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Enabling Corporate Bullies: Big Cable Loves Fewer Rules, Weakened Oversight

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to. We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with TCI. We are the largest cable company around. We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.” — Paul Alden, TCI’s vice president and national director of franchising to an independent consultant hired to review competing cable operators for Jefferson City, Mo., in a historical example of cable industry abuse

The Federal Communications Commission last week voted unanimously to expire rules that required cable operators to make their programming available on fair and reasonable terms to competitors. Big mistake.

We have been here before. Let us turn back the clock to the days before the FCC and Congress mildly reined in the cable television industry with the types of pro-consumer regulations Chairman Genachowski and others have now let expire. Why were these rules introduced in the first place? Because years of industry abuse heaped on consumers and local communities took their toll, with high prices for poor service, outrageous corporate bullying tactics, and endless litigation to hamper or stop consumer relief.

How long will it take for the industry to resume the same abusive practices that forced the FCC and Congress to finally act once before?

The Central Telecommunications. v. Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI): The Poster Child for Cable Industry Abuse

Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation’s largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

Back in the 1980s, before the days of direct broadcast satellite competition like DirecTV and Dish, and years before telco-TV was allowed by law, the cable industry totally dominated the video marketplace. The only challenges came from incredibly rare competing cable TV providers or three million home satellite dish owners or wireless cable subscribers.

The industry’s only check on unhampered monopoly growth came from local authority over cable operations through the cable franchising process. If a cable company got out of control or did not offer the programming or service a community found adequate, it could offer a franchise to another company, effectively kicking bad actors out of town.

In Jefferson City, Mo., the local cable operator during the 1980s was Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI). It had acquired the franchise in the city by buying out the original provider in the late 1970s. TCI had been buying a lot of smaller cable operators around the country under the direction of then CEO John Malone. By 1981, it had grown to the largest cable operator in the country, and few dared confront the well-heeled operator, which had a legal budget greater than the operating budgets of some communities TCI served. TCI was later acquired by AT&T Cable, which in turn sold its cable systems to Comcast, which continues to operate them to this day.

In 1980, Jefferson City officials decided it would be prudent to make sure they were getting the best cable service possible, so as TCI’s franchise agreement reached expiration, the city issued a “request for proposals” offering other cable companies a chance to bid for the right to serve the community of around 38,000. For TCI, this was tantamount to a declaration of war, and the cable company meant business. Malone equated anything threatening a permanent cable franchise for TCI as something like an act of government theft. In books later written about the events in Jefferson City, even some TCI executives admitted they were “horrified by the sleaziness” of the kind of hardball tactics involved, comparing them to a “B-movie.”

TCI revealed it would stop at nothing to keep competitors away from their territories and drag out years of litigation. Central Telecommunications, Inc., v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., revealed exactly how far TCI was willing to go:

From: Cutthroat: High Stakes & Killer Moves on the Electronic Frontier, By Stephen Keating

Cajole the mayor into canceling competitive bidding. In early 1980, after Jefferson City made it known TCI might get some competition, the company quickly met with the mayor hoping to persuade him to renew TCI’s franchise without a competitive bid process, so as to avoid a “frontal attack” by competitors.

Threaten the independent consultant. In December, 1980 the city hired Elmer Smalling, an industry consultant, to independently evaluate various bids from cable operators willing to serve Jefferson City. TCI immediately began publicly attacking his qualifications in a way the court later found to be defamatory. The court case documents Paul Alden, TCI’s vice president and national director of franchising, making personal threats against Smalling.  A sample:

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to. We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with T.C.I. We are the largest cable company around[.] We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.”

It got worse for Smalling. At this same time, Warner-Amex (another large cable company now known as Time Warner Cable) was a client of Smalling’s. Alden contacted Warner-Amex about Smalling. Following the threats, Smalling lost Warner-Amex as a client.

City Attorney Thomas Utterback later wrote a memo to the City Council in which he described TCI as a “relentless corporate bully.”

Threaten would-be competitors. On several occasions, from January of 1981 to the summer of 1981, Alden repeatedly telephoned Robert Brooks, chief operating officer of Teltran, a company which submitted a bid for the city’s franchise, and threatened him that unless Teltran withdrew from the bidding process, TCI would make trouble for Teltran in Columbia, Missouri, where it operated a cable television franchise. Teltran subsequently dropped out of the bidding process on the ground there was a “distasteful environment” in Jefferson City.

