History is best ignored when a Wall Street Journal columnist frames an argument in favor of strengthening the hegemony of Ma Bell, and darn ‘ole past precedent gets in the way of the writer’s “facts.”

Gordon Crovitz is a media and information industry adviser and executive, including former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, executive vice president of Dow Jones and president of its Consumer Media Group.  But today he’s unofficially, unabashedly AT&T.

In a column published this week, Crovitz hosts a whine and cheese festival on behalf of poor and abused AT&T, whose multi-billion dollar takeover of T-Mobile is in tatters. Crovitz places the blame squarely on the government for ruining everything:

How soon we forget the risks of overregulation: Last week, the Federal Communications Commission flexed the same muscle it once used to quash market forces in the phone industry to quash market forces in the wireless industry.

Today’s AT&T, a spinoff from the original, needs more spectrum to catch up with market leader Verizon, also a Ma Bell descendant, to support iPhones, Androids and other devices that feature video and sophisticated apps. It wants to buy T-Mobile, a division of a German company, which doesn’t have the resources to compete in the United States on its own. But the FCC decided to apply antitrust theory from the industrial era and claims to know better than wireless companies how they should operate their businesses.

AT&T’s proposed acquisition is best understood as a private-sector solution to a government-created problem. The FCC has not been able to get Congress to approve auctions to reallocate spectrum to wireless from less valuable uses. AT&T wants T-Mobile’s bandwidth so it can extend the latest fourth-generation network to 97% of the country from 80% and improve its spotty service in congested areas.

Under laws dating to the 1920s, the FCC gets to decide if a merger is in the “public interest,” a vague standard for top-down decision making. Government is the last institution in this era of fast technological innovation to act as if it has the information and power to dictate how change happens.

Crovitz apparently prefers AT&T and its phone pal Verizon Wireless dictate how “change happens,” because the two companies control the vast majority of wireless telecommunications in the United States.  Both also charge near-identical prices for near-identical levels of service.  AT&T & VZW are completely comfortable with that status quo, especially if disruptive competitor T-Mobile is dealt with in the usual industry manner (merger/buyout).

There is nothing vague about the FCC report that condemns the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile for the anti-competitive monstrosity it represents.  In hundreds of pages Crovitz evidently never read, a careful and credible argument against the deal was laid out for all to examine.  That evidence is far more persuasive than AT&T’s heavily-redacted filings the public was not authorized to see (for ‘competitive reasons’), and a multi-million-dollar-a-holler public relations distortion strategy based on hollow promises.

Playing Catch-Up With Verizon Wireless?  Hardly.

AT&T hardly needs to “catch up” with Verizon Wireless.  Both companies own wireless spectrum they have warehoused for “future use.”  As a backdrop to the merger, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski has already indicated the agency is hard at work carefully re-allocating spectrum to make more room for wireless services.  The “bandwidth crisis” AT&T talks about is a convenient argument for a merger, until you realize T-Mobile’s mostly-urban wireless network won’t help AT&T achieve its goal of rural wireless expansion.  T-Mobile has never provided service in rural America and never will.

Crovitz attempts to leverage Verizon Wireless’ recent deal with America’s largest cable companies as an argument for the AT&T and T-Mobile merger, suggesting that deal was a game changer.  What goes unsaid is the fact AT&T could have pursued that deal for themselves.  Did they?  No.  Despite AT&T’s public relations spin, the proposed merger with T-Mobile is much more than a spectrum acquisition. As the FCC and the Justice Department have argued, this merger is about ridding AT&T of a competitor willing to offer more services at lower prices.  That forces AT&T to respond in kind to compete, and consumers have benefited greatly from that competition. Verizon Wireless is hardly competition at all considering both companies price services nearly identically.  Beyond that is Sprint, already saddled with the financial albatross Clearwire and questions about its long term viability in a duopolistic wireless market.

Crovitz is wrong on his other “facts” as well:

Deutsche Telekom is hardly short on cash.  The company has plenty of resources and could bolster T-Mobile USA to compete if it saw fit.  It doesn’t, preferring to focus on its more lucrative European markets.  Instead of selling the operation on the open market to other players, which could include foreign providers interested in competing in the high-priced American market, it elected to be courted by AT&T.

Overconfident AT&T

The merger illustrates AT&T’s unparalleled level of overconfidence it could deal with regulators and consumer groups who would certainly object to the deal.  The company has since spent millions it could have used to improve its network on campaign-contribution-fueled support building on Capitol Hill, a shameless dollar-a-holler astroturf campaign that pays off non-profit groups to sing the deal’s praises, and an expensive ad campaign to sucker Americans into thinking reduced competition will somehow deliver lower prices and better service.

Even former Republican FCC Chairman Kevin Martin would have likely paused over such an obvious monopoly-building operation.  The Obama Administration’s FCC chairman — Julius Genachowski —  while often too timid for our tastes, at least knows when it is time to join the chorus of opposition.

The FCC doesn’t pretend to tell AT&T how to run its business.  It does, however, serve the public interest by providing checks and balances to unfettered corporate power.  While the Wall Street Journal‘s world view of capitalism would have been favored by the most egregious robber barons, history has taught us that when big corporations get a stranglehold on vital industries, the entire economy can suffer.

