FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s cowardly lion act. The rhetoric rarely matched the results.

Washington insiders are predicting Federal Communications Commission chairman Julius Genachowski will leave his position early in President Obama’s second term.

It cannot come soon enough, as far as we’re concerned.

One of the biggest disappointments of the Obama Administration has been the poor performance of a chairman that originally promised a departure from the rubber stamp-mentality that allowed Big Telecom providers to win near-instant approval of just about anything asked from the Republican-dominated FCC of the Bush Administration. If only to underline that point, former FCC Chairman Michael Powell joined Republican ex-commissioner Meredith Atwell-Baker on a trip through the D.C. revolving door, taking lucrative jobs with the same cable industry both used to oversee.

We had high hopes for Mr. Genachowski when he took the helm at the FCC — particularly over Net Neutrality, media consolidation, and predatory abuse of consumers at the hands of the comfortable cable-telco duopoly. Genachowski promised strong Net Neutrality protections, better broadband — especially in rural areas, an end to rubber stamping competition killing mergers and acquisitions, and more aggressive oversight of the broadband industry generally.

What we got was the reincarnation of the Cowardly Lion.

The Washington Post reviews Genachowski’s tenure during the first term of the Obama Administration and reports he has few unabashed supporters left. Telecom companies loathe Genachowski’s more cautious approach and consumer groups hate his penchant for caving in when lobbyists come calling. In short, another Democrat that talks tough and caves in at the first sign of trouble.

“His tenure has been nothing but a huge disappointment because he’s squandered an opportunity to give consumers the competitive communications market they deserve,” Derek Turner, head of policy analysis at public interest group Free Press told the Post. “If someone like him upholds compromise, it quickly leads to capitulation, which is what he’s done. He folds…to the pressure of big companies.”

Genachowski’s Record:

• Heavily promoted rural broadband and oversaw a review program measuring actual broadband speeds against those claimed by providers. But much of the money available for improving rural broadband has been separately awarded to “middle mile” and “institutional networks” that are not accessible to most consumers or businesses. Genachowki has heaped automatic praise on many of the phone companies winning broadband funding, despite the fact many of them are satisfied giving consumers no better than 4Mbps service;
• Reformed the outdated Universal Service Fund, which long outlived much of its usefulness, into a broadband expansion fund. But some unintended consequences have led to some rural providers suspending network upgrades because of funding uncertainties still unresolved;
• Approved a blockbuster merger deal between Comcast and NBC-Universal that included temporary “hard-won” concessions Comcast later admitted they were going to offer anyway – merger or not. The result is a new high bar for tolerating super-sized media consolidation with no serious consideration of the impact on consumers. The latest evidence: support for Rupert “Phone Hacker” Murdoch’s latest efforts to buy more newspapers in the United States;
• Rejected an AT&T/T-Mobile merger deal, but only after the Justice Dept. took the lead dismissing it as an anti-consumer, anti-competition nightmare. Within hours, Genachowski’s office issued a “me, too” press release condemning the deal he said little about earlier;
• Demanded a strong Net Neutrality framework to protect the open Internet, but utterly caved under pressure from politicians receiving hefty corporate contributions from AT&T and others. The resulting loophole-ridden “protections” do not apply to wireless, and the industry-approved compromise is now the subject of a lawsuit filed by some of the same companies that earlier applauded Genachowski’s flexibility;
• Genachowski handed out his direct phone numbers to the CEO’s of the top Big Telecom companies, and has been directly lobbied by those “super-citizens,” while ordinary consumers are stuck filing comments with the FCC’s arcane Electronic Comment Filing System. Genachowski also directed closed-door meetings be held on the subject of Net Neutrality with large telecom companies. These meetings were closed to the public with no consumer representatives on hand;
• Genachowski refused to reclassify broadband as a “telecommunications service,” which would give the agency clear-cut authority to oversee the service. Instead, he has stuck with former FCC Chairman Michael Powell’s odd interpretation of broadband as “an information service,” not subject to much review by the agency;
• Appropriately nixed Philip Falcone’s LightSquared venture, the biggest threat to GPS navigation around. But Genachowski’s controversial early boosting of the venture, including support for expedited special permission to launch the network without the usual scrutiny, resulted in an embarrassing about-face after long-standing critics’ fears of navigation interference were vindicated;
• In 2012, Genachowski’s cozy relationship with the industry reached whole new levels with unabashed support for Internet Overcharging schemes like usage caps and consumption billing, despite no evidence justifying them. The FCC has continued to ignore repeated requests for a review of these pricing schemes.

