HughesNet customers unjustly cut off from their Internet service for violating the company’s “Fair Access Policy,” or who paid an early termination fee when they realized satellite Internet was not for them may qualify for a settlement payment ranging from $5-40, or “tokens” that can provide a temporary free pass from the company’s usage caps as part of a class action lawsuit settlement.

Broadband Reports‘ readers who subscribe to the satellite provider first mentioned receipt of the settlement paperwork, which provides cash payments for ex-HughesNet customers who subscribed to any of the following Hughes Consumer Service Plans between May 15, 2005 – March 2, 2012:

Home, Pro, Pro Plus, Small Office, Business Internet, Elite, ElitePlus, ElitePremium, Basic, Power 150 and Power 200

Customers who canceled service are qualified to receive the cash payments. Those who paid an early termination fee prior to Dec. 6, 2010 will receive $40. Those who canceled as of March 2, 2012 and did not pay an early termination fee will receive $5. HughesNet also promised to implement a new sliding scale for their early termination fee. Each month you remain a customer under a service contract will reduce the amount of the fee by a proportional amount.

Current customers do not receive a cash settlement. Instead, they will be provided with a minimum of one “Restore token” per calendar month for the next 18 months. That may be nothing special — HughesNet already provides one token per month to every customer.

The HughesNet Fair Access Policy includes a download allowance. Users who exceed their allowance will have their service speeds reduced during the “Recovery Zone” for about 24 hours, after which speeds return to normal. Customers can apply their Restore token as a “get out of jail free” card, instantly restoring normal speeds.

HughesNet was sued for misleading customers about the company’s onerous usage limits and expensive early termination fee policy.

The lawyers bringing the case will receive fees, costs and expenses of up to $630,000. Up to $5,000 will be paid to each of the three Class Representatives that were part of the original lawsuit. Those seeking relief under the settlement have until September 28, 2012 to apply.

Complete information on the settlement and how to apply is available at: Satelliteinternetsettlement.com

Motorola cable modem

A California federal judge has thrown out most of a class action lawsuit that charged Comcast with marketing broadband service plans without disclosing extra fees for cable modem equipment.

The head plaintiff, Athanassios Diacakis, claimed Comcast sold Triple Play promotions over the phone and in the media without mentioning customers would also have to pay additional fees to lease a cable modem.  Diacakis accused the cable operator of violating California’s tough false-advertising laws by not fully disclosing all fees and surcharges while explaining the promotion.

U.S. District Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong disagreed, however, dismissing most of the plaintiffs claims.  The judge didn’t declare Diacakis’ claims untrue, but ruled they were insufficiently documented to proceed to trial.

“The [amended complaint] fails to specify when or where Comcast advertisements were viewed, the content of those advertisements, or which of them in particular Plaintiff relied upon,” Armstrong wrote.

Diacakis is free to submit an amended complaint if he wishes to proceed with his class action case.

Comcast charges customers $7 a month to lease cable modem equipment, but invites customers to purchase their own cable modems to avoid rental fees.  Many customers do just that, choosing from several dozen approved models Comcast will provision for broadband customers.  The cost to purchase cable modem equipment ranges from $50-125 on average, depending on the cable modem selected.  It takes less than two years for purchased cable modems to effectively pay for themselves at Comcast’s current rental rate.

A class action lawsuit accusing AT&T of methodically over-measuring wireless customers’ usage and subjecting them to overlimit fees has been re-assigned to arbitration because AT&T wrote terms into contracts denying customers the right to pursue grievances any other way.

Plaintiff Patrick Hendricks claimed AT&T was systematically overstating customer usage by 7-14 percent with a rigged usage meter.  Hendricks claims some customers were overbilled by as much as 300 percent for phantom data usage that he claims never took place.  The measuring errors found in a two-month study cited by Hendricks were in AT&T’s favor, potentially exposing customers to surprise overlimit fees or, more recently, speed throttles.

But U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer shut down the court case, heard in a San Francisco federal courtroom.  Breyer ruled that since AT&T’s contracts bar lawsuits by customers, Hendricks must pursue his case in the venue required by AT&T — arbitration.

“[AT&T’s contract] requires the use of arbitration on an individual basis to resolve disputes, rather than jury trials or class actions, and also limits the remedies available … in the event of a suit,” Breyer ruled.

Ironically, Breyer is the same judge that dissented from an earlier case — AT&T v. Concepcion, that ultimately set the stage allowing AT&T to force consumers to pursue arbitration and practically speaking, remove their right to pursue class action relief.

“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?,” Breyer wrote. “The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30’.”

