Stephenson

AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson on Tuesday told investors that AT&T will deploy a combination of fiber optics and 5G wireless and be able to sell a “true, high-speed internet network throughout the United States” within the next three to five years.

“In three to five years out, there will be a crossover point,” Stephenson told investors. “We go through this all the time in industry. 5G will cross over, performance wise, with what you’re seeing in home broadband. We’re seeing it in business now over our millimeter-wave spectrum. And there will be a place, it may be in five years, I think it could be as early as three, where 5G begins to actually have a crossover point in terms of performance with fiber. 5G can become the deployment mechanism for a lot of the broadband that we’re trying to hit today with fiber.”

Although the remarks sound like a broadband game changer, Stephenson has made this prediction before, most recently during an AT&T earnings call in January, 2019. Stephenson told investors he believed 5G will increasingly offer AT&T a choice of technology to deploy when offering broadband service to consumers and businesses. In high-cost scenarios, 5G could be that choice. In areas where fiber is already ubiquitous, fiber to the home service would be preferred.

Stephenson’s predictions about nationwide service will depend in part on the commercial success of millimeter wave 5G fixed home broadband, which will be required to satisfy broadband speed and capacity demands. Verizon Wireless has been offering fixed 5G in several markets with mixed results. The company’s early claims of robust coverage have been countered by Verizon’s own cautious customer qualification portal, which is more likely to deny availability of service to interested customers than offer it.

But Stephenson remains bullish about expanding broadband.

“So all things considered, over the next three to five years, [with a] continued push on fiber, 5G begins to scale in millimeter-wave, and my expectation is that we have a nationwide, true, high-speed internet network throughout the United States, [using] 5G or fiber,” Stephenson said.

Whether anything actually comes of this expansion project will depend entirely on how much money AT&T proposes to spend on it. Recently, AT&T has told investors to expect significant cuts in future investments as AT&T winds down its government-mandated fiber expansion to 14 million new locations as part of approval of the DirecTV merger-acquisition. In fact, AT&T’s biggest recent investments in home broadband are a result of those government mandates. AT&T has traditionally focused much of its spending on its wireless network, which is more profitable. For AT&T to deliver millimeter wave 5G, the company will need to spend billions on fiber optic expansion into neighborhoods where it will place many thousands of small cell antennas to deliver the service over the short distances millimeter waves propagate.

AT&T could sell a fixed 5G broadband service similar to Verizon Wireless, confine its network to mobile applications, or offer fixed wireless service to commercial and manufacturing users in selected areas. Or it could offer a combination of all the above. AT&T will also need to consider the implications of a fiber buildout outside of its current landline service area. Building fiber optic networks to provide backhaul connectivity to AT&T’s mobile network would not antagonize its competitors nearly as much as the introduction of residential fixed 5G wireless as a home broadband replacement. The competitive implications of that would be dramatic, especially in communities skipped by Verizon FiOS or stuck with DSL from under-investing independent telephone companies like CenturyLink, Frontier, and Windstream. Should AT&T start selling 300+ Mbps fixed 5G wireless in these territories, it would cause significant financial distress for the big three independent phone companies, and could trigger a competitive war with Verizon.

Wall Street is unlikely to be happy about AT&T proposing multi-billion dollar investments to launch a full-scale price war with other phone and cable companies. So do not be surprised if AT&T’s soaring rhetoric is replaced with limited, targeted deployments in urban areas, new housing developments, and business parks. It remains highly unlikely rural areas will benefit from AT&T’s definition of “nationwide,” because there is no Return on Investment formula that is likely to work deploying millimeter wave spectrum in rural areas without heavy government subsidies.

For now, AT&T may concentrate on its fiber buildout beyond the 14 million locations mandated by the DirecTV merger agreement. As Stephenson himself said, “When we put people on fiber, they do not churn.” AT&T has plenty of runway to grow its fiber to the home business because it attracts only about a 25 percent market share at present. Stephenson believes he can get that number closer to 50%. He can succeed by offering better service, at a lower price than what his cable competitors charge. Since 5G requires a massive fiber network to deploy small cells, there is nothing wrong with getting started early and then see where 5G shakes out in the months and years ahead.

Verizon’s not-quite-ready-for-prime-time mobile 5G network hurriedly held a public launch event April 3rd using a small network of 5G millimeter wave small cells installed in downtown Chicago and Minneapolis, despite employee admissions there were significant issues with the network’s reliability, coverage, and stability.

Driving Verizon was a chance to win bragging rights by claiming ownership of the world’s first, publicly available, mobile 5G network. In a company-produced video intended for employees, it quickly becomes apparent Verizon was preoccupied by South Korea’s own race to launch mobile 5G, and daily meetings at Verizon’s offices in New Jersey hinted at pressure to announce Verizon’s own 5G launch day as soon as possible.

