New York City’s cable franchise territories

A proposal to replace Charter Communications’ Spectrum cable systems in New York with a workers co-op, owned and self-managed by its workers, would offer a bundle of television, phone, and broadband service price-capped at $100 a month for residential customers.

Developed by several dozen striking Charter/Spectrum workers, the 18-page proposal, “New York City Communication July 2018 Business Plan” would, for now, address only the five boroughs of New York City and nearby Bergen, N.J. But Troy Walcott, a striking member of the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers (IBEW) Local 3, says the current proposal was written as “a proof of concept” that can be adopted across New York State.

“The best time is now,” Walcott told LaborPress, noting that if the city (or state) decided not to renew Charter Communications’ franchise agreements in the city, there will still be a few years left before it expires, giving the proposed co-op time to develop its own network or plan to overhaul what was originally Time Warner Cable’s system in places like Manhattan.

A citywide co-op would also introduce competitive service in boroughs presently serviced by Altice, formerly Cablevision. The group would have to build its own network in those areas. If New York revokes Charter’s franchise, the cable system would likely take the city and/or state to court, setting up years of litigation. Past precedent has shown that cable systems abandoning or forced from an area are exceptionally rare, and usually involve a friendly sale of the existing system to another provider. One example was Adelphia Communications Corporation, which ran the fifth largest cable company in the country until it filed bankruptcy in 2002 after investigators revealed internal executive corruption. Adelphia systems were sold to Comcast and Time Warner Cable in most areas, although the communities of Mooresville, Davidson, and Cornelius, N.C., acquired the bankrupt Adelphia system serving parts of the three communities in 2007 for $80 million, relaunching it as a community-owned cable provider with mixed results.

A workers co-op is owned and run by its workers in the public interest.

If New York does strip Charter of its Spectrum cable franchises in the state, and if that effort survives the inevitable court challenges, Charter would likely sell its systems in New York to Comcast, an obviously motivated buyer. Another possible, but less-likely buyer is Altice, which acquired Cablevision and already provides service in parts of downstate New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.

Charter is facing multiple investigations in New York over its business conduct. In New York City, where its franchise agreement is set to expire July 18, 2020, the company is under fire for its creative interpretation of “located in New York City” — language in Article 17 of the franchise agreement which requires Charter to use vendors registered to do business in New York, have a long-term commercial lease in New York, and more than 50% of its workforce living in New York.

With a substantial amount of its workforce on strike in the area for the last year and a half, and the industry’s trend to shift work to third-party contractors as a cost saving measure, the IBEW has been documenting instances of Charter-badged commercial vehicles parked overnight behind a Far Rockaway florist shop or in residential neighborhoods, often with out-of-state license plates.

Charter officials deny those accusations, and claim at least 75% of its vendors and contractors are located within New York City.

When Kate Blumm, assistant commissioner of the New York City Department of Information Technology & Telecommunications (DoITT) confronted Charter officials about its possible use of out-of-state vendors, the response from Charter was less than reassuring.

“Once we started to probe, we realized that Charter was essentially making the argument that if you are a worker and you are doing work in the city, therefore, you are located in the city,” Blumm said during the March 13 episode of the “Blue Collar Buzz” podcast. “They pointed us to a Macmillan online dictionary definition of what the word ‘located’ means — and we kind of looked at ourselves and were scratching our heads — this is not the spirit and intent of this provision. This provision says that Charter has to use best efforts to use vendors located in the city.”

As a result, the DoITT has pushed its franchise agreement audit one year earlier than normal, now scheduled to begin Sept. 1. The city’s concerns about Charter’s performance have been amplified at the state level by the New York Public Service Commission, which has hammered Charter executives for months about the company’s inability to meet its obligations under the 2016 Merger Order approving the takeover of Time Warner Cable.

