Wisconsin Republicans are outraged AT&T and CenturyLink are not able to charge taxpayers and students more than double the price for broadband in schools and libraries.

Wisconsin taxpayers and students could face substantially higher taxes and tuition fees because Republicans prefer AT&T and other commercial Internet Service Providers deliver high-speed Internet access to schools and libraries, even if prices are more than double those charged by the existing non-profit, cooperative provider.

Last week, under growing pressure and criticism from Republican legislators and the potential threat of private litigation, the University of Wisconsin withdrew its contract with WiscNet, fearing a costly backlash that could interrupt the school’s educational and research missions.

Republicans in the state legislature forced a competition ban in the 2011-2013 budget directly targeting WiscNet, an institutional broadband provider serving 300 public schools, state agencies, and 15 of 17 Wisconsin library systems. They consider WiscNet a direct competitive threat to the business interests of AT&T and other telecommunications companies.

The loss of business from UW has raised questions about the ongoing viability of WiscNet’s operations, and has encouraged critics to continue the campaign against public broadband.

“Isn’t it a sad day when political pressures from telephone company lobbyists keep us from working together,” asked WiscNet Wire. “It’s frustrating, yet fascinating.”

Many of WiscNet’s members report that “going private” for Internet connectivity will more than double their costs. This was confirmed by Wisconsin’s Legislative Audit Bureau, which reported a member paying WiscNet $500 month for Internet service would face bills of $1,100 or more if provided by AT&T or other telecom companies.

Republicans have complained WiscNet’s close ties to the state university system and its efforts to resist the Walker Administration’s efforts to dismantle the institutional fiber network’s current operational plans border on unethical.

Cheerleading the Republicans are providers including AT&T and CenturyLink, both filing their own respective complaints (AT&T) (CenturyLink). Joining them is the Wisconsin State Telecom Association (WSTA), which represents Wisconsin’s independent rural phone companies like Frontier Communications.

William Esbeck, WSTA’s executive director, has been on WiscNet’s case for years. He said WiscNet’s recent victory in a procurement process to supply Internet service across the UW system was proof the bidding was rigged.

“The UW simply created a ‘request for proposals’ that matched what WiscNet was already doing,” said Esbeck.

Republican legislators joined Esbeck threatening hearings and unspecified repercussions for the “civil disobedience” on display by university officials attempting an end run around the Walker Administration.

“There have been repeated, flagrant violations of state law — intentional deception at a level that I just am flabbergasted by, even today — and no accountability for it whatsoever,” said state Rep. Dean Knudson (R-Hudson), at a recent budget committee hearing. Among Knudson’s biggest campaign contributors: the WSTA and CenturyLink.

In a May 23 letter sent to UW System president Kevin Reilly, state Sen. Paul Farrow (R-Pewaukee) accused UW officials of “mismanagement and unethical behavior,” saying they’d shown disdain for the legislature and contempt for the laws and directives it passed, reported Bill Lueders, the Money and Politics Project director at the Wisconsin Center for Investigative Journalism.

Among Farrow’s biggest campaign donors: TDS Telecom and the WSTA.

Both Farrow and Knudson are also known members of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a corporate financed group that produces anti-public broadband draft legislation for introduction by the group’s members. Both CenturyLink and AT&T are sponsors of ALEC, AT&T in particular.

The Walker Administration has given the UW System an extra six months to sever all ties with WiscNet.

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to. We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with TCI. We are the largest cable company around. We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.” — Paul Alden, TCI’s vice president and national director of franchising to an independent consultant hired to review competing cable operators for Jefferson City, Mo., in a historical example of cable industry abuse

The Federal Communications Commission last week voted unanimously to expire rules that required cable operators to make their programming available on fair and reasonable terms to competitors. Big mistake.

We have been here before. Let us turn back the clock to the days before the FCC and Congress mildly reined in the cable television industry with the types of pro-consumer regulations Chairman Genachowski and others have now let expire. Why were these rules introduced in the first place? Because years of industry abuse heaped on consumers and local communities took their toll, with high prices for poor service, outrageous corporate bullying tactics, and endless litigation to hamper or stop consumer relief.

How long will it take for the industry to resume the same abusive practices that forced the FCC and Congress to finally act once before?

The Central Telecommunications. v. Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI): The Poster Child for Cable Industry Abuse

Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation’s largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

Back in the 1980s, before the days of direct broadcast satellite competition like DirecTV and Dish, and years before telco-TV was allowed by law, the cable industry totally dominated the video marketplace. The only challenges came from incredibly rare competing cable TV providers or three million home satellite dish owners or wireless cable subscribers.