It was also clearly a priority for Verizon’s new CEO, Hans Vestberg.

“Since I came into Verizon, this is the first thing I wanted to do,” Vestberg said. “I want to be first on 5G in the world.”

But was the network ready for launch and fit for purpose? As of April 1, there were still coverage, latency, and speed issues. Garima Garg, from Verizon’s Network Performance, said the 5G network was “very unstable” early in the first week of April. Attempts to test every smart cell in Chicago were unsuccessful. Garg said the team couldn’t connect to several of them.

Besides beating South Korea, Verizon’s goal was to launch 5G with speeds better than its 4G LTE network and AT&T’s enhanced 4G LTE service it calls “5Ge.” To test network performance, Verizon employees ran countless speed tests, often just across the street from light pole-mounted smart cells around 100 feet away. Just a day or so from launch, Verizon testers were still trying to address network problems, including packet loss and delayed acknowledgments on the TCP side of the uplink, which ‘really hurt speed.’ Verizon claims it resolved some of these problems in the final hours before launch with a custom software build.

Verizon’s efforts almost came to naught, because SK Telecom, South Korea’s largest wireless operator, suddenly surprised the public with a star-studded “5G Launching Showcase” the morning of the 3rd. SK Telecom technically beat Verizon’s attempt to be first to launch, but Verizon pointed out only a handful of celebrities, social media influencers and so-called “brand promoters” were given smartphones capable of connecting to SK Telecom’s 5G network. Verizon’s spin was that South Korea’s launch was effectively a publicity stunt, as no consumer could walk into a store and buy 5G capable devices on that date. Verizon’s launch, however, would be different. Any customer could immediately walk into a Verizon store in the two launch cities and walk out with a smartphone capable of connecting to 5G on the first day the network was switched on. Just in case SK Telecom had any other surprises planned, Verizon decided to move up its official launch date.

Garg (Image courtesy of: Verizon)

On the morning of April 3, Vestberg appeared in a friendly and exclusive CNBC interview announcing the launch of Verizon’s 5G mobile network. By the following day, tech reporters in Chicago gave the network its first thorough test, and found many of the same issues that had concerned Verizon engineers earlier that week. Not only was Verizon’s 5G service area miniscule, several small cells appeared not to be working at all (or at least were not available for connections), and after a day using Verizon’s 5G network, the service was deemed “unreliable” by PC.

Reporters used Moto Z3 phones with the new 5G Moto Mod back panel, which snaps on the back of the phone and delivers 5G connectivity to the Z3. The Mod concept is neither an elegant or inexpensive solution, turning the Z3 into a bulky and heavy handset. The Moto Mod also has its own battery, and not a high-capacity one at that. Testers reported it was dead after five hours of significant use. It cannot be recharged by the phone either. At some locations, reporters were able to verify Verizon’s 5G network did deliver a significant improvement in speed — up to 600 Mbps peaks on small cells that likely had few, if any other customers connected at the time. But the densest parts of Chicago’s downtown were already well-served by Verizon’s 4G LTE network, which capably peaked at 400 Mbps.

Verizon’s mobile 5G network relies on millimeter wave frequencies, which are very short-range and sensitive to solid objects, which can block or degrade the signal. Despite Verizon’s earlier claim that it saw better than anticipated range and performance from the company’s millimeter wave fixed wireless service running in a few other cities, real world testing showed the effective range of Verizon’s smart cells was less than expected for mobile users. Verizon claimed up to 800 feet of range from each 5G small cell, but testing found that claim wildly optimistic.

“I saw more like 300 feet of effective range, with speeds dropping below LTE levels beyond that, even though my 5G indicator would dutifully flicker on until about 450 feet,” reported PC’s
Sascha Segan. “The Mod seems unable to judge when a 4G connection would be better than a 5G one, so it hangs on to 5G for dear life even if it’s just eking out a few megabits. A phone should probably prefer a good lower-gen connection over a poor higher-gen one.”

Real world testing also revealed the expected shortcomings of mobile 5G — it can be downright terrible indoors.

“Stand under the cell site, you get 600 Mbps down. Go into the Starbucks, through glass, and that’s cut to 218 Mbps,” Segan wrote. “Go around the corner and duck into the lobby of a stone building that doesn’t face onto the site, and you’re down to 41.5 Mbps. Lower frequency bands do not have this behavior.”

Of course, it is early days for Verizon’s 5G and network and software improvements are likely to significantly improve service. But Verizon’s experience strengthens the theory that small cells are likely to thrive only in dense population areas where there is already a high traffic demand. It seems unlikely that Verizon’s 5G network will make economic sense to deploy in outer suburbs and rural areas. It may not even play well in the suburbs.

