area.  As a customer traveled between cells, the system would hand the call off to the next cell in turn and so on — all transparently to the caller.  Because of the reduced coverage area, cell towers in a city could operate on the same frequencies without creating interference problems, opening up the system to many more customers and more calls.

Inventor Martin Cooper holds one of the first portable mobile phones

In Chicago, Bell’s IMTS system only supported around a dozen callers at the same time. In 1977, the phone company built a test cellular network it dubbed “AMPS,” for Advanced Mobile Phone System.  AMPS technology was familiar to many early cell phone users.  It was more popularly known as “analog” service, and while it could still only handle one conversation at a time on each frequency, the system supported better call handling and many more users than earlier wireless phone technology.  By 1979, Bell had 1,300 customers using their test system in Chicago.

AMPS considerably eased the “spectrum crunch” earlier systems found challenging, and subsequent upgrades to digital technology dramatically increased the number of calls each tower could handle and allowed providers to slash pricing, which fueled the spectacular growth of the wireless marketplace.

Yesterday it was voice call congestion, today it is a “tidal wave” of wireless data.  But inventors like Cooper believe the solution is the same: engineering innovation.

“Somehow in the last 100 years, every time there is a problem of getting more spectrum, there is a technology that comes along that solves that problem,” Cooper told the New York Times. “Every two and a half years, every spectrum crisis has gotten solved, and that’s going to keep happening. We already know today what the solutions are for the next 50 years.”

Cooper believes in the cellular approach to wireless communications.  Dividing up today’s geographic cells into even smaller cells could vastly expand network capacity just like AMPS did for Windy City residents in the late 1970s. Using especially directional antennas focused on different service areas, placing new cell towers, innovating further with tiny neighborhood antennas mounted on telephone poles, or building out Wi-Fi networks can all manage the data capacity “crisis” says Cooper.

New technology also allows cell signals to co-exist, even on the same or adjacent frequencies, without creating interference problems. All it takes is a willingness to invest in the technology and deploy it across signal-congested urban areas.

Unfortunately, network engineers are not often responsible for the business decisions or public policy agendas of the nation’s largest wireless companies who are using the “spectrum crisis” to argue for increased deregulation and demanding additional radio spectrum which, in some cases, could be locked up by companies to make sure nobody else can use them.

The New York Times offers this easy-to-follow primer on wireless spectrum and why it matters (or not) in the current climate of explosive growth in mobile data traffic.  (3 minutes)

“Their primary interest is not necessarily in making spectrum available, or in making wireless performance better. They want to make money.” — David S. Isenberg, veteran researcher, AT&T Labs

Innovation, not wholesale deregulation, allowed the Bell System to solve the spectrum crisis of the 1970s by creating today's "cell system" that can re-use radio frequencies in adjacent areas to handle more wireless traffic.

Spectrum auctions bring billions to federal coffers, but actually deliver a hidden tax to cell phone customers who ultimately pay for the winning bids priced into their monthly bills.  It also makes it prohibitively expensive for a new player to enter the market.  Already facing enormous network construction costs, any new entrant would then face the crushing prospect of outbidding AT&T, Verizon Wireless, Bell or Rogers for the frequencies essential for operation.

As the New York Times writes:

When a company gets the license for a band of radio waves, it has the exclusive rights to use it. Once a company owns it, competitors can’t have it.

Mr. Reed said the carriers haven’t advocated for the newer technologies because they want to retain their monopolies.

Cooper advocates a new regulatory approach at the Federal Communications Commission — one that mandates wireless phone companies start using today’s technology to amplify their networks.

Cooper points to one example: the smart antenna.

Smart antennas direct cell towers to focus their transmission energy towards the specific devices connected to it.  If a customer was using their phone from the southern end of the cell tower’s coverage area, why direct signal energy to the north, where it gets wasted?  New LTE networks support smart antenna technology, but carriers have generally avoided investing in upgrading towers to support the new technology, expected to be commonplace inside new wireless devices within two years.

T-Mobile calls these technology solutions “Band-Aids” that won’t address the company’s demand for more frequencies to manage its network.  But that kind of thinking applied to the mobile phone world of the 1970s would have maintained the exorbitantly expensive IMTS technology discarded decades ago, since replaced by innovation that made more efficient use of the spectrum already on hand.  That innovation also transformed wireless phones from a tool (or toy) for the very wealthy to an affordable success story that now threatens the traditional wired phone network in ways the Bell System could have never envisioned.

It’s A Whole New System: AT&T and other wireless phone companies might want to learn the lesson the Bell System was trying to teach their employees back in 1979: Meet Change With Change.  This company-produced video implores the phone company to do more than the same old thing.  No, this video is not “PM Magazine.”  It is about innovation and actually listening to what customers want. With apologies to Mama Cass Elliot, there was indeed a New World Coming — the breakup of the Bell System just five years later.  Don’t miss the diabetic-coma-inducing, sugary-sweet jingle at the end.  Then reach for a can of Tab.  (10 minutes)

As AT&T joins Verizon selling off its Yellow Pages publishing unit and payphones keep disappearing from street corners, the media is writing the landline obituary once again.

CNN Money asks today whether we’re witnessing the death of the landline.

In as little as 20 years, the concept of a wired phone line may become the novelty a rotary-dial phone represents today.  Yes, traditional phone lines will still be found in businesses and in the homes of those uncomfortable dealing with a mobile phone, but America’s largest phone companies are well aware the traditional telephone line is in decline.

The Bell System, as it was known until the 1980s, used to comprise AT&T, Bell Labs, Western Electric, Long Lines, and two dozen local “operating companies” like New York Telephone, Mountain Bell, etc.  This AT&T documentary, from 1976, explores how “the phone company” used to function.  New innovations like “lightwave” are showcased, promising to deliver voice phone calls over glass fibers one day.  

Much of the technology seen in the documentary may be unfamiliar if you are under 30 (and check out how customer records were maintained back then), but those who remember renting telephones in garish colors from your local phone company will recognize the phones that occupied space in your home not that long ago.  The only part of the landline network that hasn’t changed much in the last 40 years is the wiring infrastructure itself, which has been allowed to deteriorate as customers continue to depart.

Why was the company so darn big back then?  Because it had to be, the documentary says, to serve a big America.  Hilariously, the company defends its then-status as a “regulated monopoly” telling viewers “[a] regulated monopoly works well in communications because you don’t duplicate facilities and you produce real economies over the long haul.”  (14 minutes)

CNN reports nearly one-third of all American homes no longer have landline service, double the rate from 2008, triple that of 2007.  Verizon is feeling the heat the most, with revenue down 19% over the last five years.  AT&T has seen their revenue drop 16.5% over the same period.

But things are not all bad for phone companies willing to spend money upgrading their networks.  Verizon’s top-rated FiOS fiber to the home service is a compelling competitor to Comcast and Time Warner Cable.  AT&T’s U-verse has gotten a respectable market share larger midwestern cities and draws customers who like its DVR box and the chance to stick it to the local cable company they’ve hated for years.

But where both companies have decided against investing in upgrades — notably in their rural service areas — the traditional phone line is trapped in time.  Only the network it depends on is changing, and not for the better.

Back in 1993, AT&T produced seven advertisements dubbed the “You Will” series, showcasing future technologies AT&T would “deliver to you.”  Eerily, the vast majority of these predictions came true, but mostly from companies other than AT&T.  While the phone company predicted what would eventually become E-ZPass, Apple’s iPad, Apple’s Siri, the smartphone, Skype, Amazon’s Kindle, the cable industry’s home security apps, video on demand, and GPS navigation, most of those innovations were developed and sold by others.  

AT&T spun away Bell Labs and became preoccupied selling Internet access, cell phones and reassembling itself into its former ‘hugeness’ through mergers and buyouts. With limited investment in innovation, AT&T risks being left as a “dumb pipe” provider, selling the connectivity (among many others) to allow other companies’ devices to communicate. (Alert: Loud Volume at around 2 minutes) (4 minutes)

Verizon decided to ditch its rural service areas to FairPoint Communications in northern New England and Frontier Communications in 14 other states.  The results have not been good for the buyers (and often customers).  FairPoint went bankrupt in 2009, overwhelmed by the debt it incurred buying phone lines in Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine.  Frontier has watched its sales fall ever since its own landline acquisition, and the company has gotten scores of complaints from ex-Verizon customers about broken promises for improved broadband, billing errors, and poor service.

Analysts predict AT&T will start dumping its rural landline customers in the near future as well, letting the company focus on its U-verse service areas.  But who will buy these cast-offs?  CNN reports nobody knows.  CenturyLink and Windstream, two major independent phone companies, don’t appear to be in the mood to acquire neglected landline facilities they will need to spend millions to repair and upgrade.

One thing is certain — both AT&T and Verizon are tailoring business plans to favor Wall Street approval.  The companies’ decisions to temporarily boost revenue selling pieces of its operations has helped stock prices, but has also made the companies shadows of their former selves.  Nearly 30 years ago, customers still paid the phone company to rent their home telephones, relied extensively on the companies’ lucrative White and Yellow Pages for directory information, and discovered new technology innovations like digital switching thanks to Bell Labs, the research arm of AT&T — today independent and known as Alcatel-Lucent.  Today, people in some cities cannot even find a telephone company-owned payphone.