The industry’s only check on unhampered monopoly growth came from local authority over cable operations through the cable franchising process. If a cable company got out of control or did not offer the programming or service a community found adequate, it could offer a franchise to another company, effectively kicking bad actors out of town.

In Jefferson City, Mo., the local cable operator during the 1980s was Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI). It had acquired the franchise in the city by buying out the original provider in the late 1970s. TCI had been buying a lot of smaller cable operators around the country under the direction of then CEO John Malone. By 1981, it had grown to the largest cable operator in the country, and few dared confront the well-heeled operator, which had a legal budget greater than the operating budgets of some communities TCI served. TCI was later acquired by AT&T Cable, which in turn sold its cable systems to Comcast, which continues to operate them to this day.

In 1980, Jefferson City officials decided it would be prudent to make sure they were getting the best cable service possible, so as TCI’s franchise agreement reached expiration, the city issued a “request for proposals” offering other cable companies a chance to bid for the right to serve the community of around 38,000. For TCI, this was tantamount to a declaration of war, and the cable company meant business. Malone equated anything threatening a permanent cable franchise for TCI as something like an act of government theft. In books later written about the events in Jefferson City, even some TCI executives admitted they were “horrified by the sleaziness” of the kind of hardball tactics involved, comparing them to a “B-movie.”

TCI revealed it would stop at nothing to keep competitors away from their territories and drag out years of litigation. Central Telecommunications, Inc., v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., revealed exactly how far TCI was willing to go:

From: Cutthroat: High Stakes & Killer Moves on the Electronic Frontier, By Stephen Keating

Cajole the mayor into canceling competitive bidding. In early 1980, after Jefferson City made it known TCI might get some competition, the company quickly met with the mayor hoping to persuade him to renew TCI’s franchise without a competitive bid process, so as to avoid a “frontal attack” by competitors.

Threaten the independent consultant. In December, 1980 the city hired Elmer Smalling, an industry consultant, to independently evaluate various bids from cable operators willing to serve Jefferson City. TCI immediately began publicly attacking his qualifications in a way the court later found to be defamatory. The court case documents Paul Alden, TCI’s vice president and national director of franchising, making personal threats against Smalling.  A sample:

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to. We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with T.C.I. We are the largest cable company around[.] We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.”

It got worse for Smalling. At this same time, Warner-Amex (another large cable company now known as Time Warner Cable) was a client of Smalling’s. Alden contacted Warner-Amex about Smalling. Following the threats, Smalling lost Warner-Amex as a client.

City Attorney Thomas Utterback later wrote a memo to the City Council in which he described TCI as a “relentless corporate bully.”

Threaten would-be competitors. On several occasions, from January of 1981 to the summer of 1981, Alden repeatedly telephoned Robert Brooks, chief operating officer of Teltran, a company which submitted a bid for the city’s franchise, and threatened him that unless Teltran withdrew from the bidding process, TCI would make trouble for Teltran in Columbia, Missouri, where it operated a cable television franchise. Teltran subsequently dropped out of the bidding process on the ground there was a “distasteful environment” in Jefferson City.

Another competitor, Central Telecommunications, became a defendant in a TCI lawsuit challenging the city’s right to request proposals from other cable companies. TCI argued it now had a 1st Amendment right of free speech to serve Jefferson City residents regardless of the wishes of city officials. In a wide ranging series of subpoenas, TCI demanded the bank handling Central’s financing turn over a “very wide range of potentially confidential records,” which according to Central was an effort to destroy its financing agreement with the bank.

Malone

Threaten customers. TCI warned customers that unless it won the cable franchise for Jefferson City, it would immediately shut off its cable system and leave customers without service, potentially for years, until Central built its own system from scratch. TCI officials said “it would not sell ‘one bolt’ of its system to whoever received the new franchise and that it would ‘rather have [its system] rot on the pole’ than sell it to a competitor at any cost.”

TCI’s system manager in Jefferson City told elderly residents of a senior citizens’ home that TCI would cut off service if denied a franchise, and the residents would be without television for two years pending construction of a new system because the concrete walls of their residence would not allow reception of over-the-air stations.

Lie, Lie, and Lie Some More. In one City Council meeting, Alden wildly claimed that TCI was the nation’s largest distributor of satellite dish antennas, with “an exclusive” right to sell in the state of Missouri. TCI promised that if the city renewed its franchise agreement, it would keep satellite dishes out of Jefferson City. If the franchise was not renewed, Alden promised to “flood the city with satellite dishes,” denying the city franchise fees. Alden later admitted both statements were untrue.

Threaten the mayor’s office. Although the mayor has never disclosed exactly what TCI threatened him with, the public record shows in March 1981, