Home » FCC » Recent Articles:

FCC’s Inspector General Finds Chairman Ajit Pai Made Up Claimed Denial of Service Attack

Phillip Dampier August 7, 2018 Net Neutrality, Public Policy & Gov't 2 Comments

Pai

The FCC under Chairman Ajit Pai “misrepresented facts and provided misleading responses” to the public and Congress about an alleged “distributed denial of service attack” (DDoS) that caused the FCC’s website to crash as millions of Americans shared their comments about net neutrality.

In a damning report released today by the FCC’s independent Inspector General, an investigation found the claimed attack never happened and the FCC’s ongoing public statements about it were demonstrably false.

The investigation into the alleged “attack” on the FCC’s electronic comment system (ECFS) on May 7-8, 2017 took several months to complete. Its findings were released after Pai was able to issue a broadly distributed press release critics claim is an effort to change the story and get ahead of the report itself, which was issued late this afternoon.

A DDoS attack overwhelms a website with a barrage of invalid traffic that eventually makes the target server unresponsive. The FCC claimed the attack was responsible for preventing people from leaving comments for hours after John Oliver brought up the subject of net neutrality on his HBO Show “Last Week Tonight” last year.

But in fact, it was the sheer volume of comments from the public that were responsible for slowing down the website — a politically inconvenient fact for net neutrality opponents (including Pai).

Highlights from the Inspector General’s 106-page report:

On May 7, 2017, at 11:30 pm EDT, the ECFS experienced a significant increase in the level of traffic attempting to access the system, resulting in the disruption of system availability. In fact, information obtained from, a contractor providing web performance and cloud security solutions to the FCC, identified a 3,116% increase in traffic to ECFS between May 7 and May 8, 2017.

The investigation matched traffic spikes to John Oliver’s show airing and the posting of videos and social media announcements about net neutrality.

On May 8, 2017, the FCC issued a press release in which the FCC’s former Chief Information Officer (CIO) Dr. David Bray provided the following statement regarding the cause of delays experienced by consumers trying to file comments on ECFS:

“Beginning on Sunday night at midnight, our analysis reveals that the FCC was subject to multiple distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDoS)[2]. These were deliberate attempts by external actors to bombard the FCC’s comment system with a high amount of traffic to our commercial cloud host. These actors were not attempting to file comments themselves; rather they made it difficult for legitimate commenters to access and file with the FCC. While the comment system remained up and running the entire time, these DDoS events tied up the servers and prevented them from responding to people attempting to submit comments. We have worked with our commercial partners to address this situation and will continue to monitor developments going forward.”

Our investigation did not substantiate the allegations of multiple DDoS attacks alleged by Bray. While we identified a small amount of anomalous activity and could not entirely rule out the possibility of individual DoS attempts during the period from May 7 through May 9, 2017, we do not believe this activity resulted in any measurable degradation of system availability given the miniscule scale of the anomalous activity relative to the contemporaneous voluminous viral traffic.

Here is what a net neutrality campaign going viral looks like. As Oliver’s show reached more viewers, many took time to visit the FCC’s website to submit comments, causing the server to slow to a crawl.

The degradation of ECFS system availability was likely the result of a combination of: (1) “flash crowd” activity resulting from the Last Week Tonight with John Oliver episode that aired on May 7, 2017 through the links provided by that program for filing comments in the proceeding; and (2) high volume traffic resulting from system design issues.

The conclusion that the event involved multiple DDoS attacks was not based on substantive analysis and ran counter to other opinions including those of the ECFS subject matter expert and the Chief of Staff.

As a result of our reviews and the findings articulated above, we determined the FCC, relying on Bray’s explanation of the events, misrepresented facts and provided misleading responses to Congressional inquiries related to this incident.

The fact millions of Americans were willing to visit a little-known FCC comment website to share their passionate views on net neutrality ran contrary to Chairman Pai’s claims that many comments were faked, demonstrated a lack of understanding of how net neutrality worked, or were otherwise not to be taken seriously. Pai even called net neutrality supporters “Chicken Littles” during a July 25 congressional hearing.

Pai’s public statements downplaying public comments on net neutrality might lose credibility if the FCC admitted the issue of net neutrality went viral and Americans were sharing their views in unprecedented numbers. Instead, the FCC repeatedly questioned the veracity of the comments, claimed an engineered attack — not dissent — caused the website to crash, and refused to participate in an investigation with the New York Attorney General’s office to uncover the origin of the alleged attack.

Pai’s press release tried to shift attention away from this damning conclusion from the FCC’s Inspector General.

Pai, in an effort to get out ahead of the unflattering report from the Inspector General, issued a press release blaming the affair on the flawed “culture” of the Obama Administration.

“I am deeply disappointed that the FCC’s former Chief Information Officer (CIO), who was hired by the prior Administration and is no longer with the Commission, provided inaccurate information about this incident to me, my office, Congress, and the American people,” Pai said in a statement. “This is completely unacceptable. I’m also disappointed that some working under the former CIO apparently either disagreed with the information that he was presenting or had questions about it, yet didn’t feel comfortable communicating their concerns to me or my office.”