WJBK in Detroit this week ventured out across Detroit to see if they could find a pay phone that actually works.  That old phone booth on the corner is long gone, and some admit they haven’t touched a pay phone in 20 years.  (2 minutes)

This influential documentary explores the rural cooperative movement for electricity in the 1930s.

In 1935, just 5-10 percent of America’s family farms were wired for electricity.  The cities: lighted.  The rest of the country: in the dark.  It was the same old story then as it is today for rural broadband:

• There are two few customers for us to make a profit by bringing you service;
• The return on investment will take too long;
• You won’t use enough service to justify the expense of providing it;
• Okay, we’ll install service, if you pay thousands of dollars to cover the cost to bring it you.

Private providers delivered electricity to big cities, but found the countryside not worthy of their time or investment.  Then, as now, rural America’s economy suffered for it.  Back in 1935, family farms coped with wood-fired stoves, school homework by kerosene lamp, discarding fresh farm products that could not be kept cool, no running water, no radio, and no appliances to make an already difficult life a bit easier to manage.  In 2012, an increasing amount of the rural economy is moving online, where raw materials and goods are bought and sold, where knowledge-based jobs require a dedicated broadband connection, and education means completing homework assignments and doing research on the Internet.

Same old problems cast in a different light to be sure, but borrowing from America’s past may put a down payment on our broadband future.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt had heard all of the excuses and seen private electric companies try to showcase their minor efforts to improve power in rural America. A series of small scale projects that looked good in the newspaper could not hide the more general attitude it was unprofitable to provide the service to family farms.  In 1935, Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing the Rural Electrification Administration (REA).  Although FDR’s contemporary critics like to consider him a socialist that interfered in the private economy, in fact Roosevelt’s REA spent the majority of its effort in areas commercial providers wouldn’t touch with a 25-foot power pole.

The idea was simple.  Rural American communities with limited or no electric service could reach out to the REA to obtain low interest loans to finance the infrastructure to construct rural electric service.  When loans were approved, a cooperative electric company was established, with each “customer” being a member and part-owner of the co-op.  Income earned from ratepayers would pay for the service and pay back the government loans.  When the federal government was paid in full, the cooperative owned the new utility company outright.

In practice, this was the only way rural Americans, especially farmers, could obtain electric service.  These cooperatives often found they could deliver the same service a private company could, and for much less money. Co-ops work for the benefit of their members, not for outside investors.

In 1940, the federal government commissioned ‘Power and the Land’ through the United States Film Service.  This one film, showing life for a farm family in southeastern Ohio before and after electrification, helped drive the rural electrification movement forward in areas yet to be wired for service.  The first 17 minutes chronicles life on the powerless farm, while the second half explores the REA electrification program and the changes electricity brought to farming life. (38 minutes)

Belmont County, Ohio shows the legacy of the REA. Diagonal line-shaded sections illustrate the service areas of the original power co-op noted in the film 'Power and the Land.' The yellow shaded areas are served by Ohio Power, a subsidiary of American Electric Power, Inc., a commercial company.

The film’s impact was profound (the Village Voice called it “a little masterpiece”), and more than four million farmers were estimated to have seen it.  Eventually, more than 500 miles of electric lines were being strung by America’s co-ops every single day.  Additional documentaries about the film were made decades later, narrated by Walter Cronkite, to chronicle the cooperative electricity movement, the original film, and what happened to the family.

Private providers were, of course, horrified by the REA and other Roosevelt Administration public works projects.  Private companies railed they were being undermined by low interest government loans, government involvement, and fear new regulations would threaten their profitable business models.  Some of Roosevelt’s fiercest critics called the administration’s zeal for public-good spending anti-capitalist and anti-American.  For Roosevelt, it was often simply a matter of finding the fastest solution to a pervasive problem private companies seemed uninterested and unwilling to solve.

The legacy of the REA remains plainly visible today.  In Ohio, what started as the Belmont Power Cooperative is today part of the South Central Power Company, itself a co-op within the Touchstone Energy Cooperative.  Belmont County, Ohio’s power grid still reflects the work of the REA in the 1930s, with the county divided into regions served by the original REA co-op and Ohio Power.

While South Central Power hasn’t gotten into the broadband business, several other rural co-ops have, expanding their focus towards fiber to deliver cable TV, Internet, and phone service.

If the concept of the REA was adopted for broadband, the formula for success can remain the same.  Low interest loans to finance fiber telecommunications networks provide limitless expansion possibilities and a clear path to solving rural America’s broadband inferiority problem.  Interest rates have never been lower, and by gradually repaying the loans from income earned from subscribers, taxpayer dollars are not at risk.  The federal government’s only real involvement in guaranteeing loans and providing oversight that the money is spent appropriately.  The co-ops that result will govern themselves by and for their members.

Some will say electricity is more important than broadband, and for some families that may be as true as similar arguments were for and against REA electricity in the 1920s and 30s.  But take a week off from your broadband service.  Disconnect it, don’t read e-mail or visit websites, and then re-evaluate that statement.

More and more, broadband has become a firmly established part of our lives at work, school, and home. If private companies won’t step up, let others organize to provide it.

Fast forward to December 2011, and watch how rural Rutherford County, N.C. farmers are adapting to the new digital economy with the use of broadband.  They are selling their crops online to eager restaurants, markets, and other buyers up to 70 miles away.  No broadband?  No deal.  (5 minutes)

Phillip "Break Free from 'What's In It For Me'-AT&T" Dampier

[We are reprinting this because it succinctly and persuasively proves a point we've been making at Stop the Cap! since 2008.  Broadband is not just a "nice thing to have." It is as important as a phone line, electricity, and safe drinking water.  News, education, commerce, and culture increasingly utilize the Internet to share information and entertain us. Essential utility services can either be provided by a private company operating as a monopoly with oversight and regulation, or operate strictly in the public interest in the form of a customer-owned cooperative, a direct service of local government, or a quasi-public independent non-profit.

In North America, broadband was originally considered a non-essential service, and private providers in the United States lobbied heavily to maintain absolute control of their broadband networks, free to open them to share with other providers, or not.  They also won sweeping deregulation and are still fighting today for decreased oversight.  The results have been uneven service.  Large, compact cities enjoy modern and fast broadband while smaller communities are forced to live with a fraction of the speeds offered elsewhere, if they have access to the service at all.

With broadband now deemed "essential," local governments have increasingly sought to end the same old excuses with the "don't care"-cable company or "what's in it for me"-AT&T and provide 21st century service themselves, especially where local commercial providers simply won't step up to the plate at all.  Suddenly, big cable and phone companies are more possessive than your last boy/girlfriend. The companies that for years couldn't care less about your broadband needs suddenly obsess when someone else moves in on "their territory." They want special laws (that apply only to the competition) to make sure your broadband future lies exclusively in their hands.

Susan P. Crawford understand how this dysfunctional, controlling relationship comes at the expense of rural America.  She's a visiting professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Law School. In 2009, she was a special assistant to President Barack Obama for science, technology and innovation policy. Her opinions were originally shared with readers of Bloomberg News.]

In cities and towns across the U.S., a familiar story is replaying itself: Powerful companies are preventing local governments from providing an essential service to their citizens. More than 100 years ago, it was electricity. Today, it is the public provision of communications services.

Susan Crawford

The Georgia legislature is currently considering a bill that would effectively make it impossible for any city in the state to provide for high-speed Internet access networks — even in areas in which the private sector cannot or will not. Nebraska, North Carolina, Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee already have similar laws in place. South Carolina is considering one, as is Florida.

Mayors across the U.S. are desperate to attract good jobs and provide residents with educational opportunities, access to affordable health care, and other benefits that depend on affordable, fast connectivity — something that people in other industrialized countries take for granted. But powerful incumbent providers such as AT&T Inc. and Time Warner Cable Inc. are hamstringing municipalities.

At the beginning of the 20th century, private power companies electrified only the most lucrative population centers and ignored most of America, particularly rural America. By the mid-1920s, 15 holding companies controlled 85 percent of the nation’s electricity distribution, and the Federal Trade Commission found that the power trusts routinely gouged consumers.

Costly and Dangerous

In response, and recognizing that cheap, plentiful electricity was essential to economic development and quality of life, thousands of communities formed electric utilities of their own. Predictably, the private utilities claimed that public ownership of electrical utilities was “costly and dangerous” and “always a failure,” according to the November 1906 issue of Moody’s Magazine. Now more than 2,000 communities in the U.S., including Seattle, San Antonio and Los Angeles, provide their own electricity.

Today, the Institute for Local Self-Reliance, which advocates for community broadband initiatives, is tracking more than 60 municipal governments that have built or are building successful fiber networks, just as they created electric systems during the 20th century. In Chattanooga, Tennessee, for example, the city’s publicly owned electric company provides fast, affordable and reliable fiber Internet access. Some businesses based in Knoxville — 100 miles to the northeast — are adding jobs in Chattanooga, where connectivity can cost an eighth as much.

Meanwhile, less than 8 percent of Americans currently receive fiber service to their homes, compared with more than 50 percent of households in South Korea, and almost 40 percent in Japan. Where it’s available, Americans pay five or six times as much for their fiber access as people in other countries do. Fully a third of Americans don’t subscribe to high-speed Internet access at all, and AT&T Chief Executive Officer Randall Stephenson said last month that the company was “trying to find a broadband solution that was economically viable to get out to rural America, and we’re not finding one, to be quite candid.” America is rapidly losing the global race for high-speed connectivity.

Tamping Down Enthusiasm

We've done something like this once before.

Like the power trusts of the 20th century, the enormous consolidated providers of wired Internet access want to tamp down any enthusiasm for municipal networks. Last year, telecom lobbyists spent more than $300,000 in a failed effort to block a referendum in Longmont, Colorado, to allow that city to provide Internet access. Time Warner Cable managed to get a North Carolina law enacted last year that makes launching municipal networks there extraordinarily difficult. The pending measures in Georgia and South Carolina are modeled on the North Carolina bill.

The Georgia bill is chock-full of sand traps and areas of deep statutory fog from which no local public network is likely ever to emerge. In addition to the ordinary public hearings that any municipality would hold on the subject, a town looking to build a public network would have to hold a referendum. It wouldn’t be allowed to spend any money in support of its position (there would be no such prohibition on the deep-pocketed incumbents). The community wouldn’t be allowed to support its network with local taxes or surplus revenues from any other services (although incumbents routinely and massively subsidize their networks with revenue from other businesses).

Most pernicious of all, the public operator would have to include in the costs of its service the phantom, imputed “capital costs” and “taxes” of a private provider. This is a fertile area for disputes, litigation and delay, as no one knows what precise costs and taxes are at issue, much less how to calculate these amounts. The public provider would also have to comply with all laws and “requirements” applicable to “the communications service,” if it were made available by “a private provider,” although again the law doesn’t specify which service is involved or which provider is relevant.

The end result of all this vague language will be to make it all but impossible for a city to obtain financing to build its network. Although the proponents of Georgia’s bill claim that they are merely trying to create a level playing field, these are terms and conditions that no new entrant, public or private, can meet — and that the incumbents themselves do not live by. You can almost hear the drafters laughing about how impossible the entire enterprise will be.

Globally Competitive Networks

Right now, state legislatures — where the incumbents wield great power — are keeping towns and cities in the U.S. from making their own choices about their communications networks. Meanwhile, municipalities, cooperatives and small independent companies are practically the only entities building globally competitive networks these days. Both AT&T and Verizon have ceased the expansion of next-generation fiber installations across the U.S., and the cable companies’ services greatly favor downloads over uploads.

Congress needs to intervene. One way it could help is by preempting state laws that erect barriers to the ability of local jurisdictions to provide communications services to their citizens.

Running for president in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt emphasized the right of communities to provide their own electricity. “I might call the right of the people to own and operate their own utility a birch rod in the cupboard,” he said, “to be taken out and used only when the child gets beyond the point where more scolding does any good.” It’s time to take out that birch rod.

Haven't we been here before?

History is best ignored when a Wall Street Journal columnist frames an argument in favor of strengthening the hegemony of Ma Bell, and darn ‘ole past precedent gets in the way of the writer’s “facts.”

Gordon Crovitz is a media and information industry adviser and executive, including former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, executive vice president of Dow Jones and president of its Consumer Media Group.  But today he’s unofficially, unabashedly AT&T.

In a column published this week, Crovitz hosts a whine and cheese festival on behalf of poor and abused AT&T, whose multi-billion dollar takeover of T-Mobile is in tatters. Crovitz places the blame squarely on the government for ruining everything:

How soon we forget the risks of overregulation: Last week, the Federal Communications Commission flexed the same muscle it once used to quash market forces in the phone industry to quash market forces in the wireless industry.

Today’s AT&T, a spinoff from the original, needs more spectrum to catch up with market leader Verizon, also a Ma Bell descendant, to support iPhones, Androids and other devices that feature video and sophisticated apps. It wants to buy T-Mobile, a division of a German company, which doesn’t have the resources to compete in the United States on its own. But the FCC decided to apply antitrust theory from the industrial era and claims to know better than wireless companies how they should operate their businesses.

AT&T’s proposed acquisition is best understood as a private-sector solution to a government-created problem. The FCC has not been able to get Congress to approve auctions to reallocate spectrum to wireless from less valuable uses. AT&T wants T-Mobile’s bandwidth so it can extend the latest fourth-generation network to 97% of the country from 80% and improve its spotty service in congested areas.

Under laws dating to the 1920s, the FCC gets to decide if a merger is in the “public interest,” a vague standard for top-down decision making. Government is the last institution in this era of fast technological innovation to act as if it has the information and power to dictate how change happens.

Crovitz apparently prefers AT&T and its phone pal Verizon Wireless dictate how “change happens,” because the two companies control the vast majority of wireless telecommunications in the United States.  Both also charge near-identical prices for near-identical levels of service.  AT&T & VZW are completely comfortable with that status quo, especially if disruptive competitor T-Mobile is dealt with in the usual industry manner (merger/buyout).

There is nothing vague about the FCC report that condemns the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile for the anti-competitive monstrosity it represents.  In hundreds of pages Crovitz evidently never read, a careful and credible argument against the deal was laid out for all to examine.  That evidence is far more persuasive than AT&T’s heavily-redacted filings the public was not authorized to see (for ‘competitive reasons’), and a multi-million-dollar-a-holler public relations distortion strategy based on hollow promises.

Playing Catch-Up With Verizon Wireless?  Hardly.

AT&T hardly needs to “catch up” with Verizon Wireless.  Both companies own wireless spectrum they have warehoused for “future use.”  As a backdrop to the merger, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has already indicated the agency is hard at work carefully re-allocating spectrum to make more room for wireless services.  The “bandwidth crisis” AT&T talks about is a convenient argument for a merger, until you realize T-Mobile’s mostly-urban wireless network won’t help AT&T achieve its goal of rural wireless expansion.  T-Mobile has never provided service in rural America and never will.

Crovitz attempts to leverage Verizon Wireless’ recent deal with America’s largest cable companies as an argument for the AT&T and T-Mobile merger, suggesting that deal was a game changer.  What goes unsaid is the fact AT&T could have pursued that deal for themselves.  Did they?  No.  Despite AT&T’s public relations spin, the proposed merger with T-Mobile is much more than a spectrum acquisition. As the FCC and the Justice Department have argued, this merger is about ridding AT&T of a competitor willing to offer more services at lower prices.  That forces AT&T to respond in kind to compete, and consumers have benefited greatly from that competition. Verizon Wireless is hardly competition at all considering both companies price services nearly identically.  Beyond that is Sprint, already saddled with the financial albatross Clearwire and questions about its long term viability in a duopolistic wireless market.

Crovitz is wrong on his other “facts” as well:

Deutsche Telekom is hardly short on cash.  The company has plenty of resources and could bolster T-Mobile USA to compete if it saw fit.  It doesn’t, preferring to focus on its more lucrative European markets.  Instead of selling the operation on the open market to other players, which could include foreign providers interested in competing in the high-priced American market, it elected to be courted by AT&T.

Overconfident AT&T

Henry De Lamar Clayton, Jr.: Author of the Clayton Act

The merger illustrates AT&T’s unparalleled level of overconfidence it could deal with regulators and consumer groups who would certainly object to the deal.  The company has since spent millions it could have used to improve its network on campaign-contribution-fueled support building on Capitol Hill, a shameless dollar-a-holler astroturf campaign that pays off non-profit groups to sing the deal’s praises, and an expensive ad campaign to sucker Americans into thinking reduced competition will somehow deliver lower prices and better service.

Even former Republican FCC Chairman Kevin Martin would have likely paused over such an obvious monopoly-building operation.  The Obama Administration’s FCC chairman — Julius Genachowski –  while often too timid for our tastes, at least knows when it is time to join the chorus of opposition.

The FCC doesn’t pretend to tell AT&T how to run its business.  It does, however, serve the public interest by providing checks and balances to unfettered corporate power.  While the Wall Street Journal‘s world view of capitalism would have been favored by the most egregious robber barons, history has taught us that when big corporations get a stranglehold on vital industries, the entire economy can suffer.

Crovitz would have us ignore the massive corporate abuses of 100 years ago that eventually provoked Congress into trust-busting legislative reform, breaking up the monopolies and oligopolies that presided over the railways, early telecommunications networks, and industrial raw materials like oil and steel.  Restrained competition brought monopoly prices and blockades against would-be competitors.  What was true then is still true now, only the technology has changed.

In 1911, the economy was powered in part by railroads, which transported goods and raw materials.  Telecommunications networks like the telegraph and early telephone helped conduct business and coordinated the movement of goods.  In 2011′s growing digital economy, telecommunications increasingly represents the railroads, telegraph, and telephone all combined-into-one.  Some of America’s richest tech companies depend on broadband and communications to fuel demand for their products.  Allowing AT&T to control the largest part of that pipeline could be disastrous to everyone but that company and their shareholders.

History Repeats Itself

In 1914, the Clayton Act was passed to put a stop to increasing anti-competitive activity and abusive market tactics.  Amazingly, the problems being solved a century ago are back with a vengeance today, all thanks to the endless drumbeat for deregulation, which has fueled mergers, acquisitions, and increased concentration of market power.  That Act cracked down on:

• Price discrimination: selling products and services at different prices to similarly situated buyers;
• Tying and exclusive-dealing contracts: sales on condition that the buyer sign exclusive contracts that force an end to dealing with the seller’s competitors;
• Corporate mergers: acquisitions of competing companies to reduce competition; and
• Interlocking directorates: Boards of directors of competing companies, packed with common members.