Another competitor, Central Telecommunications, became a defendant in a TCI lawsuit challenging the city’s right to request proposals from other cable companies. TCI argued it now had a 1st Amendment right of free speech to serve Jefferson City residents regardless of the wishes of city officials. In a wide ranging series of subpoenas, TCI demanded the bank handling Central’s financing turn over a “very wide range of potentially confidential records,” which according to Central was an effort to destroy its financing agreement with the bank.

Malone

Threaten customers. TCI warned customers that unless it won the cable franchise for Jefferson City, it would immediately shut off its cable system and leave customers without service, potentially for years, until Central built its own system from scratch. TCI officials said “it would not sell ‘one bolt’ of its system to whoever received the new franchise and that it would ‘rather have [its system] rot on the pole’ than sell it to a competitor at any cost.”

TCI’s system manager in Jefferson City told elderly residents of a senior citizens’ home that TCI would cut off service if denied a franchise, and the residents would be without television for two years pending construction of a new system because the concrete walls of their residence would not allow reception of over-the-air stations.

Lie, Lie, and Lie Some More. In one City Council meeting, Alden wildly claimed that TCI was the nation’s largest distributor of satellite dish antennas, with “an exclusive” right to sell in the state of Missouri. TCI promised that if the city renewed its franchise agreement, it would keep satellite dishes out of Jefferson City. If the franchise was not renewed, Alden promised to “flood the city with satellite dishes,” denying the city franchise fees. Alden later admitted both statements were untrue.

Threaten the mayor’s office. Although the mayor has never disclosed exactly what TCI threatened him with, the public record shows in March 1981, Alden called the mayor and threatened to turn the system off unless TCI’s franchise was renewed. TCI also filed an expensive lawsuit against Jefferson City regarding the way it handled its request for proposals.

By the fall of that year, TCI was meeting with city attorney Utterback in secret negotiations to renew its cable franchise, in direct violation of the city’s request for proposals  which required all negotiations to be open, as well as Missouri’s “sunshine laws.” By next spring, the mayor had privately notified council members he would veto any franchise renewal awarded to anyone other than TCI, which he later admitted was a condition imposed by TCI during its secret negotiations.

On January 25, 1982, the City Council provisionally awarded the franchise to… Central Telecommunications. TCI immediately refused to pay the city the prior year’s franchise fees, in excess of $60,000. It also reminded the mayor of his obligations to TCI as part of the secret franchise renewal negotiations held the prior fall. On April 20, 1982, the City Council passed the ordinance awarding a franchise to Central. The vote was six in favor and four against. The mayor vetoed the ordinance. The council then deadlocked five-to-five on awarding a franchise to TCI and the mayor cast the deciding vote in favor of that company. The next day, TCI dismissed its lawsuit against the city and paid the withheld franchise fees.

In the end, several courts upheld tens of millions in damages for Central Telecommunications, TCI’s lawsuit was dismissed at the company’s request, Mr. Alden was summarily dismissed by TCI after Malone referred to him as a “loose cannon,” and Jefferson City was stuck with several additional years of lousy service from TCI.

But TCI’s “bad corporate citizen” practices would come back to haunt the cable juggernaut, eventually failing to win assignments for two $800 million orbital slots for a direct broadcast satellite service the company proposed. After the Jefferson City experience, even the FCC could not, in good conscience, reward TCI with satellite slots it wanted for a “competing satellite service” it would sell through its own cable companies.

The memories of FCC officials are evidently short. Giving cable operators an inch has historically bought them a mile, paid for by consumers. Mandating easy to understand rules requiring cable operators sell programming to competitors on fair and reasonable terms is sound policy whether there is competition or not. Removing those rules or watering them down only promotes the kind of mischief that, when unchecked, leads to these kinds of horror stories. History need not repeat itself.

Creative Accounting Scandal: British Broadband Subsidy Helps BT’s Bottom Line; Whistleblower Fired

Phillip Dampier October 8, 2012 British Telecom, Broadband Speed, Community Networks, Competition, Consumer News, Public Policy & Gov't, Rural Broadband, Video Comments Off on Creative Accounting Scandal: British Broadband Subsidy Helps BT’s Bottom Line; Whistleblower Fired

A growing scandal over alleged diversion of British taxpayer funds intended for fiber broadband rollouts has now cost one whistleblower his job, terminated after suggesting British Telecom (BT) is artificially inflating infrastructure expenses.