Tell us what you think about your cable TV service – whether it’s @verizon , @Altice or @GetSpectrum – send us your comments so we can make sure New Yorkers get the best service possible 📺👉https://t.co/ic2cx3sAjW

— NYC IT & Telecomm (@NYCDoITT) July 11, 2018

“Not only has the company failed to meet its obligations to build out its cable system as required, it continues to make patently false and misleading claims to consumers that it has met those obligations without in any way acknowledging the findings of the Public Service Commission to the contrary,” said PSC Chairman John B. Rhodes. “Our patience with Charter has come to an end and now we must move to take much stronger actions.”

Mayor de Blasio

Backers of the cable co-op note many of those on their business plan development team have direct experience designing, surveying, building, and maintaining the existing Spectrum cable system originally owned by Time Warner Cable.

“We know the system because we built it,” Walcott said. “The system was already crumbling and the infrastructure needed to be redone. This is something that’s going to have to get done anyway. We’re saying, instead of letting them do it, let’s start doing it and rebuilding it ourselves — the people that are actually going to build it anyway.”

Finding enough money to proceed will be the co-op’s biggest challenge. New York City officials, like Mayor Bill De Blasio, are in favor of more cable competition in spirit, but are careful not to commit themselves, or the sizable sums required if the group decides to begin building a competing system or bid to acquire the current Spectrum system. So far, the New York City Council has committed to gradually increasing financial support for the development and cultivation of worker cooperatives, starting with $1.2 million in 2015 and increasing to $2.2 million last year. A full-scale acquisition of the existing infrastructure owned by Charter in New York would likely run into the billions of dollars.

The group hopes public demand and dislike of Charter/Spectrum will force elected officials to get involved in the effort.

For the last year and a half, while Charter/Spectrum has been accused of dragging its feet on rural broadband rollouts across New York State and is now threatened with franchise revocation, the company had plenty of time to spare waiting out the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 3, who have been on strike to protest a pay-and-benefits-race-to-the-bottom in the New York City.

The strike has attracted attention and support from many high-profile downstate politicians, particularly New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio and Gov. Andrew Cuomo, but so far the dramatically enlarged Charter Communications, which acquired Time Warner Cable in 2016, seems comfortable waiting out the union and hoping to force workers to give up and accept to the cable company’s less generous basic benefits package.

The cost of the strike has hurt average middle class Spectrum employees far more than Charter’s top executives — particularly CEO Thomas Rutledge, who had no objections to accepting a take-home bonus and pay package worth $98 million after overseeing the company’s merger. In contrast, many striking workers have depleted their family’s savings and have sold their homes to relocate to less expensive apartments as they struggle to holdout against the nation’s second largest cable company. A few others were reportedly homeless. The union’s emergency fund has been depleted.

The David vs. Goliath battle has also put enormous strain on some affected families. Some have quit the company and looked for employment elsewhere, some others have returned to work and abandoned the strike, leaving holdouts hoping for a breakthrough.

Instead, Charter appears to have won a mysterious ally in the form of a Spectrum employee hired after the strike began in 2017. Initially the worker  had a supervisory role in the company with a salary to match, but late last year strangely accepted an apparent demotion to a level three technician, while retaining his very generous managerial salary. That worker, on his own, managed to navigate a complicated procedure and cumbersome process to file a petition to decertify the union with the National Labor Relations Board. If his effort is successful, IBEW Local 3 would lose the right to negotiate for their members, which is another way of saying “break the union.”

“The guy was brought in – he’s a front, pretty much,” Staten Island mom Sanela Djencic told LaborPress. “He was brought in to bust the union.”

Not so, claims Charter.

“Charter had no involvement in the filing of the decertification petition,” Charter/Spectrum spokesperson John Bonomo flatly told LaborPress in an email. “We don’t have any further comment.”

The NLRB ruled the employee’s petition to decertify the union was valid, finding insufficient evidence to prove the worker was actually serving in a managerial capacity at the time.

In a June 27 letter to employees, John Quigley, Charter’s regional vice president of New York City field operations, was considerably less neutral about the union’s involvement in Charter’s business.

“This ruling clears another hurdle in the decertification process that will allow employees to determine their future,” Quigley wrote. “It is a common tactic for unions to delay and/or block decertification efforts as long as possible […] instead of allowing the voice of employees to be heard. We believe that employees should have the right to vote in a secret ballot election to determine their future. It is the fair and right thing to do.”