Today’s laissez-faire attitude towards government checks and balances helped provoke the Great Recession, corporate scandals of epic proportions, and a revolving door in Washington where regulators end up working for the companies they used to regulate. Just ask former FCC chairman Michael Powell. Three years ago he worked for us.  Today he works for Big Cable’s largest lobbying group — the National Cable & Telecommunications Association.  FCC Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker went to work for Comcast shortly after green-lighting their super-merger with NBC-Universal.

It’s All About the Money. Always.

The only thing stopping AT&T from providing wireless nirvana to rural America is its own unwillingness to spend money on behalf of customers to upgrade its network.  The company claims it didn’t see the value of spending nearly $4 billion needed to deliver expansive 4G service, but suddenly had no trouble at all finding nearly ten times that amount to purchase T-Mobile USA.

Did AT&T suddenly win PowerBall?

AT&T saw crushing a competitor Job #1.  Central Idaho’s 4G service could wait.

Crovitz later notes AT&T “was unusually blunt” criticizing the FCC report, a classic case of protesting too much.  The company got caught with its rhetorical pants down, with a series of evolving arguments for a deal that never made the first bit of sense once you began to dig deeper into their case.

In the end, Mr. Crovitz wants you to blame Big Government for AT&T’s pervasive dropped-call problem that its competitors don’t seem to have.

It’s not the company that owns and runs the network, it is that Obama and his nasty henchmen at the FCC who are responsible!  Who knew?

Bloomberg News reports the FCC found AT&T failed to demonstrate any real public benefit of its merger with T-Mobile USA.  (2 minutes)

Verizon Communications and AT&T together represent the largest providers of legacy copper wire landline phone service in the United States.  Over the past ten years, the traditional landline business has taken a beating as consumers increasingly turn their backs on the technology Alexander Graham Bell helped invent more than 100 years ago.  No utility service faces more customer defections than the phone company, and providers are increasingly rewriting their business models or lobbying to abandon unprofitable service areas altogether.

For some customers, investments in network improvements have brought advanced fiber optics straight to the home.  But in smaller communities, customers are making due with a deteriorating network phone companies no longer want to maintain.

The Glorious Growth Years

Back in the late 1980s, before most of us realized there was an Internet (or that you might be able to access it from home), the concept of connecting computers together to share information meant buying a 300-1200bps modem and using your home phone line to dial up hobbyist computer bulletin boards, CompuServe, PeopleLink, Delphi, GEnie, and QuantumLink.

Landline service was never perfect, but it worked reliably enough to make and receive phone calls and connect to low speed data networks.  As the 1990s arrived, an explosion in data and wireless services would bring both growth and unprecedented challenges for traditional telephone companies. Businesses demanded access to additional phone lines to power dedicated data lines and fax machines.  Residential customers wanted extra phone lines as well, mostly to keep data traffic off the primary house line. It was the era of frenzied area code splits, cell phones for all, and talk America could even run out of seven digit phone numbers to assign to all of the new lines.

NYNEX is today known as Verizon

As revenue and earnings exploded with the installation of new voice, data, and fax lines, Wall Street investors soon took notice.  Sleepy and safe phone company stocks were suddenly hot, and a deregulation-fueled consolidation frenzy soon resulted as phone companies merged and acquired one another.  Among the Bell System operating companies, familiar names like NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Southwestern Bell, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, and US West were gone, replaced by AT&T, Qwest, and Verizon.  Independent phone companies were not immune to the merger and acquisition game.  Today’s largest independent phone companies including Frontier Communications, CenturyLink, FairPoint, and Windstream have all grown mostly through buyouts of other providers.

The Bottom Drops Out

The rapid growth years of the traditional wired phone line came to an end around the same time as the dot.com crash and accompanying recession from 2000-2002.  While cell phone growth would continue, new competitors — especially cable-delivered “digital phone” service and other Voice Over IP providers like Vonage seriously cut into market share and revenue.  The need for additional phone lines to access the Internet subsided with the growth of DSL and cable broadband.  As household income stagnated, choices began to be made about where to cut back, and the traditional landline was a popular favorite.  Why pay for both a landline and a cell phone?  The cell phone stayed, the landline went.  Even dedicated fax machines are increasingly deemed unnecessary in an e-mail world.

The growing realization that the traditional copper wire telephone line was at risk of being the next “horse and buggy business” forced companies to consider a handful of options: ride out the landline declines and lower shareholder expectations, transform their existing networks to sustain new products like faster broadband and television service to give customers reasons to stay, or transition focus on business customers who bring more revenue.

AT&T and Verizon have adopted all three strategies, depending on where customers happen to live.

AT&T: If You are Still Waiting for DSL From Us, Forget It

In October, John J. Stephens, chief financial officer and executive vice-president at AT&T made it clear to investors the company’s interest in growing its legacy wired business had come to an end.  The company had lost landline customers for years, most switching to cell phone alternatives, sometimes sold by AT&T itself.  Spending enormous sums to upgrade AT&T’s copper landline network just didn’t make financial sense in every area.  Instead, AT&T split its operating territories in two: those suitable for upgrades to the company’s U-verse/IP platform, and those in smaller communities who will soon find themselves pushed to switch to AT&T wireless service instead.  That makes the prospects for customers still waiting for wired DSL service from AT&T pretty dim.

“We’ll continue to focus on transforming [existing] DSL lines into high speed [U-verse].” Stephens said. “In those areas where we don’t have U-verse, I think our plans have been fairly clear. We expect to have an LTE [wireless mobile broadband] rollout to 97% of the country. [...] We believe that’s going to be able to provide a wireless solution at a high speed, good quality, good cost on a profitable basis for us. That’s the long-term solution to the non-U-verse areas.”

AT&T’s lobbyists have signaled this agenda for years, pressing state and federal lawmakers to get rid of “universal service” requirements that mandate reliable, basic landline telephone service to any customer in their service area who requests it.  AT&T wants the definition of “basic telephone service” expanded to allow the company the option of discontinuing its landline network and selling rural residents cell phone service instead.  The expense associated with maintaining AT&T’s degrading copper wire network is always cause for grumbling on Wall Street, most recently after this year’s repair costs from storms that impacted some of AT&T’s service areas.  Storm damages brought outages in the southern United States, flooded regions along the Mississippi, and rained-out areas of California.

Those problems were exacerbated when AT&T’s repairs don’t always correct the problems.  Repeated outages blamed on inadequate repairs and investment brought negative publicity for the phone company, as well as a number of requests to disconnect service as customers find other providers.

In places where AT&T will never deploy U-verse, AT&T has been content asking lawmakers to ease up on the phone company, urging that minimum service standards and oversight be abolished, along with the power of regulators to fine the company for repeated transgressions.  AT&T argues increased competition makes regulation unnecessary.

AT&T: Wants to eliminate universal service for rural America.

AT&T’s bean counters have calculated investment in U-verse only makes sense in urban-suburban areas.  In more distant suburbs and rural areas, the return on investment isn’t fast enough to justify spending money up-front on service improvements.  Maintaining the decades-old landline network doesn’t make much sense to AT&T either.  Instead, the company sees wireless service as the best prospect to serve its rural customers (and deliver the company higher profits from the more expensive service plans that come with the phones).

“What I see happening with LTE and data is just a huge growth opportunity,” said Ralph de la Vega, CEO and president of AT&T Mobility & Consumer Markets. “We mentioned today that our smartphones now make up 52% of our postpaid base. But I think the way we need to think about smartphones in the future is the smartphone is going to equal the phone in the future. It will be 100% in the next 2 or 3 years. These devices are so good and the costs are coming down so much that I think in the future, you could look at close to 100% penetration.”

Some customers may find AT&T penetrating their wallets, but for the phone company, better days may be ahead:

• Moving customers to the wireless platform exposes them to higher revenue, higher-priced wireless service plans;
• Basic cell phones, which come with lower-priced voice plans are being increasingly replaced with smartphones which come with required, extra-cost data plans;
• Getting rid of the rural landline network slashes AT&T’s upkeep costs and holds customers in place with two-year service contracts common with wireless phones.

Consumers happy with their existing landline service may be less than impressed with AT&T’s cellular network coverage, its dropped call-problem, and the company’s alternative for rural broadband – heavily usage-capped and expensive LTE network access.  AT&T sells wired DSL plans for as little as $14.95 a month with a 150GB usage limit.  AT&T’s wireless LTE network will cost considerably more and is accompanied with usage limits a fraction of that amount.

Verizon: A Tale of Two Networks

Big Red has two wired landline networks: screaming fast FiOS fiber to the home for some, slow speed DSL over a decrepit copper wire network for everyone else.

Verizon is less opaque than AT&T regarding which service areas it treats as valued assets and which aren’t worth the time of day.  The company began selling off its undesirable customers several years ago, starting with Hawaii.  Northern New England was next, followed by several former GTE territories Verizon acquired in 2000.