The Conservative government’s Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) oversees £1 billion in public subsidies to improve broadband in Britain. Much of that is earmarked to construct fiber to the neighborhood facilities in smaller towns and villages — the rural subsidy providing the only chance most of these residents have for better broadband service. But a whistleblower inside the DCMS has said the primary government-approved contractor, BT, is artificially inflating its prices — pocketing a growing amount of taxpayer funds instead of enhancing its broadband buildout.

Courtesy: Br0kenTeleph0n3 (click to enlarge)

The whistleblower, identified as Michael Kiely, a DCMS broadband project consultant, was fired after he detailed BT’s ever-growing (and highly confidential) cost estimates to several village and town councils fighting for a better deal from the phone company. The issue has been closely watched by the Br0kenTeleph0n3 blog, which reports on how Britain’s broadband stimulus funding is being spent. The blog reported the DCMS sacked Kiely, apparently for exposing BT’s secret pricing schemes.

“I am getting increasingly concerned at the way in which whistleblowers are being bullied,” Margaret Hodge, chair of the Public Accounts Committee, told the Guardian newspaper while demanding an investigation. “All too often people hide behind commercial confidentiality. This culture denies us the right to know how our money is being spent.”

Many local governments are matching broadband subsidies with local funds to increase the number of homes reached by fiber-enhanced Internet access. The demand for fast broadband is so great in the UK, the initial plan to spend £530 million has now been effectively doubled, with even more money coming from the European Commission and other sources. Britain’s broadband expansion plan envisions reaching as many rural homes as feasible with the available funds. The more funds diverted away from broadband expansion into the pockets of others, the fewer number of homes can be reached.

The enormous amount of available government funding  appears to have caught BT by surprise, and Kiely suspects the company is inventing new fees, while inflating others, to ‘soak up’ the additional money without having to deliver any improvements in service.

Kiely noted BT appeared to be setting  new wholesale rates for fiber cabinets, despite the fact costs vary widely in different regions. Kiely notes that even as BT enjoys economies of scale, the price it charges for rural cabinets appears to be rising, even though costs are declining.

In rural areas, BT is seeking up to £30,000 for each fiber cabinet, despite the fact the average price in Northern Ireland’s recent broadband roll-out was just over £13,000 each.

BT’s estimate for two fiber cabinets in Great Asby, which will service hundreds of residents, was estimated at £60,000, a price Kiely also suggests is inflated.

The phone company has made cost verification nearly impossible with strict, mandatory confidentiality agreements that prohibit local councils from learning BT’s true costs. BT’s non-disclosure agreement also prohibits local governments from comparing notes about what the company charges in nearby communities. The government has approved only two vendors for the government-funded broadband expansion — BT and Fujitsu, with BT winning the overwhelming majority of contracts.

The giant, former state-owned phone company, comparable to AT&T or Bell Canada, can also hide cost reductions achieved from experience rolling out service, economies of scale like volume discounts, and other labor savings. BT’s attempt to create standardized pricing also leaves plenty of room to inflate prices by rolling in unexplained charges like “planning costs,” “availability charges,” and “take up bonuses.”

Despite this, BT says claims it is misspending public funds are completely baseless, and points to its own independent investment in British broadband.

“It is ludicrous that some people are suggesting that we are trying to pass on the full cost of deployment to our public sector partners,” BT said in a statement. “In fact, we are looking at a low double digit year payback in these areas even when the public funds are taken into account.”

Courtesy: Br0kenTeleph0n3 (Click to enlarge)

Conservative party loyalist Maria Miller, recently appointed as the government’s new culture secretary during a cabinet reshuffle, has not commented on the BT controversy. Instead, she has prioritized reducing government “red tape” for providers like BT while also tamping down expectations for the broadband expansion program.

Among her deregulation priorities: scrap the right for local governments to object to the placement of often unsightly broadband street cabinets, force “reasonable” terms on private landowners where necessary infrastructure must be placed or routed across, and sweeping permission to allow virtually anyone to put overhead lines up anywhere they please. All of these objectives heavily favor BT’s interests, according to industry observers.