“Second, it has become clear that in addition to a flawed comment system, we inherited from the prior Administration a culture in which many members of the Commission’s career IT staff were hesitant to express disagreement with the Commission’s former CIO in front of FCC management,” Pai added.

Jessica Rosenworcel, the only remaining Democrat on the Commission, dismissed Pai’s attempts to lay blame for the problems on the former administration.

Bray – the scapegoat?

“The Inspector General Report tells us what we knew all along: the FCC’s claim that it was the victim of a DDoS attack during the net neutrality proceeding is bogus,” said Rosenworcel. “What happened instead is obvious—millions of Americans overwhelmed our online system because they wanted to tell us how important Internet openness is to them and how distressed they were to see the FCC roll back their rights. It’s unfortunate that this agency’s energy and resources needed to be spent debunking this implausible claim.”

Pai’s chief scapegoat is David Bray, the FCC’s chief information officer from 2013-2017. Pai accused Bray of misleading him and other FCC officials about the source of the slowdowns and interruptions on the website.

“Yes, we’re 99.9% confident this was external folks deliberately trying to tie-up the server to prevent others from commenting and/or create a spectacle,” Pai quoted Bray as telling him during the May 2017 incident. Bray also acted as an anonymous source for several reporters, claiming a similar DDoS attack occurred in 2014 over net neutrality, a claim hotly disputed by FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler at the time and called “flat-out false” by Gigi Sohn, a senior counselor to Wheeler.

Fact or Fiction?: Bray claimed 4Chan’s “troll” army was invited to the fight by John Oliver.

Bray also claimed, without evidence, John Oliver “invited the ‘trolls'” from controversial website 4Chan to participate in the attack, suggesting the posting of Oliver’s segment on net neutrality was what “triggered the trolls.”

An exhaustive investigation of the FCC’s traffic logs found no evidence of an orchestrated DDoS attack, and the Inspector General used charts to show tremendous traffic spikes generated as Oliver’s campaign went viral.

Pai’s press release attempts to change the subject and divert attention away from the uncomfortable findings that suggest the FCC under his leadership openly deceived both the public and Congress. Instead of admitting he allowed the agency to continue claiming an outside attack on the FCC’s website was responsible for the incident, he praised himself and his office for what he claimed were findings that “debunk the conspiracy theory that my office or I had any knowledge that the information provided by the former CIO was inaccurate and was allowing that inaccurate information to be disseminated for political purposes.”

That directly contradicts the reports conclusion: “As a result of our reviews and the findings articulated above, we determined the FCC, relying on Bray’s explanation of the events, misrepresented facts and provided misleading responses to Congressional inquiries related to this incident.”

beGONE Sports: Comcast Boots beIN Sports from Lineup in Contract Renewal Dispute

Comcast has dropped sports network beIN Sports off the lineup after its contract with the cable company expired July 31.

Customers who tune to the channel will find a series of rotating on-screen messages explaining the network was switched off because the renewal price was too high:

Have you heard about a disagreement between beIn Sports and Comcast?

Every month Comcast has to pay networks to bring their programming to you. That’s right, we pay the network. Not the other way around.

Now beIN sports is asking for a major increase in fees for the channel you already have, which could have a big impact on your bill.

beIN Sports won’t allow Comcast to carry its channels until this is resolved.

beIN Media Group, a spinoff of Al Jazeera Media Network, owns the network and has already filed a complaint against Comcast for violation of the deal conditions imposed by the FCC after approving the merger of Comcast and NBCUniversal. The complaint alleges Comcast is giving preferential treatment to its own sports networks, a violation of program carriage rules. That complaint remains pending.

“We are deeply disappointed that despite our best efforts over the last year to resolve the situation, millions of Comcast XFINITY subscribers have lost access to the content they love. We are happy to extend existing terms while we continue to negotiate, but unfortunately Comcast would rather continue to charge the same while taking away valuable and loved content from customers,” said Antonio Briceño, beIN Sports’ deputy managing director for the U.S. and Canada. “The truth is, we face a disheartening trend of media consolidation, where the big get bigger and innovative brands like ours that serve diverse audiences get pushed-out. This is almost always to the detriment of consumers who end up paying the price. We hope it stops now.”

New York Public Service Commission Votes 4-0 to Kick Charter’s Spectrum Out of the State

Phillip Dampier July 28, 2018 Charter Spectrum, Consumer News, Public Policy & Gov't, Rural Broadband, Video Comments Off on New York Public Service Commission Votes 4-0 to Kick Charter’s Spectrum Out of the State

It took the four commissioners of the New York Public Service Commission just 20 minutes to vote unanimously to undo the multi-billion dollar 2016 merger of Charter Communications and Time Warner Cable, by revoking its approval for failing to meet the public interest.

“Charter’s repeated failures to serve New Yorkers and honor its commitments are well documented and are only getting worse. After more than a year of administrative enforcement efforts to bring Charter into compliance with the Commission’s merger order, the time has come for stronger actions to protect New Yorkers and the public interest,” said Commission Chair John B. Rhodes. “Charter’s non-compliance and brazenly disrespectful behavior toward New York State and its customers necessitates the actions taken today seeking court-ordered penalties for its failures, and revoking the Charter merger approval.”

