On September 13, most PBS stations will premiere a new documentary, “Bill McGowan, Long Distance Warrior” exploring the many trials and tribulations of MCI Corporation, the long distance and e-mail provider that was instrumental in breaking up Ma Bell’s monopoly in telephone service.

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A preview of PBS’ Long Distance Warrior, which premieres on most PBS stations Sept. 13  (3 minutes)

For those under 30, “MCI” may not mean much.  The company that helped pioneer competitive long distance calling was absorbed into the Worldcom empire in 1997, where it continued to provide service until a major corporate accounting scandal brought Worldcom down in 2002.  Most of what was left was eventually sold to Verizon Communications in 2005.

Remarkably, Microwave Communications, Inc. (MCI) was founded all the way back in 1963, but not as a provider of telephone services.  That MCI sought to build a network of microwave relay stations between Chicago and St. Louis to provide uninterrupted two-way radio service for some of the nation’s largest trucking and shipping companies.

The Bell System

By the late 1960s, William G. McGowan, an investor and venture capitalist from New York won a seat on MCI’s board of directors and part ownership of a newly-envisioned version of MCI — one that would provide businesses with a range of telecommunications products, including long distance telephone connections.  With many American corporations maintaining branch and regional offices, connecting them together was a potentially very lucrative business, especially if MCI could deliver the service at prices cheaper than what the monopoly Bell System was charging.

With their microwave relay network, now expanding across the country, MCI could distribute long distance phone calls cheaply and efficiently, if they could find a way to connect that network to Bell’s local phone system.  After all, it does little good to offer long distance service if you cannot connect calls to the businesses’ existing telephone equipment.

That’s where AT&T and its Bell Operating Companies objected.  For them, only calls originating on and delivered over their own network should be allowed.  MCI, as an interloper, was seeking to use the network AT&T built and paid for.  It’s an argument that has echoed more than 30 years later, when AT&T’s then-CEO Ed Whitacre objected to outside Internet content providers “using AT&T’s pipes for free.”

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On the occasion of MCI’s 20th anniversary, the company produced this retrospective exploring the difficult times competing with AT&T and the Bell System.  (9 minutes)

MCI's best argument: AT&T's long distance bills

McGowan confronted arguments from AT&T executives who warned that competitive long distance would destroy the business model of America’s Bell System, which provided affordable local phone service to all 50 states, in part subsidized by long distance telephone rates, mostly paid by its commercial customers.  Tamper with that, they warned, and local phone bills would be forced to soar to make up the difference.

MCI called that argument a scare tactic, and suggested instead that AT&T’s monopoly had grown inefficient, bloated, expensive, and resistant to innovation and change.  MCI could deliver a substantially less expensive service and would force AT&T to increase its own efficiency to compete.  AT&T wasn’t interested in that argument and sued, repeatedly, to keep MCI out of its business.

By 1984, federal courts declared AT&T a monopoly worthy of a break-up, and opened the door to MCI’s long distance network.  By that time, MCI was already thinking about evolving itself beyond a business long distance provider, whose network was largely idle after business hours.  Because most Americans were accustomed to making long distance calls at night when rates were substantially lower, MCI developed new residential long distance service plans that encouraged customers to use that idle network at night and on weekends.

[flv width=”640″ height=”447″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/crying_mother.f4v[/flv]

One of MCI’s most memorable ads features a sobbing mother who reached out and touched her son over long distance a little too much.  (1 minute)

Thus began more than a decade of heavy advertising and competition for the long distance telephone market.  With equal access rules in place, consumers could choose their own long distance phone company and shop for the one with the lowest rates.  Competitors like Sprint, WilTel, LDDS, RCI, LCI, and yes, even AT&T all pitched their own calling plans.

MCI also pioneered MCI Mail, one of the first commercial electronic mail systems.  The original concept had businesses typing letters on a computer terminal, printed on standard paper at an MCI office closest to the destination, and then mailed in an envelope through the U.S. Post Office.  This poor-man’s version of a telex or telegram worked for businesses that wanted overnight delivery, but not at the prices charged by shippers like Federal Express.  In larger cities, MCI Mail could offer businesses delivery of their electronic communications within four hours, something closer to a traditional telegram of days gone-by.

MCI Mail’s hard copy deliveries wouldn’t last long, of course.  As the 1980s progressed, the fax machine and the more familiar all-electronic e-mail we think of today became firmly established.  As MCI Mail became less relevant, the company innovated into offering low priced telex services, mass-faxing, and data backhaul services to provide connectivity for online networks.

[flv width=”504″ height=”400″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WIBW MCI Mail 1984.flv[/flv]

WIBW explores a new concept in communications — something called ‘electronic mail,’ a service that bewildered consumers in the early 1980s.  This report from 1984.  (2 minutes)

Bill McGowan: Would not approve of AT&T's plans to restore the glory days of the past.