Miller also recently took pressure off BT to deliver game-changing speeds by redefining “superfast broadband” as “potential headline download access speeds greater than 24Mbps.” That falls far short of the 100Mbps service most expected in return for more than £1 billion in taxpayer subsidies, often directed to BT.

Even more telling, Miller considers 2Mbps broadband speeds adequate: “Our investment will help provide 90% of homes and businesses with access to superfast broadband and for everyone in the UK to have access to at least 2Mbps,” she said.

The European continent, in comparison, is targeting 30Mbps as the bare minimum speed, with at least 50% of Europeans getting 100Mbps service by 2020.

Great Britain’s broadband expansion plan is highly dependent on fiber to the neighborhood (FTTN) technology, with traditional copper phone lines carrying the service the rest of the way into a home or office. Both AT&T’s U-verse and Bell’s Fibe are examples of FTTN technology.

As elsewhere, BT considers 24Mbps a suitable maximum speed for FTTN technology, but most customers will not even achieve that. Just like traditional DSL, distance matters, as does line quality. BT has quietly told most councils the average speed most local residents will actually receive is 15Mbps on average.

[flv width=”640″ height=”372″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Jeremy Hunt Announces Superfast broadband 2010.flv[/flv]

Former Secretary of State for Olympics, Culture, Media and Sport Jeremy Hunt outlining Britain’s superfast broadband initiative in 2010. (4 minutes)

AT&T and Time Warner Cable’s Unnecessary Temper Tantrum in Kansas City

Phillip “You Guys Need a Timeout” Dampier

AT&T and Time Warner Cable are complaining they have gotten a raw deal from Kansas City, Mo. and Kansas City, Ks., in comparison to the incentives Google was granted to wire both cities with gigabit fiber broadband.

“It’s time to modernize our industry’s rules and regulations…so all consumers benefit from fair and equal competition,” read a statement from AT&T.

“There are certain portions of the agreement between Google and Kansas City, Kan., that put them at a competitive advantage compared with not just us but also the other competitors in the field,” said Alex Dudley, a Time Warner Cable spokesman. “We’re happy to compete with Google, but we’d just like an even playing field.”

The Wall Street Journal seemed to suggest Google was getting the keys to both cities, with grants of free office space and free power for Google’s equipment, according to the agreement on file with the cities. The company also gets the use of all the cities’ “assets and infrastructure”—including fiber, buildings, land and computer tools, for no charge. Both cities are even providing Google a team of government employees “dedicated to the project,” says the Journal.

The Google Fiber project was so desired that the local governments rolled out the red carpet. In Kansas City, Mo., for instance, the city is allowing Google to construct “fiberhuts,” small buildings that house equipment on city land at no cost, according to a person familiar with the matter.

The cities are discounting other services, as well. For the right to attach its cables to city utility poles, Google is paying Kansas City, Kan., only $10 per pole per year—compared with the $18.95 Time Warner Cable pays. Both cities have also waived permit and inspection fees for Google.

The cities are even helping Google market its fiber build-out. And both are implementing city-managed marketing and education programs about the gigabit network that will, among other things, include direct mailings and community meetings.

Several cable executives complain that the cities also gave Google the unusual right to start its fiber project only in neighborhoods guaranteeing high demand for the service through pre-registrations. Most cable and phone companies were required by franchise agreements with regional governments to build out most of the markets they entered, regardless of demand.

But the Journal missed two key points:

  1. Time Warner Cable has been granted the same concessions given to Google on the Missouri side, and AT&T presumably will also get them when it completes negotiations with city officials on the matter.
  2. Both cable and phone companies have the benefit of incumbency, and the article ignores concessions each had secured when their operations first got started.

The Bell System enjoyed a monopoly on phone service for decades, with concessions on rights-of-way, telephone poles and placement. AT&T was a major beneficiary, and although the AT&T of today is not the same corporation that older Americans once knew, the company continues a century-long tradition of winning the benefit of the doubt in both the state and federal legislature. AT&T has won statewide video franchise agreements that give the company the power to determine where it will roll out its more advanced U-verse platform, and enjoys carefully crafted federal tax policies that helped them not only avoid paying any federal tax in 2011 — the company actually secured a $420 million “refund” subsidized by taxpayers.