Verizon produced this video covering the challenges launching their mobile 5G network in Chicago and Minneapolis in early April. (12:34)

This is the second part of a two-part series reflecting on Verizon’s 5G millimeter wave wireless home broadband service and how Wall Street complicates its potential. Be sure to read part one, “How a Wall Street Analyst Complicates AT&T and Verizon’s Upgrade and Investment Plans” for the full story.

“Put simply, the cost of building a second network is so high that its builder simply can’t earn a passable return based on the market share available to a second player,” Craig Moffett, an important telecom industry analyst working on behalf of Wall Street investors, argued over Verizon’s fiber to the home project dubbed FiOS. “Virtually every overbuilder, from telephone companies to competitive cable companies to municipalities, has learned this lesson the hard way; almost all such efforts have ended in bankruptcy. Verizon’s own FiOS network was an economic failure; there is no longer any debate about whether FiOS did or didn’t earn its cost of capital. It didn’t, and it wasn’t even close.”

Moffett’s philosophy about emerging broadband technology and competition is heavily influenced by his personal and professional belief that broadband competition is bad for business and investors. His distaste for Verizon FiOS, a plan to scrap old copper phone wiring in favor of fiber optics, was well-known across the industry and trade press. But Verizon kept going with the project under the leadership of then-CEO Ivan Seidenberg, who was a telephone man through and through. But by 2010, Seidenberg had decided to retire, and his successor, Lowell McAdam, had a very different perspective about Verizon’s future. McAdam spent almost his entire career from the early 1990s forward in the wireless business. In 2006, McAdam was named the chief operating officer and CEO of Verizon Wireless. When he succeeded Seidenberg in late 2010, Verizon had already announced it was winding down further FiOS expansion. That seemed to suit McAdam just fine, because under his leadership as CEO of Verizon, Verizon Wireless became the dominant focus of the company. Heavy investment in wireless continued, while Verizon’s landline network was allowed to deteriorate.

Moffett told his clients the end of FiOS expansion would be good news for cable companies because they would lose fewer subscribers as a result.

Verizon’s marketing machine carefully lays its business case for 5G home broadband

More than a decade later, Verizon’s decision to embark on another major technology upgrade requiring billions in new spending quickly raised eyebrows on Wall Street. This time, however, Verizon executives attempted to be better prepared to defend their 5G vision from the reflexive investor argument that it was too expensive and extravagant.

Moffett

“First, their fixed wireless broadband business will leverage investments that Verizon argues they will need to make anyway to support their wireless network,” Moffett wrote in a report to his clients, acknowledging Verizon’s claimed reasons for entering the wireless home broadband business. “Second, Verizon argues that it will be cheaper to connect homes wirelessly than it is to connect them with fiber, making it economic to deploy fixed wireless in markets where fiber to the home hasn’t been economically justifiable.”

Most of the expenses cited by Moffett relate to bringing fiber networks into neighborhoods to support the small cell technology Verizon is relying on for its 5G home broadband and mobile services.

Moffett also believes the only attractive market for 5G service will be in more upscale suburban rings around cities, not densely populated urban centers or rural areas. Moffett argues fiber providers are likely already providing service in urban areas and rural areas simply lack enough customers to justify the cost of either a fiber optic network or a small cell network. Ironically, that conclusion means the same suburban ring Moffett rejected 5-10 years ago as economically unsuitable for fiber service is now precisely the area Moffett argues is the only attractive market for fiber service, to bring 5G.

From a short-term results perspective, laying fiber optics is a costly proposition unlikely to return much revenue gain in a few short years. That reality has kept many investor-owned phone companies away from expensive network upgrades. These legacy telephone companies recognize they are going to continue to lose customers to faster technologies like cable, fiber, and perhaps, wireless. But managing an existing low-speed DSL business seems preferable to facing the wrath of investors upset over the prospect of shareholder dividends and share buybacks being curtailed to redirect money into a full-scale upgrade effort, even if it results in better returns and greater revenue a few years down the road.

Verizon is depending on its wireless division’s extremely high profitability to counter the usual objections to major upgrades, and by focusing on how 5G will enhance the wireless experience. It also benefits from media hype surrounding 5G technology, exciting some investors. But Verizon is also downplaying exactly what it will cost to lay fiber optic networks deep into neighborhoods to deliver it.

Moffett investigates Verizon’s first 5G city — Sacramento, Calif., and discovers alarming results

Moffett decided to bypass the traditional cost-benefit analysis of laying mile after mile of optical fiber and decided to test Verizon’s case for wireless 5G home broadband instead.

Six months after launch, Moffett investigated Verizon’s 5G millimeter wave network in Sacramento, examining how the service is initially performing. Moffett identified seven zip codes in Sacramento where service was most likely to be available, based on cell tower/small cell records. As of late February, Moffett found Sacramento had 391 Verizon small cells installed, with 273 used for millimeter wave 5G service (the rest are likely designed to bolster Verizon’s 4G LTE network).