AT&T, in contrast, was still getting over the loss of its local Bell Operating Companies — the regional phone companies most Americans did business with, and the loss of revenue earned from renting telephone equipment.  For years, AT&T long distance was branded as a quality leader, not a price leader.  It maintained its enormous market share partly through consumer indifference — customers who did not initially choose a new long distance carrier remained with AT&T, the default choice.

It took only about a decade after the Bell break-up for telecom industry lobbyists to begin advocating for enough deregulation to allow many of those former Baby Bells to re-combine through mergers and acquisitions.  The result is today’s AT&T, formed from its long distance unit, BellSouth, Illinois Bell, Indiana Bell, Michigan Bell, Nevada Bell, Ohio Bell, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, Wisconsin Bell, and Southern New England Telephone.  Its largest competitor is Verizon Communications, which itself resulted from a combination of Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE, and what was left of MCI after Worldcom was through with it.

McGowan’s fight was a personally costly one.  A workaholic, McGowan routinely put in 15 hour work days and drank up to 20 cups of coffee daily.  His heart finally had enough and McGowan succumbed to a heart attack in 1992 at age 64.  But he leaves a legacy and two decades of fighting to break up AT&T’s monopoly, which he always believed was bad for consumers and business (unless you were AT&T, of course).  That’s an important message as AT&T strengthens its resolve to acquire one of its significant competitors in the profitable wireless market — T-Mobile.  McGowan would have never approved.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/KCSM San Mateo Electronic Mail 6-18-87.mp4[/flv]

“The Computer Chronicles,” a production of KCSM-TV, spent a half hour in June 1987 showing off electronic e-mail service from MCI and how consumers and businesses using something called a “modem” could connect their home computers with online databases and services to exchange information and communications back and forth.  And for those business travelers on the road, away from their office computers, Speech Plus offered a product that could still keep you “connected,” by reading your e-mail to you over the phone.  In 1987, outside of commercial pay networks like CompuServe, Delphi, PeopleLink and QuantumLink, most Americans with modems used them to connect to typically-free hobbyist-run computer bulletin board systems.  Widespread access to “the Internet” would take another 5-6 years.  (29 minutes)

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

Phillip "Not Paid by AT&T" Dampier

When asked if the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile will limit customer choice, NAACP’s local executive director Stanley Miller told a Cleveland, Ohio television station, “I don’t think that’s an issue in today’s environment; I think the companies are smarter today and they will make people understand and give them the beneficial services that they’ll need.”

The civil rights group had nothing to say about how much AT&T will charge for these “beneficial services.”

At least WEWS-TV in Cleveland is bothering to ask the question.  Most of America’s television news has either ignored the enormous merger on offer from AT&T and T-Mobile, or didn’t wade much further beyond AT&T’s press release about the “benefits” the merger will bring.  Unfortunately, the television station never bothered to alert viewers to the fact the civil rights group receives substantial financial support from AT&T.

Miller’s performance trying to tout his parent organization’s unqualified support for the merger sent a very clear message to anyone watching NewsChannel 5 — he doesn’t really understand what he is talking about.

On the issue of expanding wireless service into rural Ohio, Miller was left tongue-twisting his way into advocating a monopoly because they’ll be best equipped to get service to those who need it.  That’s a fascinating prospect — a monopoly spending money expanding service where it is unprofitable to provide.  That’s the reason companies like AT&T have ignored rural America, and will continue to do so — merger or not.

Miller (WEWS-TV)

In fact, AT&T’s claim that it needs the network of T-Mobile to stop the persistent problems of dropped calls and slow data service doesn’t make much sense either.  Verizon, AT&T’s closest competitor, doesn’t seem to be suffering those problems, perhaps because it has made investments in upgrades AT&T has avoided.

In California, consumer advocate Jon Fox was taking an equally skeptical look at AT&T’s claims on behalf of CalPIRG, the California Public Interest Research Group.  Fox noted AT&T’s promotion of the merger in his state came at invitation-only cheerleading sessions run by company officials:

Earlier this month, AT&T California President Ken McNeely explained to an invitation-only audience that the proposed merger with T-Mobile will create new jobs, help communities and improve wireless phone service. AT&T preferred not to take questions from the general public on how that vision fits with AT&T’s history of consolidation, layoffs and aggressive market behavior.

Nearly 30 years after regulators broke up AT&T’s unprecedented control over the U.S. wired phone market, consumers are asked to believe that this time things will be different. This notion defies both experience and common sense. Unless significant market regulation is put into place that encourages a competitive wireless arena to flourish, this proposed merger will be bad for consumers, innovation and economic growth.

