News that two major cable operators are contemplating breaking up Time Warner Cable and dividing customers between them has caused stock prices to jump for all three of the companies involved.

CNBC reported Friday that Time Warner Cable approached Comcast earlier this year about a possible friendly takeover under Comcast’s banner to avoid an anticipated leveraged takeover bid by Charter Communications. Top Time Warner Cable executives have repeatedly stressed any offer that left a combined company mired in debt would be disadvantageous to Time Warner Cable shareholders, a clear reference to the type of offer Charter is reportedly preparing. But the executives also stressed they were not ruling out any merger or sale opportunities.

News that there were two potential rivals for Time Warner Cable excited investors, particularly when it was revealed possible suitor Comcast is also separately talking to Charter about a possible joint bid that would split up Time Warner Cable customers while minimizing potential regulatory scrutiny.

The Wall Street Journal reported Charter is nearing completion of a complicated financing arrangement that some analysts expect could include up to $15 billion in debt to finance a buyout of Time Warner Cable. Such deals are not unprecedented. Dr. John Malone’s specialty is leveraged buyouts, a technique he used extensively in the 1980s and 1990s to buy countless smaller cable operators in a quest to build Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) into the nation’s then-biggest cable operator.

In addition to Barclays Bank, Bank of America, and Deutsche Bank — all expected to finance Malone’s bid — Comcast may also inject cash should it team up with Charter’s buyout. Comcast is interested in acquiring new markets without drawing fire from antitrust regulators.

If the two companies do join forces and pull off a deal, Time Warner Cable’s current subscribers will be transitioned to Charter or Comcast within a year. That is what happened in 2006 to former customers of bankrupt Adelphia Cable who eventually became Comcast or Time Warner Cable customers. Analysts predict the two companies would divide up Time Warner Cable territory according to their respective footprints. New York and Texas would likely face a switch to Comcast service, for example, while North Carolina, Ohio, Maine, and Southern California would likely be turned over to Charter.

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CNBC reports Charter Cable and Comcast might both be interested in a buyout of Time Warner Cable that would dismantle the company and divide subscribers between them. (4:18)

Reportedly financing the next era of cable consolidation.

Both bids are very real possibilities according to Wall Street analysts. Comcast has sought formal guidance on how to deal with the antitrust implications of a controversial merger between the largest and second-largest cable operators in the country. The industry has laid the groundwork for another wave of consolidation by winning its 2009 court challenge of FCC rules limiting the total market share of any single cable operator to 30 percent. Despite that, a Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal would still face intense scrutiny from the Justice Department. Getting the deal past the FCC may be a deal-breaker, admits Craig Moffett from MoffettNathanson.

“The FCC applies a public interest test that would be much more subjective,” Moffett said. “It wouldn’t be a slam dunk by any means. The FCC would be concerned that Comcast would have de facto control over what would be available on television. If a programmer couldn’t cut a deal with Comcast, they wouldn’t exist.”

Roberts

Supporters and opponents of the deal are already lining up. Charter shareholders would likely benefit from a Charter-only buyout so they generally support the deal. Time Warner Cable clearly prefers a deal with Comcast because it can afford a buyout without massive debt financing and deliver shareholder value. Comcast shareholders are also encouraging Comcast to consider s deal with Time Warner Cable. Left out of the equation are Time Warner Cable customers, little more than passive bystanders watching the multi-billion dollar drama.

The personalities involved may also be worth considering, because Comcast CEO Brian Roberts and John Malone have history, notes the Los Angeles Times:

Malone and Roberts first brushed up against each other more than two decades ago. At that time, both Liberty and Comcast were shareholders in Turner Broadcasting, the parent of CNN, TNT, TBS and Cartoon Network. When Time Warner, which was also a shareholder, made a move to buy the entire company,  there was tension because Comcast felt Liberty got a better deal to sell its stake. Roberts grumbled at the time that Liberty was getting “preferential treatment.”

A few years later, it was Malone’s turn to be mad at Roberts. When TCI founder Bob Magness died in 1996, Roberts made a covert attempt to buy his shares, which would have given him control of [TCI]. Malone beat back the effort, but it left a bad taste in his mouth.

“Malone was livid,” wrote Mark Robichaux in his book, “Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business.”