Crovitz would have us ignore the massive corporate abuses of 100 years ago that eventually provoked Congress into trust-busting legislative reform, breaking up the monopolies and oligopolies that presided over the railways, early telecommunications networks, and industrial raw materials like oil and steel.  Restrained competition brought monopoly prices and blockades against would-be competitors.  What was true then is still true now, only the technology has changed.

In 1911, the economy was powered in part by railroads, which transported goods and raw materials.  Telecommunications networks like the telegraph and early telephone helped conduct business and coordinated the movement of goods.  In 2011’s growing digital economy, telecommunications increasingly represents the railroads, telegraph, and telephone all combined-into-one.  Some of America’s richest tech companies depend on broadband and communications to fuel demand for their products.  Allowing AT&T to control the largest part of that pipeline could be disastrous to everyone but that company and their shareholders.

History Repeats Itself

In 1914, the Clayton Act was passed to put a stop to increasing anti-competitive activity and abusive market tactics.  Amazingly, the problems being solved a century ago are back with a vengeance today, all thanks to the endless drumbeat for deregulation, which has fueled mergers, acquisitions, and increased concentration of market power.  That Act cracked down on:

• Price discrimination: selling products and services at different prices to similarly situated buyers;
• Tying and exclusive-dealing contracts: sales on condition that the buyer sign exclusive contracts that force an end to dealing with the seller’s competitors;
• Corporate mergers: acquisitions of competing companies to reduce competition; and
• Interlocking directorates: Boards of directors of competing companies, packed with common members.

Today’s laissez-faire attitude towards government checks and balances helped provoke the Great Recession, corporate scandals of epic proportions, and a revolving door in Washington where regulators end up working for the companies they used to regulate. Just ask former FCC chairman Michael Powell. Three years ago he worked for us.  Today he works for Big Cable’s largest lobbying group — the National Cable & Telecommunications Association.  FCC Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker went to work for Comcast shortly after green-lighting their super-merger with NBC-Universal.

It’s All About the Money. Always.

The only thing stopping AT&T from providing wireless nirvana to rural America is its own unwillingness to spend money on behalf of customers to upgrade its network.  The company claims it didn’t see the value of spending nearly $4 billion needed to deliver expansive 4G service, but suddenly had no trouble at all finding nearly ten times that amount to purchase T-Mobile USA.

Did AT&T suddenly win PowerBall?

AT&T saw crushing a competitor Job #1.  Central Idaho’s 4G service could wait.

Crovitz later notes AT&T “was unusually blunt” criticizing the FCC report, a classic case of protesting too much.  The company got caught with its rhetorical pants down, with a series of evolving arguments for a deal that never made the first bit of sense once you began to dig deeper into their case.

In the end, Mr. Crovitz wants you to blame Big Government for AT&T’s pervasive dropped-call problem that its competitors don’t seem to have.

It’s not the company that owns and runs the network, it is that Obama and his nasty henchmen at the FCC who are responsible!  Who knew?

[flv width=”360″ height=”290″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Bloomberg FCC Says ATT Failed to Show Public Benefit of Merger 11-30-11.mp4[/flv]

Bloomberg News reports the FCC found AT&T failed to demonstrate any real public benefit of its merger with T-Mobile USA.  (2 minutes)

Verizon Communications and AT&T together represent the largest providers of legacy copper wire landline phone service in the United States.  Over the past ten years, the traditional landline business has taken a beating as consumers increasingly turn their backs on the technology Alexander Graham Bell helped invent more than 100 years ago.  No utility service faces more customer defections than the phone company, and providers are increasingly rewriting their business models or lobbying to abandon unprofitable service areas altogether.

For some customers, investments in network improvements have brought advanced fiber optics straight to the home.  But in smaller communities, customers are making due with a deteriorating network phone companies no longer want to maintain.

The Glorious Growth Years

Back in the late 1980s, before most of us realized there was an Internet (or that you might be able to access it from home), the concept of connecting computers together to share information meant buying a 300-1200bps modem and using your home phone line to dial up hobbyist computer bulletin boards, CompuServe, PeopleLink, Delphi, GEnie, and QuantumLink.

Landline service was never perfect, but it worked reliably enough to make and receive phone calls and connect to low speed data networks.  As the 1990s arrived, an explosion in data and wireless services would bring both growth and unprecedented challenges for traditional telephone companies. Businesses demanded access to additional phone lines to power dedicated data lines and fax machines.  Residential customers wanted extra phone lines as well, mostly to keep data traffic off the primary house line. It was the era of frenzied area code splits, cell phones for all, and talk America could even run out of seven digit phone numbers to assign to all of the new lines.

As revenue and earnings exploded with the installation of new voice, data, and fax lines, Wall Street investors soon took notice.  Sleepy and safe phone company stocks were suddenly hot, and a deregulation-fueled consolidation frenzy soon resulted as phone companies merged and acquired one another.  Among the Bell System operating companies, familiar names like NYNEX, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Southwestern Bell, Pacific Telesis, Ameritech, and US West were gone, replaced by AT&T, Qwest, and Verizon.  Independent phone companies were not immune to the merger and acquisition game.  Today’s largest independent phone companies including Frontier Communications, CenturyLink, FairPoint, and Windstream have all grown mostly through buyouts of other providers.

