A classic phone hundreds of thousands of Americans are still paying a monthly equipment fee to lease

Do you or someone you love still have an old looking rotary dial or traditional bell ringer phone mounted to the wall or installed in the bedroom?  Are you sure they still aren’t paying a rental or leasing charge for that phone?  Many customers, particularly the elderly, have no idea they need not continue to pay fees up to $90 a year for a phone manufactured at a time when color television was a novel concept.

A legacy of the old Ma Bell phone monopoly, telephone companies used to own every piece of equipment attached to their lines.  Individual customers would pay a monthly fee to lease telephone equipment that was approved by the phone company to work with their service.  By the early 1980s, nearly every American home had a kitchen wall phone and one or more extensions, usually installed in the living room or bedroom.  Manufactured by companies like ITT, Stromberg-Carlson, AT&T or Comdial, these phones were built to last… and pay for themselves many times over by unaware consumers who don’t realize the days of renting phones are long gone.

After the breakup of AT&T, most phone companies began telemarketing campaigns trying to convince consumers to buy their formerly leased phones.  Those who did now own these classics outright.  Many who didn’t returned them and bought their own new phones.  But more than a million consumers did neither, and continue to pay phone equipment rental fees to this day.  Even as phone companies abandoned the phone rental business, not everyone got the message.

Most phone companies sold off their remaining leased customers to third party companies long ago, including QLT Consumer Lease Services in Miami and Ft. Worth.  QLT has several hundred thousand customers paying quarterly lease fees for telephones often years old.  The company itself admits the majority of its customers are retired, elderly consumers.

QLT markets refurbished bell ringer phones at some surprisingly high prices:

• A traditional desk or wall retro-rotary dial telephone, which many under 30 have never seen before, costs $4.45 per month to rent.
• The glitzy-for-its-day lighted dial Princess phone costs $6.95 a month.
• Big button touchtone phones run $8.85 a month.

Those quarterly fees add up

QLT informs customers they cannot buy the phones at any price — they must lease them.

QLT claims its customers appreciate the familiar phones from an earlier era, and the bell ringers are louder, too.  Customers can exchange a broken phone within a day after the company is notified, if they can figure out how to install the replacement.

But it’s an extraordinarily high price to pay for classic phones, especially when replacements can be purchased outright for less than $20.  But many QLT customers don’t realize they have that option.  While the company also pitches decidedly non-phone-related services like roadside assistance plans and health care discount cards, it doesn’t spend any time or effort informing customers they can buy their own phones.

So next time you visit your older relatives and see a classic phone, perhaps it would not a bad idea to ask if they’re still paying for it.

[flv width=”640″ height=”500″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WBAL Baltimore MD Many Older Residents Still Renting Phones 5-25-10.flv[/flv]

WBAL-TV in Baltimore found one woman still paying $90 a year for a phone that had been attached to her kitchen wall around the time Ronald Reagan was inaugurated president of the United States.  (4 minutes)

Hawaii’s landline telephone company, Hawaiian Telcom (HawTel), is awaiting approval from the state’s Public Utility Commission for its $460 million, stand-alone reorganization plan. The company, launched in 2005 from assets acquired from Verizon Hawaii, Inc., by the politically connected global private equity investment firm The Carlyle Group, lasted less than four years before declaring bankruptcy.

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KITV-TV in Honolulu introduced Hawaii to Hawaiian Telcom in this report from May 3, 2005 (1 minute)

The downfall of Hawaii’s dominant landline provider, despite decades of stable service from its progenitors — GTE/Hawaiian Telephone Company and Mutual Telephone came as no surprise to telecommunications analysts and consumer advocates who saw trouble right from the start.  The Carlyle Group and Verizon structured a deal that loaded $1.2 billion in debt onto Hawaiian Telcom’s balance sheet.  Critics of the deal weren’t impressed by the fact Carlyle had no experience running a telephone company either, and was likely to dump the company after “dressing up the pig” to inflate the company’s value and walk away with big profits from the sale, as one analyst predicted.

Long time Stop the Cap! readers know how this works only too well.  Anyone who followed the exhaustive coverage of the downfall of FairPoint Communications this past year will see plenty of familiar warning signs — piling enormous debt on the buyer, lots of promises made and broken, and plenty of billing and customer service problems that cause customers to flee to other providers.  By 2008, 21 percent of the company’s 700,000 customers did just that.  Remarkably, the only people who suffered from the failing business plan Hawaiian Telcom subjected on the islands were customers, lower-level employees, and company vendors.  The top management that made all of the bad decisions were insulated from the impact with fat bonuses, even as other employees were terminated.

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Here come the all-too-familiar billing problems.  KITV reported 9,000 HawTel customers were overbilled in this report from June 9, 2006 (2 minutes)

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/KITV Honolulu Hawaiian Telcom Problems Continue 3-21-07.flv[/flv]

A year later, still more billing problems from HawTel, this time impacting more than 10,000 customers who can never sure what their monthly bill will look like.  (March 21, 2007 – 2 minutes)

It’s all a word to the wise as Frontier Communications journeys down the same road FairPoint and Hawaiian Telcom have already paved.

On the business side, Hawaiian Telcom’s future foreshadowed its post-mortem if only based on the players who far too often have been rewarded for failure:

The Carlyle Group: Attacked by incumbent competitors in Hawaii when it sought to purchase Verizon’s assets in the state.  Both Time Warner Telecom and Pacific LightNet warned Carlyle had little, if any experience running a telecommunications business, was going to mine the company for profits for its investors from rate increases, slash costs by reducing investment in their network and firing employees, and then try and resell the business at a profit just a few years later.

BearingPoint: Hired by Hawaiian Telcom to manage billing post-Verizon, the troubled firm managed to botch thousands of customer bills, double-charging them, crediting their accounts only to rebill them months later, and other irregularities.  In the end, BearingPoint had to pay $52 million to Hawaiian Telcom and drop an additional $30 million in outstanding invoices.  Like birds of a feather, BearingPoint itself collapsed in bankruptcy in 2009.

Ruley

Michael Ruley: Hawaiian Telcom’s CEO from October 2004 through February 2008, Ruley oversaw HawTel operations during the post-transition customer service nightmares.  During his last quarter at the company, HawTel lost $29.5 million, and his prescription was a massive cost-cutting program that accelerated company layoffs that began in 2007, resulting in the dismissal of more than 100 employees, 50 of which were cut during his last full month at the company.

Stephen F. Cooper: A so-called “turnaround expert,” Cooper was hired as a ” permanent interim” CEO on February 4, 2008.  His previous “success stories” included succeeding Kenneth Lay at the infamous Enron, and a stint as CEO of Krispy Kreme, which then promptly collapsed as a success story, with store closings and bankruptcies among its franchisees.  His “permanent interim” position as CEO of HawTel ended after three months. “In my view, Hawaiian Telcom is financially stable and has ample liquidity available,” Cooper said less than a year before the company went bankrupt.

[flv width=”480″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/KITV Honolulu Hawaiian Telcom Filing for Bankruptcy 12-01-08.flv[/flv]

KITV has three reports telling viewers HawTel has filed for bankruptcy, the first time in Hawaii’s history a major utility has sought bankruptcy protection.  (12/1 – 12/3 – 2008 – 7 minutes)

Bankruptcy As a Business Tool

The sale of Verizon Hawaii’s assets to Carlyle and its creature HawTel likely doomed the company from the start.  Saddled with massive debt from the $1.6 billion dollar sale in May 2005, HawTel had to manage its 700,000 customers, protect its flank from increasing wireless competition from Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile, and constant customer poaching by Oceanic Cable.  The cable operator offered “digital phone” service at prices lower than HawTel charged and broadband service far faster than the “up to 7Mbps” DSL service the phone company provided.

As customers continues to leave, the company’s bond values lost 65 percent of their value by the start of 2008.

The Wall Street Journal itself began to notice (subscription required) these telecommunications deals had enormous implications for consumers, particularly for those who depend on landline service:

Because major phone companies are reducing their exposure to the shrinking landline phone business, phone services in a growing number of U.S. states are being taken over by private-equity firms like Carlyle or by tiny telecom companies.

Verizon, for instance, has agreed to spin off its landline business in Maine, Vermont and New Hampshire to a small phone company, FairPoint Communications Inc. Alltel Corp., which services the Midwest, was recently taken private by private-equity firms TPG Capital and Goldman Sachs Capital Partners.

Many of these deals are raising concern among local regulators and consumer advocates, who are worried about the telecom savvy of the new buyers. “Why would a company one-10th the size and not nearly as deep of pockets as Verizon be able to make a success where Verizon hasn’t,” asks Rand Wilson, a spokesman for Verizon’s unionized workers, speaking of the Verizon-FairPoint deal, which is expected to close next week. A FairPoint spokeswoman says the company has plenty of experience taking over landlines in less dense regions of the U.S. and plans to offer new technologies and services to New England customers.

Yeaman

By December 2008, it was time to get HawTel’s lawyers in Delaware to walk into Bankruptcy Court.  At the time of the filing, the company said it had about $1 billion in debt, which includes $574.6 million in bank loans as well as about $500 million in bonds.

The company sought bankruptcy to reduce the debt load, and in a remarkable concession, HawTel president and CEO Eric Yeaman spoke prophetic words not heard when the original deal was on the table:

“Our lenders all recognize that this business can’t support its debt load,” Yeaman said. “But they’re still figuring out what the magic number is. Whatever it is, it will affect different parties, especially investors who won’t get their initial investment back. That’s why it’s important that we increase in value going forward.”

In the nine months ending in September 2008, Hawaiian Telcom paid $68.2 million in interest to lenders, on top of a $35.7 million operating loss. The company has lost $425 million since it began operations in 2005.

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KHON-TV Honolulu covers the bankruptcy proceedings in this report from November 9, 2009. (1 minute)

BonusGate

Adding insult to injury, Hawaiian Telcom may have been bankrupt, but senior management were assured of being kept whole.  KITV-TV in Honolulu reported that three days before the company filed for bankruptcy, Hawaiian Telcom’s board of directors approved a financial incentive plan for 20 of its top executives for up to $2.3 million in retention bonuses and other benefits.  The executives were eligible for amounts ranging from $57,000 to $2.3 million, if the company met certain earning and revenue targets.

Regular employees were eligible to use a secluded back door to exit the company after being notified they were being laid off to “reduce costs.”

Just three months after declaring bankruptcy, HawTel officials were back asking for approval for even bigger bonuses.

Gov. Linda Lingle was outraged to learn HawTel was planning on paying bonuses to employees despite being mired in bankruptcy.

In a filing with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Hawaiian Telcom said it was seeking authorization to pay 1,418 employees a total of $6 million, a reduction of 24 percent from their original proposal to pay $7.9 million. Understanding how bad it would look for a president and CEO overseeing a company into financial failure, Yeaman gave up his $609,000 bonus and elected not to participate in the special compensation program.  Six of the company’s senior vice presidents were less generous, agreeing only to defer half of their scheduled bonuses.

Hawaii’s governor was outraged.