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Even cable stock analyst Craig Moffett is somewhat pessimistic a Comcast-TWC merger would have smooth sailing through the FCC’s approval process. Moffett worries Comcast would have too much power over programming content. (3:53)

Ironically, when Malone sold TCI to AT&T, the telephone company would later sell its cable assets to Comcast, run by… and Brian Roberts.

Most of the cable industry agrees that the increasing power of broadcasters, studios, and cable programmers is behind the renewed interest in cable consolidation. The industry believes consolidation provides leverage to block massive rate increases in renewal contracts. If a programmer doesn’t budge, the network could instantly lose tens of millions of potential viewers until a new contract is signed.

Many in the cable industry suspect when Glenn Britt retires as CEO by year’s end, Time Warner Cable’s days are numbered. But any new owner should not expect guaranteed smooth sailing.

“We expect a Comcast-TWC deal would draw intense antitrust/regulatory scrutiny and likely resistance, stoked by raw political pushback from cable critics and possibly rivals who would argue it’s simply a ‘bridge too far’ or ‘unthinkable,’” Stifel telecom analysts Christopher C. King and David Kaut wrote in a recent note to clients. “We believe government approval would be possible, but it would be costly, with serious risk. This would be a brawl.”

Usage Cap Man may soon visit Time Warner Cable customers if either Charter or Comcast becomes the new owner.

While the industry frames consolidation around cable TV programming costs, broadband consumers also face an impact from any demise of Time Warner Cable. To date, Time Warner Cable executives have repeatedly defended the presence of an unlimited use tier for its residential broadband customers. Charter has imposed usage caps and Comcast is studying how to best reimpose them. Either buyer would likely move Time Warner Cable customers to a usage-based billing system that could threaten online video competition.

“Our sense is the DOJ and FCC would have concerns about the market fallout of expanded cable concentration and vertical integration, in a broadband world where cable appears to have the upper hand over wireline telcos in most of the country (i.e., outside of the Verizon FiOS and other fiber-fed areas),” Stifel’s King and Kaut wrote. “We suspect the government would raise objections about the potential for Comcast-TWC bullying of competitors and suppliers, given the extent and linkages of their cable/broadband distribution, programming control, and broadcast ownership.”

Since none of the three providers compete head-on, the loss of “competition” would be minimal. Any Comcast-Time Warner Cable deal would likely include semi-voluntary restrictions like those attached to Comcast’s successful acquisition of NBC-Universal, including short-term bans on discriminating against content providers on its broadband service.

Customers can expect a welcome letter from Comcast and/or Charter Cable as early as spring of next year if Time Warner Cable accepts one of the deals.

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Bloomberg News reports if Comcast helps finance a deal between Charter and Time Warner Cable, Comcast would likely grab Time Warner Cable systems in New York for itself. (2:26)

The next name of Time Warner Cable?

Charter Communications is laying the foundation for a leveraged buyout of Time Warner Cable before the end of the year in a deal that could leave Time Warner Cable’s broadband customers with Charter’s usage caps.

Reuters reported discussions between the two companies grew more serious after last week’s revelation a poor third quarter left TWC with 308,000 fewer subscribers.

Charter is relying on guidance from Goldman Sachs to structure a financing deal likely to leave Charter in considerable debt. Charter Communications emerged from bankruptcy in 2009 and is the country’s tenth largest cable operator, estimated to be worth about $13 billion. Time Warner Cable is the second largest cable operator and is worth more than $34 billion.

The disparity between the two companies has kept Time Warner Cable resistant to a deal with Charter, stating it would not be beneficial to shareholders. Charter executives hope to eventually win shareholder support for a buyout stressing the significant cost savings possible from a combined operation, particularly for cable programming.

The deal would likely end Time Warner Cable as a brand and leave Charter Communications CEO Thomas Rutledge in charge of a much larger cable company. Pricing and packaging decisions are usually made by the buyer, which could bring faster broadband speeds to Time Warner customers, but also usage caps already in place at Charter.

John Malone’s War on Customers

Malone

Cable billionaire John Malone, former CEO of Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) — America’s largest cable operator in the 1980s — believes consolidation is critical to the future of a cable business facing competition from phone companies and cord cutting. Malone’s Liberty Media, which now holds a 25% stake in Charter, is currently buying and consolidating cable operators in Europe. Malone’s post-consolidation vision calls for only two or three cable operators in the United States.

Malone’s quest for consolidation is nothing new.