If the order withstands inevitable court challenges, it would be the first time a regulator drove a large cable operator out of business in a state for bad conduct. It would also make history, achieving similar notoriety to the 1981 case of Tele-Communications, Inc., vs. Jefferson City, Mo., when TCI’s national director of franchising personally threatened the mayor and the city’s cable consultant if their franchise was not renewed. When the city voted to award the franchise to another cable operator, TCI refused to sell its system, withheld franchise fee payments, and alternately told the city it would either strip its cables off utility poles in spite or let them “rot on the pole” rather than sell at any price.

Without modification, the Charter/Time Warner Cable merger was a bad deal for New York

After Stop the Cap! and other consumer groups participated in a detailed review of Charter Communications’ proposal to acquire Time Warner Cable, the Public Service Commission adopted many of our pro-consumer suggestions to ensure the merger benefited the people of New York at least partly as much as the executives and shareholders of the two companies. New York State law demands that telecommunications mergers must meet a public interest test to win approval. On its face, the Commission found the Charter/Time Warner Cable proposal failed to meet this test. The state received detailed evidence showing Time Warner Cable’s existing upgrade plan offered a better deal to New York residents than Charter’s own proposal. Time Warner Cable also maintained a large workforce in New York in call centers, direct hire technicians, and its corporate headquarters.

After a detailed analysis, the PSC rejected the merger for failure to meet the public interest. At the same time, it also offered Charter a way to turn that rejection into a conditional approval. If the company agreed to “enforceable and concrete conditions” that would deliver positive net benefits for New Yorkers to share in the rewards of the merger deal, the Commission would approve the transaction.

Charter has complied with most of the deal conditions demanded by the Commission. The company has boosted its broadband speeds across the state ahead of schedule, committed to at least seven years of broadband service without data caps, introduced an affordable internet access program and temporarily maintained an existing offer for $14.99 slow-speed internet access available to any New York customer, and agreed to maintain jobs in New York (with the exception of a 1.5 year strike action ongoing in New York City affecting technicians).

But the most costly condition for Charter to meet is also the one it has repeatedly failed to meet — its commitment to wire unserved rural areas, largely in upstate New York. Charter committed to a timetable to roll out high-speed internet access for 145,000 homes and businesses that currently lack access to any internet provider.

Charter’s merger deal meets Gov. Cuomo’s Broadband for All Program

Gov. Andrew Cuomo announcing rural broadband initiatives in New York in 2015.

This rural broadband expansion condition was integral to Gov. Andrew Cuomo’s Broadband for All program, promising to make broadband access available to every resident and business in New York State.

Cuomo’s broadband program depended on several sources to accomplish its goal:

  • State/Private Funding: The state invested $500 million of $5.7 billion dollars it earned from settling lawsuits against big banks and insurance companies over the improprieties that helped trigger the 2008 Great Recession. This money was designed to incentivize the private sector to expand high-speed internet access in underserved/unserved areas. Recipients had to provide a 1:1 financial match of whatever grant funds were given, putting the dollar value of this part of the program at over $1 billion.
  • The FCC: The Federal Communications Commission’s Connect America Fund (CAF) offered funding to incumbent providers to expand service in certain areas in New York. Some $170 million of that funding allocated to the state was declined, principally by Verizon, which showed little interest in expanding its rural broadband network. A bipartisan effort to retain and divert those funds into the New NY Broadband Program was successful, allowing the state to fund several rural broadband projects Verizon was not interested in.
  • Charter/Time Warner Cable Merger: To win approval of its merger in New York, Charter agreed to pass an additional 145,000 homes and businesses in less densely populated areas across the state. The company was required to file regular updates on its progress and coordinate with the state the exact locations it planned to serve. This was to ensure Charter would not spend money wiring areas already receiving broadband expansion funding.

For the program to be successful, it was essential that duplication of expansion efforts be avoided. As the program’s public funding wound down, the state discovered it lacked enough money to attract private bidders to serve the last 75,628 locations around the state that remained without a service provider, deemed too remote and expensive to serve. The state awarded over $15 million in state funds and an additional $13.6 million in federal and private funding to Hughes Network Services, LLC, which will furnish satellite-based internet service to those locations. That solution prompted loud complaints from residents discovering they were baited with high-speed internet access that realistically could provide gigabit speed, and suddenly switched to satellite service that cannot guarantee to consistently meet the FCC’s 25/3 Mbps broadband standard and comes with a data cap of 50 GB (or less in some instances) a month, rendering its usefulness highly questionable.

Bait rural upstate customers with the promise of Spectrum internet access, switch to expanding service in New York City instead

Rural broadband for urban customers.

The Cuomo Administration may also have to temper its excitement for successfully completing the Broadband for All program if Charter fails to deliver service to the homes and businesses the state expected it would. In fact, the Commission today accused Charter of substituting broadband expansion in dense urban areas where the company would undoubtedly offer service with or without an expansion commitment for the rural upstate areas it originally promised to service. By adding one customer in a converted loft in Brooklyn while deleting a customer it planned to serve in upstate Livingston County, Charter would save a substantial sum. In all, the Commission alleges Charter’s attempts to count urban areas as “newly passed” while leaving rural upstate areas unserved could save the company tens of millions of dollars.