While Verizon enjoyed the proceeds of the tax-free transactions, most of the impacted customers did not.  Hawaiian Telcom floundered for a few years with bad service and an outrageous debt load before declaring bankruptcy.  Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont suffered through a year-long transition to buyer FairPoint Communications, complete with poor service and notoriously inaccurate billing before that company also declared bankruptcy.  Former Verizon customers in the Pacific Northwest, Indiana, and West Virginia (among others) are coping with Frontier Communications own billing and service problems.

The FairPoint Trust called the $2.3 billion acquisition of Verizon’s New England operations “disastrous.”  It also echoed what Verizon obviously understood itself: its landline operation in New England had been allowed to deteriorate into “inferior assets that had no future.”

Frontier Communications itself judged the network it purchased from Verizon in West Virginia in need of serious upgrades and repairs.  Critics of the deal called Verizon’s West Virginia network “a technical disaster area.”

But while Verizon is capable of landline neglect, it is also the only major phone company delivering true fiber-to-the-home service over its award winning (and expensive to build) FiOS network.

The feast or famine approach Verizon has used for capital investments has resulted in amazing service for some, a loss of reliable service to many others.

FiOS has allowed Verizon to remain a serious player, particularly in the northeast, despite the onslaught of competition from Cablevision, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable.  Average revenues earned from FiOS customers are much higher than what the company earns from customers on its copper wire telephone network.

Some Verizon shareholders have never liked the price for the company’s fiber future.  When the economy tanked in late 2008, an indefinite suspension of FiOS expansion soon followed, leaving Verizon’s network expansion plans in limbo.  The company is still slowly completing the portion of its fiber network promised under existing agreements, but has avoided introducing the service in new cities and towns.  At the same time, Verizon is loathe to maintain investment in its antiquated copper wire landline network, which in some areas was supposed to be retired in favor of FiOS.

Bistro Chat Noir: Reliable Verizon phone service is not on the menu.

As long as Verizon’s older network can be held together, with fingers crossed, customers still have a dial tone.  But when things start to fail, customers are in for serious headaches.  They are popping aspirin almost daily at Bistro Chat Noir, a prestigious French restaurant along Madison Avenue on Manhattan’s Upper East Side.  If you plan to dine there, it is best to bring cash.  Even if the management wanted to take your Visa or Mastercard, the restaurant’s phone lines are out so often, they can’t easily process your payment.

These days, the resourceful owners rely on a neighbor’s graciously shared Wi-Fi connection (presumably powered by competitor Time Warner Cable) to process credit card transactions manually.

Waiting for FiOS

The New York Times wrote Verizon’s atrocious level of service isn’t isolated to one bistro:

“Obviously, this is not the way we want to do business,” said Ms. Latapie, who has started giving clients her personal cellphone number to avoid missing reservations when the restaurant’s phone is not performing properly. “When people can’t get through, I tell them it’s Verizon. And if they live in this area, they know — because they have the same problem.”

However irritating, sporadic utility failures are not uncommon. But along a a stretch of Madison Avenue in what is arguably the city’s most expensive shopping and eating district, phone and Internet blackouts have become a nightmarish routine of life for many expensive restaurants, stores and hotels.

For weeks now, mundane tasks — making dinner reservations and paying for purchases by credit card — have become a frustrating challenge.

“We are in the highest rent district in North America and we don’t have communication,” said Jillian Wright, whose spa on East 66th Street is on the second floor of a brownstone building and not ideal for walk-ins. Ms. Wright said she was losing clients daily, and her spa’s phone number goes straight to a voicemail message apologizing to clients for Verizon’s service.

The service failures have affected dozens of businesses, primarily in the East 60s along Madison Avenue. The scope of the problem varies, with some businesses having no phone or Internet service at all for the past several weeks and others experiencing blackouts that last days or a few hours.

Meetings with Verizon officials have deteriorated into spin-and-excuse sessions where company officials promise results but continue to deliver lousy service.  It turns out the problem is Verizon’s ancient copper wiring found underneath the streets in the area.  Just two feet away from Verizon’s cables are steam heating pipes, which warm the tunnels and create major condensation problems.  Couple that with water runoff from the streets above — salt-laden in the winter time — and you have a recipe for corrosion that destroys reliable phone service.

Eventually, Verizon plans to wire FiOS fiber across a large section of Madison Avenue, but with the company’s unwillingness to invest appropriate sums to get the job done, business and residential customers are simply kept waiting.

Or they can switch to Time Warner Cable, and many are.

Your Telephone Is Temporarily Out of Service…

A traditional overhead phone cable is packed with cable pairs for neighborhood phone service

Verizon’s service woes are not just for big city dwellers.  Residents in Virginia are coping with Verizon landline problems in suburban neighborhoods, too.  Verizon employees openly admit they are fighting a losing battle with management to replace defective cables and equipment that should have been replaced years ago.  Management keeps winning and customers keep losing.

“When we come to this area, we dread it,” admits Alex Long, a cable splicer at Verizon for 22 years.

Long just pulled up to a pole off Burksdale Road in Norfolk and found nothing he had not seen many times before  — untrimmed tree branches overgrown into the overhead wires.  The branches had managed to rub the phone cable’s insulation down to bare copper wire.

As a result, whenever it rains, telephone service in the neighborhood becomes sporadic.  If tree branches don’t knock service out, cable-chewing squirrels do.  The lines, the equipment, and the technology is well past its prime, but Verizon management insists repair crews fix what is already there instead of replacing it with something better.  It’s all a matter of money, and Verizon wants to spend as little as possible on its copper landline network.

Long’s experiences were the highlight of a piece published by the Virginian-Pilot, which has heard complaints from readers about dreadful Verizon phone service across the region.

The repairman discloses Verizon technicians have known about the bad cable for at least five years, but requests to replace it have been repeatedly rejected.

“The cable’s totally shot,” Long told the newspaper. “It needs to be replaced, and the company’s budget doesn’t allow for it. That’s what engineering keeps telling us.”

In Hampton Roads, Va., it is a case of the fiber haves and have nots.  The parts of Hampton Roads that have been upgraded to Verizon’s fiber to the home network are virtually trouble-free in comparison to neighborhoods where copper cables still deliver service.  Verizon’s legacy network is of such concern, the Virginia State Corporation Commission has increasingly taken a close look at the level of service Verizon is providing in non-FiOS areas.

William Irby, director of the commission’s Division of Communications, has heard plenty of concerns that Verizon is neglecting their copper network in favor of FiOS fiber.

Verizon’s copper wire neglect might not be such a big problem had the company provided a date certain for upgrade relief.  But with FiOS expansion also stalled, some cities are now wondering if Verizon is abandoning them.

Boston is one of them.

Left Behind: The Cities Without FiOS

Verizon FiOS is well-known in eastern Massachusetts.  There are those who have it and those who want it.  Verizon had been aggressively pursuing franchise agreements with 111 communities across the state until the company announced it was putting on the brakes and ceasing further expansion efforts in new areas.  That leaves Boston and other communities like Quincy behind because they didn’t sign agreements with the company fast enough.

Verizon FiOS customers get the good life: $90 a month for a triple-play package with a $300 Visa debit card reward for signing up.

“If you’ve got FiOS, lucky you,” shares Quincy resident Roger Jones. “If you don’t, good luck.”

Jones says Verizon has left Quincy with a neglected landline network the company doesn’t seem interested in maintaining, much less replacing with fiber optics.

“The company believed in fiber optics because they saw the opportunities fiber could deliver, like additional revenue from selling TV channels,” Jones says. “But then Wall Street caught up to them and said it was all too much.  I might even understand that, except they won’t spend a nickle maintaining what they already have either, unless the regulators twist their arms and threaten fines over the bad service.”

Jones says his Verizon phone line was out three times earlier this year.

“Three strikes and they were out — I switched to Comcast,” Jones says. “A Verizon repair guy that came to my house the third time said all of his relatives switched to Comcast because service got to be so unreliable with Verizon’s old network.”

Back on Burksdale Road in Norfolk, Long was trying to track down another customer’s phone troubles — a loud hum on their line.  Hours later, Long decided it was a futile effort and began looking for an unused replacement pair of good wires he could switch to for the customer.  With the growing number of Verizon customers disconnecting their landline service permanently, that task gets easier every day.

Long told the newspaper it was no surprise Burksdale Road customers were experiencing problems.  Closures which were designed to protect the cable where it splits off individual phone lines were supposed to be water and air-tight.  Instead, he was working with a deteriorating rubber enclosure that showed its age after years of service.  Unfortunately, he explains, Burksdale Road customers will simply have to make due.

Not only won’t Long be able to replace the deteriorating infrastructure he finds, he’ll be forced to improvise with Verizon’s latest cost-cutting solution for wet cables — covering them with sheeting that resembles a plastic garbage bag.  Even that is nothing new for Burksdale Road.  Several houses down, a cable “rain-slicker” was already tightly wrapped around a section of cable where the rubber closure had gone missing altogether.

After getting the dial tone back, Long handed the customer his business card with his direct number and apologized.

“You may have problems again,” he said, advising the customer to call him directly the next time his phone line stops working.

Verizon better hope the customer doesn’t call the local cable company to switch providers or disconnect his landline altogether.