Verizon has admitted small cell technology is vulnerable to distance, so Moffett relied on earlier purported claims of 5G coverage to limit the number of addresses to be sampled. Moffett’s team identified 45,000 out of 70,000 possible addresses, based on if those homes were located within a radius of 0.7 miles of a 5G small cell. Then, Moffett’s team devised a method of hitting Verizon’s 5G availability website with each of those 45,000 addresses to learn which ones Verizon qualified for 5G service.

The results, so far, are underwhelming:

• Only an average of 6% of the queried addresses were actually eligible to receive Verizon’s fixed wireless service. That could mean Verizon has installed 5G small cells, but some are not yet operational in all areas or the network is performing much worse than originally anticipated. Some zip codes did better than others, but not by much. The best offered just an 18% pre-qualified acceptance rate. Apparently Verizon’s qualification website also informs applicants if they already have service, which proved to be a good way of finding out how many addresses actually have signed up. Moffett claims only 3% of eligible customers have decided to subscribe to Verizon’s 5G home broadband service so far.
• Coverage appears to a problem. As Moffett checked addresses further away from each small cell, more and more were deemed ineligible for service. In fact, despite Verizon’s claims that its 5G signal reached customers more than 1,900 feet away, the company’s own website refused to actually sell service to customers that far away. Moffett found subscribers were deemed ineligible for service as little as 400 feet away from a small cell. At that distance, less than 50% of checked addresses could sign up. For those 700 feet or more away, almost no addresses were qualified for service.

With those results, Moffett was able to extrapolate some important numbers about how much Verizon’s infrastructure is being utilized:

• Each small cell serves approximately 27 eligible addresses.
• Verizon’s 5G home broadband has a 0.1% market share in Sacramento.
• Excluding areas where multi-dwelling properties dominate, Verizon has achieved a penetration of roughly one subscribed single-family home per 1.5 5G small cell.

“Our findings in Sacramento — limited coverage, low penetration — preliminary though they may be, suggest that earning an attractive return will be challenging, at best,” Moffett concluded.

Because Verizon has attracted so few subscribers thus far, the total cost per connected home for 5G wireless service could far exceed what it would cost to just lay down fiber to the home service to each customer, which might actually give Verizon more business.

“Our analysis suggests that costs will likely be much higher (that is, cell radii appear smaller) and penetration rates lower than initially expected,” the report explained. “If those patterns are indicative of what is to come in a broader rollout, it would mean a much higher cost per connected home, and therefore much lower returns on capital, than what might have been expected from Verizon’s advance billing.”

If Moffett’s estimate of 27 residences served per small cell was proven true, Verizon would have to deploy well over five million small cells to deliver 5G wireless service across America.

Verizon’s choice of cities to launch its 5G millimeter wave network may be partly designed to test the differences in topology, building density and foliage levels, and there may be dramatic differences between Houston, Sacramento, Indianapolis, and Los Angeles.

Moffett’s overall conclusion is that should Verizon move forward on rolling out 5G wireless home broadband to around 25% of the country, as it planned, reaching those 30 million homes “will take a very, very long time, and it will cost a great deal of money.”

Moffett

The road to 5G wireless home broadband is paved with good intentions and a lot of hype, but at least one Wall Street analyst hints Verizon’s millimeter wave 5G project may be a bad idea, unable to achieve a proper return on investment and potentially a worse performer than originally thought. In contrast, if you’re looking for more reliable investment opportunities, you could buy gold bullion in Brisbane with City Gold Bullion to secure a stable asset that can provide long-term value. You may also check out non-traditional options on upmarket to diversify your portfolio.

Craig Moffett, a key analyst at MoffettNathanson, has analyzed and commented on the telecommunications industry at least as far back as the 1990s. He slammed cable operators for overpriced upgrades in the 1990s, talked down AT&T’s U-verse project, and spent years telling the media and investors that Verizon FiOS — a fiber to the home project, was an expensive failure.

Moffett’s latest research examines Verizon’s six-month old 5G millimeter wave wireless network in Sacramento, Calif., which relies on a large number of small cells to provide a $50 wireless home broadband replacement. But after taking a closer look at the technology, its performance, and costs, Moffett has warned investors Verizon has a “steep climb” to convince Wall Street it can attract enough revenue from paying customers to justify the tens of billions in new spending required to roll out small cell technology across the country.

How does Moffett know this and can his views derail or alter Verizon’s long-term plans for millimeter wave 5G? The answer is clearly “maybe.”

In this series, we will look at how Wall Street’s view of the telecom industry is often focused on short term profits at the expense of long term growth and customer satisfaction.