Quigley

Quigley did not comment on Charter’s own role erecting hurdles to settle the strike action, something that would also allow employees to determine their future. In fact, strikers complain companies like Charter often prefer to stall and block a fair settlement in hopes the union and its members will run out of funds before it is forced to the table to sign a new agreement.

The company’s efforts to reject union demands come at the same time it is under pressure to deliver the merger-related cost savings it promised shareholders and Wall Street as an outcome of the multibillion dollar merger deal. Cutting back on employee benefits is one way to manage that. Bringing in independent contractors, traditionally paid less and offered fewer benefits, is another. But Charter has consistently claimed it is not trying to hurt its workforce.

Scabby the Rat

“Charter did not want this strike and made multiple attempts to resolve it,” a company spokesman said. “But the union has not been a true partner in negotiations. With Local 3 refusing to even discuss the terms in Charter’s offer, we moved forward last summer and implemented wage increases and other worker benefits. Today we are putting more money into our employees’ pockets, providing them with excellent benefits, and making substantial investments to shore up their retirement benefits that are in jeopardy.”

Charter’s declarations of what is ‘fair and right’ have irritated some members of New York City government.

“Charter Communications has betrayed the public trust and is not deserving of the right to do business with our City,” said Councilman I. Daneek Miller (D-St. Albans). “Charter has an established pattern of deceit against its own workers and consumers in the name of boosting its profit margin, and it must be held accountable for its deception. Well-paying middle class jobs, healthcare and the generational security that is best achieved through union membership are core principles of our city, for which the company has demonstrated no appreciation. If Charter continues to engage in bad faith negotiations with Local 3 or sponsors any attempts to break the union, it’ll be hard pressed to persuade the council to renew its franchise agreement.”

In June, Councilman Rory Lancman (D-Hillcrest) told The Tribune, “Charter Communications has spent the past 15 months doing everything in its power to break Local 3 and boost its own bottom line. Charter’s complete disregard for its own workers and unwillingness to negotiate in good faith are beyond shameful and will not be tolerated in New York City.”

After the inspector general of the Federal Communications Commission opened an investigation into FCC Chairman Ajit Pai’s close relationship with executives at Sinclair Broadcasting, Pai stopped returning Sinclair’s phone calls and refused any further meetings with America’s largest local TV station owner, at least until last Tuesday when Pai called Sinclair’s general counsel to say its multi-billion dollar merger with Tribune Media was in trouble.

The revelation Pai effectively froze out Sinclair while under investigation came in an ex parte communication disclosed by FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel’s office late last week.

“I realize that you appear to have been unwilling to discuss this matter for the past several months (and for that reason our counsel and Tribune’s have been reaching out everyone at the FCC but you),” Sinclair general counsel Barry Faber wrote in an email to Ajit Pai the morning after the phone call.

Based on the email, it is clear Mr. Pai personally called Mr. Faber on Tuesday evening to report the FCC planned to refer Sinclair’s buyout of multiple Tribune Media TV stations, including WGN in Chicago, to an independent administrative law judge who would pursue a hearing — a procedure that usually signals the death of a proposed merger or acquisition. The courtesy call was one last consideration to Sinclair by Mr. Pai, giving executives an early warning that would allow them to quietly withdraw the deal as a face-saving measure before the FCC publicly pulled the rug out the next day. The call came as an apparent shock to executives at Sinclair and Tribune, who had repeatedly expressed confidence the transaction would meet approval from the Republican majority at the FCC — one led by Pai, who personally proposed several rule changes that made the Sinclair transaction possible.

Faber told Pai in response the two companies could not agree to withdraw the deal “in the brief period of time provided to us.” Instead, Faber begged Pai to give the companies more time to reassure the FCC and then offered to withdraw the controversial sweetheart sales of TV stations in Chicago, Dallas, and Houston a short time later. The buyers all had long-standing, close ties to the family that founded Sinclair and were suspected of buying the stations to become Sinclair’s silent partners. Pai refused Faber’s request and went public the next morning with the proposal to refer the matter to an administrative hearing. As of today, the deal is still headed for a hearing, but few expect it will survive long enough to begin the process. But the repercussions are likely to last far longer than that.

Faber

While talking to Faber, it is clear Pai also raised the issue of Sinclair’s possible deception in its merger application and its lack of candor about its plan to divest stations in those three cities.

“I understand that if Sinclair has not been completely truthful and forthcoming with regard to these proposed sales, abandoning them would not eliminate such unacceptable behavior. I point out, however, that as we discussed yesterday no evidence exists that Sinclair has mislead the FCC or been anything other than completely candid with respect to our relationships with the proposed buyers and the terms of the transaction,” Faber wrote. “To designate our transaction for hearing based on the possibility that there may be more to the deals than meets the eyes based on the pricing and other terms that have been disclosed, would be extraordinary and unprecedented.”

Deal critics claim Sinclair’s bold effort to barely disguise the sweetheart deals with well-known business associates of Sinclair’s chairman David Smith was extraordinary and unprecedented as well. Several Wall Street and K Street analysts have expressed concern Sinclair was being exceptionally brazen with the FCC, proposing to spin-off stations to known Sinclair associates at fire sale prices, with contract clauses allowing Sinclair to program the stations ‘for the owner’ and also have the right to buy the stations back at their original fire sale price, assuming deregulation of station ownership caps continued moving forward. Sinclair is no stranger to political controversy, generating a full-scale advertiser boycott and Wall Street blowback over mandatory political programming aired on its stations during the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Recently Sinclair’s mandatory editorials and news stories have received even more scrutiny in the media, and have generated a lot of negative press for the Baltimore-based TV station owner.

Pai

Some on Wall Street are reportedly growing tired of Sinclair management’s political agendas getting in the way of potential profits, and this latest high-profile incident is likely to further strengthen that perception. Pai’s announcement that the merger deal smacked of a “lack of candor” and “misrepresentation,” raise questions about the Sinclair’s honesty and character, something that could threaten its ability to keep or renew its stations’ licenses. Long standing FCC rules state a license can be revoked if an owner lies to the Commission or engages in unethical or criminal behavior.

The FCC rarely forgets about egregious bad conduct. In the 1960s, RKO General, a division of General Tire and Rubber Company, falsely testified to the FCC that its television stations, including KHJ Los Angeles, WNAC Boston, and WOR New York did not engage in “reciprocal trade practices” — forcing General Tire’s vendors to buy advertising time on RKO stations if they wanted their contracts with the tire company renewed. In 1969, the FCC had enough evidence to prove RKO officials had lied to the Commission and were brazenly violating FCC rules. In 1975, RKO was once again hauled before the FCC and questioned about allegations General Tire was bribing foreign officials, had a secret slush fund to finance campaign contributions, and misappropriated revenue from overseas operations to cook its books.

Five years later in 1980, the FCC stunned the broadcasting industry by canceling the license of RKO’s Boston station — WNAC, declaring RKO “lacked the requisite character” to hold a FCC license because it openly deceived the FCC by withholding evidence, covered up improper dealings, and maintained a “persistent lack of candor” about its business practices and behavior. The FCC also moved to cancel licenses for KHJ in Los Angeles and WOR in New York. RKO held on for a few more years by appealing the FCC’s decision in various courts. It eventually sold most of its TV stations by the mid-1980s. But by then, FCC administrative law judge Ed Kuhlmann documented even more corruption by RKO, calling the company’s conduct the worst case of dishonesty in FCC history. RKO systematically misled advertisers about station ratings, fraudulently billed clients, destroyed audit reports demanded by the FCC, and filed several false financial statements with the FCC. Kuhlmann wanted RKO out of the broadcasting business for good, ordering RKO to surrender licenses for the two remaining TV stations it still owned in 1987, as well as 12 radio stations.

Sinclair’s critics are likely to invoke RKO General in challenging Sinclair license renewals in the future, noting a similar lack of candor and misrepresentation.