“The decision by Hawaiian Telcom to ask the bankruptcy court to approve $6 million in bonuses for its employees is unconscionable, and we will oppose it in court,” Gov. Linda Lingle said on March 19th. “Hawaiian Telcom is the critical communications backbone for our state, and its action to pay millions in bonuses puts the company in a precarious position that jeopardizes its long-term viability, as well as threatens Hawaii’s economic recovery.”

Bankruptcy can be a profitable business for more than just bonus recipients.

Fees billed by companies working on the bankruptcy reorganization also angered creditors and the U.S. trustee appointed to oversee the company’s restructuring:

• Lazard Freres & Co. was being paid $2,527.38 per hour for its work in Hawaiian Telcom Communications Inc.’s bankruptcy case.  The company billed for 237.4 hours of work between April 1 and June 30 totaling an astonishing $600,000, an amount Acting U.S. Trustee Tiffany Carroll said was way out of line.  “Simply put, the amount of time Lazard is devoting to this case is not commensurate with its interim compensation,” she wrote in papers filed with the Honolulu bankruptcy court.
• The Carlyle Group, despite its losses from piling on debt from the Verizon sale did manage a legislative win when it lobbied for and got passage of a nice deregulation package in the form of SB603, a state bill providing a deregulatory advantage to Hawaiian Telcom, now able to charge higher prices for competitors that connect with HawTel’s network to complete calls to customers.  Better yet, SB603 provides for no oversight or justification for the rates HawTel chooses to charge.  Hawaii’s legislature bowed to the lobbyists to deregulate a company that lost more than $1 billion dollars in bankruptcy.
• Ernst & Young, LLP, a financial advisor hired by Hawaiian Telcom to advise on tax matters, would receive payment for services without as much scrutiny from the bankruptcy court, owing to HawTel’s lawyers seeking to have E&Y’s fees be subject to review only under the “improvident” standard, which would make it much harder to protest unreasonable fees.

The more money paid out to consultants, lawyers, secured creditors, and other advisors, the less money remains available to pay unsecured creditors — mostly suppliers and smaller companies hired as subcontractors to do the work HawTel farmed out.

What The Future Holds for HawTel & Customers

As the company works its way towards an exit to bankruptcy, it’s betting the company’s survival on Next Generation Television (NGTV), an “IPTV” service that delivers Internet, television, and phone service over a broadband network.  HawTel seeks to construct a faster broadband network using a fiber-optic based backbone network and integrate it with the ordinary phone lines that string through neighborhoods across the islands.  Similar to AT&T’s U-verse system, by reducing the length of copper wiring, HawTel can boost broadband speeds to at least 25Mbps, the bare minimum required to deliver a “triple play” package of phone, Internet, and cable-TV service to Hawaiians.  Relying on less than that can seriously degrade parts of the package if customers try to use them all at once (try making a phone call, download a file, and watch two different channels at the same time on a network with reduced bandwidth.)

HawTel realizes without being able to sell all three services to consumers, they have little hope of surviving in a state where consumers are dropping landline phone service in favor of Oceanic Cable’s own “triple play” service, or relying on one of the cell phone providers serving Hawaii.

Of course, such an undertaking will require millions of dollars of investment, something The Carlyle Group may not exactly be enthusiastic to provide.  Company observers suspect HawTel will instead come hat in hand to Washington looking for broadband stimulus funding so the company need not invest as much of its own money.

Why This Is Important To Millions of Potential New Frontier Communications Customers

Detailing the history of broken promises, bad customer service, billing problems, and the impact of more than a billion dollars of crushing debt, all hallmarks of two previous deals with Verizon — one with HawTel, the other with FairPoint Communications — illustrates just how risky the latest Verizon-Frontier deal could be to customers, suppliers, employees, and other creditors.  HawTel’s debt hampered the company’s potential and kept it from providing the kind of enhanced services it speaks of today.  What was once $1.1 billion in debt has been dramatically reduced by a Bankruptcy Court judge to just $300 million.  The better-looking balance sheet frees the company to invest in the services it will be required to provide to protect it from future obsolescence.

Why state utility commissions are willing to risk rolling the dice on another risky deal, and one that is largely tax-free thanks to loopholes in the law, is a question that must be asked.  Consumers, small businesses, and individual employees pay the price for the wrong decisions others make, all while those handful of executives who run the show have built-in insulation from the impact, earning bonuses and benefits that come regardless of their performance or lack thereof.

One of the promised benefits of permitting the Verizon-Frontier spinoff is that Frontier will bring more and better broadband service to areas Verizon has ignored for years.  The company has been running television ads in West Virginia promoting Frontier’s promised “next generation” of broadband.  But what does that mean?

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Frontier Verizon Deal Advertisement West Virginia.flv[/flv]

Frontier Communications is running this advertisement in West Virginia.

The West Virginia Consumer Advocate Division of the Public Service Commission brought in Trevor R. Roycroft, PhD., former Associate Professor at the J. Warren McClure School of Communication Systems Management, Ohio University, to examine the details behind the marketing and public relations push to promote the deal.

He was not impressed.

After an extensive review of confidential and public documents from Frontier, his conclusion was that Frontier’s DSL service is just plain bad, and for plenty of West Virginians who may only have one choice for broadband in the foreseeable future, being stuck with Frontier’s idea of broadband is particularly bad.

Indeed, Frontier’s idea of what defines “next generation broadband” would be true, if this was the year 1992.

“Frontier has made no commitment regarding improved broadband deployment in West Virginia. Frontier, while achieving higher levels of DSL availability in West Virginia, generally offers its broadband services at higher prices and provides lower quality than those associated with Verizon’s DSL. Frontier’s ability to increase broadband deployment in West Virginia will depend on the condition of the outside plant that it has acquired, which may negatively impact Frontier’s costs of deployment. Furthermore, Frontier must upgrade substantial numbers of customer locations outside of West Virginia, and West Virginia will be competing with this larger priority,” Roycroft writes in his testimony to the West Virginia Public Service Commission.

The infrastructure Frontier utilizes to deliver its broadband service is revealing even to those Frontier customers not directly impacted by this transaction.  Some of the documents Roycroft reviewed laid bare the nonsense the company has used to defend its Acceptable Use Policy language defining an “acceptable amount” of monthly broadband usage at just five gigabytes.  Company officials have said for more than a year that they were concerned about the growth of usage on their network, and its potential to slow service for other customers.  But company documents, included within the scope of Roycroft’s testimony, tell a very different story:

Frontier plans to increase its core backbone from its current level of 10 Gbps to a capacity of 20 Gbps (should the spinoff be approved). With regard to the capacity of its existing backbone, Frontier states:

Frontier expanded the backbone from OC 48 to 10 Gigabit Ethernet during the first half of 2009. Because of this network expansion we do not have peak usage for the past 12 months. No backbone link has peaked above 2.8 Gigabit/second or 28% of the capacity of a link since the augment was completed in 2009.

Thus, Frontier’s current backbone configuration appears to have excess capacity. With the expansion of its backbone network to 20 Gbps, the company’s current data traffic load results in about 14% of capacity being utilized at peak.

Potentially limiting customers to just five gigabytes of usage is so unjustified, in Roycroft’s analysis, its potential imposition on West Virginian customers should be a deal-breaker.

Roycroft ponders whether Frontier will invest enough resources to make sure capacity is not an issue. The only way Frontier’s network will show signs of strain is if the company makes a conscious decision not to sufficiently upgrade their network as they take on millions of new Verizon customers, or they dramatically underestimate the average Verizon customer’s usage.

Roycroft was also asked to evaluate whether Frontier’s claims of 90% broadband availability in its overall service area and 92% in its West Virginia territory rang true.

Roycroft writes that Frontier’s numbers don’t tell the whole story.  In five states, Frontier admits the percentages are notably lower, so no guarantee can be inferred for West Virginia based on Frontier’s talking points.

Frontier’s “Advanced” Broadband Network Is Hardly Advanced and Barely Qualifies As Broadband

Heavy criticism was leveled at Frontier for its “advanced” broadband service.  Roycroft compared Frontier DSL with several other providers and was unimpressed with the company’s broadband speeds.

Roycroft's table illustrates what's on offer from the competition

“Frontier’s advertised DSL speeds are generally much lower than those available from Verizon and other carriers. Based on a location-based search of Frontier DSL service offerings, it appears that Frontier’s most prevalent DSL speeds are 3 Mbps and 768 kbps (for download),” Roycroft said.

Frontier's DSL Speeds in Selected Cities

Although the expressed upload speed for Rochester should be listed at a higher rate (I managed around 512kbps myself), Roycroft is correct when he says, “it can be seen that outside of Rochester, NY, the DSL speeds associated with Frontier offerings cannot be considered ‘cutting edge.'”

Even while noting Rochester’s potential DSL speeds, real-world speeds are another matter entirely.

[flv width=”640″ height=”405″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Real World Frontier vs Road Runner Speeds.flv[/flv]

One New York customer provided real world evidence of the significant differences in speed offered by Road Runner from Time Warner Cable and Frontier’s DSL (courtesy: 1ComputerSavvyGuy) (1 minute)

Frontier’s DSL offerings in West Virginia are of even lower quality. Frontier indicates that it offers three grades of DSL service in West Virginia:

Up to 256 kbps download/128 kbps upload;
Up to 1 Mbps download/200 kbps upload;
Up to 3 Mbps download/200 kbps upload.

These data transmission speeds, especially upload speeds, are at the very low end of commercial offerings that I have observed.

Comparing Verizon DSL vs. Frontier DSL Pricing & Gotchas, Contracts, and Internet Overcharging Schemes

Roycroft’s study found Frontier’s pricing significantly higher than Verizon for DSL service.

Frontier’s DSL prices, either with telephone service, or on a stand-alone basis, are significantly higher than are Verizon’s. For example, the entry-level Frontier plan has a nominal price that is 100% higher than Verizon’s.

However, when considering the per Mbps price, Frontier’s price is 160% higher. It is also notable that Frontier’s upload speeds are also low when compared to Verizon’s.  Consumers are increasingly relying on upload capabilities to share large files, such as videos. Overall, Frontier’s DSL products are low quality.

Comparing Prices

Roycroft also gave special attention to Frontier’s infamous 5GB Acceptable Use Policy, which he suggested was a major negative for West Virginia’s online experience.

Frontier indicates that it monitors network usage if “it receives a complaint of slow service or if it discovers that network bandwidth utilization is unusually high in a particular area.

Frontier was asked to identify any action taken against a customer associated with its acceptable use policy and, in response, the company stated that it has not “terminated a customer’s service based on exceeding the 5 GB threshold identified in the AUP.” However, the restriction on usage further raises the relative cost of Frontier’s service. Frontier indicates that consumers may face action by the company if they exceed the usage cap, thus indicating that the prices reflect both speed and volume. Verizon’s DSL service does not include a similar limit.

Frontier’s DSL pricing policies and usage restrictions will represent a significant negative impact on West Virginia consumers, should these policies be implemented in Verizon’s service area in West Virginia.

Even more importantly, Roycroft considered the argument for imposing such Internet Overcharging schemes as unwarranted.