The telecom industry analyst presents detailed analyses tracking industry developments, mergers and acquisitions, technology shifts, competition, regulation, expenses, and shifting consumer behavior into reports for investment banks, institutional investors, or in some cases individual investors looking for both hard numbers and perspective on what is going on in the industry.

The metrics analysts use to describe success or failure are typically different from what customers use, and many analysts don’t spend much time focused on technical trivia, public policy goals, and ways of overcoming problems for which there are no obvious market solutions, such as rural community broadband. Some analysts are particularly friendly and non-confrontational with executives, who know and recognize them by their first name, while others are more willing to challenge company press releases and policies and can eventually develop an adversarial relationship with at least some of the companies they cover. The analyst’s reputation for getting the correct analyses to clients means everything. Good research and advice does not come cheap, and subscription fees can be breathtakingly high. Many Wall Street analysts also make frequent appearances in the media, often on business cable news channels and newspapers.

Moffett is one of the most frequently-quoted telecom analysts, known for his favorable coverage of the cable industry and skepticism towards telephone companies attempting to reinvent themselves. He has advocated for the adoption of usage caps and usage-based billing to further monetize broadband, but has not been as aggressive as others, such as Jonathan Chaplin, a Wall Street analyst with New Street Research, who has frequently called on the cable industry to aggressively raise broadband prices to $90 a month or more. Moffett, in contrast, worried last year that Cable One, an operator specializing in serving small and medium sized cities, was pricing its service far too high, driving off potential customers.

Cable’s Hybrid Fiber/Coax vs. Telco’s Copper: Dueling Legacy Technologies Confront a Fiber and Wireless Future

Most of the nation’s cable television systems were built in the 1970s and 1980s and were primarily dependent on copper-based coaxial cable. By the 1990s, many cable operators embarked on system wide “rebuilds” to prepare for the era of digital cable television. It was during this decade that most cable systems moved beyond 50-70 analog TV channels and also began offering new services, including home phone, broadband, home security, and large on-demand video libraries. To support these new services and to increase the reliability of cable systems, operators began replacing some of the coaxial cable in their networks with more reliable fiber optics. Investments in these upgrades were significant, but to the cable industry not extravagant. A loud chorus from Wall Street disagreed, complaining cable systems were overspending on upgrades. Moffett, an analyst for Sanford Bernstein at the time, complained the cable industry collectively wasted $100 billion on network upgrades.

But like many Wall Street analysts who complain about almost any significant investment or spending, once a company has gone ahead and spent the money, analysts start looking at how those companies are monetizing those upgrades to recover the investment, boost revenue, and maximize shareholder value. Moffett flipped on a dime from being a critic of cable’s spending to commenting on how well the cable industry was now positioned to lead the telecom industry.

“Cable built a plant that was more expensive than they ever should have built,” Moffett told the New York Times in 2008. “But now that the cable companies have spent that money, their network is in place to deliver phone service more cheaply than any other alternative.”

The cable industry’s hybrid fiber-coax (HFC) systems upgraded in the 1990s are still partly in wide use today. Cable operators are using incremental technology upgrades to squeeze more performance out of these systems, notably by retiring space-hogging analog cable television in favor of digital. That analog to digital video conversion, along with regular updates to the cable broadband technical standard, known as DOCSIS, has allowed most cable operators to claim they do not need to upgrade to an all fiber network to support the services offered today, which includes hundreds of TV channels and gigabit speed downloads. Altice USA, which operates Cablevision in suburban New York City, is among a few operators claiming it was time to discard HFC technology in favor of fiber to the home (FTTH) service. Altice argues fiber further increases available bandwidth and is much more reliable, reducing costs. So far, other major operators like Comcast, Charter, and Cox are still taking a more incremental approach towards fiber, in part to keep costs down.

The upgrade spending that Wall Street complained about in the 1990s ultimately paid off handsomely for the cable industry. Moffett himself only occasionally criticizes cable operators these days, preferring to target most of his negative coverage on phone companies. In fact, in an interview in 2008, Moffett called effectively called phone companies obsolete.

“In 1996, as soon as you saw that the technology existed for a cable network with vastly higher capacity and vastly lower margin cost to be able to do voice calls over the same network, you would have said the end game is obvious: Cable will win and the telcos will go into bankruptcy. The only question is how long it will take,” Moffett said.

Moffett praised Qwest for doing and spending nothing to confront copper wire obsolescence.

The phone companies, having no interest in voluntarily sacrificing themselves in bankruptcy court, have moved to meet the cable industry’s challenge by upgrading their own networks to compete, something Moffett is not a big fan of either. Back in 2008, he gave top marks to Qwest, the orphaned Baby Bell serving the sparsely populated Pacific Northwest that would later be bought by CenturyLink. Lacking its own mobile business, or a large amount of capital for upgrades, Moffett praised Qwest for making the right decision (according to him) in the cable vs. phone wars of the early 2000s: “do nothing.”