On September 13, most PBS stations will premiere a new documentary, “Bill McGowan, Long Distance Warrior” exploring the many trials and tribulations of MCI Corporation, the long distance and e-mail provider that was instrumental in breaking up Ma Bell’s monopoly in telephone service.

A preview of PBS’ Long Distance Warrior, which premieres on most PBS stations Sept. 13  (3 minutes)

For those under 30, “MCI” may not mean much.  The company that helped pioneer competitive long distance calling was absorbed into the Worldcom empire in 1997, where it continued to provide service until a major corporate accounting scandal brought Worldcom down in 2002.  Most of what was left was eventually sold to Verizon Communications in 2005.

Remarkably, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was founded all the way back in 1963, but not as a provider of telephone services.  That MCI sought to build a network of microwave relay stations between Chicago and St. Louis to provide uninterrupted two-way radio service for some of the nation’s largest trucking and shipping companies.

The Bell System

By the late 1960s, William G. McGowan, an investor and venture capitalist from New York won a seat on MCI’s board of directors and part ownership of a newly-envisioned version of MCI — one that would provide businesses with a range of telecommunications products, including long distance telephone connections.  With many American corporations maintaining branch and regional offices, connecting them together was a potentially very lucrative business, especially if MCI could deliver the service at prices cheaper than what the monopoly Bell System was charging.

With their microwave relay network, now expanding across the country, MCI could distribute long distance phone calls cheaply and efficiently, if they could find a way to connect that network to Bell’s local phone system.  After all, it does little good to offer long distance service if you cannot connect calls to the businesses’ existing telephone equipment.

That’s where AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies objected.  For them, only calls originating on and delivered over their own network should be allowed.  MCI, as an interloper, was seeking to use the network AT&T built and paid for.  It’s an argument that has echoed more than 30 years later, when AT&T’s then-CEO Ed Whitacre objected to outside Internet content providers “using AT&T’s pipes for free.”

On the occasion of MCI’s 20th anniversary, the company produced this retrospective exploring the difficult times competing with AT&T and the Bell System.  (9 minutes)

MCI's best argument: AT&T's long distance bills

McGowan confronted arguments from AT&T executives who warned that competitive long distance would destroy the business model of America’s Bell System, which provided affordable local phone service to all 50 states, in part subsidized by long distance telephone rates, mostly paid by its commercial customers.  Tamper with that, they warned, and local phone bills would be forced to soar to make up the difference.

MCI called that argument a scare tactic, and suggested instead that AT&T’s monopoly had grown inefficient, bloated, expensive, and resistant to innovation and change.  MCI could deliver a substantially less expensive service and would force AT&T to increase its own efficiency to compete.  AT&T wasn’t interested in that argument and sued, repeatedly, to keep MCI out of its business.

By 1984, federal courts declared AT&T a monopoly worthy of a break-up, and opened the door to MCI’s long distance network.  By that time, MCI was already thinking about evolving itself beyond a business long distance provider, whose network was largely idle after business hours.  Because most Americans were accustomed to making long distance calls at night when rates were substantially lower, MCI developed new residential long distance service plans that encouraged customers to use that idle network at night and on weekends.

One of MCI’s most memorable ads features a sobbing mother who reached out and touched her son over long distance a little too much.  (1 minute)

Thus began more than a decade of heavy advertising and competition for the long distance telephone market.  With equal access rules in place, consumers could choose their own long distance phone company and shop for the one with the lowest rates.  Competitors like Sprint, WilTel, LDDS, RCI, LCI, and yes, even AT&T all pitched their own calling plans.

MCI also pioneered MCI Mail, one of the first commercial electronic mail systems.  The original concept had businesses typing letters on a computer terminal, printed on standard paper at an MCI office closest to the destination, and then mailed in an envelope through the U.S. Post Office.  This poor-man’s version of a telex or telegram worked for businesses that wanted overnight delivery, but not at the prices charged by shippers like Federal Express.  In larger cities, MCI Mail could offer businesses delivery of their electronic communications within four hours, something closer to a traditional telegram of days gone-by.

MCI Mail’s hard copy deliveries wouldn’t last long, of course.  As the 1980s progressed, the fax machine and the more familiar all-electronic e-mail we think of today became firmly established.  As MCI Mail became less relevant, the company innovated into offering low priced telex services, mass-faxing, and data backhaul services to provide connectivity for online networks.

WIBW explores a new concept in communications — something called ‘electronic mail,’ a service that bewildered consumers in the early 1980s.  This report from 1984.  (2 minutes)

Bill McGowan: Would not approve of AT&T's plans to restore the glory days of the past.

AT&T, in contrast, was still getting over the loss of its local Bell Operating Companies — the regional phone companies most Americans did business with, and the loss of revenue earned from renting telephone equipment.  For years, AT&T long distance was branded as a quality leader, not a price leader.  It maintained its enormous market share partly through consumer indifference — customers who did not initially choose a new long distance carrier remained with AT&T, the default choice.

It took only about a decade after the Bell break-up for telecom industry lobbyists to begin advocating for enough deregulation to allow many of those former Baby Bells to re-combine through mergers and acquisitions.  The result is today’s AT&T, formed from its long distance unit, BellSouth, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Nevada Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Wisconsin Bell, and Southern New England Telephone.  Its largest competitor is Verizon Communications, which itself resulted from a combination of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE, and what was left of MCI after Worldcom was through with it.

McGowan’s fight was a personally costly one.  A workaholic, McGowan routinely put in 15 hour work days and drank up to 20 cups of coffee daily.  His heart finally had enough and McGowan succumbed to a heart attack in 1992 at age 64.  But he leaves a legacy and two decades of fighting to break up AT&T’s monopoly, which he always believed was bad for consumers and business (unless you were AT&T, of course).  That’s an important message as AT&T strengthens its resolve to acquire one of its significant competitors in the profitable wireless market — T-Mobile.  McGowan would have never approved.

“The Computer Chronicles,” a production of KCSM-TV, spent a half hour in June 1987 showing off electronic e-mail service from MCI and how consumers and businesses using something called a “modem” could connect their home computers with online databases and services to exchange information and communications back and forth.  And for those business travelers on the road, away from their office computers, Speech Plus offered a product that could still keep you “connected,” by reading your e-mail to you over the phone.  In 1987, outside of commercial pay networks like CompuServe, Delphi, PeopleLink and QuantumLink, most Americans with modems used them to connect to typically-free hobbyist-run computer bulletin board systems.  Widespread access to “the Internet” would take another 5-6 years.  (29 minutes)

The thin horizontal line found in this chart represents the rate of inflation. The individual bars show just how high Tennessee cable operators raised their rates from 1986-1989, when deregulation allowed them to charge "sky is the limit" prices. (click to enlarge)

On this Memorial Day, we thought it might be a good time to look back to years past when legislators were forced to deal with a deregulated cable industry that immediately went on a rate hike spree that was unprecedented even for oil companies.

In 1984, cable television companies won the right of complete rate deregulation, arguing government involvement in the cable business was retarding investment, harming innovation, and killing jobs.  By keeping the cable industry free of government regulation, the industry promised improved service, more innovation, and even the potential for more competition.  The importance of this drive to deregulation was underlined with a flood of campaign contributions from some of the biggest players in the industry.

In the mid-1980s, that lineup included the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the cable industry lobbying group led by James Mooney.  Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)’s John Malone — dubbed Darth Vadar of a Cable Cosa Nostra by then Sen. Albert Gore, Jr., and an assortment of cable industry executives from companies like Warner-Amex, Sammons Cable, Cablevision, and a variety of other operators large and small.

TCI would later become AT&T Cable and then eventually evolve into today’s Comcast.  Warner-Amex is today Time Warner Cable.  Sammons joined dozens of other medium-sized multiple cable system operators in selling out to larger players — in this case TCI.  Cablevision sold off most of its systems outside of the metropolitan New York City region to companies like Time Warner Cable.

After winning near-complete deregulation, Americans saw the start of a relentless series of rate increases Tony Soprano would not have attempted.  Called “price adjustments” or a benign “pricing reset” by cable lobbyists, what used to be an average rate for basic cable amounting to just over $11 per month rapidly increased to $16, $19, $25, $29, $35, $45, $50, $55, and now today’s frequently seen $60 threshold for a basic cable package.

What used to be an exciting new product in the late 1970s and early 1980s was now rapidly becoming a highly consolidated handful of corporate empires that promised to be money machines for shareholders.  At one point, adding up the number of corporate entities that were parented under TCI, including local and regional cable systems, programming distributors, cable networks, and other entities generated a printout more than six feet in length.

The mid-to-late 1980s were the cable industry’s glory years, with unfettered rate increases sometimes resulting in more than doubling customer bills.  Members of Congress got an earful from irate consumers who noticed even with the higher prices, the quality of service received deteriorated markedly.  Many cable systems simply left an answering machine on their service and support line.  Others left local cable offices locked and closed for business.

There were many reasons for the deterioration:

• Investors saw the best possible returns buying and selling existing cable systems, not investing -in- them;
• Some cable systems changed hands 3-4 times in just a few years, leading to staffing shortages, billing chaos, and confusion;
• Some small operators saw no need to invest in aging cable systems when their value was skyrocketing during the consolidation era.  They waited for a buyout offer and cashed out of the business;
• There was no enforcement agency capable of stopping the abusive business practices;
• There was almost no competition.