Fox notes the wireless marketplace in the United States is hardly a paragon of competitiveness today.  If the merger were approved, 76 percent of Americans would receive wireless service from two providers — AT&T and Verizon.  Fox observed America’s next-most-hated conglomerate — the oil and gas industry — wishes it could have that sort of market power.  The top two oil companies in the U.S. have a combined market share of only 24 percent.  America, he notes, wouldn’t tolerate that kind of consolidation in the gasoline market, so why should we tolerate it in the mobile market?

The California Public Interest Research Group

Fox advocates more competition, not less.  He suggests the government force AT&T and Verizon to open their cellular networks to independent third party competitors at fair prices, and let everyone compete.  That could germinate competition that would end the chorus of rate increases from the largest players and allow for innovative pricing plans that don’t force customers into the nearly identical service plans AT&T and Verizon want to force you to accept.  T-Mobile already provides the most innovative pricing in the wireless marketplace, and AT&T is about to swallow that innovation whole.

What ultimately happens to a well-dwarfed Sprint remains an open question, but one many on Wall Street have already answered, suspecting America’s third largest carrier simply won’t be in a position to compete.  Fox thinks the situation is dire when two companies will have a virtual lock on wireless data services Americans increasingly depend on.

That’s not the view of the NAACP, of course.  But then the NAACP is hardly an independent observer, being the recipient of a considerable amount of money and executive talent from AT&T.  That counts for a whole lot more than the rank and file members of the organization, who will be paying the increased prices AT&T has in store for everyone.

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WEWS-TV in Cleveland investigates the ramifications of a merger between AT&T and T-Mobile.  More than 94% of all Ohioans filing comments with FCC oppose the merger, but groups like the NAACP support it.  NewsCenter 5 wanted to find out why.  (3 minutes)

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Southern Cross has the monopoly for international fiber connections between New Zealand and the rest of the world.

Three companies — Telecom New Zealand, Verizon, and Optus jointly own the single underseas fiber network that connects New Zealand with the rest of the world.  Unless a second underseas fiber provider provides competition, the monopoly control on international connectivity may guarantee New Zealand an ultra fast fiber broadband network for domestic use, but leave consumers heavily usage-capped and subjected to monopoly price-gouging for international traffic.  Those are the claims of Sam Morgan, a venture capitalist and philanthropist who advises Pacific Fibre, the company that wants to bring that second underseas fiber cable to New Zealand.

American and Canadian providers routinely point to Australia and New Zealand as examples of countries with usage-caps firmly in place, arguing this provides justification to do likewise in North America.  But usage caps in the South Pacific are a product of international capacity shortages — a problem not found in either the United States or Canada, so their claims have no merit.

Morgan explores the implications of a second fiber cable reaching New Zealand — the imminent removal of the hated Internet Overcharging schemes.  The clip comes courtesy of TV New Zealand.  (17 minutes)

Although the English needs a little work, Korean broadband delivers a reality most Americans can only imagine.

South Korea has launched a nationwide broadband upgrade to rid themselves of 100Mbps service for $38 a month, claiming those speeds and prices are no longer sufficient for Korea’s new digital economy.

By the end of 2012, South Korea intends to connect every home in the country to the Internet at one gigabit per second and slash the monthly price to just $27 a month.

That’s more than 200 times faster than speeds enjoyed by most Americans, who pay an average of $46 a month — nearly double Korea’s planned price. Even more galling for Canadians — those speeds and prices are for completely unlimited access.

Stop the Cap! reader John in Victoria, B.C., thinks South Korea’s broadband improvements call out just how ludicrous Canada’s Internet Overcharging schemes really are.

“If the Canadian Radio-TV and Telecommunications Commission ultimately allows $2 per gigabyte in overlimit fees, we would have to pay $5,184,000 per month for the same thing,” John says. “If this comparison doesn’t make people want to chuck the CRTC, what will?”

For the government of South Korea, which is spearheading the Internet expansion effort, broadband has become a national priority for the fast-growing Korean economy.

[flv width=”640″ height=”447″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Hello CJ TV.flv[/flv]

Korea’s CJ HelloVision cable system delivers TV programming, broadband, and phone service at speeds and prices that make North American providers look ridiculous.  Bonus: That sure looks like Sarah Palin making a cameo appearance in this animated video.  (1 minute)

South Korea historically trailed Japan’s economic post-World War II revival for decades, but no more. The country, which used to be poorer than the Communist People’s Republic of Korea to the north, has grown to the world’s 13th largest economic power, and has designs on being a world leader in the transition to the digital/information economy. They are already ahead of North America, with an advanced broadband platform that can sustain concepts like cloud computing that are just getting off the ground in Canada and the USA.

The KCC is spearheading Korea's broadband advancements

Only the most rural parts of Korea still rely on copper phone wires delivering DSL service, now considered archaic. Most of the country is now wired for fiber optics, making a transition from 100Mbps-1Gbps relatively simple. With new laser technology, existing fiber cables can transmit faster speeds, and when fiber is laid in the country, extra strands are buried for future use. The costs of burying 10 or 100 or 1,000 strands come mostly from labor, not the wiring.

Private electronics companies are strong proponents of the infrastructure upgrades, and service providers are on board to deliver the service. That is in marked contrast with providers in the United States and Canada who consider expensive upgrades an unnecessary proposition.

“Providers in the USA and Canada defend their existing networks as ‘good enough for average residential use,’ something that would be laughed away here in Korea or in Japan,” Dr. Park Sung-Jin, a Korean broadband researcher who travels between Seoul and Los Angeles tells Stop the Cap! “Large providers like AT&T cannot afford to lose their propaganda arguments of broadband sufficiency because if they did, they would lose face and be forced to transform broadband in the USA at the expense of their enormous profits.”

“In Asia, we would never allow our providers to dictate the national broadband policies of the country, and our discussions are long past arguing over what speeds are correct,” Park says.  “Now we’re arguing about how to bring the cost down.”

Japan delivers 1Gbps broadband service for $70 a month, a price scoffed at by Choi Gwang-gi, the 28-year old Korean now in charge of the Korea’s expansive broadband plans.

“I can’t imagine anyone in Korea paying that much,” Choi told the New York Times. “No, no, that’s unthinkable.”

A pilot gigabit project initiated by the government is underway with 5,000 households in five South Korean cities. Each customer pays about 30,000 won a month, or less than $27.

“A lot of Koreans are early adopters,” Mr. Choi said, “and we thought we needed to be prepared for things like 3-D TV, Internet protocol TV, high-definition multimedia, gaming and videoconferencing, ultra-high-definition TV, cloud computing.”

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/200Mbps Broadband.flv[/flv]

Hello Broadband delivers a silly advertisement for its soon to be obsolete 200Mbps broadband service.  (1 minute)

Meanwhile, according to Dr. Park, North American providers like Bell, Rogers, and Comcast are spending millions trying to convince lawmakers in both countries that such speeds are wholly unnecessary.

“The United States and Canada are the worst, with providers spending countless millions themselves and through their lackey trade associations and illicit ‘consumer groups’ working for them trying to convince lawmakers American broadband isn’t so bad after all, but it is,” Park says. “They routinely claim any country that is ahead of the U.S. or Canada is a ‘special case’ because of urban density or government subsidies, but that can’t explain away all of the disparity in speeds and accessibility, only money and monopoly profits can.”

Both Romania and Latvia now beat Canada and the USA in broadband speeds and pricing, and North America’s dominance in a digital economy could be at risk.

Closer to home Don Norman, co-founder of the Nielsen Norman Group in Fremont, Calif., told the Times Korea is on the right track.

“The gigabit Internet is essential for the future, absolutely essential, and all the technologists will tell you this,” said Norman. “We’re all going to be doing cloud computing, for example, and that won’t work if you’re not always connected. Games. Videoconferencing. Video on demand. All this will require huge bandwidth, huge speed.”

In Canada, such predictions have given companies like Bell an excuse to engage in a national Internet Overcharging scheme they claim will help pay for building these kinds of future networks. But other countries around the world now deliver speeds Canada only promises their citizens, without overcharging them to pay for it.

“Charging for broadband traffic would be like you or I charging for the wind — it has no real value except in the eyes of the people who stand to profit from it,” Park said.

Will people notice a difference between 100Mbps and 1Gbps? Koreans say they will, according to the New York Times.

One of the customers already connected to Mr. Choi’s pilot program is Moon Ki-soo, 42, an Internet consultant. He got a gigabit hookup about a year ago through CJ Hellovision, although because of the internal wiring of his apartment building his actual connection speed clocks in at 278 megabits a second.

But even that speed — about a quarter-gigabit — has him dazzled.

“It is so much more convenient to watch movies and drama shows now,” he told the newspaper.

[flv width=”368″ height=”228″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Giga Internet.flv[/flv]

This Korean language promotional video for Giga Internet, the marketing brand for 1Gbps broadband, still dazzles the imagination for those who lack the ability to follow the words.  As you watch, consider how America’s typical DSL service provider leaves millions of Americans with a ‘covered wagon’ 3Mbps broadband solution.  (6 minutes)

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A stylish ad for SK Broadband, declaring new high speeds will let users “See the Unseen.”  (1 minute)