Under his leadership, TCI eventually became the country’s biggest cable operator, but one often accused of poor service and high prices. More than a decade of complaints from customers eventually attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress, which sought to rein in the industry with the 1992 Cable Act — legislation that lightly regulated rental fees for equipment and the price of the company’s most-basic television tier.

Despite the fact consumer advocates didn’t win stronger consumer protection regulations, TCI was still incensed it faced a new regulatory environment that left its hands tied. One executive at a TCI subsidiary advocated retaliation with broad rate increases for unregulated services to make up any losses from mandated rate cuts.

A 1993 internal TCI memo obtained by the Washington Post instructed TCI system managers and division vice presidents to increase prices charged for customer service calls and add new fees for common installation services the company used to offer for free. TCI’s Barry Marshall recommended charging for as many “transaction” services as possible — like hooking up VCR’s, running cable wire, and programming remote controls for confused customers.

“We have to have discipline,” Marshall wrote. “We cannot be dissuaded from the [new] charges simply because customers object. It will take awhile, but they’ll get used to it. The best news of all is we can blame it on re-regulation and the government now. Let’s take advantage of it!”

Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation’s largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

The FCC’s interim chairman at the time — James Quello, charged with monitoring the cable industry, was not amused.

“It typifies the attitude of cable companies engaging in creative pricing and rate increases to evade the intent of Congress and the FCC,” Quello said. “There is little doubt that the cable industry has an economic stake in discrediting the congressional act they vehemently and unsuccessfully opposed.”

Marshall defended his internal memo, although admitted it was inartfully written and was not intended for the public. Revelation of a damaging memo like this would normally lead to a quiet resignation by the offending author, but not at John Malone’s TCI, a company with a reputation for being difficult.

Mark Robichaux’s 2005 book, Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business, was even less charitable.

Robichaux describes Malone as a “complicated hero,” at least for investors for whom he was willing to ignore banking rules and creatively interpret tax law. Robichaux wrote Malone’s idea of customer service was to ‘charge as much as you can, but spend as little as you can get away with.’

TCI’s top priority was to keep up the cable business as an “insular cartel.” The predictable result included accusations of “shoddy service” customers were forced to take or leave. In the handful of markets where TCI faced another cable competitor, TCI ruthlessly slashed prices to levels some would describe as “predatory,” only to rescind them the moment the competitor was gone. TCI’s intolerance for competition usually meant mounting pressure on competitors to sell their system to TCI (sometimes at an astronomical price) or face a certain slow death from unsustainable price cuts.

Among Malone’s most-trusted friends: junk bond financier Michael Milken and Leo Hindery, former CEO of Global Crossing.

Congressman Albert Gore, Jr., later vice-president during the Clinton Administration, was probably Malone’s fiercest critic in Washington. Gore’s office was swamped with complaints from his Tennessee constituents upset over TCI’s constant rate increases and anti-competitive behavior.

The cable industry’s biggest competitor in the 1980s-1990s was a TVRO 6-12 foot diameter home satellite system.

Gore was especially unhappy that TCI’s grip extended even to its biggest competitor — satellite television.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, cable operators made life increasingly difficult for home satellite dish owners, many in rural areas unserved by cable television. But things were worse for home dish owners that walked away from TCI and began watching satellite television instead. To protect against cord-cutting, the cable industry demanded encryption of all basic and premium cable channels delivered via satellite. It was not hard to convince programmers to scramble — most cable networks in the 1980s were part-owned by the cable industry itself.

To make matters worse, unlike cable systems that only leased set-top boxes to customers, home dish owners had to buy combination receiver-descrambler equipment outright, starting at $500. Just a few years later, the industry pressured programmers to switch to a slightly different encryption system — one that required home dish owners replace their expensive set-top box with a different decoder module available only for sale.

Gore was further incensed to learn TCI often insisted home dish owners living within a TCI service area buy their satellite-delivered programming direct from the cable company. Customers hoping to leave cable for good found themselves still being billed by TCI.

Sometimes the rhetoric against TCI and Malone got personal.

”He called me Darth Vader and the leader of the cable Cosa Nostra,” Malone said of Gore. “You can’t win a pissing contest with a skunk, so there’s no point in getting involved in that kind of rhetoric.”

“There’s a joke going around Washington,” John Tinker, a New York-based Morgan Stanley & Company investment banker who specializes in cable television said of Malone back in 1990. “If you have a gun with two bullets, and you have Abu Nidal, Saddam Hussein and John Malone in a room, who would you shoot? The answer is John Malone — twice, to make sure he’s dead.”

TCI itself was a four letter word in the many small communities that endured the cable company’s insufferable service, outdated equipment, and constant rate “adjustments.”

The New York Times reported John Malone’s TCI had a reputation for treating customers with “utter disdain,” and provided examples:

• In 1973, rate negotiations stalled with local regulators in Vail, Colo., the local TCI system shut off all programming for a weekend and ran nothing but the names and home phone numbers of the mayor and city manager. The harried local government gave in.
• In 1981, TCI withheld fees and vowed to go completely dark in Jefferson City, Mo., if the city failed to renew its franchise, while a TCI employee — “who turned out to have a psychological problem,” said Malone — threatened harm to the city’s media consultant. Again, a beleaguered local government renewed the franchise — although in a subsequent lawsuit, TCI was fined $10.8 million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
• In 1983, the small city of Kearney, Neb., also dissatisfied with poor service and rising rates, tried to give Malone some competition in the form of a rival system built by the regional telephone company. TCI slashed fees and added channels until the enemy was driven from the field.

“That’s the dark side, if you will, of TCI,” said Richard J. MacDonald, a media analyst with New York-based MacDonald Grippo Riely.

By mid-1989, Malone’s frenzied effort to consolidate the cable industry resulted in him presiding over 482 merger/buyout deals, on average one every two weeks. Among the legacy cable companies that no longer existed after TCI’s takeover crew arrived: Heritage Communications, United Artists Communications and Storer Communications.

To cover the debt-laden deals, Malone simply raised cable rates and shopped for easy credit. Bidding with others’ money, the per-subscriber price of cable systems shot up from $998 in 1983 to an astronomical $2,328 in 1989.

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found deregulating the cable industry cost customers through rate hikes averaging 43 percent. In Denver, TCI raised rates more than 70% between 1986 and 1989.

Malone’s attempt to finance a leveraged, debt-heavy buyout of Time Warner Cable seems to show his business philosophy has not changed much.

Time Warner Cable’s summer was “horrible,” to quote one analyst, after three percent of customers left over programming disputes and increasing prices for broadband and telephone service, with more likely to follow as price promotions expire and rates increase further.

Cable analysts were shocked Time Warner Cable lost 308,000 customers in the last three months, most leaving over interruptions of CBS and Showtime over a contract dispute. But customers were also ready to leave over increasing modem rental fees, rate increases, and the company’s growing pullback on promotional pricing. Time Warner Cable’s poor results have ironically caused its stock price to increase this morning, but only because investors suspect a shareholder value-boosting merger with Charter Communications could come within months.

“Just horrible,” MoffetNathanson analyst Craig Moffett wrote in a note to investor clients this morning. “The CBS dispute apparently took a much larger toll than anyone would have imagined, and this colored all the results.”

Sources have told Reuters that cable billionaire John Malone has approached Time Warner Cable about a full takeover by Charter Communications, but has been rebuffed by Britt so far. But with Britt exiting and Time Warner Cable’s underperformance, shareholder pressure for a deal with Charter will only increase.

“This enhances Malone’s appeal to Time Warner Cable shareholders that they would be better off with another management team,” Brean Capital analyst Todd Mitchell told Reuters.

When promotional prices end, a growing percentage of TWC customers drop services or take their business elsewhere.

The subscriber losses pushed profits down 34 percent at the cable company, to $532 million. The triple play tragedy saw subscriber losses for all the company’s residential services. At a time when other cable companies cannot process High Speed Internet sign ups fast enough, at least 24,000 Time Warner Cable broadband customers left over rate hikes and equipment fees. Analysts had expected the company to pick up more than 46,000 broadband customers during the last three months, not lose them. The company’s phone service is also in decline. Only rate increases and customers upgrading to higher speed tiers delivered a slight revenue boost.