The company’s failure to meet its rural buildout commitment began almost immediately. Despite a requirement to complete an initial buildout to 36,250 homes and businesses by May 18, 2017, Charter only managed to reach 15,164 premises — just 41.8% of its goal. As a result, the Commission began talks with Charter to get the company back on track and monitor Charter’s claim that utility companies were stalling approval of Charter’s pole attachment requests. The Commission even offered its staff to assist Charter with a comprehensive database tracking pole attachment issues, in hopes of facilitating prompt resolution of any problems that delayed service expansion.

To further assist Charter, the Commission set a new schedule of Charter’s buildout obligations for the period between December 2017 and May 2020, comprised of roughly 20,000-23,000 new passings during each six month period, a significant reduction from the original requirement of 36,250 new passings in the first buildout phase.

To incentivize Charter to stay on track, the Commission also required the company to establish a $12 million Letter of Credit to secure Charter’s obligations. If Charter missed further deadlines, the state could draw funds each time Charter missed a target, typically in $1 million increments.

On Jan. 8, 2018, Charter filed its first report under the new settlement on its buildout progress. The company claimed it exceeded its target by reaching 42,889 homes and businesses in the previous six months. The company also began airing commercials inserted into cable channels seen by Spectrum customers around the state, proclaiming it was expanding service ahead of schedule.

On closer inspection, however, the PSC discovered the most innovative part of Charter’s new-found success was inflating the numbers of new passings by including over 12,000 addresses in New York City and several upstate cities, 1,762 locations where Spectrum service was already available, and more than 250 addresses that were in areas that already received state funding to expand service. In addition to not being rural areas, Charter’s existing franchise agreements would have compelled the company to offer service to most of these addresses with or without the PSC deal conditions.

The state informed Charter it planned to disqualify 18,363 passings from the December report filed on Jan. 8, which meant Charter again failed to satisfy the required 36,771 passings it was supposed to have finished by mid-December. The Commission also removed addresses Charter unilaterally added to its 145,000 buildout plan where other providers already offered service or were planning to with the assistance of already-awarded grant funding.

The many fines for Charter Communications

The Commission has fined Charter $1 million for missing its December targets and another $1 million for not making good on correcting its earlier failures. On Friday, it fined Charter once again for another $1 million, reaching a total of $3 million in fines. The PSC also directed its Counsel to bring an enforcement action in State Supreme Court to seek additional penalties for past failures and ongoing non-compliance with its obligations. Earlier this month, the PSC referred a false advertising claim to the Attorney General’s office regarding Charter’s misleading ads about its progress expanding rural broadband in New York.

The number of alleged misdeeds by Charter has been amply covered by Stop the Cap! in our own investigative report.

In fact, to date, the Commission says Charter has never met any of its rural buildout targets. In response, Charter claimed it effectively did not have to, arguing that once the merger was approved, Charter was under no obligation to answer to the Commission’s regulatory requirements respecting broadband rollouts. Under federal deregulation laws, the state cannot regulate broadband service, Charter argued.

$12 million is a small price to pay when saving tens of millions not expanding rural service

The Commission also suspects that Charter’s $12 million Letter of Credit is a small price to pay for reneging on its broadband commitments.

“It appears that the prospect of forfeiting its right to earn back all of Settlement Agreement’s $12 million Letter of Credit does not seem to be an appropriate incentive where the company stands to save tens of millions of dollars by failing to live up to its buildout obligations in New York,” the Commission wrote.

A 4-0 Vote to Kick Charter Spectrum Out of New York

What has gotten the company’s intention is a 4-0 unanimous vote to cancel the approval of the company’s merger agreement with the state, which effectively puts Charter out of business in New York. The Commission ordered Charter to file a plan within 60 days detailing how it plans to cease service in New York and transition to another provider without causing any service disruptions for customers.

Such a move is unprecedented, but not unwarranted in the eyes of the Commission, which claims it gave Charter ample warnings to correct its bad behavior.

“Both the Commission and the DPS [PSC] Staff have repeatedly attempted to correct Charter’s behavior and secure its performance of the Approval Order’s Network Expansion Condition,” the Commission wrote. “Charter continues to show an inability or a total unwillingness to extend its network in the manner intended by the Commission to pass the requisite number of unserved or underserved homes and/or businesses, which make evident that there was not – and is not – a corporate commitment of compliance with regard to this important public interest condition.”

Now the company faces a requirement to file a six-month transition plan to end service in all areas formerly served by Time Warner Cable in New York State by early 2019. The Commission has also made it clear it is done talking and negotiating with Charter, denying all requests for a rehearing.

“Charter’s repeated, continued, and brazen non-compliance with the Commission-imposed regulatory obligations and failure to act in the public’s interest necessitates a more stringent remedy,” the Commission concluded.

The New York Public Service Commission holds a special session to fine Charter Communications and revoke its merger with Time Warner Cable. (Hearing commences at 5:00 mark) (25:24)

Sinclair’s Lawyer Says Ajit Pai Froze Sinclair Out in All-But-Dead Sinclair-Tribune Merger

After the inspector general of the Federal Communications Commission opened an investigation into FCC Chairman Ajit Pai’s close relationship with executives at Sinclair Broadcasting, Pai stopped returning Sinclair’s phone calls and refused any further meetings with America’s largest local TV station owner, at least until last Tuesday when Pai called Sinclair’s general counsel to say its multi-billion dollar merger with Tribune Media was in trouble.

The revelation Pai effectively froze out Sinclair while under investigation came in an ex parte communication disclosed by FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel’s office late last week.

“I realize that you appear to have been unwilling to discuss this matter for the past several months (and for that reason our counsel and Tribune’s have been reaching out everyone at the FCC but you),” Sinclair general counsel Barry Faber wrote in an email to Ajit Pai the morning after the phone call.

Based on the email, it is clear Mr. Pai personally called Mr. Faber on Tuesday evening to report the FCC planned to refer Sinclair’s buyout of multiple Tribune Media TV stations, including WGN in Chicago, to an independent administrative law judge who would pursue a hearing — a procedure that usually signals the death of a proposed merger or acquisition. The courtesy call was one last consideration to Sinclair by Mr. Pai, giving executives an early warning that would allow them to quietly withdraw the deal as a face-saving measure before the FCC publicly pulled the rug out the next day. The call came as an apparent shock to executives at Sinclair and Tribune, who had repeatedly expressed confidence the transaction would meet approval from the Republican majority at the FCC — one led by Pai, who personally proposed several rule changes that made the Sinclair transaction possible.

Faber told Pai in response the two companies could not agree to withdraw the deal “in the brief period of time provided to us.” Instead, Faber begged Pai to give the companies more time to reassure the FCC and then offered to withdraw the controversial sweetheart sales of TV stations in Chicago, Dallas, and Houston a short time later. The buyers all had long-standing, close ties to the family that founded Sinclair and were suspected of buying the stations to become Sinclair’s silent partners. Pai refused Faber’s request and went public the next morning with the proposal to refer the matter to an administrative hearing. As of today, the deal is still headed for a hearing, but few expect it will survive long enough to begin the process. But the repercussions are likely to last far longer than that.

Faber

While talking to Faber, it is clear Pai also raised the issue of Sinclair’s possible deception in its merger application and its lack of candor about its plan to divest stations in those three cities.

“I understand that if Sinclair has not been completely truthful and forthcoming with regard to these proposed sales, abandoning them would not eliminate such unacceptable behavior. I point out, however, that as we discussed yesterday no evidence exists that Sinclair has mislead the FCC or been anything other than completely candid with respect to our relationships with the proposed buyers and the terms of the transaction,” Faber wrote. “To designate our transaction for hearing based on the possibility that there may be more to the deals than meets the eyes based on the pricing and other terms that have been disclosed, would be extraordinary and unprecedented.”

Deal critics claim Sinclair’s bold effort to barely disguise the sweetheart deals with well-known business associates of Sinclair’s chairman David Smith was extraordinary and unprecedented as well. Several Wall Street and K Street analysts have expressed concern Sinclair was being exceptionally brazen with the FCC, proposing to spin-off stations to known Sinclair associates at fire sale prices, with contract clauses allowing Sinclair to program the stations ‘for the owner’ and also have the right to buy the stations back at their original fire sale price, assuming deregulation of station ownership caps continued moving forward. Sinclair is no stranger to political controversy, generating a full-scale advertiser boycott and Wall Street blowback over mandatory political programming aired on its stations during the 2004 U.S. presidential election. Recently Sinclair’s mandatory editorials and news stories have received even more scrutiny in the media, and have generated a lot of negative press for the Baltimore-based TV station owner.

Pai

Some on Wall Street are reportedly growing tired of Sinclair management’s political agendas getting in the way of potential profits, and this latest high-profile incident is likely to further strengthen that perception. Pai’s announcement that the merger deal smacked of a “lack of candor” and “misrepresentation,” raise questions about the Sinclair’s honesty and character, something that could threaten its ability to keep or renew its stations’ licenses. Long standing FCC rules state a license can be revoked if an owner lies to the Commission or engages in unethical or criminal behavior.

The FCC rarely forgets about egregious bad conduct. In the 1960s, RKO General, a division of General Tire and Rubber Company, falsely testified to the FCC that its television stations, including KHJ Los Angeles, WNAC Boston, and WOR New York did not engage in “reciprocal trade practices” — forcing General Tire’s vendors to buy advertising time on RKO stations if they wanted their contracts with the tire company renewed. In 1969, the FCC had enough evidence to prove RKO officials had lied to the Commission and were brazenly violating FCC rules. In 1975, RKO was once again hauled before the FCC and questioned about allegations General Tire was bribing foreign officials, had a secret slush fund to finance campaign contributions, and misappropriated revenue from overseas operations to cook its books.

Five years later in 1980, the FCC stunned the broadcasting industry by canceling the license of RKO’s Boston station — WNAC, declaring RKO “lacked the requisite character” to hold a FCC license because it openly deceived the FCC by withholding evidence, covered up improper dealings, and maintained a “persistent lack of candor” about its business practices and behavior. The FCC also moved to cancel licenses for KHJ in Los Angeles and WOR in New York. RKO held on for a few more years by appealing the FCC’s decision in various courts. It eventually sold most of its TV stations by the mid-1980s. But by then, FCC administrative law judge Ed Kuhlmann documented even more corruption by RKO, calling the company’s conduct the worst case of dishonesty in FCC history. RKO systematically misled advertisers about station ratings, fraudulently billed clients, destroyed audit reports demanded by the FCC, and filed several false financial statements with the FCC. Kuhlmann wanted RKO out of the broadcasting business for good, ordering RKO to surrender licenses for the two remaining TV stations it still owned in 1987, as well as 12 radio stations.