Cable operators also won major concessions from local governments under pressure from citizens eager to buy cable television. At the time, cable companies were granted exclusive franchises — a cable monopoly — to operate, an important distinction for investors concerned about the value of their early investments. Local zoning and pole attachment matters were either negotiated or dealt with legislatively to allow cable companies the right to hang their wires on existing utility poles. Franchise agreements permitted the gradual roll-out of cable service in each franchise area, often allowing two, three, or more years to introduce service. It was not uncommon for neighborhoods on one side of town to have cable two years before the other side could sign up. That sounds awfully familiar to AT&T U-verse today.

Google’s proposal to build a revolutionary broadband network delivering 1Gbps deserved and got the same type of treatment then-revolutionary phone and cable service won back in the day.

Time Warner Cable also won much the same treatment Google is now getting, and the cable operator has gotten $27,000 in fees refunded and will avoid another $100,000 in permit fees going forward. Time Warner Cable and Google will both receive free traffic control services during network construction — not that Time Warner Cable plans much of a change for customers in either Missouri or Kansas.

AT&T will likely also receive the same treatment, although it would be hypocritical of them to complain that Google gets to pick and choose where it provides service. Large swaths of Kansas City and suburbs are still waiting for U-verse to arrive, and many areas will never get the service. Cable operators had to wire a little further, but also benefited from years of monopoly status and network construction expenses paid off years ago when there literally was no competition.

Those paragons of virtue at Goldman Sachs are appalled Google has such a good relationship with Kansas City officials more than happy to have the gigabit speeds neither AT&T or Time Warner Cable would even consider providing.

Google’s rights “appear to be significantly more favorable than those cable, Verizon or any other fiber overbuilders achieved when striking deals with local governments in the past,” Goldman Sachs analyst Jason Armstrong told the Journal. “We’re surprised Time Warner Cable hasn’t been more vocal in its opposition.”

But then the cable company has secured most of the same benefits Google has, so why complain at all?

In fact, city officials had to browbeat Time Warner to modernize its network in ways it would have not done otherwise without the new agreement.

Both AT&T and Time Warner have every right to be concerned. Their substandard networks and high prices (along with a lousy history of customer service, according to national surveys) put them at a competitive disadvantage if Google does not make any major mistakes. Neither cable or phone company has made any noise about upgrading service to compete, and should customers begin to leave in droves, then both companies may actually have something to cry about.

The Wall Street Journal’s report on the concessions granted to Google wanders off into the Net Neutrality debate for some reason, and misses several important facts reviewed above.  (3 minutes)

Our Big Fat Telecom Monopoly: “Competition is So ’90s”; Michael Copps vs. Big Telecom

Phillip Dampier October 4, 2012 Astroturf, Competition, Consumer News, Public Policy & Gov't, Wireless Broadband Comments Off on Our Big Fat Telecom Monopoly: “Competition is So ’90s”; Michael Copps vs. Big Telecom

Copps

Americans need to stand up and say “no” to more telecom mergers and lobbying efforts that push for additional deregulation and corporate protectionism in the telecommunications sector. Unfortunately, we are in for a fight, thanks to Washington’s problem disappointing a multi-billion industry that lavishly finances political campaigns, conventions, and vacation outings.

Michael Copps, former commissioner on the Federal Communications Commission from 2001-2011 and acting chairman for the first six months of the Obama Administration ought to know.

“The consolidated world of telecom broadband did not evolve from the hand of God, the mysterious workings of natural law, or the inevitability of market-based dynamics,” Copps wrote in his essay, “Why Give Up on Competition?” “It was enabled by conscious decision-making at the federal level, largely through the abdication of its oversight responsibilities by the Federal Communications Commission over the better part of 30 years.”

In short, it did not have to turn out this way, no matter what the telecom industry and their astroturf friends have to say.

“Go to just about any telecom conference these days, and some industry maven will make the case that restoring competition to the telecom world is so 1990s,” Copps writes. “Why don’t we all just recognize the inevitable, they ask: telecom is a natural monopoly, competition is a chimera, and the sooner we flash a steady green light for more industry consolidation and less government oversight, the better off we’ll all be.”

Provider-backed ALEC advocates for the corporate interests that fund its operations.