Phillip “I can see the duopoly from my house — why can’t the FCC?” Dampier

The New York Times is pondering whether Americans are paying too much for wireless broadband based on Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology. A new study now offers proof, noting U.S. customers pay three times as much, on average, for each gigabyte of data in contrast to European consumers.

The UK-based mobile industry group GSM Association offers evidence Americans are not getting the lower wireless broadband prices promised by the more advanced, cost-efficient LTE technology, although customers in other parts of the world are seeing savings.

According to the group’s findings, Verizon Wireless customers effectively pay $7.50 per gigabyte of data over the company’s 4G LTE network. That is three times more expensive than the European average of $2.50/GB, and more than 10 times higher than what Swedes pay: $0.63/GB, cheaper than many wired broadband providers’ overlimit fees.

Verizon Wireless’ Brenda Raney tried to defend the discrepancy, claiming that Verizon offers enhanced value bundles with unlimited voice, text, and mobile hotspot service. Having a data-only plan, Raney told the newspaper, would reduce the cost to $5.50/GB.

That is still more than twice as much as what Europeans pay.

So what is the real reason for the enormous price difference?

The wireless industry regularly claims that the vast expanse of the United States means a much larger investment in wireless technology and infrastructure, notably cell towers, to reach customers in suburban and rural areas. European countries, in contract, are much more compact and urban-focused, making infrastructure less costly.

But that has proven to be nonsense for Sweden’s Tele2, which not only operates a nationwide 4G cellular network in Sweden — a country with its own vast rural regions — but promises to deliver service to 99% of the country by the end of the year and already covers more than 100 Swedish municipalities. They deliver service at a fraction of the cost charged by Verizon. Tele2 remains undeterred by the “rural cost argument,” taking on the world’s largest country — the Russian Federation. It has already acquired 12 regional mobile operators in Russia, expanding service to more than 43 regions with over 22 million customers, and plans additional investments.

The real reason for the inflated price of service, unsurprisingly, is America’s lack of robust wireless competition, according to GSMA.

Europe has the largest number of competing providers — 38 of 88 operators with LTE technology are in Europe. Even the smallest countries have at least three major competitors. The U.S. has two major competitors, two smaller national carriers, and a dozen or more regional or prepaid operators totally dependent on the larger four to deliver national roaming service.

Until recently, Verizon Wireless had a veritable monopoly on LTE service as AT&T tries to catch up — one of the very rare moments Verizon directly challenged AT&T in advertising that distinguished the coverage differences between the two. These days, AT&T and Verizon mimic one another, often offering identically priced service plans. Customers who want to pay less have to reduce their expectations with smaller competitors that offer reduced coverage.

If you don’t want access to premium wireless broadband, American carriers will also gouge you for lesser 3G service.

U.S. consumers on two year contract plans spend an average of $115 a month for 3G service, according to a survey conducted by Ernst & Young. In the Netherlands, the average was $51; in Britain, $59 — about half the price.

The growing mobile phone bill has now reached the point where Ernst & Young’s Jonathan Dharmapalan suggests it is literally interfering with smartphone adoption and causing others to shut off the devices permanently after an experience with bill shock.

“The No. 1 reason for customers’ discontinuing their use of a smartphone service or not taking the option is the fear of overspending,” Dharmapalan said.

A former FCC senior Internet technology adviser attempted to explain away the vast discrepancies in pricing, offering this bit of analysis: Europeans talk and surf  less.

Sprint’s deal with Softbank is bad news for margin-obsessed Wall Street. More competition=lower profits.

Wall Street is turning a cold shoulder to today’s official announcement that Japan’s Softbank will acquire nearly 70% of Sprint-Nextel, giving effective control of the company to Japanese business magnet Masayoshi Son.

The $20.1 billion acquisition is the largest-ever foreign buyout by a Japanese company, made possible by the combination of a historically low U.S. dollar against the increasingly strong yen, giving Softbank even more value for money.

But outside of a handful of investment banks that stand to earn $200 million in fees for helping to advice the two companies about the deal, Wall Street is not happy.

“It’s a competitive headache,” said Christopher King, an analyst at Stifel Nicolaus & Co. The transaction is expected to infuse billions in new capital into perennially third-place Sprint, which is far behind its larger rivals AT&T and Verizon Wireless.