The Bottom Drops Out

The rapid growth years of the traditional wired phone line came to an end around the same time as the dot.com crash and accompanying recession from 2000-2002.  While cell phone growth would continue, new competitors — especially cable-delivered “digital phone” service and other Voice Over IP providers like Vonage seriously cut into market share and revenue.  The need for additional phone lines to access the Internet subsided with the growth of DSL and cable broadband.  As household income stagnated, choices began to be made about where to cut back, and the traditional landline was a popular favorite.  Why pay for both a landline and a cell phone?  The cell phone stayed, the landline went.  Even dedicated fax machines are increasingly deemed unnecessary in an e-mail world.

The growing realization that the traditional copper wire telephone line was at risk of being the next “horse and buggy business” forced companies to consider a handful of options: ride out the landline declines and lower shareholder expectations, transform their existing networks to sustain new products like faster broadband and television service to give customers reasons to stay, or transition focus on business customers who bring more revenue.

AT&T and Verizon have adopted all three strategies, depending on where customers happen to live.

AT&T: If You are Still Waiting for DSL From Us, Forget It

In October, John J. Stephens, chief financial officer and executive vice-president at AT&T made it clear to investors the company’s interest in growing its legacy wired business had come to an end.  The company had lost landline customers for years, most switching to cell phone alternatives, sometimes sold by AT&T itself.  Spending enormous sums to upgrade AT&T’s copper landline network just didn’t make financial sense in every area.  Instead, AT&T split its operating territories in two: those suitable for upgrades to the company’s U-verse/IP platform, and those in smaller communities who will soon find themselves pushed to switch to AT&T wireless service instead.  That makes the prospects for customers still waiting for wired DSL service from AT&T pretty dim.

“We’ll continue to focus on transforming [existing] DSL lines into high speed [U-verse].” Stephens said. “In those areas where we don’t have U-verse, I think our plans have been fairly clear. We expect to have an LTE [wireless mobile broadband] rollout to 97% of the country. […] We believe that’s going to be able to provide a wireless solution at a high speed, good quality, good cost on a profitable basis for us. That’s the long-term solution to the non-U-verse areas.”

AT&T’s lobbyists have signaled this agenda for years, pressing state and federal lawmakers to get rid of “universal service” requirements that mandate reliable, basic landline telephone service to any customer in their service area who requests it.  AT&T wants the definition of “basic telephone service” expanded to allow the company the option of discontinuing its landline network and selling rural residents cell phone service instead.  The expense associated with maintaining AT&T’s degrading copper wire network is always cause for grumbling on Wall Street, most recently after this year’s repair costs from storms that impacted some of AT&T’s service areas.  Storm damages brought outages in the southern United States, flooded regions along the Mississippi, and rained-out areas of California.

Those problems were exacerbated when AT&T’s repairs don’t always correct the problems.  Repeated outages blamed on inadequate repairs and investment brought negative publicity for the phone company, as well as a number of requests to disconnect service as customers find other providers.

In places where AT&T will never deploy U-verse, AT&T has been content asking lawmakers to ease up on the phone company, urging that minimum service standards and oversight be abolished, along with the power of regulators to fine the company for repeated transgressions.  AT&T argues increased competition makes regulation unnecessary.

AT&T’s bean counters have calculated investment in U-verse only makes sense in urban-suburban areas.  In more distant suburbs and rural areas, the return on investment isn’t fast enough to justify spending money up-front on service improvements.  Maintaining the decades-old landline network doesn’t make much sense to AT&T either.  Instead, the company sees wireless service as the best prospect to serve its rural customers (and deliver the company higher profits from the more expensive service plans that come with the phones).

“What I see happening with LTE and data is just a huge growth opportunity,” said Ralph de la Vega, CEO and president of AT&T Mobility & Consumer Markets. “We mentioned today that our smartphones now make up 52% of our postpaid base. But I think the way we need to think about smartphones in the future is the smartphone is going to equal the phone in the future. It will be 100% in the next 2 or 3 years. These devices are so good and the costs are coming down so much that I think in the future, you could look at close to 100% penetration.”

Some customers may find AT&T penetrating their wallets, but for the phone company, better days may be ahead:

• Moving customers to the wireless platform exposes them to higher revenue, higher-priced wireless service plans;
• Basic cell phones, which come with lower-priced voice plans are being increasingly replaced with smartphones which come with required, extra-cost data plans;
• Getting rid of the rural landline network slashes AT&T’s upkeep costs and holds customers in place with two-year service contracts common with wireless phones.

Consumers happy with their existing landline service may be less than impressed with AT&T’s cellular network coverage, its dropped call-problem, and the company’s alternative for rural broadband – heavily usage-capped and expensive LTE network access.  AT&T sells wired DSL plans for as little as $14.95 a month with a 150GB usage limit.  AT&T’s wireless LTE network will cost considerably more and is accompanied with usage limits a fraction of that amount.