Before becoming part of the Comcast empire, Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation's largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

Competition in the cable industry was a rarity in the 1980s, but a handful of communities did have more than one cable operator, with lower rates and better service the result.  But pressure from investors forced most of these competitive anomalies to either divide into respective monopoly service territories, or forced one company to sell their business to the other.  Competition and rate wars were bad for business.

The satellite dish industry was the only national competitor to cable television at this time.  Before DirecTV and DISH, rural and suburban homeowners erected often enormous backyard satellite dishes of up to 12 feet in diameter.  Capable of receiving hundreds of channels with better picture quality, home satellite offered an experience somewhat familiar to those with large rooftop antennas.  Rotate the dish slightly and enjoy two dozen or more channels on each respective satellite.  More than three million Americans eventually installed satellite dishes, even with the entry cost of installation and assembly, which could run several thousand dollars.  For rural Americans, it often meant the difference between some television and none at all.

Never tolerant of competition, the satellite industry came under a withering attack on all fronts:

• Cable programming was scrambled and either unavailable to satellite dishowners at any price, or sold at prices similar to what cable subscribers would pay, even though home dishowners owned and maintained their own equipment;
• Most cable networks at that time were either owned outright or tacitly subject to cable industry pressure not to sell programming at steep discounts;
• Premium cable channels often sold programming to satellite dishowners at prices higher than those paid by cable subscribers;
• Home dishowners were required to purchase their own decoder box outright, at a cost exceeding $300 — an enormous price at a time when most people paid less than $20 a month for basic cable service;
• Cable companies encouraged or defended town zoning laws which required would-be dishowners to purchase expensive permits, hide their dishes from view (and sometimes viewable signals in the process), or ban their use outright;
• In the case of networks owned by TCI, consumers with satellite dishes often had to buy the programming from their nearest TCI cable system and be billed by them.  So much for avoiding the cable company.

Then-Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tenn.) got into the fight against unregulated cable when cable rates in his home state of Tennessee more than doubled.

The worst abuses, and corresponding distortions from the cable industry, occurred from 1987-1992.  More than a dozen pieces of legislation attempted to correct the over-deregulation of the industry, but campaign contributions to both parties meant years of failed attempts.  Some of the worst anti-consumer officials included Sen. Tim Wirth (D-Colorado) who happened to represent the state where the vast majority of large cable companies were headquartered at that time, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), who read industry talking points and was skeptical about stories of cable abuse, and Sens. Bob Packwood (R-Washington) and Bob Dole (R-Kansas) who didn’t like government regulation and thought the abuses would be self-correcting if consumers cancelled service.

Many of the heroes of the cable fight of the last generation remain familiar names.  Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee) was perhaps the industry’s greatest foe.  He began the fight as a congressman in the mid-1980s and carried the battle all the way through 1993, when he became vice president under the Clinton Administration.  Other notables included Sen. Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky), who is a far cry from today’s two senators in Kentucky.  Ford heard complaints about Kentucky cable companies almost daily.  Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who wasted no time calling the cable industry an outrageous unregulated monopoly. Sen. John Danforth (R-Missouri) railed against the cable industry and was instrumental in helping pass legislation in 1992 that finally ended the worst abuses.

What the cable industry promoted and defended in 1987 for cable television will haunt you when you consider they are appealing for the same types of “hands-off” policies for broadband today.  Only now they are joined by the nation’s largest phone companies.  In the early 1990s, the telephone companies were threatening to compete with the cable industry and the two were considered foes.  But once an industry player becomes well-established, they defend their right to raise rates, restrict service, and retard any additional competition.

To give you a taste of what the abuses were like, and the industry’s efforts to excuse them, we present coverage of a Senate hearing held in November, 1989 pitting cable industry titans against would-be competitors and government officials from towns and cities trying to deal with a cable “bad actor” in their midst.  Some of the most interesting parallels come in the very last video as you watch Chuck Dawson, representing consumers and independent satellite dealers, detailing the schemes by the cable industry to kill off any threats.  Pay particular attention as he discusses the lies the industry will tell to predict the imminent failure of its then-newest competitor — the home satellite dish industry.  It’s a game plan they’ve used again fighting off community broadband.

QUBE's "revolutionary" interactive wired remote control, from 1978 (courtesy: QUBE-tv.com)

Happy Thanksgiving to all Stop the Cap! readers.

While we take a break from our usual reports, let’s turn the clock all the way back to 1978, an era before broadband (or dial-up for the most part) and even before most of the basic cable networks know today existed.  Cable television was not even an option yet in many communities, although discussions about the concept were well underway.

In Columbus, Ohio Warner Cable constructed an experimental two-way cable system called QUBE, which brought 30,000 homes in the city access to interactive, locally-produced programming.  Viewers could vote on different topics, share their opinions, answer quizzes, and order individual pay-per-view movies — a new concept for most people back then.

Cable television in 1978 didn’t deliver CNN, TNT, ESPN, or any of dozens of other cable networks that are household names today.  Instead, most delivered clear signals of broadcast television stations received over the air from a master antenna mounted high above the local cable company, supplemented with text-based information channels running newswires, sports scores, financial tickers, weather and other wire service reports.  Locally produced government, public access and educational programming covered much of the rest of the channel lineup.  Cable radio hooked up to home stereos and delivered improved FM radio reception and some privately run cable radio stations.

QUBE was no different in this respect.  The bulk of the programming people watched came from local broadcasters and imported stations from Indianapolis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Athens — all selected from a wired remote control.  It total, QUBE carried 30 channels, 10 of which were premium or pay per view.  The concept was so revolutionary, some folks traveled from miles around to record sample programming off the system and share copies of videotapes with other cable enthusiasts.

QUBE was not a financial success for Warner, however.  The costs to produce interactive programming, building brand new cable systems, and purchasing the equipment to run them, caused Warner to accumulate $875 million in total debt by 1983.  It abandoned the concept a few years later because new cable networks and superstations were rapidly signing on, creating a huge number of new viewing options that effectively drowned out the locally-produced interactive shows.  Cable would remain a one-way medium, at least for awhile.

Watching the enthusiasm of Ray Glasser, who produced the video included below, all over a 30-channel cable system was fascinating, as was watching the assortment of television stations sampled from more than 30 years ago.  And check out those supermarket prices listed on one of the text channels Ray previews.  After a series of sales and ownership transfers, Warner Cable still exists in Columbus.  But today, we know it better as Time Warner Cable.

A video tour of Warner Cable’s QUBE system in Columbus, Ohio, produced in 1978 by Ray Glasser.  (50 minutes)

Today’s merger between CenturyTel (soon to be CenturyLink) and Qwest will combine 10 million Qwest customers and 7 million from CenturyTel into a single company serving 37 states in every region of the country except the northeast and much of California and Nevada.  CenturyLink gains access to Qwest’s highly valued portfolio of services sold to business customers and Qwest gets a partner that can help manage its $11.8 billion debt and help grow the last remaining Baby Bell, formerly known as US West, into a national player capable of withstanding ongoing erosion of landline service.

The deal will impact consumers and businesses, and will challenge regulatory authorities to consider the implications of ongoing consolidation in the traditional telephone service marketplace.  It brings implications for broadband service strategies for both companies, which we’ll explore in greater detail.

Breaking Up Was Too Hard to Do, So Let’s Put It Back Together

Ultimately, the genesis of this, and most of the other big telecom deals that we’ve witnessed over the past few years comes from the 1996 Communications Act, which deregulated large parts of the telecommunications industry and triggered a massive wave of consolidation that is still ongoing.  That legislation was the antithesis of the 1984 court ruling which ultimately led to the breakup of AT&T and the Bell System monopoly in 1984.  When President Clinton signed the 1996 bill into law, it allowed much of the Bell System to eventually recombine into two major entities:

• AT&T ultimately pieced itself back together with the acquisitions of:

BellSouth — serving the southeastern United States

Ameritech — serving the upper Midwest

SBC/Southwestern Bell — serving Texas and several southern prairie states

Pacific Telesis — serving California and Nevada

• Verizon became a regional powerhouse by combining:

NYNEX — serving New England and New York

Bell Atlantic — serving mid-Atlantic states

Qwest Tower - Denver

The remaining orphaned Baby Bell was US West, which comprised Mountain Bell serving the Rocky Mountain states, Northwestern Bell which covered the Dakotas, Minnesota, the prairie states not covered by SBC, and Pacific Northwest Bell which managed service for Oregon, Washington, and northern Idaho.  US West was subjected to a hostile takeover in 2000 by an upstart telecommunications company that was laying fiber optic cable in the late 1990s alongside the railways its owner, Philip Anschutz, also happened to own.  Qwest assumed control of US West that summer and rechristened it with its own name.  Owned by a Bell outsider, Qwest has always been the company that didn’t quite fit with the rest.