Sinclair’s critics are likely to invoke RKO General in challenging Sinclair license renewals in the future, noting a similar lack of candor and misrepresentation.

With the Sinclair-Tribune merger deal now swirling in the bowl, shareholders may be the ultimate judge, jury, and executioner, at least at Tribune Media. Sports Fan Coalition and Public Knowledge took the opportunity to remind Tribune’s board of directors it just blew a $3.9 billion deal by allowing Sinclair to manage the transaction with apparent dishonesty and chutzpah:

The FCC has unanimously determined that Sinclair may have “engaged in misrepresentation and/or lack of candor in its applications with the Commission,” in possible violation of the Communications Act and FCC rules. Thus, because Sinclair failed to satisfy its commitments under the merger agreement, Tribune can and should invoke its termination right under the merger agreement. Such termination would not trigger the liquidated damages provisions of the merger agreement.

[…] “Either take immediate action to terminate your agreements for the sale of your company to Sinclair Broadcast Group, or resign as directors of Tribune Media.”

Historical Truths: The Telecom Act of 1996 Sowed the Seeds of a Telecom Oligopoly

How exactly did America get stuck with a broadband monopoly in many areas, a duopoly in most others? It did not happen by accident. In this occasional series, “Historical Truths,” we will take you back to important moments in telecom public and regulatory policy that would later prove to be essential for the creation of today’s anti-competitive, overpriced marketplace for broadband internet service. By understanding the trickery and legislative shell games practiced by lobbyists and their elected partners in Congress, you will learn to recognize when the telecom industry and their friends are preparing to sell you another bill of goods. 

Vice President Al Gore watches President Bill Clinton digitally sign the 1996 Telecom Act into law on February 8, 1996.

By the end of the first term of the Clinton Administration, the president faced a major backlash from Republicans two years into the Gingrich Revolution. A well-funded chorus of voices in the business community, the Democratic Leadership Council — a business-friendly group of moderate Democrats, as well as commentators and pundits had the attention of the Beltway media, complaining in unison that the Democrats shifted too far to the left during the first term of the Clinton Administration, leaving it exposed in the forthcoming presidential election to another voter backlash like the one that installed the Gingrich revolutionaries in the House of Representatives and delivered a Republican takeover of the U.S. Senate in 1994.

With pressure over the growing lack of bipartisanship, and a presidential election ahead in the fall, the Clinton Administration was looking for ideas to prove it could work across the aisle and pass new laws that would deliver for ordinary Americans.

Revamping telecommunications policies would definitely touch every American with a phone line, computer, modem, and a television. Before 1996, America’s telecommunications regulation largely emanated from the Communications Act of 1934, which empowered the Federal Communications Commission to establish good order for the growing number of radio stations, telephone, and wire lines crisscrossing the country.

The 1934 Act’s legacy remains today, at least in part. It created the FCC, firmly established the concept of content regulation on the public airwaves, and established a single body to conduct federal oversight of the nation’s telephone monopoly controlled by AT&T.

Efforts to replace the 1934 Act began well before the Clinton Administration. In the early 1980s, Sen. Bob Packwood (R-Ore.) attempted to push for a legislative breakup of AT&T and a significant reduction in the oversight powers of the FCC. The bill met considerable opposition from AT&T, spending $2 million lobbying against the bill in 1981 and 1982. Alarm companies also heavily opposed the measure, terrified AT&T would enter their market and put them out of business. AT&T preferred a more orderly plan of divestiture being carefully negotiated in a settlement of a 1974 antitrust lawsuit by the Justice Department. A 1982 consent decree broke off AT&T’s control of local telephone lines by establishing seven Regional Bell Operating Companies independent of AT&T (NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Southwestern Bell Corporation, BellSouth, and US West). AT&T (technically an eighth Baby Bell) kept control of its nationwide long distance network.

Also in the 1980s, the cable television industry gained a much firmer foothold across the country, quickly gaining political power through well-financed lobbyists and close political ties to selected members of Congress (particularly Democrat Tim Wirth, who served in the House and later Senate representing the state of Colorado) that allowed them to push through a major amendment to the 1934 Act in 1984 deregulating the cable industry. The result was an early wave of industry consolidation as family owned cable companies were snapped up by a dozen or so growing operators. These buyouts were largely financed by dramatic rate increases passed on to consumers, resulting in cable bills tripling (or more) in some areas almost immediately. By the end of the 1980s, a major consumer backlash began, creating enormous energy for the eventual passage of the 1992 Cable Act, which re-regulated the industry and allowed the FCC to order immediate rate reductions.

The Progress and Freedom Foundation, with close ties to former House Speaker Newt Gingrich, closed its doors in 2010.