With the Sinclair-Tribune merger deal now swirling in the bowl, shareholders may be the ultimate judge, jury, and executioner, at least at Tribune Media. Sports Fan Coalition and Public Knowledge took the opportunity to remind Tribune’s board of directors it just blew a $3.9 billion deal by allowing Sinclair to manage the transaction with apparent dishonesty and chutzpah:

The FCC has unanimously determined that Sinclair may have “engaged in misrepresentation and/or lack of candor in its applications with the Commission,” in possible violation of the Communications Act and FCC rules. Thus, because Sinclair failed to satisfy its commitments under the merger agreement, Tribune can and should invoke its termination right under the merger agreement. Such termination would not trigger the liquidated damages provisions of the merger agreement.

[…] “Either take immediate action to terminate your agreements for the sale of your company to Sinclair Broadcast Group, or resign as directors of Tribune Media.”

New York’s Public Service Commission is drafting additional fines and sanctions on Charter Communications, as well as possibly stripping the company’s ability to continue providing cable service in New York State.

PSC Chair John Rhodes on Friday accused Charter, which offers service under the Spectrum brand, of “gaslighting its own customers,” with false claims it exceeded its obligations to New York State, while actually shortchanging customers and dragging its feet on promised service expansion.

“Not only has the company failed to meet its obligations to build out its cable system as required, it continues to make patently false and misleading claims to consumers that it has met those obligations without in any way acknowledging the findings of the Public Service Commission to the contrary,” said Chair Rhodes. “Our patience with Charter has come to an end and now we must move to take much stronger actions.”

The PSC is currently developing a number of enforcement actions, including additional penalties/fines, injunctive relief, sanctions, and/or revocation of Spectrum’s ability to continue offering cable service in New York State.

Rhodes’ complaints largely focus on Charter’s ongoing failure to commit to the State’s 2016 Merger Order which approved Charter’s acquisition of Time Warner Cable as long as Charter completed service improvements, rural broadband expansion, and reduced customer complaints. Rhodes is particularly upset that Charter has failed to meet its rural broadband obligations on a timely basis, leaving many of the 145,000 unserved and underserved homes and businesses promised Spectrum internet service waiting through lengthy delays.

That may come as a surprise to many Spectrum subscribers in New York, who have seen saturation advertising for several months from Charter promoting its statewide rural broadband expansion program and the company’s claims it is ahead of schedule.

The PSC previously ordered Charter to cease “its misleading campaign” and has referred the matter to the New York Attorney General’s office for possible civil action. As of this week, the advertisements continue to air.

Charter has denied the allegations made by the state’s regulators and notified the PSC it intends to seek judicial review and/or bring legal action against the state.

How exactly did America get stuck with a broadband monopoly in many areas, a duopoly in most others? It did not happen by accident. In this occasional series, “Historical Truths,” we will take you back to important moments in telecom public and regulatory policy that would later prove to be essential for the creation of today’s anti-competitive, overpriced marketplace for broadband internet service. By understanding the trickery and legislative shell games practiced by lobbyists and their elected partners in Congress, you will learn to recognize when the telecom industry and their friends are preparing to sell you another bill of goods. 

Vice President Al Gore watches President Bill Clinton digitally sign the 1996 Telecom Act into law on February 8, 1996.

By the end of the first term of the Clinton Administration, the president faced a major backlash from Republicans two years into the Gingrich Revolution. A well-funded chorus of voices in the business community, the Democratic Leadership Council — a business-friendly group of moderate Democrats, as well as commentators and pundits had the attention of the Beltway media, complaining in unison that the Democrats shifted too far to the left during the first term of the Clinton Administration, leaving it exposed in the forthcoming presidential election to another voter backlash like the one that installed the Gingrich revolutionaries in the House of Representatives and delivered a Republican takeover of the U.S. Senate in 1994.

With pressure over the growing lack of bipartisanship, and a presidential election ahead in the fall, the Clinton Administration was looking for ideas to prove it could work across the aisle and pass new laws that would deliver for ordinary Americans.

Revamping telecommunications policies would definitely touch every American with a phone line, computer, modem, and a television. Before 1996, America’s telecommunications regulation largely emanated from the Communications Act of 1934, which empowered the Federal Communications Commission to establish good order for the growing number of radio stations, telephone, and wire lines crisscrossing the country.