Verizon: A Tale of Two Networks

Big Red has two wired landline networks: screaming fast FiOS fiber to the home for some, slow speed DSL over a decrepit copper wire network for everyone else.

Verizon is less opaque than AT&T regarding which service areas it treats as valued assets and which aren’t worth the time of day.  The company began selling off its undesirable customers several years ago, starting with Hawaii.  Northern New England was next, followed by several former GTE territories Verizon acquired in 2000.

While Verizon enjoyed the proceeds of the tax-free transactions, most of the impacted customers did not.  Hawaiian Telcom floundered for a few years with bad service and an outrageous debt load before declaring bankruptcy.  Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont suffered through a year-long transition to buyer FairPoint Communications, complete with poor service and notoriously inaccurate billing before that company also declared bankruptcy.  Former Verizon customers in the Pacific Northwest, Indiana, and West Virginia (among others) are coping with Frontier Communications own billing and service problems.

The FairPoint Trust called the $2.3 billion acquisition of Verizon’s New England operations “disastrous.”  It also echoed what Verizon obviously understood itself: its landline operation in New England had been allowed to deteriorate into “inferior assets that had no future.”

Frontier Communications itself judged the network it purchased from Verizon in West Virginia in need of serious upgrades and repairs.  Critics of the deal called Verizon’s West Virginia network “a technical disaster area.”

But while Verizon is capable of landline neglect, it is also the only major phone company delivering true fiber-to-the-home service over its award winning (and expensive to build) FiOS network.

The feast or famine approach Verizon has used for capital investments has resulted in amazing service for some, a loss of reliable service to many others.

FiOS has allowed Verizon to remain a serious player, particularly in the northeast, despite the onslaught of competition from Cablevision, Comcast, and Time Warner Cable.  Average revenues earned from FiOS customers are much higher than what the company earns from customers on its copper wire telephone network.

Some Verizon shareholders have never liked the price for the company’s fiber future.  When the economy tanked in late 2008, an indefinite suspension of FiOS expansion soon followed, leaving Verizon’s network expansion plans in limbo.  The company is still slowly completing the portion of its fiber network promised under existing agreements, but has avoided introducing the service in new cities and towns.  At the same time, Verizon is loathe to maintain investment in its antiquated copper wire landline network, which in some areas was supposed to be retired in favor of FiOS.

As long as Verizon’s older network can be held together, with fingers crossed, customers still have a dial tone.  But when things start to fail, customers are in for serious headaches.  They are popping aspirin almost daily at Bistro Chat Noir, a prestigious French restaurant along Madison Avenue on Manhattan’s Upper East Side.  If you plan to dine there, it is best to bring cash.  Even if the management wanted to take your Visa or Mastercard, the restaurant’s phone lines are out so often, they can’t easily process your payment.

These days, the resourceful owners rely on a neighbor’s graciously shared Wi-Fi connection (presumably powered by competitor Time Warner Cable) to process credit card transactions manually.

The New York Times wrote Verizon’s atrocious level of service isn’t isolated to one bistro:

“Obviously, this is not the way we want to do business,” said Ms. Latapie, who has started giving clients her personal cellphone number to avoid missing reservations when the restaurant’s phone is not performing properly. “When people can’t get through, I tell them it’s Verizon. And if they live in this area, they know — because they have the same problem.”

However irritating, sporadic utility failures are not uncommon. But along a a stretch of Madison Avenue in what is arguably the city’s most expensive shopping and eating district, phone and Internet blackouts have become a nightmarish routine of life for many expensive restaurants, stores and hotels.

For weeks now, mundane tasks — making dinner reservations and paying for purchases by credit card — have become a frustrating challenge.

“We are in the highest rent district in North America and we don’t have communication,” said Jillian Wright, whose spa on East 66th Street is on the second floor of a brownstone building and not ideal for walk-ins. Ms. Wright said she was losing clients daily, and her spa’s phone number goes straight to a voicemail message apologizing to clients for Verizon’s service.

The service failures have affected dozens of businesses, primarily in the East 60s along Madison Avenue. The scope of the problem varies, with some businesses having no phone or Internet service at all for the past several weeks and others experiencing blackouts that last days or a few hours.

Meetings with Verizon officials have deteriorated into spin-and-excuse sessions where company officials promise results but continue to deliver lousy service.  It turns out the problem is Verizon’s ancient copper wiring found underneath the streets in the area.  Just two feet away from Verizon’s cables are steam heating pipes, which warm the tunnels and create major condensation problems.  Couple that with water runoff from the streets above — salt-laden in the winter time — and you have a recipe for corrosion that destroys reliable phone service.

Eventually, Verizon plans to wire FiOS fiber across a large section of Madison Avenue, but with the company’s unwillingness to invest appropriate sums to get the job done, business and residential customers are simply kept waiting.

Or they can switch to Time Warner Cable, and many are.

Your Telephone Is Temporarily Out of Service…

Verizon’s service woes are not just for big city dwellers.  Residents in Virginia are coping with Verizon landline problems in suburban neighborhoods, too.  Verizon employees openly admit they are fighting a losing battle with management to replace defective cables and equipment that should have been replaced years ago.  Management keeps winning and customers keep losing.

“When we come to this area, we dread it,” admits Alex Long, a cable splicer at Verizon for 22 years.

Long just pulled up to a pole off Burksdale Road in Norfolk and found nothing he had not seen many times before  — untrimmed tree branches overgrown into the overhead wires.  The branches had managed to rub the phone cable’s insulation down to bare copper wire.

As a result, whenever it rains, telephone service in the neighborhood becomes sporadic.  If tree branches don’t knock service out, cable-chewing squirrels do.  The lines, the equipment, and the technology is well past its prime, but Verizon management insists repair crews fix what is already there instead of replacing it with something better.  It’s all a matter of money, and Verizon wants to spend as little as possible on its copper landline network.

Long’s experiences were the highlight of a piece published by the Virginian-Pilot, which has heard complaints from readers about dreadful Verizon phone service across the region.

The repairman discloses Verizon technicians have known about the bad cable for at least five years, but requests to replace it have been repeatedly rejected.

“The cable’s totally shot,” Long told the newspaper. “It needs to be replaced, and the company’s budget doesn’t allow for it. That’s what engineering keeps telling us.”

In Hampton Roads, Va., it is a case of the fiber haves and have nots.  The parts of Hampton Roads that have been upgraded to Verizon’s fiber to the home network are virtually trouble-free in comparison to neighborhoods where copper cables still deliver service.  Verizon’s legacy network is of such concern, the Virginia State Corporation Commission has increasingly taken a close look at the level of service Verizon is providing in non-FiOS areas.

William Irby, director of the commission’s Division of Communications, has heard plenty of concerns that Verizon is neglecting their copper network in favor of FiOS fiber.

Verizon’s copper wire neglect might not be such a big problem had the company provided a date certain for upgrade relief.  But with FiOS expansion also stalled, some cities are now wondering if Verizon is abandoning them.

Boston is one of them.

Left Behind: The Cities Without FiOS

Verizon FiOS is well-known in eastern Massachusetts.  There are those who have it and those who want it.  Verizon had been aggressively pursuing franchise agreements with 111 communities across the state until the company announced it was putting on the brakes and ceasing further expansion efforts in new areas.  That leaves Boston and other communities like Quincy behind because they didn’t sign agreements with the company fast enough.

“If you’ve got FiOS, lucky you,” shares Quincy resident Roger Jones. “If you don’t, good luck.”

Jones says Verizon has left Quincy with a neglected landline network the company doesn’t seem interested in maintaining, much less replacing with fiber optics.

“The company believed in fiber optics because they saw the opportunities fiber could deliver, like additional revenue from selling TV channels,” Jones says. “But then Wall Street caught up to them and said it was all too much.  I might even understand that, except they won’t spend a nickle maintaining what they already have either, unless the regulators twist their arms and threaten fines over the bad service.”

Jones says his Verizon phone line was out three times earlier this year.

“Three strikes and they were out — I switched to Comcast,” Jones says. “A Verizon repair guy that came to my house the third time said all of his relatives switched to Comcast because service got to be so unreliable with Verizon’s old network.”

Back on Burksdale Road in Norfolk, Long was trying to track down another customer’s phone troubles — a loud hum on their line.  Hours later, Long decided it was a futile effort and began looking for an unused replacement pair of good wires he could switch to for the customer.  With the growing number of Verizon customers disconnecting their landline service permanently, that task gets easier every day.

Long told the newspaper it was no surprise Burksdale Road customers were experiencing problems.  Closures which were designed to protect the cable where it splits off individual phone lines were supposed to be water and air-tight.  Instead, he was working with a deteriorating rubber enclosure that showed its age after years of service.  Unfortunately, he explains, Burksdale Road customers will simply have to make due.

Not only won’t Long be able to replace the deteriorating infrastructure he finds, he’ll be forced to improvise with Verizon’s latest cost-cutting solution for wet cables — covering them with sheeting that resembles a plastic garbage bag.  Even that is nothing new for Burksdale Road.  Several houses down, a cable “rain-slicker” was already tightly wrapped around a section of cable where the rubber closure had gone missing altogether.

After getting the dial tone back, Long handed the customer his business card with his direct number and apologized.

“You may have problems again,” he said, advising the customer to call him directly the next time his phone line stops working.

Verizon better hope the customer doesn’t call the local cable company to switch providers or disconnect his landline altogether.

On September 13, most PBS stations will premiere a new documentary, “Bill McGowan, Long Distance Warrior” exploring the many trials and tribulations of MCI Corporation, the long distance and e-mail provider that was instrumental in breaking up Ma Bell’s monopoly in telephone service.

[flv width=”512″ height=”308″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Long Distance Warrior.flv[/flv]

A preview of PBS’ Long Distance Warrior, which premieres on most PBS stations Sept. 13  (3 minutes)

For those under 30, “MCI” may not mean much.  The company that helped pioneer competitive long distance calling was absorbed into the Worldcom empire in 1997, where it continued to provide service until a major corporate accounting scandal brought Worldcom down in 2002.  Most of what was left was eventually sold to Verizon Communications in 2005.