The biggest push for a near-complete revision of the 1934 Act came during the Gingrich Revolution. In 1995, the conservative Progress & Freedom Foundation — a group closely tied to then-Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) floated a trial balloon calling for the elimination of an independent Federal Communications Commission, replaced by a stripped-down Office of Communications that would be run out of the White House and be controlled by the president. A small army of telecom industry-backed scholars also began proposing privatizing the public airwaves by selling off spectrum to companies to be owned as private property. The intense interest in the FCC by the group may have been the result of its veritable “who’s who” of telecom industry backers, including AT&T, BellSouth, Verizon, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, cable companies like Comcast and Time Warner; cell phone companies like T-Mobile and Sprint; and broadcasters like Clear Channel Communications and Viacom.

The proposal outraged Democrats and liberal groups who called it a corporate-friendly sell-off and giveaway of the public airwaves. Then FCC Chairman Reed Hundt took the proposal very seriously, because at the time Gingrich lieutenant Tom DeLay’s (R-Tex.) secretive Project Relief group had 350 industry lobbyists, including some from BellSouth and Southwestern Bell literally drafting deregulation bills and a regulatory moratorium on behalf of the new Republican majority, coordinating campaign contributions for would-be supporters along the way. The proposal ultimately went nowhere, lost in a sea of the House Republicans’ constantly changing agendas, but did draw attention to the fact a wholesale revision of telecommunications policy would attract healthy campaign contributions from all corners of the industry — broadcasters, cable companies, phone companies, and the emerging wireless industry.

When it became known Congress was once again going to tackle telecommunications regulation, lobbyists immediately descended from their K Street perches in relentless waves, with checks in hand. There were two very important agendas in mind – deregulation, which would remove FCC rate regulation, service oversight, cross-competition prohibitions, and ownership caps, and ironically, protectionism. The cable and satellite companies had become increasingly fearful of the regional Baby Bells, which arrived in Congress in the early 1990s promoting the idea of entering the cable TV business. The cable industry feared phone companies would cross-subsidize the development of Telco TV by charging telephone ratepayers new fees to finance that entry. The cable industry had carefully developed a de facto monopoly over the prior decade of consolidation. Companies learned quickly direct head-to-head competition between two cable operators in the same market was bad for business.

The original premise of the 1996 Telecom Act was that it would eliminate regulations that discouraged competition. Promoters of the legislation asked why there should only be one phone or cable company in each city and why maintain regulations that kept cable and phone companies out of each others’ markets. Fears about market power and allowing domineering cable and phone companies to grow even larger were dismissed on the premise that a wide open marketplace, with regulations in place to protect consumers and competition would avoid creating telecom robber barons.

The checks handed out by industry lobbyists were bi-partisan. Democrats could crow the new rules would finally give consumers a new choice for cable TV or phone service, and help bring the “information superhighway” of the internet to schools, libraries, and other public institutions. Republicans proclaimed it a model example of free market deregulation, promoting competition, consumer choice, and lower prices.

At a high-brow bill signing ceremony held at the Library of Congress, both President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore were on hand to “electronically sign” the bill into law. Both the president and vice-president emphasized the historical significance of the emerging internet, and its ability to connect information-have’s and have-not’s in an emerging digital divide. Missing from the discussion was an exploration of what industry lobbyists and their congressional allies were doing inserting specific language into the 1996 Telecom Act that would later haunt the bill’s legacy.

On hand to celebrate the bi-partisan bill’s signing were Speaker Gingrich, Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.); Sen. Ernest F. Hollings (D-S.C.); Rep. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R-Va.); Rep. John Dingell (D-Mich.); and Ron Brown, the Secretary of Commerce. Pressler was among the soon-to-be-endangered moderate Republicans, Hollings was a holdout against the gradual wave of Republican takeovers in southern “red states,” and Dingell was a veteran lawmaker with close ties to the broadcasting industry.

Some of the bill’s industry backers were also there, some who would ironically see its signing as directly responsible for the eventual demise of their independent companies. John Hendricks of the Discovery Channel, Glenn Jones of Jones Intercable (acquired by Comcast in 1999), Jean Monty of Northern Telecom (later Nortel), Donald Newhouse of Advance Publications (eventual part owner of Bright House Networks and later Charter Communications), William O’Shea of Reuters Ltd. and Ray Smith of Bell Atlantic (today part of Verizon) were on hand. Also in the audience was Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of America, representing Hollywood Studios.

Among the fatal flaws in the Telecom Act of 1996 were its various ‘competition tests,’ which were open to considerable interpretation and latitude at the FCC. The Republican supporters of the bill argued that the presence of an open and free marketplace would, by itself, induce competition among various entrants. They were generally unconcerned with the question of whether new competition would actually arrive. Their priority was lifting the protective levers of legacy regulation as soon as possible. Many Democrats assumed what appeared to be carefully drafted regulatory language would protect consumers by preventing the FCC from lifting protections too early in the competitive process. But lobbyists consistently outmaneuvered lawmakers, finding ways to insert loopholes and compromise language that introduced inconsistencies that could be dealt with and eliminated either by the FCC or the courts later.

