A class action lawsuit accusing AT&T of methodically over-measuring wireless customers’ usage and subjecting them to overlimit fees has been re-assigned to arbitration because AT&T wrote terms into contracts denying customers the right to pursue grievances any other way.

Plaintiff Patrick Hendricks claimed AT&T was systematically overstating customer usage by 7-14 percent with a rigged usage meter.  Hendricks claims some customers were overbilled by as much as 300 percent for phantom data usage that he claims never took place.  The measuring errors found in a two-month study cited by Hendricks were in AT&T’s favor, potentially exposing customers to surprise overlimit fees or, more recently, speed throttles.

But U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer shut down the court case, heard in a San Francisco federal courtroom.  Breyer ruled that since AT&T’s contracts bar lawsuits by customers, Hendricks must pursue his case in the venue required by AT&T — arbitration.

“[AT&T’s contract] requires the use of arbitration on an individual basis to resolve disputes, rather than jury trials or class actions, and also limits the remedies available … in the event of a suit,” Breyer ruled.

Ironically, Breyer is the same judge that dissented from an earlier case — AT&T v. Concepcion, that ultimately set the stage allowing AT&T to force consumers to pursue arbitration and practically speaking, remove their right to pursue class action relief.

“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?,” Breyer wrote. “The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30’.”

Brandi M. Bennett, a California attorney who specializes in intellectual property law, considers arbitration clauses to be a major threat to class action cases:

“Class actions make it possible to find recourse for individuals with damages that make traditional litigation impractical. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion appears to leave the average consumer at risk of being defrauded by corporations for $10, $20, $50 without any practical remedy. If one million customers are damaged for $20 each, a corporation can improperly realize a $20 million gain. Class actions serve to prevent that.”

Arbitration can offer a poor substitute, because most arbitration firms are beholden to their corporate clients for repeat business.  An arbitrator perceived to be exceptionally pro-consumer stands little chance of being retained when corporate defendants pay the arbitration firm for its services.  Some arbitration policies require consumers and the company to split the costs of arbitration, but those costs often easily exceed the value of the original claim, discouraging customers from pursuing a refund settlement.

Companies understand that reality, which is why clauses requiring arbitration to settle disputes are increasingly common in service contracts.

Hendricks’ original suit sought restitution for the entire class of consumers and damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and fraudulent business practices, unfair competition, and violations of the federal Communications Act.  Most arbitration clauses require consumers to file individual complaints, which few may ultimately do considering arbitration proceedings may occur in another city and often requires the complainant to appear in person to provide testimony.

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

Thanks to a divided 5-4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, customers trying to seek relief from unilateral fees and surcharges suddenly showing up on their Verizon cell phone bills will have to pursue individual arbitration claims with the cell phone company instead of joining forces in a class arbitration claim.

That Supreme Court case, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, is turning out to benefit Verizon Wireless as much as AT&T, because the Supreme Court found merit in contracts obligating customers to seek individual arbitration to settle differences while forbidding customers from pursuing organized legal action.

Now the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia has reversed an earlier ruling, reinstating a 2008 decision by U.S. District Judge Freda Wolfson that delivered victory to Verizon Wireless.

At issue was Verizon’s decision in October 2005 to unilaterally impose an “administrative fee” of $0.40 and/or $0.70, as part of the monthly charges for each Verizon cell phone line.  Customers upset with the new fees felt they violated the principle that, as part of their two year contracts, Verizon would deliver a fixed-price service.  The cell phone company has since implemented a variety of fees and surcharges on customers that are pocketed by Verizon, regardless of the contract price.

All Verizon Wireless customers are obligated by contract to challenge any terms and conditions they disagree with through an arbitrator of Verizon’s choosing, at a place also chosen by the company.  That means Verizon could place an arbitrator on retention in a city potentially thousands of miles away, and demand the customer make their case there, to an arbitrator whose livelihood ultimately depends on retainer fees paid by the company.  Few consumers would make such a journey to protest a fee that amounts to less than $10 a year per line.