Remarkably, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was founded all the way back in 1963, but not as a provider of telephone services.  That MCI sought to build a network of microwave relay stations between Chicago and St. Louis to provide uninterrupted two-way radio service for some of the nation’s largest trucking and shipping companies.

By the late 1960s, William G. McGowan, an investor and venture capitalist from New York won a seat on MCI’s board of directors and part ownership of a newly-envisioned version of MCI — one that would provide businesses with a range of telecommunications products, including long distance telephone connections.  With many American corporations maintaining branch and regional offices, connecting them together was a potentially very lucrative business, especially if MCI could deliver the service at prices cheaper than what the monopoly Bell System was charging.

With their microwave relay network, now expanding across the country, MCI could distribute long distance phone calls cheaply and efficiently, if they could find a way to connect that network to Bell’s local phone system.  After all, it does little good to offer long distance service if you cannot connect calls to the businesses’ existing telephone equipment.

That’s where AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies objected.  For them, only calls originating on and delivered over their own network should be allowed.  MCI, as an interloper, was seeking to use the network AT&T built and paid for.  It’s an argument that has echoed more than 30 years later, when AT&T’s then-CEO Ed Whitacre objected to outside Internet content providers “using AT&T’s pipes for free.”

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/MCI First 20 Years.mp4[/flv]

On the occasion of MCI’s 20th anniversary, the company produced this retrospective exploring the difficult times competing with AT&T and the Bell System.  (9 minutes)

McGowan confronted arguments from AT&T executives who warned that competitive long distance would destroy the business model of America’s Bell System, which provided affordable local phone service to all 50 states, in part subsidized by long distance telephone rates, mostly paid by its commercial customers.  Tamper with that, they warned, and local phone bills would be forced to soar to make up the difference.

MCI called that argument a scare tactic, and suggested instead that AT&T’s monopoly had grown inefficient, bloated, expensive, and resistant to innovation and change.  MCI could deliver a substantially less expensive service and would force AT&T to increase its own efficiency to compete.  AT&T wasn’t interested in that argument and sued, repeatedly, to keep MCI out of its business.

By 1984, federal courts declared AT&T a monopoly worthy of a break-up, and opened the door to MCI’s long distance network.  By that time, MCI was already thinking about evolving itself beyond a business long distance provider, whose network was largely idle after business hours.  Because most Americans were accustomed to making long distance calls at night when rates were substantially lower, MCI developed new residential long distance service plans that encouraged customers to use that idle network at night and on weekends.

[flv width=”640″ height=”447″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/crying_mother.f4v[/flv]

One of MCI’s most memorable ads features a sobbing mother who reached out and touched her son over long distance a little too much.  (1 minute)

Thus began more than a decade of heavy advertising and competition for the long distance telephone market.  With equal access rules in place, consumers could choose their own long distance phone company and shop for the one with the lowest rates.  Competitors like Sprint, WilTel, LDDS, RCI, LCI, and yes, even AT&T all pitched their own calling plans.

MCI also pioneered MCI Mail, one of the first commercial electronic mail systems.  The original concept had businesses typing letters on a computer terminal, printed on standard paper at an MCI office closest to the destination, and then mailed in an envelope through the U.S. Post Office.  This poor-man’s version of a telex or telegram worked for businesses that wanted overnight delivery, but not at the prices charged by shippers like Federal Express.  In larger cities, MCI Mail could offer businesses delivery of their electronic communications within four hours, something closer to a traditional telegram of days gone-by.

MCI Mail’s hard copy deliveries wouldn’t last long, of course.  As the 1980s progressed, the fax machine and the more familiar all-electronic e-mail we think of today became firmly established.  As MCI Mail became less relevant, the company innovated into offering low priced telex services, mass-faxing, and data backhaul services to provide connectivity for online networks.

[flv width=”504″ height=”400″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WIBW MCI Mail 1984.flv[/flv]

WIBW explores a new concept in communications — something called ‘electronic mail,’ a service that bewildered consumers in the early 1980s.  This report from 1984.  (2 minutes)

AT&T, in contrast, was still getting over the loss of its local Bell Operating Companies — the regional phone companies most Americans did business with, and the loss of revenue earned from renting telephone equipment.  For years, AT&T long distance was branded as a quality leader, not a price leader.  It maintained its enormous market share partly through consumer indifference — customers who did not initially choose a new long distance carrier remained with AT&T, the default choice.

It took only about a decade after the Bell break-up for telecom industry lobbyists to begin advocating for enough deregulation to allow many of those former Baby Bells to re-combine through mergers and acquisitions.  The result is today’s AT&T, formed from its long distance unit, BellSouth, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Nevada Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Wisconsin Bell, and Southern New England Telephone.  Its largest competitor is Verizon Communications, which itself resulted from a combination of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE, and what was left of MCI after Worldcom was through with it.