Brandi M. Bennett, a California attorney who specializes in intellectual property law, considers arbitration clauses to be a major threat to class action cases:

“Class actions make it possible to find recourse for individuals with damages that make traditional litigation impractical. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion appears to leave the average consumer at risk of being defrauded by corporations for $10, $20, $50 without any practical remedy. If one million customers are damaged for $20 each, a corporation can improperly realize a $20 million gain. Class actions serve to prevent that.”

Arbitration can offer a poor substitute, because most arbitration firms are beholden to their corporate clients for repeat business.  An arbitrator perceived to be exceptionally pro-consumer stands little chance of being retained when corporate defendants pay the arbitration firm for its services.  Some arbitration policies require consumers and the company to split the costs of arbitration, but those costs often easily exceed the value of the original claim, discouraging customers from pursuing a refund settlement.

Companies understand that reality, which is why clauses requiring arbitration to settle disputes are increasingly common in service contracts.

Hendricks’ original suit sought restitution for the entire class of consumers and damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and fraudulent business practices, unfair competition, and violations of the federal Communications Act.  Most arbitration clauses require consumers to file individual complaints, which few may ultimately do considering arbitration proceedings may occur in another city and often requires the complainant to appear in person to provide testimony.

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

Not really

Back in 2002 Vincent and Liza Concepcion walked into a southern California AT&T Mobility store to purchase new cellphones for themselves.  AT&T advertised a buy one, get one “free” offer for cellphones.  What AT&T didn’t say was that the family would end up paying more than $30 in hidden sales taxes for both phones.

More than eight years later, that purchase — and the resulting class action lawsuit it launched — threatens to sweep away important consumer protections by letting corporations ban class action cases and curtail Attorneys General from enforcing state consumer protection laws.

Oral arguments in the case AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion were heard before the U.S. Supreme Court last Tuesday in one of the most important consumer protection cases in decades. At issue is this clause, inserted into the Concepcion’s service contract with AT&T that would disallow the family from participating in a class action lawsuit:

“You and AT&T agree that each may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”

That clause clashes with several state laws, California’s included, which basically say consumers cannot be compelled to sign away their basic consumer protection rights.  California law also says some contracts can be considered unenforceable ‘if they are built on deception, are too-one sided, or violate broader public policy.’

Hello, AT&T.

Vincent and Liza, through their attorney, argue that bringing an individual lawsuit against AT&T over $30 in sales taxes would be crazy — no lawyer would take the case and no plaintiff would front a retainer well beyond the amount in dispute.

As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote in another class action case, “The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”

The “class action” concept provides at outlet for aggrieved consumers who can attract legal representation if a company can be sued on behalf of every impacted customer.  For AT&T, that could mean facing not just the Concepcion family, but millions of Californians — each charged sales taxes for phones the company advertised as “free.”

How AT&T’s Case Has Broadened Into a Major Dispute Over Arbitration vs. Class Action Lawsuits

It's easy to navigate AT&T's terms and conditions to achieve a good outcome from arbitration, right?

But what began as a legal argument over a “free” phone has broadened into a much larger legal case before the Supreme Court: can consumers be compelled to participate in company dispute settlement schemes and give up their legal right to petition the court system for relief?  Further, what happens when those contract clauses conflict with state consumer protection laws?

Following in the footsteps of the credit card industry, AT&T inserted a clause mandating customers stay away from class action lawsuits.  By telling consumers they are forbidden to participate in such cases, AT&T pushes customers into the murky world of “arbitration” — a system where AT&T picks a private company, with whom it has a financial-business relationship, to “impartially” rule on customer complaints in secret proceedings.  Consumers have to pay their own way to attend arbitration hearings, often held in cities a thousand miles away or more.  They also must agree the decisions are binding and final.

AT&T argues, both directly and through its dollar-a-holler advocates, that class action cases are annoying, expensive, and do not typically deliver substantial benefits to class members.  The wireless carrier argues arbitration of individual cases is much faster and potentially more lucrative to would-be class action members.  Stephen J. Ware, a professor of law at the University of Kansas School of Law argues consumers have often done far better avoiding litigation and entering into arbitration programs.

But consumer advocates claim AT&T’s arbitration rules are stacked against consumers.  Arthur H. Byrant, executive director of Public Justice argues:

First, AT&T’s “agreement” bars its customers from court (except small claims court) and requires them to utilize the company’s mandatory arbitration program. Its rules say that, if a customer completes the process and recovers more than the last written settlement offer AT&T made before the arbitrator was chosen, a $7,500 premium will be paid. Second, the “agreement” bans AT&T’s customers from bringing or participating in class actions against it. Third, the “agreement” provides that, if AT&T’s class action ban is found to violate the law (as 20 states have held contractual class action bans do when they effectively immunize a company from liability), the arbitration clause “blows up” and the class action must proceed in court. Then, when the class action ban is struck down under state law (as AT&T knew it would be), the company springs its wacky trap: It argues that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (FAA) pre-empts — and invalidates — that state law because (believe it or not) the state law is biased against arbitration.