Lawyers Keith Litman and Robert Wachtel, representing Verizon customers, decided to try a different approach — a class action arbitration.  The two attorneys would represent potentially millions of impacted customers themselves, making any travel cost concerns incidental, and providing a seasoned challenge before arbitrators, who would also hear counter-arguments from Verizon’s own legal team.

Verizon’s attorneys argued such class action arbitration was specifically forbidden in the company’s contract with customers.  Normally, a judge might decide at that point a customer agreeing to those terms and conditions was effectively up the creek.  But a series of legal challenges in circuit courts opened the door to invalidating those terms.

Litman and Wachtel argued that because the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Del. (2006), has held that an arbitration provision in a consumer contract that precludes class arbitration of low-value claims is unconscionable under New Jersey law, similarly, the arbitration provision in Verizon’s contract is also unenforceable.

Unfortunately for the two attorneys representing consumers, the decision by the U.S. Supreme Court effectively overrode that case, leaving Verizon on top with Judge Wolfson’s 2008 decision.

Wolfson

Wolfson’s written ruling on the case seemed unimpressed with claims that Verizon’s fees were unconscionable:

In this case, Plaintiffs are customers who chose Verizon as their wireless provider at least four years ago and continue to use Verizon today. They signed the customer Agreement with the arbitration clause and agreed to subsequent terms of service as added by Verizon. Plaintiffs do not allege that they did not understand the Agreement that they voluntarily entered into nor do they allege fraud or misrepresentation. The parties agreed “to settle [their] disputes . . . only by arbitration,” and the “agreement doesn’t permit class arbitration.” Therefore, [federal law] requires this Court to uphold the arbitration provision within Plaintiffs’ service Agreement.

But Judge Wolfson did recognize the effective impact of her decision:

“The Court recognizes the many hardships visited upon plaintiffs, such as in this case, based upon this ruling. First, it creates the opportunity for a different result depending on whether the case is brought in federal or state court. Second, it is also clear that compelling individual arbitration in this case will be tantamount to ending the Plaintiffs’ pursuit of their claims, as there is very little possibility that these Plaintiffs or any other plaintiff will pursue individual arbitration for claims that amount only to several dollars in damages. While this outcome is harsh, this Court is bound by Third Circuit precedent.”

Lately, Verizon Wireless customers have been seeking other forms of relief when Verizon unilaterally changes or implements new fees or surcharges.  Many are invoking the “materially adverse” clause found in Verizon’s terms and conditions, which theoretically allows customers to exit their contracts penalty-free if they do not agree to the changes Verizon is imposing on customers.  Verizon Wireless appears to be increasingly aggressive in fighting these claims, too, refusing to allow customers to leave without stiff early termination fees.  That may become the subject of another lawsuit at some point in the future.

AT&T: Suing its own customers

AT&T has filed suit against at least eight of their wireless customers who are opposed to the company’s attempts to buy T-Mobile.

The lawsuits, filed in federal court, include a request for an injunction against what AT&T calls abuse of the court with “meritless” arbitration claims being filed as a class action lawsuit.

Stop the Cap! earlier covered the efforts by law firm Bursor & Fisher to seek an end to the merger between AT&T and T-Mobile, and payments of up to $10,000 in damages per customer if the merger goes through.

Now AT&T is pushing back.

Bursor and Fisher’s legal theory is that customers can use the arbitration provisions found in AT&T’s terms and conditions to seek relief against the company for what attorney Scott Bursor suggests will be a future of higher wireless prices for AT&T Wireless customers.

AT&T’s suit seeks to dispel that legal theory:

“Defendant is among the 1,000 (and counting) ATTM [AT&T Mobility] customers whom the law firm of Bursor & Fisher P.A. (‘Bursor’) has solicited and now claims to have recruited as part of a scheme to pressure ATTM into settling meritless claims.”

“Bursor and Faruqi’s [another attorney partnering with Bursor & Fisher’s lawsuit] scheme plainly violates the arbitration agreement between ATTM and defendant. Among other limitations on the scope of arbitration, the agreement expressly precludes ‘any form of representative or class proceeding’ and permits claims for injunctive relief ‘only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim.'”

Bursor

AT&T may have gotten serious after losing an appeal to the American Arbitration Association to block administration of the cases.  In a rare move, the Association overrode AT&T’s objection and started processing cases last week.  Arbitration has never been considered consumer-friendly, because the arbitration industry is heavily dependent on businesses and their arbitration agreements to survive.

AT&T’s general counsel stated the arbitration actions will “place a $39 billion merger in jeopardy.”

Bursor and Fisher appeared to be unintimidated by AT&T and suggested a wireless company willing to sue its own customers is “desperate.”

“AT&T now realizes it faces a substantial likelihood that one or more of these arbitration [cases] will indeed stop the takeover from happening,” Bursor said. “But AT&T’s legal arguments are frivolous. We expect the courts will reject AT&T’s arguments and dismiss these cases very quickly.”

Dear Chairman Genachowski, Attorney General Holder and Commissioner Sandoval:

We write to urge you to reject AT&T Inc.’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile because it will without question lead to higher prices for consumers.

This is not conjecture; it is the lesson of history. Seven years ago, AT&T Inc.’s wholly owned subsidiary, AT&T Mobility LLC (then known as Cingular Wireless Corporation) requested permission to buy AT&T’s wireless network (then known as AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.) for $41 billion. At that time, AT&T and Cingular had the first and second largest share, respectively, of wireless communications providers in the U.S.

In order to get the merger approved, AT&T and an army of executives, lobbyists and allies assured regulators and consumers that the deal was in the public interest by making promises — the very same promises that we’re hearing from AT&T today:

What happened after the AT&T – Cingular merger? Once the Federal Communications Commission approved the deal (after negligible scrutiny), the newly merged company – which later renamed itself AT&T Mobility LLC– betrayed its promises. It abandoned the old AT&T network, deliberately degrading the network so that AT&T customers would be forced to migrate to Cingular’s own network, pay an upgrade fee of $18, buy new phones and agree to new and more expensive rate plans. These anti-consumer moves were enforced by an anti-competitive “early termination fee” of anywhere between $175 and $400, which prevented customers of AT&T from moving to another carrier.

In short, AT&T policyholders were railroaded into spending hundreds of dollars more in order to maintain their cellular service – a colossal rip-off by the same corporate executives who are now asking for permission to do it all over again.

Nothing in the terms of the proposed merger bars AT&T from engaging in a repeat performance against helpless T-Mobile customers if this deal is approved. Indeed, even as the companies mount a massive public relations campaign to win your approval, T-Mobile executives are already implicitly acknowledging that once the merger is approved, AT&T will make changes in the T-Mobile network:

T-Mobile has no plans to alter our 3G / 4G network in any way that would make your device obsolete. The deal is expected to close in approximately 12 months. After that, decisions about the network will be AT&T’s to make. That said, the president and CEO of AT&T Mobility was quoted in the Associated Press saying “there’s nothing for [customers] to worry about… [network changes affecting devices] will be done over time… ”

Moreover, AT&T has publicly admitted that if the merger goes through, T-Mobile subscribers with 3G phones will have to replace their phones to keep their wireless broadband service. AT&T plans to “rearrange how T-Mobile’s cell towers work” so that T-Mobile’s airwaves can be used for 4G service rather than 3G. Even though AT&T will be altering T-Mobile’s 3G cell towers to operate 4G services, Ralph de la Vega, president and CEO of AT&T Mobility and Consumer Markets, said that after the merger, T-Mobile 3G phones will need to be replaced with AT&T 3G phones, which “will happen as part of the normal phone upgrade process.” Once AT&T forces the T-Mobile subscribers with 3G phones to buy AT&T 3G phones, it is only a matter of time before AT&T pushes all of its subscribers over to the 4G network.

T-Mobile customers who are forced to migrate to AT&T’s network will have to buy new phones, agree to more expensive rate plans, or cancel their contracts and pay a termination fee.

Once known for its low prices, T-Mobile has already begun increasing its rates and decreasing options in anticipation of the merger. On July 20, 2011, T-Mobile discontinued its unlimited data plans, replacing them with plans that cap the amount of data a customer can use; once the customer hits the data cap, T-Mobile will substantially slow down their network speed. Nine days later, AT&T, which stopped offering new unlimited data plans last year, announced it would similarly start throttling data speeds even for customers on “grandfathered” unlimited data plans. AT&T is attributing its slow-down to the “serious wireless spectrum crunch.” In another implicit promise sure to be broken, AT&T has told its customers and regulators that “[n]othing short of completing the T-Mobile merger will provide additional spectrum capacity to address these near term challenges.”

Finally, T-Mobile was recently named one of the world’s most ethical companies for 2011. It was the only U.S. wireless telecommunication service provider that made the list. By contrast, complaints about AT&T’s service and prices are legion. Indeed, the views of millions of AT&T customers have been summarized by an online campaign known as “#attfail.” This merger will eliminate a U.S. wireless company that at least seemed to care about its customers.

To this day, the AT&T customers who were misled and overcharged by AT&T’s actions after the 2004 merger are still fighting in the courts for refunds and other remediation arising from the merger. In 2006, lawyers for Consumer Watchdog, joined by a group of private law firms, filed a national class action lawsuit against AT&T on behalf of the millions of customers who were victimized by the merger: Coneff v. AT&T Corp., et al., No. C06-0944 (W.D. Wash). In response, AT&T’s lawyers claimed that when AT&T customers were forcibly moved to the new network, they simultaneously agreed to waive their right to seek refunds from AT&T in court because of a provision buried in the fine-print of AT&T’s contract that required arbitration of all disputes and barred customers from joining together in an arbitration. Throughout the litigation, AT&T changed its arbitration clause several times, each time modifying various terms while retaining the arbitration clause that prohibited customers from bringing or participating in a class action, regardless of whether it is brought in arbitration or in court.

In 2009, the U.S. District Court in Seattle, Washington, held that AT&T’s arbitration clause was unconscionable because most AT&T customers would never obtain redress without the ability to bring a class action. The case is presently before the 9th Circuit. In its briefing, AT&T now contends that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 563 U.S. __ (2011) should be interpreted by the courts to apply to the egregiously unfair and one-sided mandatory arbitration clauses like the one struck down in Coneff in 2009, which, in our case and unlike in Concepcion, has been shown to preclude customers’ basic due process rights.

Albert Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Considering AT&T’s track record, it is irrational to expect that the AT&T and T-Mobile merger will yield different results. If the merger is approved, millions of T-Mobile customers will be subjected to the same costly and unfair practices that AT&T customers experienced after the 2004 Cingular merger. Moreover, permitting AT&T to swallow a competitor will leave the American cellular marketplace controlled by a duopoly that, through the artifice of termination fees and arbitration agreements, will effectively eliminate competition between them.

This is a bread and butter test of the federal government’s commitment to American consumers versus the Wall Street and corporate interests that too often seem to be the winners every time the federal government takes action.  The Administration should ignore the lofty pronouncements of the corporate-funded academics and allies who provide cover for the glib promises of two cellular giants, along with the Wall Street firms that will reap millions in fees for providing the merger paperwork, in favor of the average American family, who, after all they have been forced to sacrifice these last few years, should not be required to pay more of their dollars for the ability to use a cell phone.

Harvey Rosenfeld

Laura Antonini

You can find documented footnotes accompanying this letter here.

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/ATT T-Mobile Merger Ad.flv[/flv]

AT&T is blanketing the airwaves with claims of improved service in its advertising promoting the merger with T-Mobile.  (1 minute)