The 1934 Act’s legacy remains today, at least in part. It created the FCC, firmly established the concept of content regulation on the public airwaves, and established a single body to conduct federal oversight of the nation’s telephone monopoly controlled by AT&T.

Efforts to replace the 1934 Act began well before the Clinton Administration. In the early 1980s, Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) attempted to push for a legislative breakup of AT&T and a significant reduction in the oversight powers of the FCC. The bill met considerable opposition from AT&T, spending $2 million lobbying against the bill in 1981 and 1982. Alarm companies also heavily opposed the measure, terrified AT&T would enter their market and put them out of business. AT&T preferred a more orderly plan of divestiture being carefully negotiated in a settlement of a 1974 antitrust lawsuit by the Justice Department. A 1982 consent decree broke off AT&T’s control of local telephone lines by establishing seven Regional Bell Operating Companies independent of AT&T (NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell Corporation, BellSouth, and US West). AT&T (technically an eighth Baby Bell) kept control of its nationwide long distance network.

Also in the 1980s, the cable television industry gained a much firmer foothold across the country, quickly gaining political power through well-financed lobbyists and close political ties to selected members of Congress (particularly Democrat Tim Wirth, who served in the House and later Senate representing the state of Colorado) that allowed them to push through a major amendment to the 1934 Act in 1984 deregulating the cable industry. The result was an early wave of industry consolidation as family owned cable companies were snapped up by a dozen or so growing operators. These buyouts were largely financed by dramatic rate increases passed on to consumers, resulting in cable bills tripling (or more) in some areas almost immediately. By the end of the 1980s, a major consumer backlash began, creating enormous energy for the eventual passage of the 1992 Cable Act, which re-regulated the industry and allowed the FCC to order immediate rate reductions.

The Progress and Freedom Foundation, with close ties to former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, closed its doors in 2010.

The biggest push for a near-complete revision of the 1934 Act came during the Gingrich Revolution. In 1995, the conservative Progress & Freedom Foundation — a group closely tied to then-Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) floated a trial balloon calling for the elimination of an independent Federal Communications Commission, replaced by a stripped-down Office of Communications that would be run out of the White House and be controlled by the president. A small army of telecom industry-backed scholars also began proposing privatizing the public airwaves by selling off spectrum to companies to be owned as private property. The intense interest in the FCC by the group may have been the result of its veritable “who’s who” of telecom industry backers, including AT&T, BellSouth, Verizon, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, cable companies like Comcast and Time Warner; cell phone companies like T-Mobile and Sprint; and broadcasters like Clear Channel Communications and Viacom.

The proposal outraged Democrats and liberal groups who called it a corporate-friendly sell-off and giveaway of the public airwaves. Then FCC Chairman Reed Hundt took the proposal very seriously, because at the time Gingrich lieutenant Tom DeLay’s (R-Tex.) secretive Project Relief group had 350 industry lobbyists, including some from BellSouth and Southwestern Bell literally drafting deregulation bills and a regulatory moratorium on behalf of the new Republican majority, coordinating campaign contributions for would-be supporters along the way. The proposal ultimately went nowhere, lost in a sea of the House Republicans’ constantly changing agendas, but did draw attention to the fact a wholesale revision of telecommunications policy would attract healthy campaign contributions from all corners of the industry — broadcasters, cable companies, phone companies, and the emerging wireless industry.

When it became known Congress was once again going to tackle telecommunications regulation, lobbyists immediately descended from their K Street perches in relentless waves, with checks in hand. There were two very important agendas in mind – deregulation, which would remove FCC rate regulation, service oversight, cross-competition prohibitions, and ownership caps, and ironically, protectionism. The cable and satellite companies had become increasingly fearful of the regional Baby Bells, which arrived in Congress in the early 1990s promoting the idea of entering the cable TV business. The cable industry feared phone companies would cross-subsidize the development of Telco TV by charging telephone ratepayers new fees to finance that entry. The cable industry had carefully developed a de facto monopoly over the prior decade of consolidation. Companies learned quickly direct head-to-head competition between two cable operators in the same market was bad for business.