That advice was simply not acceptable to the top executives at two of the biggest phone companies in the country. Both rejected Moffett’s philosophy of living with the technology they had instead of putting investors through the agony of spending money to completely overhaul the existing copper wire phone network. For Moffett, that was throwing good money after bad, and it was too late to try.

“It is an obsolete technology,” Moffett said. “It’s not like horses lost share of the transportation market until they stabilized at 40 percent market share.”

Phone Company Fiber Optic Upgrades = ‘Shareholder Value Destruction’

Large phone companies saw the same writing on the wall about landline telephone service Moffett did back in the 1990s. Their emerging wireless mobile businesses were cannibalizing in-home landlines and the introduction of the cable industry’s “digital phone” Voice over IP product, often bundled with a range of calling features and a nationwide long distance plan, quickly began eroding the revenue phone companies earned from per-call charges, calling features like Caller ID, and long distance revenue.

AT&T repair truck

AT&T and Verizon had a problem. Telephone networks were designed and built to handle voice-grade phone calls, not broadband or television. Repurposing the traditional landline to support a popular package of phone, internet, and television service was complex and costly. DSL had already emerged as the phone company’s best effort to compete with cable broadband over the traditional copper phone wire network. Phone companies experimented with competing television service, sending one channel at a time down a customer’s phone line. When a customer changed channels, one streaming channel stopped and another began. It did not always prove to be very reliable or dependable, because performance degraded significantly the farther the customer lived from the phone company’s switching office. Something better was needed, and it was going to cost billions.

The 1992 Cable Act, which guaranteed competing video providers could offer popular cable networks on fair and competitive terms, was crucial to laying the groundwork for a reimagined local phone company. Telephone company executives began approaching state and local officials with proposals to replace existing phone networks with newer fiber technology that could support voice and video, giving local cable monopolies long-awaited competition. The sticking point was money. Some large phone companies sought regulator approval to raise telephone rates to create a fiber fund that would be used to cover some of the costs of scrapping copper wire networks and replace them with fiber optics. The cable industry understood the threat and immediately launched a fierce lobbying campaign to block attempts to bill captive phone ratepayers for the cost of fiber upgrades. The phone companies were largely unsuccessful winning approval to cross-subsidize their fiber future, but some companies did make deals with state regulators to approve rate increases with the promise the extra revenue would fund future fiber upgrades.

Critics contend AT&T and Verizon’s wireless mobile networks ended up the biggest beneficiaries of the revenue raked in from rate increases, with some accusing companies like Verizon of shifting money away from landline service to help pay for the construction of their growing wireless businesses. With billions spent on cell tower construction and network buildout costs, there was not much money left for fiber to the home upgrades. The cost to wire each home for fiber was also a concern, as were regulatory requirements surrounding universal service, which meant phone companies might have to serve any customer seeking service, while cable companies were allowed to skip serving rural America altogether.

It would take until 2004 for phone companies to begin major upgrades. At the same time, deregulation was once again stirring up the marketplace, triggering a gradual re-consolidation of the old Bell System, coalescing primarily around AT&T (SBC, Ameritech, BellSouth, and Pacific Telesis) and Verizon (Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, independent telephone company GTE, and former long distance carrier MCI). Both AT&T and Verizon were exploring fiber upgrades.

AT&T U-verse vs. Verizon FiOS – Wall Street Not Impressed Either Way

Project Lightspeed was developed by SBC in 2004 and later renamed AT&T U-verse in time for its commercial launch in 2006. AT&T chose a fiber to the neighborhood approach, leaving intact existing copper phone wiring already in place in neighborhoods and homes. U-verse was capable (at the time) of delivering just over 20 Mbps internet service while customers also watched TV,  and/or made a phone call. The advantage of U-verse was that it was cheaper to deploy across AT&T’s more sprawling local telephone territories than fiber all the way to each customer’s home.

Verizon, which serves a number of densely populated cities in the northeast and mid-Atlantic region, believed a fiber to the home upgrade would future proof their network and deliver better, more reliable service than U-verse. Verizon FiOS launched in September 2005 and completely did away with existing copper phone wiring in favor of optical cable. Verizon argued that although it was more expensive, a complete fiber upgrade would cost the company less over time, and was essentially infinitely upgradable as customer needs changed. Verizon also argued that with scale, the cost of wiring each home or business would fall, making the technology more cost-effective. Verizon launched its FiOS business with great fanfare among customers, some who bought homes specifically because they were located in a FiOS service area.