AT&T’s call for pre-emption suffers from a bad connection. State law is not biased against arbitration. It allows AT&T to resolve disputes in either arbitration or court. Only AT&T’s “agreement” is biased against arbitration. Its “blowup clause” precludes class actions from proceeding in arbitration, but not in court.

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Using the scroll bar to the right of the player, move down and click on Attorney Paul Bland’s name and watch him argue forcefully that AT&T’s motives are plain and simple — to allow them to get away with anything they want and not face accountability from the legal system. — “Arbitration is not the Candy Bridge into Rainbow Land.”

Tapping Into Consumer Discontent With Class Action Cases for the Benefit of AT&T

What the lawyers get

Ask anyone about the merits of most class action settlements and one will often get a response that the lawyers win while consumers lose.  Just this week many owners of HP printers will get word a deal has been reached over a class action case involving printer ink.  The multiple law firms involved will split not more than $2.9 million under the terms of the proposed settlement.  Consumers will get “e-credit” worth $5, $2, or $6 redeemable at HP’s online store, which sells ink cartridges at inflated prices.  In effect, HP has little to grumble about delivering “awards” to consumers that ultimately benefit its own enterprise, the only place those awards can be redeemed.

With settlements like that all too common, it is easy for AT&T’s advocates to tap into consumer discontent with class action lawyers, proclaiming AT&T’s case is actually consumer-friendly because it would cut those money-grabbers out of disputes with the company.

But consumer advocates stress class action cases do more than deliver settlements — they deter bad behavior on the part of would-be wrongdoers, bring corporations to account fiscally when they are forced to settle, and open the door to legal discovery which can uncover patterns of extensive wrongdoing that would otherwise remain secret in arbitration.

But most important of all, class actions impact every customer, not just the handful who navigate arbitration to achieve a confidential settlement.  That can be critically important to stop unfair business practices.

What you get

Of course, reform is also desperately needed in the class action system.  Too often, judges approve class action cases that deliver maximum benefits to the law firms that bring them, leaving consumers with peanuts.  Strict limits on legal fees recouped in such cases, perhaps tied to a percentage of total recovery would be a start, as are bans on settlements that don’t provide cash refunds to consumers who choose not to conduct further business with companies that abuse them.  Coupons, low value trinkets, and donations to third party groups (non-profit or otherwise) are insufficient.  Attorneys that selfishly claim most of the proceeds for themselves have only themselves to blame when corporations use that fact against them under so-called “tort reform” proposals.

Some advocates of AT&T’s position also argue that government oversight can provide a more effective system of checks and balances against corporate overreach.  While a noble sentiment, anyone who has watched the revolving door of lobbyists going to work for such agencies, later returning to lucrative jobs with the companies they formerly regulated, knows that is a classic case of the fox overseeing the hen house.  In an era of government “oversight” that missed everything from BP’s safety lapses, salmonella-infected eggs, produce, and meat, tainted pet food ingredients from China, and indecisiveness about telecommunications reform like Net Neutrality — such proposals are not to be treated seriously.

The Supreme Court Decision

While it will be months before the Court rules, most observers suspect consumers will ultimately win the case.  Liberals on the court are skeptical AT&T’s efforts to preempt state consumer protection laws are actually for the benefit of consumers, and some of the most conservative members of the court like Justice Clarence Thomas, big believers in “states’ rights” are likely to find for the Concepcion family.

“Based on what was said during the argument, I predict a 8-1 or 7-2 vote for the consumers and California, with Samuel Alito dissenting and John Roberts a toss up. Thomas, who never speaks at oral argument, will vote for the consumers and state on federalism grounds, as he always does in [arbitration] cases,” writes Lawrence Cunningham, Argument in Class Waiver Case Favors Consumers, States, Concurring Opinions.

“[I]t doesn’t look as though there are too many votes at the high court to do away with the right of consumers to band together to sue the great American manufacturers of fine print,” said Dahlia Lithwick, Can You Hear Them Now? The Supreme Court reads the fine print on your cell phone contract, Slate.

If these two observers are wrong, it will be open season on consumers who will be forced into arbitration agreements that deliver all of the benefits to companies like AT&T.  Under such a scenario, there would be little to dissuade companies from developing new fine print to trick and overcharge consumers.  Few will be willing to buy a ticket to fly halfway across the country to sit for arbitration proceedings over a $20 dispute, especially when the arbitration firm’s income depends on fees paid by the very companies that are accused of wrongdoing.