The original premise of the 1996 Telecom Act was that it would eliminate regulations that discouraged competition. Promoters of the legislation asked why there should only be one phone or cable company in each city and why maintain regulations that kept cable and phone companies out of each others’ markets. Fears about market power and allowing domineering cable and phone companies to grow even larger were dismissed on the premise that a wide open marketplace, with regulations in place to protect consumers and competition would avoid creating telecom robber barons.

The checks handed out by industry lobbyists were bi-partisan. Democrats could crow the new rules would finally give consumers a new choice for cable TV or phone service, and help bring the “information superhighway” of the internet to schools, libraries, and other public institutions. Republicans proclaimed it a model example of free market deregulation, promoting competition, consumer choice, and lower prices.

At a high-brow bill signing ceremony held at the Library of Congress, both President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore were on hand to “electronically sign” the bill into law. Both the president and vice-president emphasized the historical significance of the emerging internet, and its ability to connect information-have’s and have-not’s in an emerging digital divide. Missing from the discussion was an exploration of what industry lobbyists and their congressional allies were doing inserting specific language into the 1996 Telecom Act that would later haunt the bill’s legacy.

On hand to celebrate the bi-partisan bill’s signing were Speaker Gingrich, Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.); Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.); Rep. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R-Va.); Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.); and Ron Brown, the Secretary of Commerce. Pressler was among the soon-to-be-endangered moderate Republicans, Hollings was a holdout against the gradual wave of Republican takeovers in southern “red states,” and Dingell was a veteran lawmaker with close ties to the broadcasting industry.

Some of the bill’s industry backers were also there, some who would ironically see its signing as directly responsible for the eventual demise of their independent companies. John Hendricks of the Discovery Channel, Glenn Jones of Jones Intercable (acquired by Comcast in 1999), Jean Monty of Northern Telecom (later Nortel), Donald Newhouse of Advance Publications (eventual part owner of Bright House Networks and later Charter Communications), William O’Shea of Reuters Ltd. and Ray Smith of Bell Atlantic (today part of Verizon) were on hand. Also in the audience was Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of America, representing Hollywood Studios.

Among the fatal flaws in the Telecom Act of 1996 were its various ‘competition tests,’ which were open to considerable interpretation and latitude at the FCC. The Republican supporters of the bill argued that the presence of an open and free marketplace would, by itself, induce competition among various entrants. They were generally unconcerned with the question of whether new competition would actually arrive. Their priority was lifting the protective levers of legacy regulation as soon as possible. Many Democrats assumed what appeared to be carefully drafted regulatory language would protect consumers by preventing the FCC from lifting protections too early in the competitive process. But lobbyists consistently outmaneuvered lawmakers, finding ways to insert loopholes and compromise language that introduced inconsistencies that could be dealt with and eliminated either by the FCC or the courts later.

For example, lawmakers insisted on unbundling telecommunications network elements, an arcane way of saying new competitors must be granted access to existing networks to be shared at wholesale rates. In practice, this meant if a phone company entered the internet service provider business, it must also make its network available for other ISPs as well. In some areas, competing local telephone companies also offered landline service over existing telephone lines, paying wholesale connection fees to the incumbent local phone company. As competition emerged, the incumbent company usually petitioned for a lifting of the regulations governing their business, claiming competition had arrived.

The first warning the 1996 Act was going awry came a year after the bill was signed into law. Phone companies started raising rates from $1.50-6 a month on average. AT&T was petitioning to hike rates $7 a month. Someone would have to pay to replace the scrapped subsidy system in a competitive market — subsidies that had been in place at the nation’s phone companies for decades. By charging higher rates for phone service in cities and for pricier long distance calls before the arrival of companies like MCI and Sprint, the phone companies used this revenue to subsidize their Universal Service obligations, keeping rural phone bills low and often below the real cost of providing service. To establish a truly competitive phone business, the subsidies had to be reformed or go, and that meant someone had to cover the difference.