As with the cable industry’s rebuilding (and spending) wave of the 1990s, many on Wall Street were unhappy with both AT&T and Verizon. Moffett’s calculations were based on the premise that projects like this have 15 years not only to pay back investors in full, but also generate shareholder value from increased revenue. If the costs are not covered in full and then some, it is deemed a failure and value destructive. What customers want is only a tiny part of the means test Wall Street analysts use to determine if a project is good news or bad news:

Good News

• The provider successfully raises prices and accelerates payoff of outstanding debt.
• A project attracts new customers and prompts current customers to upgrade, generating more revenue.
• An upgrade can be expensed in a way that results in extra tax savings.
• Customer churn drops, as a more satisfied customer remains a customer.
• An upgrade offers new revenue opportunities not available before.

Bad News

• A project causes a surprise increase in capital expenses, especially if those costs are higher than anticipated.
• An upgrade results in increased competition, or worse, a price war that forces providers to cut prices.
• The project cannot be paid off within ~15 years. Short term results matter. Long term results only matter to future investors.
• An upgrade forces competitors to also undertake upgrades.
• A provider is forced to choose between share buybacks and dividend payouts and spending money on upgrades and chooses the latter. Shareholders matter more.

Moffett’s 2008 calculations argued that Verizon would lose $769 on each FiOS customer signing up for service. AT&T U-verse would come close to breaking even, but not generate much in the way of profit for AT&T. After determining that, he was a frequent and vocal critic of upgrade efforts, particularly in the case of FiOS. Verizon argued his calculations were wrong and that the company was pleased with the progress of its fiber buildout. But Moffett claimed vindication when Verizon shelved future FiOS expansion in 2010, leaving many cities with only a smattering of fiber service — often in a handful of wealthy suburbs and nowhere else.

Verizon clearly changed direction in 2010, but probably not because of Moffett and other critics. Verizon’s CEO at the time came from Verizon Wireless, and his executive team was focused predominantly on the phone company’s wireless unit, which was earning Verizon plenty of revenue. Verizon so valued its wireless business, in 2014 it bought out its partner Vodafone’s 45% interest in Verizon Wireless in a transaction valued at approximately $130 billion. That kind of money would have wired a considerable amount of the United States with fiber to the home service.

Paradox: 2008 – Don’t you dare spend that kind of money / 2013 – That was money well spent

Wall Street analysts, like many investors, like to focus on the short-term picture of the companies they cover. What appears to be really bad news today may not be so bad tomorrow, and as a result their advice often changes with time.

For example, Mr. Moffett spit nails over the cable industry’s “waste” of $100 billion on system rebuilds in the 1990s, but by the late 2000s he was a veritable cable stock promoter. Moffett told the New York Times it was clear cable was emerging on top in the telecom space and its competitors, including satellite and telephone companies, were dead companies walking. Cable’s success would likely not have come without the investments Moffett and other Wall Street analysts howled about.

Among the phone companies, AT&T initially won more respect from investors for not overspending on its U-verse project, which was less costly than FiOS, but also less capable. U-verse avoided the cost of ripping out copper cable from backyards and the sides of homes, but also had limits on broadband speed and the number of concurrent TV channels a customer could watch. As HDTV took hold, those limits became more clear, especially to customers. As a result, U-verse customer satisfaction was not that high. In contrast, Verizon FiOS consistently achieved top position in customer ratings year after year because it delivered more than customers expected and was ready-made for easy expansion and upgrades.

“There was a raging debate a couple of years ago about who got it right, AT&T or Verizon,” Blair Levin, then an analyst with Stifel, Nicolaus & Company, told the Times in 2008. “Initially the investment community thought it was AT&T, but increasingly Verizon got their begrudging respect.”

Even Moffett’s views on FiOS ‘evolved’ over time. In 2013, he sent a research note to his clients admitting his views were more positive about FiOS than before.

“FiOS will sustain subscriber growth longer than either we or Verizon had projected, and that FiOS will ultimately achieve higher penetration rates than either we or Verizon had originally targeted,” Moffett’s team wrote. “Verizon’s FiOS is overwhelmingly the largest and most important FTTH network in the U.S. For comparison, Verizon’s FiOS covers 14% of American homes; Google’s fledgling fiber network, at least based on the three markets that have been disclosed up to now . . . will cover less than ½% to 1% when it is eventually completed.”

Moffett himself predicted in 2008 his views would evolve over time, as would his clients. Those invested in Verizon during FiOS’ buildout years would suffer somewhat from the costs to deploy the fiber optic network. But those who bought shares around 2010 or after consider those expenses “sunk costs” at this point — already spent and dealt with on the balance sheet. The economics change from ‘who is going to pay for all this’ to ‘how is the company going to use this new asset to best monetize its business.’

