A class action lawsuit accusing AT&T of methodically over-measuring wireless customers’ usage and subjecting them to overlimit fees has been re-assigned to arbitration because AT&T wrote terms into contracts denying customers the right to pursue grievances any other way.

Plaintiff Patrick Hendricks claimed AT&T was systematically overstating customer usage by 7-14 percent with a rigged usage meter.  Hendricks claims some customers were overbilled by as much as 300 percent for phantom data usage that he claims never took place.  The measuring errors found in a two-month study cited by Hendricks were in AT&T’s favor, potentially exposing customers to surprise overlimit fees or, more recently, speed throttles.

But U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer shut down the court case, heard in a San Francisco federal courtroom.  Breyer ruled that since AT&T’s contracts bar lawsuits by customers, Hendricks must pursue his case in the venue required by AT&T — arbitration.

“[AT&T’s contract] requires the use of arbitration on an individual basis to resolve disputes, rather than jury trials or class actions, and also limits the remedies available … in the event of a suit,” Breyer ruled.

Ironically, Breyer is the same judge that dissented from an earlier case — AT&T v. Concepcion, that ultimately set the stage allowing AT&T to force consumers to pursue arbitration and practically speaking, remove their right to pursue class action relief.

“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?,” Breyer wrote. “The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30’.”

Brandi M. Bennett, a California attorney who specializes in intellectual property law, considers arbitration clauses to be a major threat to class action cases:

“Class actions make it possible to find recourse for individuals with damages that make traditional litigation impractical. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion appears to leave the average consumer at risk of being defrauded by corporations for $10, $20, $50 without any practical remedy. If one million customers are damaged for $20 each, a corporation can improperly realize a $20 million gain. Class actions serve to prevent that.”

Arbitration can offer a poor substitute, because most arbitration firms are beholden to their corporate clients for repeat business.  An arbitrator perceived to be exceptionally pro-consumer stands little chance of being retained when corporate defendants pay the arbitration firm for its services.  Some arbitration policies require consumers and the company to split the costs of arbitration, but those costs often easily exceed the value of the original claim, discouraging customers from pursuing a refund settlement.

Companies understand that reality, which is why clauses requiring arbitration to settle disputes are increasingly common in service contracts.

Hendricks’ original suit sought restitution for the entire class of consumers and damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, unfair and fraudulent business practices, unfair competition, and violations of the federal Communications Act.  Most arbitration clauses require consumers to file individual complaints, which few may ultimately do considering arbitration proceedings may occur in another city and often requires the complainant to appear in person to provide testimony.

One of the principal components of Internet Overcharging is the so-called “usage meter,” a measurement tool designed to help customers keep track of their usage so they don’t exceed arbitrary usage allowances and face overlimit penalties or speed throttles.

But with no government agency or independent watchdog monitoring the accuracy of the meter, providers can claim any amount of usage they wish, and stick customers with the bill.

Telecom New Zealand is the latest ISP forced to admit its usage meter was wildly inaccurate, with nearly 100,000 accounts impacted by faulty meter measurements between November 2010 and June 2011.  At least 47,000 faced punitive measures including substantial overlimit fees or throttled speeds for exceeding usage limits, even though they actually didn’t.  Now Telecom has admitted the meter was wrong, it violated the Fair Trading Act in the process, and is refunding $2.7NZ million dollars in overcharges. It was either that or face substantial fines from the Commerce Commission.

Telecom called the error that forced some customers into more expensive plans to avoid additional overlimit fees “an incorrect perception about […] data usage.”

“We’re pleased to have reached a settlement with Telecom and that they have made prompt refunds directly back to the customers who have lost out,” said Stuart Wallace, Commerce Commission Competition Manager. “Telecom brought this issue to our attention as soon as they were made aware by their customers and have co-operated fully with the Commission. Due to Telecom’s immediate admission of a breach of the Fair Trading Act, followed by appropriate compensation to customers, the settlement is the best possible outcome for those customers and avoids potentially lengthy and costly court hearings paid for by taxpayers.”

It’s the second usage measurement failure announced by the company this month.  In a separate move, Telecom agreed to pay $31.6 million to five of its competitors overcharged for wholesale broadband service.