“This game is called ‘shift and shaft,'” Sharon L. Nelson, the chairwoman of the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, said in 1997. “You shift the costs to the states and shaft the consumer.”

Sam Brownback (R-Kansas)

Gradually, consumers suddenly discovered their phone bill littered with a host of new charges, including the Subscriber Line Charge and various regulatory recovery fees and universal service cost recovery schemes. Phone companies also boosted rates on their unregulated Class phone features, like call waiting, caller ID, and three-way calling. The proceeds helped make up for the tens of billions in lost subsidies, but the end effect was that phone bills were still rising, despite promises of competitive, cheap phone service.

At a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee later that year, several angry senators said they would never have voted in favor of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 if they had thought it would lead to higher rates. Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican, was in the line of fire because of his rural constituents. Rates for those customers are subsidized more heavily than elsewhere because of the cost of extending service to them. Rates were threatening to skyrocket.

“We would be foolish to build up all these expectations about competition without saying to the American people, ‘We’re going to have to raise your phone bill,'” Brownback said.

But the rate hikes were just beginning. By the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, telecom lobbyists brought a thick agenda of action items to Michael Powell’s FCC. Despite promises of competition breaking out everywhere, that simply was not the case. Republicans quickly blamed the remaining regulatory protections still in place in noncompetitive markets for ‘deterring competition.’ But the companies knew the only thing better than deregulation was deregulation without competition.

Consolidation wave

The Republican-dominated FCC quickly began removing many of those protective regulations, claiming they were outdated and unnecessary. The very definition of competition was broadened, allowing the presence of virtually any company offering almost any service good enough to trip the deregulation levers. Later, even open access to networks by competitors was often limited to pre-existing networks, not the future next generation networks. Republicans argued those networks should be managed by their owners and not subject to “unbundling” requirements.

The weakened rules also sparked one of the country’s largest consolidation waves in history. Cable companies bought other cable companies and the Baby Bells gradually started putting themselves back together into what would eventually be AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest/CenturyLink. For good measure, phone companies even snapped up a handful of independent phone companies, most notably General Telephone and Electronics, better known as GTE by Verizon and Southern New England Telephone (SNET) by AT&T.

Prices rising as costs dropping.

The cable industry, under the premise it needed territories of scale to maximize potential ad insertion revenue from selling commercials on cable networks, gradually shrunk from at least a dozen well-known companies to two very large ones – Comcast and Charter, along with a few middle-sized powerhouses like Cox and Altice. Merger and acquisition deals faced little scrutiny during the Bush years of 2002-2009, usually approved with few conditions.

The result has been a rate-raising oligopoly for telecom services. In broadcasting, the consolidation wave started in radio, with entities like Clear Channel buying up hundreds of radio stations (and eventually putting the resulting giant iHeartMedia into bankruptcy) and Sinclair and similar companies acquiring masses of local television outlets. On many, local news and original programming was sacrificed, along with a significant number of employees at each station, in favor of inexpensive music, network or syndicated programming. Some stations that aired local news for 50 years ended that tradition or turned newsgathering over to a co-owned station in the same city.

Although telephone service eventually dropped in price with the advent of Voice over IP service, consumers’ cable TV and internet bills are skyrocketing at levels well in excess of inflation. Last year, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth demonstrated that the current consolidated, anti-competitive telecom marketplace results in rising prices for buyers and falling costs for providers.

Your oligopoly tax.

“In truly competitive markets, a significant part of cost reductions would be passed through to consumers,” the group wrote. “Based on a detailed analysis of profits—primarily EBITDA—we estimate that the resulting overcharges amount to more than $45 per month, or $540 per year, an aggregate of almost $60 billion, or about 25 percent of the total average consumer’s monthly bill.”

That is one expensive bill, paid by subscribers year after year with no relief in sight. Several Republicans are proposing to double down on deregulation even more after eliminating net neutrality, which could cause your internet bill to rise further. Several Republicans want to rewrite the 1996 Telecom Act once again, and lobbyists are already sharing their ideas to further curtail consumer protections, lift ownership caps, and promote additional consolidation.