Outgoing CEO Glenn Britt set the stage for the current forced retreat on its revenue forecast for the year:

• Time Warner Cable executives made the decision at the end of 2012 to stop heavily discounting service and cut back on promotions. Their theory was the company would attract a larger base of stable customers willing to pay non-promotional rates and tolerate rate increases;
• Executives announced as Time Warner’s phone service was brought “in-house,” the company would stop aggressively pricing triple play bundles that included phone service. That turned out to be a bad decision for growth because customers, already prone to landline cord-cutting, downgraded their bundle or left when promotions expired and ditched the phone line;
• A year of broadband price increases and the introduction of a modem rental fee rubbed customers the wrong way. “We have raised prices recently in the form of modem rental fees, but it’s really just broadband price increase,” again admitted Britt this morning. Future rate increases on modem rentals will give broadband customers another push to shop around for a better deal. At least 24,000 did that over the summer and left, mostly for AT&T U-verse in the midwest and Verizon FiOS in the east.

The lengthy dispute between Time Warner and CBS did the most damage and not just to customers directly affected by channel losses. A major increase in call volumes from alienated customers overwhelmed national call centers, creating long hold times for everyone calling in.

Time Warner expects 40 percent of the cable company’s service area will be overlapped by major competitors AT&T U-verse (now 27%) and Verizon FiOS (now 13%). That represents one million more homes than last year.

Bye Bye: Time Warner Cable lost residential customers for all of its services during the third quarter.

Incoming CEO Robert Marcus said he was dissatisfied with subscriber results from current promotions and rates. New Time Warner Cable customers, Marcus noted, are paying higher prices for fewer or less robust services as part of current promotional packages. Although that has driven a “dramatic improvement in recurring revenue” among customers actually signing up, many choose the lower-priced competition instead.

Marcus also noted customers are taking fewer services and are resistant to upgrading to double or triple play packages, reducing the potential average revenue per customer (ARPU).

“To a great extent, these are expected outcomes of our pricing and packaging strategy and the trade-off between ARPU and volume, but I’m confident we can do better on volume without giving up the ARPU benefits we’ve been achieving,” Marcus told analysts on a morning conference call.

Instead of getting more aggressive on pricing, the company plans to trot out free gifts and pitch discounted slow speed Internet to attract price-resistant DSL customers.

“Next week, we’ll launch our holiday offer, which includes a free Samsung tablet loaded with all of our apps, including TWC TV, with the purchase of higher-end packages,” Marcus said. “I think this will generate lots of interest and really highlight TWC TV and the value it adds to our service offerings.”

Marcus called it inconceivable and unacceptable that at least 4.5 million people are still subscribed to telephone company DSL in Time Warner Cable service areas. The company plans an advertising blitz to steal customers away from companies like AT&T, Verizon, Frontier, CenturyLink, Windstream and FairPoint.

At the center of that effort is the recently announced 2/1Mbps Lite package, which will sell at the everyday price of $14.95 a month. Marcus wants at least 500,000 DSL customers switched to Time Warner over the next 18 months.

“Over time, as these customers’ speed and capacity needs increase, we’ll be well positioned to sell them higher-end product,” Marcus said.

Or they will switch back to the phone company if Time Warner increases the price.

AT&T and Verizon are among the biggest tech company spenders in Washington, paying millions every quarter to lobby federal and state lawmakers on how they can make life easier for the telecom giants.

AT&T increased their lobbying budget by a whopping 23 percent in the third quarter, easily beating year over year spending of $3.5 million in the third quarter of 2012. In just three months this year, AT&T spent $4.3 million lobbying lawmakers on regulatory relief, retiring the rural landline network, reform of cell tower placement policies, and trying to keep the FCC from gaining new oversight powers.

Verizon Communications had lobbying costs of $3.09 million last year at this time. This year, it reduced that amount by two percent, spending $3.04 million. But Verizon Wireless upped its political spending by 19 percent, from $1.1 to $1.2 million. Taken together, Verizon spent a collective $4.24 million on lobbying in the last three months. Verizon lobbied on some of the same issues AT&T did.

In contrast Google spent $3.4 million, Facebook spent $1.4 million, and Microsoft spent $2.2 million.

“Once again the lobbying disclosures demonstrate the sad truth about the state of our democracy,” said John M. Simpson, Consumer Watchdog’s Privacy Project director. “When the government is open for business, policymaking is all about who has the cash and is willing throw it around.”