Too many in Washington are already true believers, according to Copps, and the result is two companies controlling over 2/3rds of the wireless marketplace and a broadband duopoly for most Americans. This did not happen overnight. Enormous and expensive lobbying campaigns run for over a decade have convinced lawmakers that less is more when it comes to telecom regulation and oversight. Regulators ringing alarm bells about deregulation without sufficient competition have been picked off, says Copps, by the telecom industry-backed American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which has convinced at least 19 state legislatures to wipe away authority from state public service commissions that for years have been trying to protect consumers and preserve competition.

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was originally designed to open the telecommunications marketplace to increased competition, but also ensure a level playing field for competitors by charging the FCC to implement and enforce strong rules to keep incumbent telecommunications companies from steamrolling new competitors.

No surprises here: Michael Powell was FCC chairman during the deregulation frenzy of the first term of George W. Bush. Today, he’s the president of the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, the largest cable industry lobbying group in the country.

With the arrival of President George W. Bush, the new Republican majority at the FCC promptly began obliterating checks and balances at the behest of some of the nation’s largest phone and cable companies. The results:

  • Reselling rights and wholesale leasing of facilities to competitors were wiped away, guaranteeing monopoly control of already-established networks;
  • Opening up the long distance and local market to Baby Bell competition with their promise they would compete nationwide failed. Like Big Cable, the Baby Bells sold local and long distance only to their own customers, not to those located in another Baby Bell’s service area;
  • Instead of competing, phone companies simply bought each other. “As soon as one transaction was approved, another one came through the door,” Copps reported. “Sometimes it seemed like the merger approval business was our only business.”;
  • ” The FCC voted, over the strenuous objections of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein and me, to remove advanced telecommunications (broadband) from the purview of Title II of the Telecommunications Act—where consumer protections, competition, privacy, and public safety are clearly mandated—and placed them instead in the nebulous and uncharted land of Title I, where regulatory authority is uncertain, consumer protections are virtually non-existent, and where the huge companies are better positioned to wreak havoc on the promise of competition,” Copps said.

To right the wrongs, Copps wants some major changes to reignite competition and return to telecom innovation, eliminating the stagnation we have from today’s cozy, barely competitive marketplace:

  1. Learn to say “no” to more industry mergers. Consolidation has not brought communications nirvana for consumers, just higher prices and fewer choices, often from a monopoly provider;
  2. Encourage innovative approaches like municipal broadband. Copps: “‘My way or nothing’ may be the mantra of the big guys, but that means no broadband in places they don’t wish to serve.” Copps wants to see the federal government pre-empt state bans on public broadband laws provider-backed ALEC has gotten through legislatures across the country;
  3. Smarter stewardship of wireless spectrum, including unlicensed spectrum use, shared spectrum, smarter technology, and a “use it or lose it” policy that pulls back unused/warehoused spectrum held by some of the nation’s largest wireless carriers.
Copps believes today’s barely competitive marketplace is a direct consequence of the regulatory policies custom-written to meet the needs of the giant corporations whose oligopoly those policies now protect. The anti-competitive marketplace can be broken up in short order if rules are implemented that meet the needs of ordinary Americans, not seven-figure corporate lobbying efforts.

AT&T’s ‘Future of Rural Landlines Decision Day’: November 7th

November 7 will be an important day if you are a rural AT&T landline customer. On that date, AT&T, in concert with Wall Street, plans to announce the future of its rural and “tier two-smaller city” landline business.

The implications for customers are enormous. AT&T could elect to exit and auction off its rural customers to companies like Windstream, Frontier Communications, CenturyLink, and FairPoint Communications. AT&T could also announce it will aggressively petition the Federal Communications Commission to decommission its copper landline facilities in favor of a new wireless IP network based largely on its national 4G LTE expansion, or it could be a combination of both: keeping existing landline facilities but transitioning them to Voice over IP technology with a gradual shift towards wireless.

AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson delivered important clues about the company’s direction in remarks at yesterday’s Goldman Sachs Communacopia Conference, attended primarily by Wall Street investors. Stephenson drew clear distinctions between valued customers in areas upgraded to AT&T’s U-verse platform and more problematic customers in smaller communities where AT&T refuses to invest in landline upgrades.