For example, lawmakers insisted on unbundling telecommunications network elements, an arcane way of saying new competitors must be granted access to existing networks to be shared at wholesale rates. In practice, this meant if a phone company entered the internet service provider business, it must also make its network available for other ISPs as well. In some areas, competing local telephone companies also offered landline service over existing telephone lines, paying wholesale connection fees to the incumbent local phone company. As competition emerged, the incumbent company usually petitioned for a lifting of the regulations governing their business, claiming competition had arrived.

The first warning the 1996 Act was going awry came a year after the bill was signed into law. Phone companies started raising rates from $1.50-6 a month on average. AT&T was petitioning to hike rates $7 a month. Someone would have to pay to replace the scrapped subsidy system in a competitive market — subsidies that had been in place at the nation’s phone companies for decades. By charging higher rates for phone service in cities and for pricier long distance calls before the arrival of companies like MCI and Sprint, the phone companies used this revenue to subsidize their Universal Service obligations, keeping rural phone bills low and often below the real cost of providing service. To establish a truly competitive phone business, the subsidies had to be reformed or go, and that meant someone had to cover the difference.

“This game is called ‘shift and shaft,'” Sharon L. Nelson, the chairwoman of the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, said in 1997. “You shift the costs to the states and shaft the consumer.”

Sam Brownback (R-Kansas)

Gradually, consumers suddenly discovered their phone bill littered with a host of new charges, including the Subscriber Line Charge and various regulatory recovery fees and universal service cost recovery schemes. Phone companies also boosted rates on their unregulated Class phone features, like call waiting, caller ID, and three-way calling. The proceeds helped make up for the tens of billions in lost subsidies, but the end effect was that phone bills were still rising, despite promises of competitive, cheap phone service.

At a hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee later that year, several angry senators said they would never have voted in favor of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 if they had thought it would lead to higher rates. Sam Brownback, a Kansas Republican, was in the line of fire because of his rural constituents. Rates for those customers are subsidized more heavily than elsewhere because of the cost of extending service to them. Rates were threatening to skyrocket.

“We would be foolish to build up all these expectations about competition without saying to the American people, ‘We’re going to have to raise your phone bill,'” Brownback said.

But the rate hikes were just beginning. By the beginning of the George W. Bush administration, telecom lobbyists brought a thick agenda of action items to Michael Powell’s FCC. Despite promises of competition breaking out everywhere, that simply was not the case. Republicans quickly blamed the remaining regulatory protections still in place in noncompetitive markets for ‘deterring competition.’ But the companies knew the only thing better than deregulation was deregulation without competition.

Consolidation wave

The Republican-dominated FCC quickly began removing many of those protective regulations, claiming they were outdated and unnecessary. The very definition of competition was broadened, allowing the presence of virtually any company offering almost any service good enough to trip the deregulation levers. Later, even open access to networks by competitors was often limited to pre-existing networks, not the future next generation networks. Republicans argued those networks should be managed by their owners and not subject to “unbundling” requirements.

The weakened rules also sparked one of the country’s largest consolidation waves in history. Cable companies bought other cable companies and the Baby Bells gradually started putting themselves back together into what would eventually be AT&T, Verizon, and Qwest/CenturyLink. For good measure, phone companies even snapped up a handful of independent phone companies, most notably General Telephone and Electronics, better known as GTE by Verizon and Southern New England Telephone (SNET) by AT&T.

Prices rising as costs dropping.

The cable industry, under the premise it needed territories of scale to maximize potential ad insertion revenue from selling commercials on cable networks, gradually shrunk from at least a dozen well-known companies to two very large ones – Comcast and Charter, along with a few middle-sized powerhouses like Cox and Altice. Merger and acquisition deals faced little scrutiny during the Bush years of 2002-2009, usually approved with few conditions.

The result has been a rate-raising oligopoly for telecom services. In broadcasting, the consolidation wave started in radio, with entities like Clear Channel buying up hundreds of radio stations (and eventually putting the resulting giant iHeartMedia into bankruptcy) and Sinclair and similar companies acquiring masses of local television outlets. On many, local news and original programming was sacrificed, along with a significant number of employees at each station, in favor of inexpensive music, network or syndicated programming. Some stations that aired local news for 50 years ended that tradition or turned newsgathering over to a co-owned station in the same city.

Although telephone service eventually dropped in price with the advent of Voice over IP service, consumers’ cable TV and internet bills are skyrocketing at levels well in excess of inflation. Last year, the Washington Center for Equitable Growth demonstrated that the current consolidated, anti-competitive telecom marketplace results in rising prices for buyers and falling costs for providers.

Your oligopoly tax.

“In truly competitive markets, a significant part of cost reductions would be passed through to consumers,” the group wrote. “Based on a detailed analysis of profits—primarily EBITDA—we estimate that the resulting overcharges amount to more than $45 per month, or $540 per year, an aggregate of almost $60 billion, or about 25 percent of the total average consumer’s monthly bill.”

That is one expensive bill, paid by subscribers year after year with no relief in sight. Several Republicans are proposing to double down on deregulation even more after eliminating net neutrality, which could cause your internet bill to rise further. Several Republicans want to rewrite the 1996 Telecom Act once again, and lobbyists are already sharing their ideas to further curtail consumer protections, lift ownership caps, and promote additional consolidation.

Search This Site:

Contributions:

Recent Comments:

Your Account:

Stop the Cap!