USA Today reported Verizon has also once again achieved a 0% effective tax rate during the past 12 months, which means any owed taxes will be offset by a variety of accounting tricks:

A big reason that Verizon’s effective tax rate is so low, coming in at a negative 4.8%, is largely due to accounting. The company’s sped-up depreciation, severance and pension costs are large credits that contribute to pushing the company’s taxes down, says Jonathan Schildkraut of Evercore. But there’s also a distortion caused by the company’s 55% interest in Verizon Wireless. Vodafone, which owns 45% of Verizon Wireless, pays taxes on its share, but the entire profit is reported on income. Adjusting for this, Verizon’s effective tax rate is closer to 30%, the company says. Verizon is buying Vodafone’s stake, which will eliminate the issue in the future. Similarly, real estate investment trusts have low effective tax rates because they pass profit to shareholders, who then pay the taxes.

The question for investors is whether or not companies paying low effective tax rates might, eventually, attract the attention to regulators. “They are slow at getting at these issues,” Yee says.

LightSquared, the ill-fated venture to bring nationwide 4G wireless broadband to the masses may be all but gone and forgotten in bankruptcy reorganization proceedings, but the wireless spectrum it controls and the drama surrounding it is not.

A battle between billionaires and the hedge funds they support has broken out over who will ultimately control the failed venture — a hedge fund manager deep in LightSquared debt or the richest man in Colorado that often finds a way to get his way.

Harbinger Capital Partners’ Phil Falcone

Falcone

Phil Falcone earned his first fortune trading junk bonds in the 1980s. In 2001, he launched Harbinger Capital Partners and by 2007, Falcone and his investors were well-positioned for a blizzard of cash betting against sub-prime mortgages just before the housing collapse and credit crisis that followed. Falcone took home $1.7 billion in compensation that year while an epidemic of foreclosures and upside down mortgages was just getting started.

In late 2008, when the economy was in free-fall, Falcone suspended or limited withdrawals from his largest funds, upsetting investors who couldn’t get their money out. But Falcone reportedly gave special treatment to certain large investors (sources say Goldman Sachs is among them) who were able to clear out their exposed accounts before the losses piled up.

By 2009, Falcone was again making money — so much he vastly underestimated his federal and state tax bills. What’s a cash-strapped billionaire to do? Quietly loan himself $113.2 million from one of his investment funds at a favorable interest rate and keep it a secret from investors for five months. When they eventually found out, they were understandably disturbed. Falcone had barred those same investors from cashing out of the fund he borrowed from.

The Securities and Exchange Commission was not happy either and filed charges against Falcone.

“Today’s charges read like the final exam in a graduate school course in how to operate a hedge fund unlawfully,” Robert Khuzami, director of the S.E.C.’s division of enforcement, said in a statement. “Clients and market participants alike were victimized as Falcone unscrupulously used fund assets to pay his personal taxes, manipulated the market for certain bonds, favored some clients at the expense of others, and violated trading rules intended to prohibit manipulative short sales.”

Despite the publicity generated by the SEC, investors who appreciated Falcone’s ability to earn them money allowed them turn a blind eye to the ethics questions and pour money into Falcone’s latest venture — a wireless network known as LightSquared.

LightSquared was preparing to launch a unique nationwide 4G LTE mobile broadband network powered by satellites and ground-based cell towers, selling wholesale access to third-party wireless companies able to market the service under their own brand. Falcone’s funds poured nearly $3 billion dollars into the venture while getting a waiver from the government to operate high-powered transmitters on the “L” band — 1525-1559 MHz. LightSquared’s plans alarmed the next door neighbors — GPS satellites facing interference issues that would hurt the accuracy of precise location information provided to millions of tracking devices on the “L1” band — 1559 to 1610 MHz.

Initial testing showed that significant interference from the prototype ground-based transmitters would occur and potentially could cripple aviation and public safety GPS users. The FCC eventually withdrew permission for LightSquared to run its network as planned, a potential death-blow to the venture.

Creditors grew anxious wondering how LightSquared would be in a position to repay its loans when it was unable to launch its wireless network.

In May 2012, creditors forced the issue and LightSquared filed for bankruptcy protection, listing assets of $4.48 billion and debts of $2.29 billion. Falcone claimed the bankruptcy filing would give the company more time to overcome the FCC’s objections to its network operations plan. Falcone estimated it would take two years to secure a resolution. Analysts familiar with the FCC suggested Falcone might die of old age before the agency gave way.

Falcone’s subsequent efforts to win back control of the venture have been made more difficult because one man has been quietly buying up large amounts of LightSquared’s debt with designs on the venture’s spectrum.

Dish Networks’ Charles Ergen

With LightSquared’s debt trading at around 50 cents on the dollar, Charlie Ergen went shopping.

