The U.S. government has filed a lawsuit to block a $39 billion dollar merger deal between AT&T and T-Mobile USA, citing substantially reduced competition for American cell phone customers.

“AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced rival would remove a significant competitive force from the market,” the Justice Dept. said in its filing.

“We are seeking to block this deal in order to maintain a vibrant and competitive marketplace that allows everyone to benefit from lower prices and better quality and innovative products,” said James M. Cole, deputy attorney general.

News that the merger could be ultimately blocked by the Justice Department caused AT&T and T-Mobile shares to lose as much as seven percent of their value.  But shares of competitor Sprint, considered the most vulnerable remaining competitor to AT&T and Verizon Wireless are soaring this morning by more than seven percent.

Cole’s statement was harsh in its condemnation of the merger’s benefits touted by AT&T:

The Department filed its lawsuit because we believe the combination of AT&T and T-Mobile would result in tens of millions of consumers all across the United States facing higher prices, fewer choices and lower quality products for their mobile wireless services.

Consumers across the country, including those in rural areas and those with lower incomes, have benefitted from competition among the nation’s wireless carriers, particularly the four remaining national carriers.   This lawsuit seeks to ensure that everyone can continue to reap the benefits of that competition.

Right now, four nationwide providers account for more than 90 percent of the mobile wireless connections in America, and preserving competition among them is crucial.   For instance, AT&T and T-Mobile currently compete head-to-head in 97 of the nation’s largest 100 cellular marketing areas.   They also compete nationwide to attract business and government customers.   Were the merger to proceed, there would only be three providers with 90 percent of the market, and competition among the remaining competitors on all dimensions—including price, quality, and innovation—would be diminished.

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Bloomberg News delivered the breaking news that the Department of Justice would oppose the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile on antitrust grounds.  (2 minutes)

The deal falling through would cost AT&T a $3 billion dollar failed deal breakup fee, and a parting gift of wireless spectrum to T-Mobile USA, a unit of Deutsche Telekom AG.

Observers suggest part of the reason for the rejection may have been an attempt by the Obama Administration to draw a line in the sand for the size of large mergers and acquisitions it will tolerate.  The antitrust division of the Dept. of Justice has recently become more aggressive in reviewing large corporate merger transactions, and had the Administration approved the deal between AT&T and T-Mobile, the acceptance of permitting two companies to control the majority of wireless customers would have arguably meant virtually any merger deal would have passed muster, regardless of the implications of concentrated market share.

Traditionally, opposition from the Dept. of Justice spells doom for most merger proposals.  But AT&T is no ordinary corporate entity.  In addition to being confident enough to agree to a $3 billion breakup fee and giving away valuable spectrum should the deal fail, AT&T’s lobbying efforts and legal budget are unparalleled, and the company may decide to fight to preserve the deal using political and legal channels.  The terms of the merger could also be renegotiated, agreeing to spin off more customers to reduce market share, or compromising on consumer protections or other givebacks.

But for most companies, opposition from the government’s antitrust division is a high hurdle to overcome, and many won’t even try.

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CNBC delivered the stunned reaction among its own anchors and telecommunications industry analysts about the Justice Department’s strong objections to the proposed merger.  Many on Wall Street predicted this was a ‘done deal.’  (12 minutes)

Should AT&T and T-Mobile abort the deal, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee Americans will still have four major carriers to choose from.  Deutsche Telekom maintains a strong interest in selling off T-Mobile USA, and has reduced investment in the company.  That could renew rumors of a merger deal between T-Mobile and Sprint.

AT&T executives as late as this morning seemed to have no advance warning of the Justice Department’s decision.  CEO Randall Stephenson spent much of his morning suggesting AT&T would hire thousands of call center workers as a result of the merger.

After learning of the impending lawsuit, AT&T released a statement: “We are surprised and disappointed by today’s action, particularly since we have met repeatedly with the Department of Justice and there was no indication from the DOJ that this action was being contemplated,” the statement said. “The DOJ has the burden of proving alleged anti-competitive affects and we intend to vigorously contest this matter in court.”