McGowan’s fight was a personally costly one.  A workaholic, McGowan routinely put in 15 hour work days and drank up to 20 cups of coffee daily.  His heart finally had enough and McGowan succumbed to a heart attack in 1992 at age 64.  But he leaves a legacy and two decades of fighting to break up AT&T’s monopoly, which he always believed was bad for consumers and business (unless you were AT&T, of course).  That’s an important message as AT&T strengthens its resolve to acquire one of its significant competitors in the profitable wireless market — T-Mobile.  McGowan would have never approved.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/KCSM San Mateo Electronic Mail 6-18-87.mp4[/flv]

“The Computer Chronicles,” a production of KCSM-TV, spent a half hour in June 1987 showing off electronic e-mail service from MCI and how consumers and businesses using something called a “modem” could connect their home computers with online databases and services to exchange information and communications back and forth.  And for those business travelers on the road, away from their office computers, Speech Plus offered a product that could still keep you “connected,” by reading your e-mail to you over the phone.  In 1987, outside of commercial pay networks like CompuServe, Delphi, PeopleLink and QuantumLink, most Americans with modems used them to connect to typically-free hobbyist-run computer bulletin board systems.  Widespread access to “the Internet” would take another 5-6 years.  (29 minutes)

On this Memorial Day, we thought it might be a good time to look back to years past when legislators were forced to deal with a deregulated cable industry that immediately went on a rate hike spree that was unprecedented even for oil companies.

In 1984, cable television companies won the right of complete rate deregulation, arguing government involvement in the cable business was retarding investment, harming innovation, and killing jobs.  By keeping the cable industry free of government regulation, the industry promised improved service, more innovation, and even the potential for more competition.  The importance of this drive to deregulation was underlined with a flood of campaign contributions from some of the biggest players in the industry.

In the mid-1980s, that lineup included the National Cable Television Association (NCTA), the cable industry lobbying group led by James Mooney.  Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI)’s John Malone — dubbed Darth Vadar of a Cable Cosa Nostra by then Sen. Albert Gore, Jr., and an assortment of cable industry executives from companies like Warner-Amex, Sammons Cable, Cablevision, and a variety of other operators large and small.

TCI would later become AT&T Cable and then eventually evolve into today’s Comcast.  Warner-Amex is today Time Warner Cable.  Sammons joined dozens of other medium-sized multiple cable system operators in selling out to larger players — in this case TCI.  Cablevision sold off most of its systems outside of the metropolitan New York City region to companies like Time Warner Cable.

After winning near-complete deregulation, Americans saw the start of a relentless series of rate increases Tony Soprano would not have attempted.  Called “price adjustments” or a benign “pricing reset” by cable lobbyists, what used to be an average rate for basic cable amounting to just over $11 per month rapidly increased to $16, $19, $25, $29, $35, $45, $50, $55, and now today’s frequently seen $60 threshold for a basic cable package.

What used to be an exciting new product in the late 1970s and early 1980s was now rapidly becoming a highly consolidated handful of corporate empires that promised to be money machines for shareholders.  At one point, adding up the number of corporate entities that were parented under TCI, including local and regional cable systems, programming distributors, cable networks, and other entities generated a printout more than six feet in length.

The mid-to-late 1980s were the cable industry’s glory years, with unfettered rate increases sometimes resulting in more than doubling customer bills.  Members of Congress got an earful from irate consumers who noticed even with the higher prices, the quality of service received deteriorated markedly.  Many cable systems simply left an answering machine on their service and support line.  Others left local cable offices locked and closed for business.

There were many reasons for the deterioration:

• Investors saw the best possible returns buying and selling existing cable systems, not investing -in- them;
• Some cable systems changed hands 3-4 times in just a few years, leading to staffing shortages, billing chaos, and confusion;
• Some small operators saw no need to invest in aging cable systems when their value was skyrocketing during the consolidation era.  They waited for a buyout offer and cashed out of the business;
• There was no enforcement agency capable of stopping the abusive business practices;
• There was almost no competition.

Competition in the cable industry was a rarity in the 1980s, but a handful of communities did have more than one cable operator, with lower rates and better service the result.  But pressure from investors forced most of these competitive anomalies to either divide into respective monopoly service territories, or forced one company to sell their business to the other.  Competition and rate wars were bad for business.

The satellite dish industry was the only national competitor to cable television at this time.  Before DirecTV and DISH, rural and suburban homeowners erected often enormous backyard satellite dishes of up to 12 feet in diameter.  Capable of receiving hundreds of channels with better picture quality, home satellite offered an experience somewhat familiar to those with large rooftop antennas.  Rotate the dish slightly and enjoy two dozen or more channels on each respective satellite.  More than three million Americans eventually installed satellite dishes, even with the entry cost of installation and assembly, which could run several thousand dollars.  For rural Americans, it often meant the difference between some television and none at all.

Never tolerant of competition, the satellite industry came under a withering attack on all fronts:

• Cable programming was scrambled and either unavailable to satellite dishowners at any price, or sold at prices similar to what cable subscribers would pay, even though home dishowners owned and maintained their own equipment;
• Most cable networks at that time were either owned outright or tacitly subject to cable industry pressure not to sell programming at steep discounts;
• Premium cable channels often sold programming to satellite dishowners at prices higher than those paid by cable subscribers;
• Home dishowners were required to purchase their own decoder box outright, at a cost exceeding $300 — an enormous price at a time when most people paid less than $20 a month for basic cable service;
• Cable companies encouraged or defended town zoning laws which required would-be dishowners to purchase expensive permits, hide their dishes from view (and sometimes viewable signals in the process), or ban their use outright;
• In the case of networks owned by TCI, consumers with satellite dishes often had to buy the programming from their nearest TCI cable system and be billed by them.  So much for avoiding the cable company.