“Where you look at the footprint where we have deployed U-verse technology we do very well,” Stephenson said. “In fact we are the share leader in virtually all U-verse markets. Those markets grow nicely. Where we have not deployed fiber and U-verse technology, we are losing share and those markets are in decline and that is the whole reason behind this analysis and evaluation that we will be laying out Nov. 7. What do we do with those markets? Because we have demonstrated if you go invest you can grow the market.”

Stephenson

“We said coming into the year that we have to find a broadband solution for these assets that is cost-effective or we need to look at selling them,” Stephenson said. “I would just tell you at the 30,000 foot [line length] level we think we’re finding line of sight to some investment theses here. We can get a good competitive broadband product to a large portion of our footprint and would avoid us having to go through a number of regulatory approval processes to sell [landlines] across a large geography. There will probably be a mix of actions here, but the bottom line is we think we may have line of sight but we will flush that out on Nov. 7 in an analyst conference here in New York.”

Early indications suggest the company is considering deploying DSL extenders to reach a larger share of rural customers without a complete overhaul of its copper wire network. The upgrades could deliver results similar to what Frontier Communications has been doing in territories it acquired from Verizon Communications, which includes extending fiber optics further into neighborhoods and finding ways to reduce copper wire length to improve speeds. Frontier has set its sights on delivering up to 25Mbps over copper landlines, a speed it feels is competitive with cable broadband. AT&T could come close to these speeds without the amount of investment required in a typical U-verse deployment.

But just as likely is a largely wireless broadband solution to replace the company’s aging copper wire-based DSL service. Stephenson says he strongly believes that a wireless solution exists for rural America over the company’s new LTE 4G network.

“I don’t envision in major metropolitan dense population centers that LTE will serve as a broad-based fixed-line replacement or surrogate,” Stephenson said. “I do believe in less dense markets and especially when you begin to think about rural America and tier two towns, that LTE can become a fixed line replacement or even better than what you can get in fixed line out in those markets. This is one of the exciting things about the WCS spectrum [AT&T plans to acquire]. It allows you to truly begin to think about investing in and doing this.”

But AT&T’s solutions will come with strings attached: a lobbying effort to get the FCC to loosen up on regulations, acquire more wireless spectrum, and allow the company to dispose of its landline infrastructure.

“You don’t go out and put in LTE capability in rural America and leave up all your copper infrastructure in the long haul,” said Stephenson. “It just wouldn’t make sense to do both. So this is the big regulatory issue. The FCC would require us to leave that copper and TDM fixed-line infrastructure up by some mandated rules and you can’t do both. You can’t support both infrastructures. We have got to work through the regulatory implications of this, but I think LTE can prove over time to be a fixed line replacement in rural and less dense populations. I think in a five year time horizon that can become significant.”

Thus far, AT&T has been unwilling to consider upgrading smaller communities to its U-verse platform, primarily because of the cost and return on investment. The company is content with its current U-verse footprint and has begun to enjoy increased wireline margins from a growing number of urban customers as programming costs decline.

LTE: AT&T’s wireless rural broadband solution?

“The U-verse margins continue to expand,” Stephenson noted. “U-verse is one of those where you go make a really significant capital investment and then you go in as a new entrant to do programming contracts and you’re paying multiples of what the big scale guys are paying and then as you scale that over time then margins really begin to expand. We’re riding that right now and we’re getting really good margin expansion just out out of scaling U-verse and getting better economics on content terms as well.”

Wall Street has been applying pressure to Stephenson to extract higher margins and cut costs from its traditional landline business. Stephenson sought to placate concerns about the cost profile of AT&T landlines before investors.

“We have done a nice job controlling our labor costs and that has been very helpful to continue to sustain margins in the fixed line business,” Stephenson said. “Those labor costs savings we take and reinvest back in the business in the form of U-verse and looking at some future investments as well.”

Stephenson hopes the FCC will eventually let AT&T abandon traditional landline service everywhere, which could also deliver serious cost savings for AT&T.

“I do believe if we can find a path to an all-IP infrastructure in not just your major metropolitan areas but your tier two markets there are significant cost savings in the five or six year time horizon that could come out of these businesses as well,” he noted.

AT&T CEO Randall Stephenson took questions at Goldman Sachs’ Communacopia Conference about its wireless network and the future of the rural landline business. (September 19, 2012) (41 minutes)
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