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CNBC reporters and analysts react to the impact the Justice Department’s objections are having on the entire telecommunications business sector.  The question now being pondered at AT&T: Will it fight for the deal or will it fold?  (5 minutes)

Industry Minister Christian Paradis just completed nearly two weeks of private meetings with some of Canada’s largest telecommunications companies regarding issues important to the industry, but has not scheduled face time with ordinary Canadian consumers or the public interest consumer groups that represent their interests.

Minister Paradis

Wire Report provided the schedule:

Aug. 16
Cogeco Cable Inc.
Shaw Communications Inc.
Quebecor Media Inc.
Globalive Wireless Management Corp.
Xplornet Communications Inc.
Public Mobile

Aug. 17
EastLink
BCE Inc.
Mobilicity
Telus Communications Co.

Aug. 22
Rogers Communications Inc.
MTS Allstream

Aug. 24
SaskTel

Bloomberg reports the primary topic on the agenda is upcoming spectrum auctions for additional wireless frequencies and loosening restrictions on foreign-ownership rules regarding would-be wireless competitors interested in entering Canada’s cell phone marketplace, which currently has the third-highest prices for mobile-phone services in the world, according to the OECD.

A rules change regarding foreign ownership may open the door...

Canadian telecom providers may not have more than 20 percent of their operations owned or controlled by foreign entities, a percentage that could be adjusted in the coming months.  But while changes in foreign ownership rules may benefit new entrants like Globalive Holdings, which operates Wind Mobile, it could also spell profound changes for millions of Canadians.  Industry analyst Dvai Ghose told Bloomberg he expects any relaxation of foreign-ownership rules may also pave the way for a mega merger of Bell and Telus.

“If you allow foreigners into our market, it becomes much more compelling to say we should allow one Canadian champion,” said Ghose, co-head of Canadian research at Canaccord Genuity.

That “champion” could quickly become Canada’s version of AT&T, dramatically reducing competition and raising prices, especially for captive landline customers who rely on the companies for broadband and landline service.  Telus and Bell currently compete with one another in the wireless market, where they would have an enormous share and combined market power should they be permitted to merge.

That would be a high price to pay for many Canadian consumers who do business with Bell or Telus, especially when contrasted with the fact Wind Mobile has attracted only 271,000 customers as of the end of March 2011.

...to a mega-merger of Bell and Telus.

Unfortunately, consumers are not included in Minister Paradis’ day-planner to share their views of further marketplace consolidation or wireless spectrum reform.  In fact, they don’t even have a right to learn what exactly was discussed during the closed door sessions.

A spokeswoman for Paradis, Pascale Boulay, would only confirm the minister met with 13 companies since Aug. 16, but refused to elaborate on the meetings.

Federal Communications Commission chairman Julius Genachowski tried this approach with some of America’s largest telecommunications companies last summer, holding a series of closed door meetings.  They eventually produced telecommunications policies so watered down, they neutralized Genachowski’s earlier commitments to protect Net Neutrality and foster additional competition.  Will Canada repeat America’s mistake?

Better days: AT&T's BlackBerry Curve, circa 2007

The prevalence of unlimited wireless data plans may have been an important factor in the American consumer’s move away from Research in Motion’s (RIM) former superstar BlackBerry, according to a company official.

Responding to questions about its falling market share in the U.S., Patrick Spence, the managing director of regional marketing at RIM pointed to unlimited usage plans as one potential way the competition got a leg up on their devices.

“In the United States, they’ve had flat rate data pricing for a long time, which has meant users haven’t had to worry about how they are using their smartphones,” Spence said.

He noted Americans love for wireless data has forced carriers to launch 4G upgrades in advance of other markets where 3G remains the fastest available standard.

The Guardian’s Charles Arthur gave RIM’s Patrick Spence a challenging series of questions about RIM’s ongoing loss of market share, and why the company is forcing BlackBerry owners to cope through two major platform upgrades in the coming months. (11 minutes)
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Spence said the dynamics of unlimited data have inspired a change in the types of devices used in the United States, namely not necessarily those carrying the BlackBerry brand.

As carriers end unlimited data, Spence predicts users will likely change their behavior in concert with new data plan limits as low as 200MB per month.

Where data limits prevail, BlackBerry devices seem to do better.  Spence touted the fact BlackBerry phones have now achieved number one status in Africa and countries in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia, displacing troubled Nokia.

Spence warned tech reporters not to extrapolate American marketplace trends as foreshadowing developments in the rest of the world.  One reason for that, according to Spence, has been the unlimited data plan, now being replaced with usage based billing or usage-capped plans.

BlackBerry phones have had a difficult time competing with the iconic Apple iPhone, as well as Android-based smartphones on offer from virtually every wireless carrier.  BlackBerry devices, once deemed the most advanced phones in the market, have lost quite a bit of luster in the last four years, particularly after the arrival of iPhone.

As a result, RIM has been engaged in serious cost-cutting, announcing job cuts of some 2,000 employees recently.  The company hopes to spring back with a series of platform upgrades and new phones, dubbed “superphones” by RIM, to regain market share.

It cannot come soon enough, as RIM lost another four percent of market share in just the past four months.  comScore suggests RIM phones now have just 21.7 percent of the smartphone market.  Only Microsoft and Nokia are doing worse.  Most of the BlackBerry fan base are moving to Android-based smartphones instead as their contracts come up for renewal, particularly those made by Samsung.  The Korean manufacturer now manufactures one of every four smartphones Americans own.

As of July 2011, RIM has 7.6 percent of the market share in the United States.

BlackBerry phones have fewer challenges overseas, and the devices remain very popular among younger users in the United Kingdom, parts of western Europe, Africa, and the Middle East.  That has been a mixed blessing for RIM in England, where the phone has been  implicated as the device of choice for looters during riots earlier this month.

On September 13, most PBS stations will premiere a new documentary, “Bill McGowan, Long Distance Warrior” exploring the many trials and tribulations of MCI Corporation, the long distance and e-mail provider that was instrumental in breaking up Ma Bell’s monopoly in telephone service.

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A preview of PBS’ Long Distance Warrior, which premieres on most PBS stations Sept. 13  (3 minutes)

For those under 30, “MCI” may not mean much.  The company that helped pioneer competitive long distance calling was absorbed into the Worldcom empire in 1997, where it continued to provide service until a major corporate accounting scandal brought Worldcom down in 2002.  Most of what was left was eventually sold to Verizon Communications in 2005.

Remarkably, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was founded all the way back in 1963, but not as a provider of telephone services.  That MCI sought to build a network of microwave relay stations between Chicago and St. Louis to provide uninterrupted two-way radio service for some of the nation’s largest trucking and shipping companies.

The Bell System

By the late 1960s, William G. McGowan, an investor and venture capitalist from New York won a seat on MCI’s board of directors and part ownership of a newly-envisioned version of MCI — one that would provide businesses with a range of telecommunications products, including long distance telephone connections.  With many American corporations maintaining branch and regional offices, connecting them together was a potentially very lucrative business, especially if MCI could deliver the service at prices cheaper than what the monopoly Bell System was charging.

With their microwave relay network, now expanding across the country, MCI could distribute long distance phone calls cheaply and efficiently, if they could find a way to connect that network to Bell’s local phone system.  After all, it does little good to offer long distance service if you cannot connect calls to the businesses’ existing telephone equipment.

That’s where AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies objected.  For them, only calls originating on and delivered over their own network should be allowed.  MCI, as an interloper, was seeking to use the network AT&T built and paid for.  It’s an argument that has echoed more than 30 years later, when AT&T’s then-CEO Ed Whitacre objected to outside Internet content providers “using AT&T’s pipes for free.”

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On the occasion of MCI’s 20th anniversary, the company produced this retrospective exploring the difficult times competing with AT&T and the Bell System.  (9 minutes)

MCI's best argument: AT&T's long distance bills

McGowan confronted arguments from AT&T executives who warned that competitive long distance would destroy the business model of America’s Bell System, which provided affordable local phone service to all 50 states, in part subsidized by long distance telephone rates, mostly paid by its commercial customers.  Tamper with that, they warned, and local phone bills would be forced to soar to make up the difference.