King and other Wall Street analysts fear a bolstered Sprint will spark new competition into the decreasingly competitive wireless marketplace. Softbank is well known in Japan for cut-throat pricing competition, something that could directly impact Verizon and AT&T’s increasingly expensive pricing for wireless service. Many on Wall Street fear an emboldened Sprint could overtake T-Mobile offering aggressively priced service plans.

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Stifel Nicolaus & Co., analyst Christopher King calls today’s announcement by Softbank and Sprint “a competitive headache” for the wireless industry, which may face more competition and lower prices.  (2 minutes)

Christopher King, an analyst for Stifel Nicolaus & Co., called the Sprint-Softbank deal a competitive headache.

Sprint is also expected to put Softbank’s investment to good use — acquiring additional spectrum and quickly upgrading its 4G LTE network, now under construction. The surprise investment could mean a more robust network for Sprint, an important objective for a company criticized for offering less coverage than its larger rivals.

Craig Moffett, an analyst with Sanford Bernstein, said Sprint’s aggressive upgrades are bad news because it means the company is going to spend a lot to improve service and presumably cut prices, which will hurt profit margins at Sprint and its competitors who may be forced to lower prices in turn to compete.

Consumers, especially existing Sprint customers, will likely celebrate a stronger Sprint, especially if it triggers a wireless price war.

The investment banks offering advice to both parties have little to complain about either. Citigroup and Raine Group LLC may earn as much as $200 million in direct fees from the deal. Softbank’s own advisers — Deutsche Bank and Mizuho Securities will earn $70-100 million. Sprint’s advisers — Citigroup, UBS, and Rothschild will likely earn an equal amount, according to Bloomberg News.

Investment bankers are hopeful the deal will help trigger another wave of wireless consolidation, which will bolster their fee earnings. In addition to Leap Wireless’ Cricket, there are at least a dozen independent regional carriers including C-Spire and US Cellular now ripe for acquisition by AT&T, Verizon Wireless, Sprint, or T-Mobile.

Softbank has been acquiring some of its own competitors back home in Japan, including eAccess, largely to gain additional spectrum to bolster its LTE 4G network build.

For now, the deal announced today does not include beleaguered Clearwire, but most Wall Street investors believe the Sprint-controlled company will eventually also be acquired.

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CNBC talks with Sanford Bernstein’s Craig Moffett, who is not thrilled with a deal that will leave Sprint on a spending spree to upgrade its network and potentially trigger a price war.  (4 minutes)

Copps

Americans need to stand up and say “no” to more telecom mergers and lobbying efforts that push for additional deregulation and corporate protectionism in the telecommunications sector. Unfortunately, we are in for a fight, thanks to Washington’s problem disappointing a multi-billion industry that lavishly finances political campaigns, conventions, and vacation outings.

Michael Copps, former commissioner on the Federal Communications Commission from 2001-2011 and acting chairman for the first six months of the Obama Administration ought to know.

“The consolidated world of telecom broadband did not evolve from the hand of God, the mysterious workings of natural law, or the inevitability of market-based dynamics,” Copps wrote in his essay, “Why Give Up on Competition?” “It was enabled by conscious decision-making at the federal level, largely through the abdication of its oversight responsibilities by the Federal Communications Commission over the better part of 30 years.”

In short, it did not have to turn out this way, no matter what the telecom industry and their astroturf friends have to say.

“Go to just about any telecom conference these days, and some industry maven will make the case that restoring competition to the telecom world is so 1990s,” Copps writes. “Why don’t we all just recognize the inevitable, they ask: telecom is a natural monopoly, competition is a chimera, and the sooner we flash a steady green light for more industry consolidation and less government oversight, the better off we’ll all be.”

Provider-backed ALEC advocates for the corporate interests that fund its operations.

Too many in Washington are already true believers, according to Copps, and the result is two companies controlling over 2/3rds of the wireless marketplace and a broadband duopoly for most Americans. This did not happen overnight. Enormous and expensive lobbying campaigns run for over a decade have convinced lawmakers that less is more when it comes to telecom regulation and oversight. Regulators ringing alarm bells about deregulation without sufficient competition have been picked off, says Copps, by the telecom industry-backed American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which has convinced at least 19 state legislatures to wipe away authority from state public service commissions that for years have been trying to protect consumers and preserve competition.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was originally designed to open the telecommunications marketplace to increased competition, but also ensure a level playing field for competitors by charging the FCC to implement and enforce strong rules to keep incumbent telecommunications companies from steamrolling new competitors.

No surprises here: Michael Powell was FCC chairman during the deregulation frenzy of the first term of George W. Bush. Today, he’s the president of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, the largest cable industry lobbying group in the country.