“While DSL provides dedicated bandwidth to the customer in the last mile, DSL subscribers will share network capacity in the ‘middle mile.’ For example, shared data networks will carry consumer traffic from the telephone company central office to an Internet gateway. I believe that Frontier’s policy is more likely to reflect an unwillingness on Frontier’s part to invest in ‘middle mile’ Internet access facilities that would require capacity additions as customer demand increases, and choose to restrict customer usage instead of investing in the capacity needed to meet customer demand,” Roycroft writes.

“Furthermore, Comcast’s download-cap policy includes limits that are dramatically higher than Frontier’s. Comcast’s acceptable use policy identifies 250 gigabytes as the threshold at which Comcast may take action against a customer, which is fifty times the usage associated with Frontier’s policy,” he added.

Roycroft was also concerned about the many ‘gotchas’ that are part of Frontier’s marketing efforts which bring even higher prices to consumers choosing to have DSL service installed.

“To receive the services of Frontier’s technician, the consumer will incur a $134 fee unless the consumer signs up for a term service contract. Even with the term service contract, the customer must pay a $34 fee for the on-site set-up. Furthermore, the technicians that Frontier dispatches to new broadband customers’ homes are also sales agents. Thus, while it may be that these individuals can help with system set-up and the like, they also are part of Frontier’s overall up-selling strategy,” said Roycroft.

Frontier markets a variety of services to customers as part of their promotions and service offerings.  For instance, recent Dell Netbook promotions required customers to sign multi-year contracts for service, with an early termination fee up to $400 if the consumer chooses to cancel service.  Such promotions do not come out of the goodness of Frontier’s heart.  Indeed, such promotions provide even more revenue potential by pitching customers on its “Peace of Mind” services, which include computer technical support, backups, and inside wire maintenance for an additional monthly fee.

Customers don’t even qualify for many Frontier promotions unless they accept a bundled service package combining broadband with traditional phone service and a multi-year service contract.

Roycroft says West Virginia should demand modifications to Frontier’s proposal before it should even consider accepting it.  Among the changes:

• Frontier should be required to make broadband services available in 100% of its wire centers, and to 90% of its West Virginia customers by the end of 2013. Frontier should expand broadband availability to 100% of its customers by 2015.
• Frontier should be required to deploy and promote broadband services in West Virginia so that, by the end of 2013, at least 90% of its customers can achieve download speeds of 3 Mbps; 75% of its customers can achieve download speeds of 6 Mbps; and 50% of customers can achieve download speeds of 10 Mbps.
• To achieve these broadband objectives, Frontier should be required to exceed Verizon’s baseline level of capital investment by at least $117 million during the period ending December 31, 2013, or by an amount sufficient to meet the broadband objectives.
• Frontier should be required to offer broadband services at prices that do not exceed those currently offered by Verizon for 1 Mbps and 3 Mbps services, i.e., Frontier should offer services at Verizon’s advertised prices for 1 Mbps and 3 Mbps service (respectively, $19.99 per month and $29.99 per month) for a period of 24 months following the merger.
• Frontier should be prohibited from imposing its broadband “download cap” in West Virginia.
• Frontier should be required to provide individual written notice to its customers regarding the merger, and should notify customers of any change in services that result from the merger. Changes in billing format should also be clearly explained to customers, both in writing, and through a web-based tutorial.
• Frontier should be prohibited from migrating any Verizon customer to a Frontier plan that either increases the customer’s rates, diminishes the level of service, or has a materially adverse impact on any of the terms and conditions of the customer’s service. West Virginia customers should experience a rate freeze for a period of 24 months.
• Frontier should be required to allow former Verizon customers to take a “fresh look” at their purchases, including those customers who have term contracts with Verizon. All early termination charges should be waived for a period of 90 days following the merger, and the long distance PIC charge should also be waived for Verizon long-distance customers who select a long-distance provider other than Frontier.

Bray Cary, Host of Decision Makers

A network of West Virginia television stations spent 20 minutes this past Sunday airing a puff piece that could have been a video press release straight out of Frontier’s public relations department.  Decision Makers, a self-described “agenda setting” public affairs program ostensibly puts important people on the “hot seat” to answer “tough questions about where West Virginia is heading and how it will get there.”

Hardball this was not. Host Bray Cary, who also happens to serve as president and CEO of the television station group, presided over a one-sided softball tournament for Ken Arndt, Frontier’s new Southeast region chief in a 20 minute interview where the hardest question was likely posed off camera – ‘where would you like to do lunch?’

Decision Makers is seen across West Virginia on Cary’s statewide network of television stations — WOWK in Charleston-Huntington, WBOY in Clarksburg-Morgantown, WTRF in Wheeling and WVNS in Beckley-Bluefield.

The appearance of Arndt on the program comes the same week Frontier reportedly committed to purchasing significant advertising time on the stations, leading a Stop the Cap! reader who informed us about the program to ponder whether this Fluff-Fest was part of the ad deal.

Viewers on the public comment section for the show were unimpressed.

“I can’t believe Mr. Cary didn’t ask the Frontier guy any hard questions. It was like a 20 minute commercial for Frontier, is that what you get for buying advertising with the station,” asked one.  “I believe that we would all like to hear and understand Frontier’s direct response to challenging questions from an involved, and knowledgeable speaker. We need to hear more then a branding speech,” said another.

The interview was loaded with misleading and occasionally false statements, often coming from the program host, who served as presiding cheerleader.  You can watch the program’s two segments, and then take a look at our reality check (and if an all-consumer volunteer website can manage this, why can’t Mr. Cary?)

[Video No Longer Available]

Now that you’ve watched, let’s review the misleading statements, some made by Arndt, some by the host:

“You guys are serving 35% of West Virginia – that’s a third of the phones.”

Frontier may serve 35% of the landmass of West Virginia, but not 35% of the population, which is a very important distinction.  Verizon has the overwhelming majority of customers in the state, not the tw0-thirds this statement suggests.

“I guess the only guys fighting you all right now are the Communications Workers of America union workers.”

Ken Arndt - Frontier Communications

That, along with other dismissive comments made by Cary represent just how biased his interview was.  In many communities, citizens, businesses, utility commission staff, and yes – company workers are fighting this deal, because it’s bad news for every community facing a Frontier takeover.  Of course, Cary doesn’t have anyone on his program to refute his guest (or him for that matter.)

“From a timelime perspective, and we’re actually finishing our [broadband expansion] engineering plan right now — by December 15th, my expectation is within the first 18 months we will make a substantial increase raising that 60% (of Verizon broadband penetration) exponentially and making a large investment and bringing in the individuals — the engineering and construction talent to be able to get it done as quickly as possible.”

Frontier anticipates cutting $500 million in costs per year if the deal consummates, according to Bloomberg News. Job cuts at both Frontier and Verizon will create some of that savings, according to Maggie Wilderotter, Frontier’s CEO.  Customer service and field-technician jobs won’t be eliminated, she claims, but with a need for that level of cost savings, combined with the enormous debt Frontier will assume, where the resources to accomplish this expansion will come from is not explained.

Frontier’s broadband expansion targets so-called “middle-mile” expansion.  That was precisely what was done in Rochester.  Fiber optics are used to connect various central offices and some remote network extenders (known as DSLAMs) to try and extend DSL service into more distant areas further away from the central office.  DSL speed is highly dependent on distance.  The further away you get, the lower the speed you can obtain.  Frontier plans to install limited amounts of fiber linking their offices in hopes of providing DSL service in areas that do not have access to it currently.  Unfortunately, every indication is that Frontier’s DSL in most parts of West Virginia will provide a maximum of 3Mbps, if you’re lucky.  In communities like Rochester, DSL service is marketed at 10Mbps, but as I’ve experienced myself, that speed really turned out to be 3.1Mbps living less than one-half mile from the city line.

To many consumers, hearing talk about fiber optics may leave the impression they’ll have this type of connection in their home or business.  That’s highly unlikely.  Frontier fiber serves their own internal network.  Verizon FiOS serves you directly on a fiber optic cable.

‘In West Virginia in 2007 Frontier lost 2.7% of our access lines.  In Verizon’s footprint they lost 6.7%.  In 2008, Frontier’s lost just 2% while Verizon increased [their loss] to over 8%.  Frontier has put together unique packages that continually add value to landlines.  It’s through [Frontier’s] packaging, providing unique services and unique technologies [that the company limits losses].’

Frontier is in the enviable position of focusing on rural markets long bypassed by the phone company’s biggest threats: cable and wireless competition.  Verizon is not.  The real reason for the dramatic difference in line loss is that Frontier customers often have no other choices for telecommunications services.  In West Virginia, cable does not serve many rural communities, so there is no “digital phone” competition to worry about.  Mobile phones in the most mountainous regions of the state can offer problematic service if it’s the only phone you have.  Verizon, which does face relentless cable television competition, pays the price in greater line loss.  Rural West Virginia has a much higher population of elderly residents, who are usually the least likely to drop traditional phone service.  In fact, no state has a higher population of the rural elderly except Florida.

These factors afford Frontier more protection from line loss, not the so-called “unique services and unique technologies” the company only speaks about generally.

Arndt also responds to a question about Frontier’s plans for fiber and other forms of “telco-TV” such as that provided by Verizon FiOS.  After noting the company does plan to move forward on an extremely limited basis by finishing FiOS projects already under construction, Arndt signals Frontier believes its status as a simple reseller of DISH satellite service somehow provides a superior solution to telephone company provided television.

Not really.

Who needs Frontier to sign up for DISH?  Customers can sign up directly themselves.  The advantage of “telco TV” really comes from the construction of the network to support it.  Both AT&T and Verizon have built television-ready networks which not only compete with cable, but also give their customers more and better broadband choices that Frontier cannot and will not offer consumers.  Frontier tries to valiantly spin its copper cable future by saying satellite television offers a better service, but in reality, being a DISH Network reseller hardly is in the same class as FiOS or U-verse.

Residents in the affected areas need to consider whether they are tying themselves to a company that believes copper wire slow speed DSL is good enough for now and into the indefinite future, has no plans to directly compete with cable and other providers in delivering a wired telephone company cable service, will not build FiOS-like fiber optic networks in areas that one day could have been wired by Verizon, and will live with a company content with delivering “ubiquity” of service across all of its service areas, which in reality means large communities will suffer with lowest common denominator service, and rural communities will be lucky to get “good enough for you” broadband.

Arndt’s comments about fiber connectivity in selected portions of their service area refer mostly to multi-dwelling units and new housing developments where service was provided more cost effectively through a shared fiber connection.  That’s not FiOS either.

Color us unexcited about the prospect of Frontier’s ‘unique cable television via broadband service’ Arndt hints at.  That is almost certainly the new DISH set top box that can connect to your Frontier DSL service to stream on-demand television shows.  With Frontier’s 5GB Acceptable Use Policy for broadband, don’t expect to watch too much if and when they enforce the limit.

Among the most shameful segments of the 20 minute video press release Cary presides over is in the second half, when he asks and answers his own questions, spun in Frontier’s direction, about their ability to digest Verizon’s operations that dramatically dwarf Frontier’s current size and scope.  He’s even done “his research,” which suspiciously appears to be surfing through Frontier’s own talking points from their website and public relations efforts.  As far as Cary is concerned, Wall Street says they “like” the deal, and opposition to it is “a lot of noise.”