Ergen has been involved in the satellite business for decades. Today, he controls and runs Dish Network, a satellite television provider that has seen the back of high customer growth. Dish and DirecTV are both locked out of the “triple play” business most cable and phone companies offer customers. Neither company can offer broadband or telephone service without partnering with another provider. As cord-cutting continues to take hold, customers willing to pay for increasingly expensive television packages are in decline. That likely explains Ergen’s interest in acquiring wireless spectrum — to build Dish into a broadband, television, and telephone service provider.

In May, Dish publicly bid $2.2 billion for certain spectrum assets from LightSquared. But for more than a year earlier, Ergen was quietly buying up LightSquared’s debt through holding companies and hedge funds.

Ergen created an opaque investment entity named “SP Special Opportunites, LLC” a/k/a “Sound Point” to buy LightSquared debt. Separately, Ergen asked Stephen Ketchum, a former investment banker with close ties to Ergen, to buy over $1 billion in LightSquared debt securities through Ketchum’s hedge fund. From April 2012 until May 2013, Sound Point allegedly spent $1,013,082,326.30 to purchase secured debt for Ergen’s personal benefit and without the knowledge of Dish or its board of directors. Secured debt held by creditors is paid first in a bankruptcy proceeding, and Ergen quietly because LightSquared’s largest single secured creditor.

That puts Charlie Ergen in a major ethical dilemma.

The more Dish offers to pay for LightSquared, the more money Ergen will be paid to cover the shares of LightSquared’s secure debt. Ergen has a controlling interest in Dish, which means he can order Dish to overpay for LightSquared, personally pocketing the proceeds.

Bloomberg’s Matt Levine explains the shady deal:

“An executive going around and buying up an asset for cheap, then convincing his company to buy all of that asset for a higher price – doesn’t come up a lot because it’s so obviously shady,” Levine wrote. “If you’re supposed to be devoting your time and energy to finding opportunities for your company, it looks pretty bad to steal those opportunities for yourself.”

Falcone was outraged when he learned of Ergen’s stealthy acquisitions.

Ergen

In July, Harbinger accused Ergen of “fraudulently” becoming a creditor to block efforts by LightSquared to reorganize and emerge intact from bankruptcy. Instead, Harbinger accused Ergen of seeking to acquire the company’s assets “on the cheap.” Harbinger also points to provisions in a LightSquared debt agreement that forbids certain competitors from buying the company’s debt.

Also upset are several major Dish Network shareholders who are not pleased Ergen’s private deal could make him a lot of money while costing shareholders plenty should Dish overpay for LightSquard’s assets or worse, end up with everything but the spectrum Dish covets.

At least five lawsuits have been filed since August, accusing Ergen and other board members of casting their fiduciary duties to the wind and wasting money along the way. They are also upset Ergen and his connections purchased $1 billion in LightSquared debt at a substantial discount and will likely be repaid the full face value of those debts with Dish Network’s money. That means nearly $300 million in personal profits for Ergen.

The latest shareholder lawsuit was filed by the Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System. It along with the suit filed by the City of Daytona Beach Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Retirement System claim Ergen’s near-total control of Dish’s board of directors makes it impossible for the board to meet its obligation of representing shareholder interests first.

“Ergen’s control over the company and the board is highlighted by the numerous transactions he has caused Dish to enter into with members of his family,” the lawsuit states.

Ergen and Dish’s efforts to insulate themselves from charges of conflict of interest didn’t fly with many investors.

One lawsuit noted Tom Ortolf, one of the directors on the supposedly independent committee reviewing Dish’s bid, has a daughter that works at Dish; the other, George Brokaw, chose Mr. Ergen’s wife, Cantey Ergen—a Dish director named in the shareholder suit—to be the godmother of his son.

The discomfort level at Dish reached high enough to prompt one board member, Gary Howard, to suddenly resign in early September. Howard was also on the committee formed to vet the LightSquared deal because of the potential conflict of interest on Ergen’s part.

Before Falcone could claim the high road at Ergen’s expense, this week New York’s top financial regulator banned Falcone from managing Fidelity & Guaranty Life Insurance Company of New York for seven years. Harbinger Group bought Fidelity & Guaranty, the U.S. life and annuity unit of London-based Old Mutual Plc, for $350 million in 2011.

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Bloomberg News discusses the high drama between LightSquared and Dish Network. (4 minutes)