The company gained respect for its enormous fiber backbone that weaves across many American cities, including several in the northeast.  It is best known for its services to business customers.  On the residential side, the story is less impressive.  The company’s customer service record is spotty and the company has accumulated an enormous amount of legacy debt left over from earlier acquisitions.  Despite the company’s repeated efforts to find a partner, it took until today for it to finally find one.  There are several reasons for this:

1. Qwest’s service area is notoriously rural and expensive to serve.  Outside of its corporate headquarters in Denver, the majority of its service area is either mountainous or rural.  Even today, Qwest serves only 10 million residential customers, almost matched by CenturyTel’s own seven million largely rural customers scattered across the country.
2. Qwest’s history has been littered with financial scandals, starting with a series of deals with disgraced Enron from 1999-2001.  That was followed with charges of fraud and insider trading in 2005.
3. Qwest does not own its own wireless division and its previous efforts to deliver television service to customers were largely unsuccessful.  That made Qwest’s ability to withstand erosion in its core business – landline phone service, more difficult.
4. Qwest’s debt is downright frightening for would-be suitors.

Why Does CenturyTel Want to Buy Qwest?

CenturyTel claims such a transaction allows a combined company to become a larger player on the national scene.  By combining Qwest’s good reputation in the business telecommunications sector with combined efforts to deliver broadband products including high speed Internet, the company thinks the combination can’t be beat.  CenturyTel envisions packages of video entertainment, data hosting and managed services, as well as fiber to cell tower connectivity and other high bandwidth services to deliver replacement revenue lost from disconnected landlines.  It also believes it can realize cost savings from the merger and keep the company relevant on a stage dominated by Verizon, AT&T, and a few large cable companies.

But there are other reasons.  For the three super-sized independent phone companies that Americans are growing increasingly familiar with — Frontier Communications, Windstream Communications, and CenturyTel, their business models depend on their ability to constantly engage in deal-making and acquisitions.  All three companies have built their businesses on investors who see their stocks as “investment grade” financial instruments that dependably return a dividend back to shareholders.  As we’ve seen in countless quarterly financial results conference calls, all three companies are preoccupied answering questions from Wall Street about the all-important dividend.  TV personalities like Jim Cramer has specifically recommended these telecom stocks based, in part, on their dividend payout.  If that dividend dramatically shrunk or stopped, the share price for all three stocks would likely plummet.

One of the side effects of companies dependent on dividend payouts is their constant need to be on the lookout for additional merger and acquisition opportunities.  Here’s how it works.  Let’s say CenturyTel’s debt load and reduced revenue, caused by customer defections to cell phones or cable phone service, delivered a bad fiscal quarter for the company.  Cash flow was down, and company officials simply couldn’t keep the dividend payout at the same level as the previous quarter.  Since many people hold CenturyTel stock specifically because of the dividend, a downward turn in that payout could cause some to sell their shares, driving the stock price downwards.

CenturyTel is still digesting a previous merger with EMBARQ, which led it to rechristen the company CenturyLink

One way around this is to seek out a new merger or acquisition target.  By bringing two companies together, preferably one with a healthy cash flow, suddenly the big picture changes.  Your balance sheet now reflects the combined revenue from both companies, which incidentally makes the percentage of debt versus revenue look a lot healthier.  Cash flow immediately improves, especially if you can slash redundant costs.  Come next quarter, that dividend payout is right back up in healthy territory.

Sometimes companies become so preoccupied with their dividend and corresponding stock price, it can lead them to pay out more in dividends than a company earns in revenue.  While that’s great for investors, it is unsustainable in the long run.

Many critics of telecommunications companies employing this strategy claim it’s evidence that a company is biding time and unwilling to invest in innovation for the future.  Some also believe dividend payouts shortchange customers because they can eventually bleed a company’s ability to invest in service improvements, research and development, and capital investments to maintain their network and expand service.

As consolidation continues, the number of new buyout opportunities begins to shrink, and one shudders to think what happens when there is no one else to buy.  How long is this business model sustainable?

Both CenturyTel and Qwest also recognize the impact of ongoing disconnections from landline service, now averaging 10 percent of their customers a year.  Those departing customers are now relying on their cell phones or alternative calling services like cable company “digital phone” service or broadband-based calling from companies like Vonage or Skype.

The one service they hope can stem customer defections is broadband.  Unfortunately, telephone companies are increasingly losing ground against their cable modem competitors, who have an easier time increasing broadband speeds for customers now seeking online video and other high bandwidth applications.

Of course, one of the benefits of being a “rural phone company” is the fact cable competition is often unlikely.  In fact, some of the lowest erosion rates for landline service are in rural communities where the telephone company is the only game in town.  There is plenty of money still to be made offering high priced slow speed DSL service in communities with no cable competitor and spotty wireless broadband that is often slower and usage-limited.

All three of these big independent players are well aware of this, and maintaining a strong position in relatively slow speed DSL service also protects another revenue stream — Universal Service Fund revenue given to rural providers to equalize telephone rates.  CenturyTel recognizes the increasing likelihood much of that money will be diverted to stimulating broadband expansion, something the phone company is more than willing to do if it means preserving their subsidies.

The new combined Qwest-CenturyTel company hopes the merger can help both survive obsolescence.

For Qwest, a debt reduction may make it possible to spend more to deliver fiber-to-the-curb service, similar to AT&T U-verse.  That could increase broadband speeds and prompt them to reconsider their earlier decision to abandon IPTV in the western half of the country.

CenturyTel can continue to offer traditional DSL service with a more incremental upgrade approach in its more rural service areas, but tap into Qwest’s fiber network to reduce backhaul expenses and potentially pick up new business customers by offering Qwest-branded business services.  Company officials strongly hinted that, at least for now, CenturyTel’s existing customers will continue to find the video portion of their “triple play” package delivered by DirecTV satellite service, so no IPTV for them.

CenturyTel and Qwest's combined local service areas

What Does This Mean for Employees of Both Companies?

Mergers like this always generate great excitement over “cost savings” made possible by the merger.  Much of these savings typically come from employee expenses.  When you hear “cost savings,” think layoffs and pay cuts for all but top management.  Based on past precedent, Qwest employees can anticipate some serious job losses if this transaction closes, especially in the business office.  The combined company will be henceforth known as CenturyLink, with headquarters remaining in Monroe, Louisiana.  That is potentially bad news for Qwest’s employees in Denver.

The transaction is expected to generate annual operating cost savings (which CenturyTel calls “synergies”) of approximately $575 million, which are expected to be fully realized three to five years following closing.  The transaction also is expected to generate annual capital expenditure “synergies” of approximately $50 million within the first two years after close.  That means spending less on infrastructure improvements.

Billing and customer service are traditionally handled by CenturyTel when a company joins the CenturyTel family.  North Carolina customers can attest to that as EMBARQ, an earlier CenturyTel target, finally moves to CenturyTel’s billing system in the coming weeks.

For the sake of pushing the merger through state regulatory agencies, cutbacks in unionized technicians who handle service installations, repairs, and maintain the lines are not expected.  The Communications Workers of America issued a statement today that mildly acknowledged the merger announcement, saying the union “looked forward to serious negotiations with both companies” regarding employment security and assurances of aggressive high speed broadband rollout throughout both companies’ territories.

How the combined CenturyTel-Qwest company stacks up against other independent phone companies. (Q-Qwest, CTL-CenturyTel, FTR-Frontier, WIN-Windstream)

What Does This Mean for Qwest and CenturyTel Customers?

In the short term, nothing.  This merger will take at least a year to complete, assuming regulatory approval in every state where a review is required by state officials.  In 2011, should the merger be approved, Qwest customers can anticipate transition headaches as the Denver-based company winds down operations in favor of CenturyTel.  Billing and customer service will both be impacted.  Long term plans for major projects are likely to be stalled until the merger settles into place.  CenturyTel business customers will eventually see Qwest’s strong business products line become available in many CenturyTel service areas.  Eventually, some larger CenturyTel-served cities may find Qwest’s more advanced DSL service arriving on the scene delivering faster speeds.

Although CenturyTel has hinted it may review whether it’s now large enough to operate its own wireless mobile division, for the near term, expect the partnership to resell Verizon Wireless service to continue.

What is the View of Stop the Cap! on the CenturyTel-Qwest Merger?

Generally speaking, most of the industry consolidation that has been fueled by a deregulatory framework established by the Clinton Administration has not benefited consumers anywhere near the level promised by deregulation advocates.  The three largest independent phone company consolidators — Frontier, Windstream, and CenturyTel are spending more time and resources looking for new acquisitions and schemes to pay out dividends than they are working to enhance service in their respective service areas.  Smaller independent phone companies are deploying fiber to the home networks and answer to the communities where they work and live.  From companies like Frontier, we get Internet Overcharging schemes combined with slow DSL service, tricks and traps from “price protection agreements” that automatically renew, rate increases, and cost cutting.  Windstream plagues some of their customers with extended service outages, and CenturyTel’s promised broadband speeds often don’t deliver.

Unfortunately, bigger is not always better in telecommunications.  While the biggest players like Verizon seek to discard rural American customers, getting one of these three companies instead doesn’t always represent progress.  Our regulators are too often satisfied with basic answers to questions about broadband and service improvements that come with few details and deadlines.  It is just as important to ask what kind of broadband service a company will bring, at what speeds and price, and what usage limits, if any, will accompany the service.

Companies engaged in these mergers hope regulators don’t pin them down to specific service commitments and standards, which could harm the financial windfall these deals bring to a select few.  But they must be the first thing on the table, guaranteeing that customers also get the enjoy the “synergies” these deals are supposed to bring.