To be sure, Moffett still frequently recoils when a company reports it is planning on significant and costly upgrades, like Verizon’s millimeter wave 5G network. He is more tolerant of gradual upgrades, like those undertaken by Charter Spectrum to retire analog cable television and upgrade its systems to DOCSIS 3.1 technology, allowing it to sell faster internet speeds.

Moffett and other analysts can present a problem for for-profit, investor-owned companies that are about to launch a disruptive product or service. Verizon’s 5G project is now facing new scrutiny, perhaps as a backlash against the excessive hype these wireless networks are enjoying in the media. The costs to deploy small cell wireless technology across the country will be staggering, and it is not a stretch to suggest some on Wall Street will champion efforts to consolidate costs by building a shared network, recommending a tough return on investment formula to determine where small cell technology will be deployed, or calling for higher prices on services. Companies like Verizon will have to be prepared to defend their business case for 5G, perhaps stronger than they did defending FiOS more than a decade ago.

We’ll explore Moffett’s latest findings about the performance of Verizon’s millimeter wave 5G wireless home broadband replacement in part two.

Craig Moffett was a featured guest on C-SPAN’s ‘The Communicators’ at the 2013 Cable Show, discussing cable’s inherent advantages over telephone companies and the emergence of video cord-cutting as a result of too many rate hikes on customers. (24:39)

Verizon, the country’s leading provider of millimeter wave 5G wireless broadband, is promising to expand service nationwide, but admits it will only service urban areas where the economics of small cell/fiber network infrastructure makes economic sense.

At the Mobile World Congress conference in Barcelona, Spain, Verizon’s vice president of technology planning told PC that when it launches its mobile 5G network later this spring, home wireless internet service will come along for the ride.

“It is one network, based on 5G, supporting multiple use cases,” Verizon’s Adam Koeppe said. “Enterprise, small/medium business, consumer, mobility, fixed. When the 5G network is built, you have a fixed and mobile play that’s basically native to the deployment you’re doing.”

That means Verizon’s millimeter wave 5G network is designed to be shared by everyone and everything, including businesses, residential customers, cell phone users on the go, Internet of Things applications like smart meters and intelligent traffic systems, and more. But that network will not be everywhere Verizon or Verizon Wireless currently provides service.

“Our deployments of millimeter wave are focused on urban centers. It’s where the people are, where the consumption is,” Koeppe said.

Verizon faces significant costs building out its 5G wireless network in areas where it does not already offer FiOS fiber to the home service. Verizon’s 5G network is dependent on a fiber optic-fed network of small cells placed on top of utility and light poles at least every few city blocks. That means Verizon is most likely to get a reasonable return on its investment placing its 5G network in urban downtown areas and high wireless traffic suburban zones, such as around event venues, large shopping centers and entertainment districts. The company has chosen to deploy 5G in some residential areas, but only within large city limits. So far, it has generally steered clear of residential suburbs in favor of older gentrified city neighborhoods with plenty of closely-spaced multi-dwelling apartments, condos, and homes, as well as in urban centers with converted lofts or apartments.

Koeppe

Rural areas are definitely off Verizon’s list because the millimeter waves Verizon prefers to use do not travel very far, making it very expensive to deploy the technology to serve a relatively small number of customers.

Other carriers are not committing to large scale 5G deployments either.

At a debate held earlier today at Georgetown Law’s Institute for Technology Law & Policy, former FCC commissioner Mignon Clyburn, now a paid lobbyist for T-Mobile, warned that unless T-Mobile was allowed to merge with Sprint, its deployment of 5G will only happen in “very limited areas.”

Sprint has plans to introduce its own flavor of 5G, which won’t use millimeter wave frequencies, by June in nine U.S. cities. T-Mobile has talked about deploying 5G on existing large cell towers, which means one tower will serve many more customers than Verizon’s small cells. But with more customers sharing that bandwidth, the effective speed customers will see is likely to be only incrementally better than T-Mobile’s existing 4G LTE network. AT&T is initially moving in the same direction as T-Mobile, meaning many customers will be sharing the same bandwidth. That may explain why AT&T’s current 5G hotspot service plan also comes with a 15 GB data cap.

Verizon says its millimeter wave network will, by geography and design, limit the number of people sharing each small cell, making data caps unnecessary for its 5G fixed wireless home broadband replacement, which delivers download speeds of around 300 Mbps on average.

“We engineer the network to give the customer what they need when they need it, and the results speak for themselves,” Koeppe said.

Verizon is already selling its 5G service in limited areas for $50 a month to Verizon Wireless customers, $70 a month for non-customers. There are no data caps or speed throttles.

Based on the plans of all four major U.S. carriers, consumers should only expect scattered rollouts of 5G this year, and only in certain neighborhoods at first. It will take several years to build out the different iterations of 5G technology, with millimeter wave taking the longest to expand because of infrastructure and potential permitting issues.