When technically-savvy customers realize they are being billed for non-existent usage and the media takes an interest, providers eventually disclose their mistaken measurement tools.

“Customers are expected to keep these ISP’s honest,” says Stuart Littlejohn, a Stop the Cap! reader in Wellington. “ISP’s never suggest their meters are anything except accurate until they are caught with their fingers on the scale, and always in their favor.”

Littlejohn has already received a refund from Telecom for illegitimate overcharges he incurred earlier this year.

“It was an absolute nightmare,” he shares. “We thought someone hacked our wireless network or someone in the home was lying about their usage, all theories encouraged by Telecom employees who pointed the finger at everyone but themselves.”

Littlejohn says after Telecom granted one credit as a “goodwill gesture,” subsequent overcharges that went unexplained were his problem, not theirs.

“After the first credit, everything else is your fault,” he says.

Littlejohn caught the company red-handed when storm damage disrupted his service for nearly a week, and Telecom’s usage meter recorded 22GB of usage on his down-and-out service anyway.

“They ultimately couldn’t argue with themselves, but they tried at first,” he says. “Then I told them to call the department responsible for repairing my service and they quickly learned the line they said used 22GB was out of service at the time the usage was supposed to occur.”

“Without that, they would have probably insisted I still owed them for that ‘usage.'”

Littlejohn wasn’t alone.  Other overbilled customers appealed their case to the New Zealand Herald last June, and two weeks later, Telecom admitted their usage measurement tool was faulty.  But by then, customers were already paying for the erroneous charges:

The Herald has received detailed internet usage logs from two Telecom customers – one in Dunedin and the other in New Plymouth – which show over-counting broadband downloads, in one period by as much as 139 per cent. Both have raised the matter repeatedly with Telecom, but have yet to get an explanation.

“We showed Telecom five days of data as early as February 14,” says director Mark Peisker of Dunedin’s CueClub. “There was massive variance between our data and that reported by the Telecom usage meter. I said to them: ‘Your counting has very little to do with what comes down my line to me’.”

CueClub’s data taken from its two internet routers shows an average of 62 per cent over-counting during a three month period – the worst month being May when Telecom counted an extra 118.24 gigabytes (GB) of usage amounting to $203.97 in overcharging.

“They’re crooks, plain and simple, and only when they were caught did they admit their mistakes, and the only ‘penalty’ they are paying is refunding their ill-gotten gains,” Littlejohn says. “Where is the substantial fine to send a message stealing from your customers is wrong?  A strong fine would tell Telecom they made a costly mistake not worth repeating.”

Why would a Delaware company holding several dozen patents — several formerly owned and controlled by a semiconductor manufacturer — suddenly decide to sue businesses that offer their customers access to Wi-Fi?  Because that is where the money is.

Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC is a patent holding company — one that today holds 31 patents, acquired mostly from Broadcom, that generally deal with “wireless local area network” technology most consumers know better as Wi-Fi.  In reality, Innovatio doesn’t really innovate much of anything in the technology department.  It has no products or services for sale.  But it has managed to innovate what critics are calling a “major shakedown” with the help of its law firm to collect royalty payments from companies large and small who find it easier to settle the lawsuits than hire attorneys to defend them.

That may be precisely the business model companies like Innovatio have in mind.

The company is suing coffee shops, grocery stores, restaurant chains, and even individual hotels and motels where Wi-Fi is provided as a customer convenience.  Among the defendants: Hyatt Corporation, Marriott Hotels, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Ramada Inn, Best Western, Days Inn, Super 8 Hotels, Travelodge, Caribou Coffee, Cosí and Panera Bread Co., and Meijer, Inc.  Within those lawsuits, hundreds of individual business locations are accused of violating Innovatio’s Wi-Fi patent rights.

But there is a way to make Innovatio, and their attorneys, go away.  Agree to a quick, “one-time settlement” in the form of a “licensing payment” between $2,300 and $5,000 per infringing location.

That’s cheaper than putting an attorney on a retainer and spending several hours contemplating a defense strategy, a fact of life many businesses can’t afford to ignore.