The worst abuses, and corresponding distortions from the cable industry, occurred from 1987-1992.  More than a dozen pieces of legislation attempted to correct the over-deregulation of the industry, but campaign contributions to both parties meant years of failed attempts.  Some of the worst anti-consumer officials included Sen. Tim Wirth (D-Colorado) who happened to represent the state where the vast majority of large cable companies were headquartered at that time, Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), who read industry talking points and was skeptical about stories of cable abuse, and Sens. Bob Packwood (R-Washington) and Bob Dole (R-Kansas) who didn’t like government regulation and thought the abuses would be self-correcting if consumers cancelled service.

Many of the heroes of the cable fight of the last generation remain familiar names.  Sen. Albert Gore, Jr. (D-Tennessee) was perhaps the industry’s greatest foe.  He began the fight as a congressman in the mid-1980s and carried the battle all the way through 1993, when he became vice president under the Clinton Administration.  Other notables included Sen. Wendell Ford (D-Kentucky), who is a far cry from today’s two senators in Kentucky.  Ford heard complaints about Kentucky cable companies almost daily.  Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), who wasted no time calling the cable industry an outrageous unregulated monopoly. Sen. John Danforth (R-Missouri) railed against the cable industry and was instrumental in helping pass legislation in 1992 that finally ended the worst abuses.

What the cable industry promoted and defended in 1987 for cable television will haunt you when you consider they are appealing for the same types of “hands-off” policies for broadband today.  Only now they are joined by the nation’s largest phone companies.  In the early 1990s, the telephone companies were threatening to compete with the cable industry and the two were considered foes.  But once an industry player becomes well-established, they defend their right to raise rates, restrict service, and retard any additional competition.

To give you a taste of what the abuses were like, and the industry’s efforts to excuse them, we present coverage of a Senate hearing held in November, 1989 pitting cable industry titans against would-be competitors and government officials from towns and cities trying to deal with a cable “bad actor” in their midst.  Some of the most interesting parallels come in the very last video as you watch Chuck Dawson, representing consumers and independent satellite dealers, detailing the schemes by the cable industry to kill off any threats.  Pay particular attention as he discusses the lies the industry will tell to predict the imminent failure of its then-newest competitor — the home satellite dish industry.  It’s a game plan they’ve used again fighting off community broadband.

Happy Thanksgiving to all Stop the Cap! readers.

While we take a break from our usual reports, let’s turn the clock all the way back to 1978, an era before broadband (or dial-up for the most part) and even before most of the basic cable networks know today existed.  Cable television was not even an option yet in many communities, although discussions about the concept were well underway.

In Columbus, Ohio Warner Cable constructed an experimental two-way cable system called QUBE, which brought 30,000 homes in the city access to interactive, locally-produced programming.  Viewers could vote on different topics, share their opinions, answer quizzes, and order individual pay-per-view movies — a new concept for most people back then.

Cable television in 1978 didn’t deliver CNN, TNT, ESPN, or any of dozens of other cable networks that are household names today.  Instead, most delivered clear signals of broadcast television stations received over the air from a master antenna mounted high above the local cable company, supplemented with text-based information channels running newswires, sports scores, financial tickers, weather and other wire service reports.  Locally produced government, public access and educational programming covered much of the rest of the channel lineup.  Cable radio hooked up to home stereos and delivered improved FM radio reception and some privately run cable radio stations.

QUBE was no different in this respect.  The bulk of the programming people watched came from local broadcasters and imported stations from Indianapolis, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Athens — all selected from a wired remote control.  It total, QUBE carried 30 channels, 10 of which were premium or pay per view.  The concept was so revolutionary, some folks traveled from miles around to record sample programming off the system and share copies of videotapes with other cable enthusiasts.

QUBE was not a financial success for Warner, however.  The costs to produce interactive programming, building brand new cable systems, and purchasing the equipment to run them, caused Warner to accumulate $875 million in total debt by 1983.  It abandoned the concept a few years later because new cable networks and superstations were rapidly signing on, creating a huge number of new viewing options that effectively drowned out the locally-produced interactive shows.  Cable would remain a one-way medium, at least for awhile.

Watching the enthusiasm of Ray Glasser, who produced the video included below, all over a 30-channel cable system was fascinating, as was watching the assortment of television stations sampled from more than 30 years ago.  And check out those supermarket prices listed on one of the text channels Ray previews.  After a series of sales and ownership transfers, Warner Cable still exists in Columbus.  But today, we know it better as Time Warner Cable.

[flv width=”422″ height=”327″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Qube.flv[/flv]

A video tour of Warner Cable’s QUBE system in Columbus, Ohio, produced in 1978 by Ray Glasser.  (50 minutes)