With the arrival of President George W. Bush, the new Republican majority at the FCC promptly began obliterating checks and balances at the behest of some of the nation’s largest phone and cable companies. The results:

• Reselling rights and wholesale leasing of facilities to competitors were wiped away, guaranteeing monopoly control of already-established networks;
• Opening up the long distance and local market to Baby Bell competition with their promise they would compete nationwide failed. Like Big Cable, the Baby Bells sold local and long distance only to their own customers, not to those located in another Baby Bell’s service area;
• Instead of competing, phone companies simply bought each other. “As soon as one transaction was approved, another one came through the door,” Copps reported. “Sometimes it seemed like the merger approval business was our only business.”;
• ” The FCC voted, over the strenuous objections of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein and me, to remove advanced telecommunications (broadband) from the purview of Title II of the Telecommunications Act—where consumer protections, competition, privacy, and public safety are clearly mandated—and placed them instead in the nebulous and uncharted land of Title I, where regulatory authority is uncertain, consumer protections are virtually non-existent, and where the huge companies are better positioned to wreak havoc on the promise of competition,” Copps said.

To right the wrongs, Copps wants some major changes to reignite competition and return to telecom innovation, eliminating the stagnation we have from today’s cozy, barely competitive marketplace:

1. Learn to say “no” to more industry mergers. Consolidation has not brought communications nirvana for consumers, just higher prices and fewer choices, often from a monopoly provider;
2. Encourage innovative approaches like municipal broadband. Copps: “‘My way or nothing’ may be the mantra of the big guys, but that means no broadband in places they don’t wish to serve.” Copps wants to see the federal government pre-empt state bans on public broadband laws provider-backed ALEC has gotten through legislatures across the country;
3. Smarter stewardship of wireless spectrum, including unlicensed spectrum use, shared spectrum, smarter technology, and a “use it or lose it” policy that pulls back unused/warehoused spectrum held by some of the nation’s largest wireless carriers.

An industry orphan?

Sprint CEO Dan Hesse probably rues the day his Board of Directors pulled the plug on a merger deal that would have combined MetroPCS and Sprint back in February. The merger was abandoned after board members openly worried the transaction would distract Sprint from its network improvement project — dubbed Network Vision — then just getting underway.

The deal with T-Mobile and MetroPCS may have limited Sprint’s takeover options, although analysts say a hostile counteroffer for MetroPCS could still take the small carrier away from T-Mobile.

Hesse himself is a proponent of additional wireless industry consolidation. He believes the current market has too many wireless carriers and the two dominant providers — AT&T and Verizon — enjoy economy of scale Sprint cannot hope to achieve in its current position.

Hesse

Wall Street was more pessimistic about Sprint after the T-Mobile/MetroPCS merger was announced, suggesting they may be an industry orphan, pushed into a corner and running out of options.

Shares of Leap Wireless, the owner of Cricket, rose as much as 17 percent after the T-Mobile deal was announced, signaling Cricket is likely an endangered species. Leap’s cellular network is similar in scope to MetroPCS, although the two companies largely serve different markets. Wall Street’s favorite dance card has Sprint and Leap Wireless as future partners, and Sprint may be forced to acquire the smaller carrier to save face. Leap operates its own modest network of cell towers and has plans to roll out LTE 4G service to its customers. That spectrum could become important to Sprint, especially in the larger urban areas Cricket targets.

An endangered species.

Some Wall Street analysts say deals with MetroPCS, Leap, and other small regional carriers are small potatoes. Many advocate for a much larger merger between Sprint and T-Mobile to more realistically confront the de-facto duopoly of AT&T and Verizon Wireless.

Regulators under the Obama Administration may take a dim view of a merger that combines the third and fourth largest nationwide carriers, but nobody expects much regulatory resistance approving mergers that wipe out MetroPCS and Cricket.

“The problems that Sprint and T-Mobile have are they are not as big as AT&T and Verizon,” Piper Jaffray’s Chris Larsen told Bloomberg News in a phone interview. “They don’t have the scale so therefore it is harder to compete. Increasing your size 25 percent, it helps. But when you are less than half as big as your rival, getting 25 percent bigger narrows the gap, but it does not close the gap.”

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CNBC reports the T-Mobile/MetroPCS deal reignites wireless consolidation and leaves Sprint in a potentially difficult position.  (5 minutes)

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Bloomberg News reports T-Mobile needs more subscribers, but some Wall Street analysts think the company is making a mistake focusing on the prepaid market.  (1 minute)