Critics of these patent-holding companies call them “patent trolls” that exist solely to rake in settlement payments on broadly-written patents.  Innovatio’s own lawsuits describe anyone who uses Wi-Fi as a potential violator.  It’s a new tactic for patent attorneys who more commonly chase equipment manufacturers and vendors, not the end users of the technology.  Innovatio has set its sights on smaller companies offering Wi-Fi services, perhaps because some of America’s largest equipment manufacturers, Cisco and Motorola, have deep enough pockets to fight back in court.

Who has even fewer resources to defend themselves against a patent infringement lawsuit mill?  Individual consumers, who technically are also violating Innovatio’s patents just by running a wireless network inside their home.  Innovatio defines that as patent infringement themselves, but benevolently suggests it will not sue ordinary consumers “at this stage” of Innovatio’s “systematic campaign,” reports The Patent Examiner:

“Innovatio has made a strategic and business judgment at this stage that it doesn’t intend to pursue [lawsuits on the basis of] residential use of WiFi,” said Matthew McAndrews, the lawyer representing Innovatio in the case. (The law firm’s offices in downtown Chicago are located about five blocks away from Innovatio’s office. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office shows another address for Innovatio, in a house at the end of a cul-de-sac in Ladera Ranch, Calif.)

As if to assure anyone who owns a laptop, smartphone or tablet that they’re not in danger of finding themselves in the company’s cross hairs, McAndrews added that he doesn’t “perceive” Innovatio’s litigation strategy changing. McAndrews did not respond to queries about who is behind Innovatio.

But that may not last forever:

McAndrews acknowledged the ubiquity of wireless Internet – likening it to a fundamental utility like gas or electricity – but offered a different perspective on the terms of its use. Ultimately, he said, Innovatio’s “plan is to license this portfolio to the fullest extent possible. That would include anyone who’s wireless networking.”

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

AT&T: Suing its own customers

AT&T has filed suit against at least eight of their wireless customers who are opposed to the company’s attempts to buy T-Mobile.

The lawsuits, filed in federal court, include a request for an injunction against what AT&T calls abuse of the court with “meritless” arbitration claims being filed as a class action lawsuit.

Stop the Cap! earlier covered the efforts by law firm Bursor & Fisher to seek an end to the merger between AT&T and T-Mobile, and payments of up to $10,000 in damages per customer if the merger goes through.

Now AT&T is pushing back.

Bursor and Fisher’s legal theory is that customers can use the arbitration provisions found in AT&T’s terms and conditions to seek relief against the company for what attorney Scott Bursor suggests will be a future of higher wireless prices for AT&T Wireless customers.

AT&T’s suit seeks to dispel that legal theory:

“Defendant is among the 1,000 (and counting) ATTM [AT&T Mobility] customers whom the law firm of Bursor & Fisher P.A. (‘Bursor’) has solicited and now claims to have recruited as part of a scheme to pressure ATTM into settling meritless claims.”

“Bursor and Faruqi’s [another attorney partnering with Bursor & Fisher’s lawsuit] scheme plainly violates the arbitration agreement between ATTM and defendant. Among other limitations on the scope of arbitration, the agreement expressly precludes ‘any form of representative or class proceeding’ and permits claims for injunctive relief ‘only in favor of the individual party seeking relief and only to the extent necessary to provide relief warranted by that party’s individual claim.'”

Bursor

AT&T may have gotten serious after losing an appeal to the American Arbitration Association to block administration of the cases.  In a rare move, the Association overrode AT&T’s objection and started processing cases last week.  Arbitration has never been considered consumer-friendly, because the arbitration industry is heavily dependent on businesses and their arbitration agreements to survive.

AT&T’s general counsel stated the arbitration actions will “place a $39 billion merger in jeopardy.”

Bursor and Fisher appeared to be unintimidated by AT&T and suggested a wireless company willing to sue its own customers is “desperate.”

“AT&T now realizes it faces a substantial likelihood that one or more of these arbitration [cases] will indeed stop the takeover from happening,” Bursor said. “But AT&T’s legal arguments are frivolous. We expect the courts will reject AT&T’s arguments and dismiss these cases very quickly.”