MCI called that argument a scare tactic, and suggested instead that AT&T’s monopoly had grown inefficient, bloated, expensive, and resistant to innovation and change.  MCI could deliver a substantially less expensive service and would force AT&T to increase its own efficiency to compete.  AT&T wasn’t interested in that argument and sued, repeatedly, to keep MCI out of its business.

By 1984, federal courts declared AT&T a monopoly worthy of a break-up, and opened the door to MCI’s long distance network.  By that time, MCI was already thinking about evolving itself beyond a business long distance provider, whose network was largely idle after business hours.  Because most Americans were accustomed to making long distance calls at night when rates were substantially lower, MCI developed new residential long distance service plans that encouraged customers to use that idle network at night and on weekends.

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One of MCI’s most memorable ads features a sobbing mother who reached out and touched her son over long distance a little too much.  (1 minute)

Thus began more than a decade of heavy advertising and competition for the long distance telephone market.  With equal access rules in place, consumers could choose their own long distance phone company and shop for the one with the lowest rates.  Competitors like Sprint, WilTel, LDDS, RCI, LCI, and yes, even AT&T all pitched their own calling plans.

MCI also pioneered MCI Mail, one of the first commercial electronic mail systems.  The original concept had businesses typing letters on a computer terminal, printed on standard paper at an MCI office closest to the destination, and then mailed in an envelope through the U.S. Post Office.  This poor-man’s version of a telex or telegram worked for businesses that wanted overnight delivery, but not at the prices charged by shippers like Federal Express.  In larger cities, MCI Mail could offer businesses delivery of their electronic communications within four hours, something closer to a traditional telegram of days gone-by.

MCI Mail’s hard copy deliveries wouldn’t last long, of course.  As the 1980s progressed, the fax machine and the more familiar all-electronic e-mail we think of today became firmly established.  As MCI Mail became less relevant, the company innovated into offering low priced telex services, mass-faxing, and data backhaul services to provide connectivity for online networks.

[flv width=”504″ height=”400″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WIBW MCI Mail 1984.flv[/flv]

WIBW explores a new concept in communications — something called ‘electronic mail,’ a service that bewildered consumers in the early 1980s.  This report from 1984.  (2 minutes)

Bill McGowan: Would not approve of AT&T's plans to restore the glory days of the past.

AT&T, in contrast, was still getting over the loss of its local Bell Operating Companies — the regional phone companies most Americans did business with, and the loss of revenue earned from renting telephone equipment.  For years, AT&T long distance was branded as a quality leader, not a price leader.  It maintained its enormous market share partly through consumer indifference — customers who did not initially choose a new long distance carrier remained with AT&T, the default choice.

It took only about a decade after the Bell break-up for telecom industry lobbyists to begin advocating for enough deregulation to allow many of those former Baby Bells to re-combine through mergers and acquisitions.  The result is today’s AT&T, formed from its long distance unit, BellSouth, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Nevada Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Wisconsin Bell, and Southern New England Telephone.  Its largest competitor is Verizon Communications, which itself resulted from a combination of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE, and what was left of MCI after Worldcom was through with it.

McGowan’s fight was a personally costly one.  A workaholic, McGowan routinely put in 15 hour work days and drank up to 20 cups of coffee daily.  His heart finally had enough and McGowan succumbed to a heart attack in 1992 at age 64.  But he leaves a legacy and two decades of fighting to break up AT&T’s monopoly, which he always believed was bad for consumers and business (unless you were AT&T, of course).  That’s an important message as AT&T strengthens its resolve to acquire one of its significant competitors in the profitable wireless market — T-Mobile.  McGowan would have never approved.

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“The Computer Chronicles,” a production of KCSM-TV, spent a half hour in June 1987 showing off electronic e-mail service from MCI and how consumers and businesses using something called a “modem” could connect their home computers with online databases and services to exchange information and communications back and forth.  And for those business travelers on the road, away from their office computers, Speech Plus offered a product that could still keep you “connected,” by reading your e-mail to you over the phone.  In 1987, outside of commercial pay networks like CompuServe, Delphi, PeopleLink and QuantumLink, most Americans with modems used them to connect to typically-free hobbyist-run computer bulletin board systems.  Widespread access to “the Internet” would take another 5-6 years.  (29 minutes)

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.