Arndt responds that the opposition to the deal comes because of FairPoint Communications, which he says failed because of the complexities of integrating their billing systems.  As Stop the Cap! readers already know, FairPoint’s troubles went well beyond computer integration problems.  Arndt’s reasoning is akin to saying New Orleans drowned in Hurricane Katrina because a storm sewer up the street was clogged.  More than 20 news reports on this site alone document the entire sordid story.  On every level, FairPoint failed New England for a range of reasons:

1. The enormous debt FairPoint was saddled with made it difficult for the company to spend the money necessary to maintain and grow their network and survive an economic downturn.  Frontier will also take on enormous debt during a challenging economy and claims it will spend millions to expand broadband service into rural areas where fewer potential customers mean a longer Return On Investment;
2. FairPoint’s acquisition of Verizon New England involved more customers than FairPoint served nationwide before the buyout.  The exact same thing is true of Frontier in this deal;
3. FairPoint’s earlier acquisitions were small, independent phone companies run with limited bureaucracy.  Verizon, and its predecessor Bell System businesses, have done things their own way for decades, making theoretical transitions doable on paper and chaotic in reality.  The exact same scenario exists with Frontier’s purchase of Verizon service areas;
4. Poor service, unresponsive and overwhelmed customer service centers, insufficient investment, and broken promises plagued FairPoint’s New England adventure from day one.  Frontier risks repeating FairPoint’s mistakes, putting customers with no other options for telecommunications service at serious risk.

Cary doesn’t have the insight or the interest in digging down into Arndt’s claims.  Maybe he forgot.  As far as Cary is concerned, everyone in West Virginia should just get familiar with the Frontier name.

Of course, actual consumers aren’t invited on Decision Makers.  Nor are any groups opposed to the deal.  But West Virginians and others can be “decision makers” and choose a different path for their telecommunications future.  They can get on the phone and call their state representatives and tell them to oppose the deal.  They can also contact the state utility commission and file their own comments telling them this deal isn’t worth the risk — three bankruptcies out of three earlier deals.

Even when playing this kind of softball, three strikes should mean you are out.

LUS Fiber - Lafayette, Louisiana's public utility municipal broadband provider, offers fast speeds with great rates

Frustrated communities across America, take note.

If your town or city government starts making serious noises about constructing your own, municipally-owned broadband network (especially one built with fiber optics to the home), existing providers who have repeatedly said “no” to requests for faster service at more reasonable prices have a track record of quickly turning around and saying, “yes — why didn’t you ask us before?”

Big existing telecommunications players loathe the thought of facing a new competitor in their midst.  They are accustomed to the usual arrangement of one cable operator and one phone company.  Cable companies provide cable modem service, phone companies mostly provide DSL.  In smaller cities, and where a competitor is missing (or provides a lower quality service), there is almost no drive to upgrade.  Cable will set speeds just above what the phone company is offering, and both will co-exist happily ever after.

For communities being bypassed by the fiber revolution now underway by Verizon, and to a lesser degree AT&T, requests from civic leaders, businesses, and consumers for upgraded service fall on deaf ears.  ‘What you have now is good enough for this market, so be quiet and be lucky we give you what you’ve got now.  Oh, and we’re raising rates, too.’

In Rochester, the one upstate New York city not on the “to-do” list of Verizon (which is merrily wiring urban and suburban communities across their service areas with fiber optic cable FiOS), Time Warner Cable sees little incentive to raise speeds or upgrade to DOCSIS 3 with a phone company competitor that has no apparent plans to move beyond traditional old school DSL service.  Where FiOS does threaten, Time Warner Cable is in a hurry to provide “wideband” broadband as quickly as possible.

In Wilson, North Carolina, years of pleading from local officials to provide something beyond anemic broadband in their community was met with yawns from Time Warner Cable and Embarq, the local phone company.  Wilson decided to build their own municipal fiber network, offering faster speeds at better pricing.  Time Warner and Embarq did what most existing competitors do — they moved through the Four Stages of Telecommunications Competition Grief:

1) Behind the Scenes Threats and Anger: Companies work the phones with local officials trying to browbeat them into dropping the plans to construct municipal broadband, try to gin up partisan opposition, issue overinflated cost estimates, issue warnings about the trouble they’ll cause local politicians who support such initiatives, and snow a blizzard of documents illustrating how wonderful and reasonable their existing service is;

2) Stall Tactics Through Negotiation: Once home office is notified, a series of negotiations to attempt to forestall the project begins, such as throwing crumbs for incrementally better service, offers to build showcase mini-projects that represent a “win” for local politicians, or “looks good on paper” concessions that end up amounting to far less.  Most of these discussions are designed simply to stall to allow the company to prepare for stage three.

3) PR and Legal Blitzkrieg: Assuming local officials haven’t been discouraged away from their idea, or dropped it after starring in a company-sponsored press event – ribbon cutting a small wi-fi or school connectivity project, the next stage is a multi-front battle involving company legal teams filing lawsuits to delay or kill projects, public relations and astroturf lobbying efforts to distort issues and build public opposition, legislative maneuverings to make such projects untenable through industry-friendly laws, and often vague promises about impending upgrades making the entire project unnecessary.

4) Acceptance, Competition, and Better Service: The final stage is the realization consumers don’t always get suckered by astroturf groups and company scare tactics.  They accept the project is moving forward, and send out the press release saying they welcome the competition and are announcing their own significant service upgrade because “customers asked for it.”  Price increases slow, speeds increase, and service improves, all because of the reality that an aggressive competitor is in their future.

Wilson city officials tried negotiations for better service, got nowhere, and had to fight back against a blizzard of nonsense from the telecommunications industry trying to legislate such projects out of existence with changes to state law.  Americans for Prosperity, an astroturf group, even hassled residents in other nearby communities with robocalls to try and stop similar projects.

The arrival of Wilson’s Greenlight service, which offers speeds far faster than Time Warner and Embarq ever did, at lower prices, was a shock to Time Warner’s call centers.  As customers canceled, representatives taking those calls were in denial residents were actually achieving the speeds Time Warner failed to deliver.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Chattanooga Builds Fiber Network.flv[/flv]

Chattanooga’s public power utility fought back against telecommunication company propaganda to construct fiber to the home service across the city, which launched this year. (5 minutes)

In Monticello, Minnesota, local telephone company TDS had spent years refusing requests to improve service in the city.  Speed and access issues plagued the community, northwest of Minneapolis.  Local officials had enough and voted to construct their own fiber to the home municipal network.

Enter the four stages.  TDS started by telling city officials the company’s network was state of the art for Monticello, and couldn’t be immediately improved because there was insufficient return on investment.  Companies want to be assured they are paid back for investments they make, and because Monticello is a relatively small city, there were questions whether the costs for a fiber network would be paid back quickly enough through revenues.

When that didn’t work, the company sued the city as a stalling tactic.  Despite the fact Monticello won case after case, TDS kept filing.  A full assault by large telecommunications interests also began, trying to gin up public opposition.  While the project was approved by voters, and Monticello was tied up in court, TDS quickly moved to stage four and started rapidly building their own fiber network in Monticello, actually putting down fiber the city was prohibited to wire themselves as the lawsuits dragged through the courts.

The company told Ars Technica that despite its earlier refusals to provide fiber service, TDS didn’t act earlier because it didn’t actually know that people really, really wanted fiber; once the referendum was a success, the company moved quickly to give people what it now knew they wanted.

Then, in June, the company said with the advent of its own fiber network, the city of Monticello should back away from constructing theirs, because its economic viability report was partly premised on the fact TDS refused to provide that service.

To underline that, TDS’ new fiber network doubled customer speeds to 50Mbps, trying to keep customers from taking their business to  FiberNet Monticello.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Vote Yes on Fiber.mp4[/flv]

Lafayette staged a multi-year battle with Cox and other providers to bring municipal fiber broadband to it’s corner of Louisiana.  This 30 second ad promoted a “yes” vote on the project.

In Louisiana, Cox Cable is facing accusations it’s engaged in predatory pricing to kill Lafayette Utility System’s fiber to the home network and EATel’s fiber network in Ascension Parish.  Cox Cable froze rates and moved in with DOCSIS 3 upgrades, delivering up to 50Mbps service.  Cox chose to upgrade Lafayette before any other Cox-served community.

The Lafayette Pro-Fiber Blog found this EATel billboard taunting Cox

EATel, an independent phone company that wired fiber across Ascension Parish, also faced down Cox.  When the cable company began promoting cut-rate pricing in Ascension, EATel took out advertising promoting Cox’s special prices — in other cities, much to Cox’s consternation.  EATel’s ads, much like those run by Novus against Shaw in British Columbia, tell Cox’s customers to call the company and ask for the lower price they are advertising elsewhere.

“Cox came in with an incredibly aggressive promotion for TV service with every bell and whistle you could imagine. We couldn’t figure out how they could even make money on it. So we took out an ad in the Lafayette newspaper that basically said, ‘Hey Lafayette, look at the great prices you are going to get from Cox.’ Cox was not amused,” Trae Russell, communications manager for EATel told Telephony Online.

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p style=”text-align: center;”>Joey Durel, Jr., president of Lafayette parish, testifies before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on Lafayette’s municipal fiber network on February 27, 2008. (7 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

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Lesson learned — just threatening to bring in a municipal competitor is often all it takes to turn a persistent “no” from the local cable and phone companies into “yes, Yes, YES!”

Of course, not every project is successful.  Some, such as Burlington Telecom Stop the Cap! reported on yesterday face political and cost challenges.  Others are killed through stage managed opposition and astroturf campaigns paid for by the telecommunications industry before they even get started.

In North St. Paul this year,  “PolarNet,” a planned fiber optic broadband network to stimulate the local economy was killed by an astroturf propaganda campaign undertaken by Qwest, Comcast, and other telecommunications companies that would have to deal with PolarNet as a competitor.  The telecommunications companies claimed it would result in higher local taxes and “more government” where it wasn’t needed.  Citizens defeated the proposal 67-33%.

Windom, Minnesota faced similar challenges and their fiber project was shot down in 1999, but with lessons learned, proponents brought it back up and won in 2000.  To this day, the community of 4500 in western Minnesota face considerable envy from adjacent communities — they want service from the fiber-to-the-home system as well.

Almost universally, opponents to municipal broadband systems claim they are financial failures and saddle communities with debt.  In reality, most have forced those opponents to provide improved service in their competitive communities, or those companies will become the financial failure.

[flv width=”427″ height=”240″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Terry Huval of Lafayette Utility System April 2009.flv[/flv]

Terry Huval of Lafayette Utility System talks with the Fiber Revolution blog about the challenges Lafayette experienced building their own municipal fiber network.  Huval offers excellent advice for other municipalities exploring similar projects.  (April, 2009 – 10 minutes)

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p style=”text-align: left;”>Thanks to Stop the Cap! readers Tim and Matt who suggested this story idea.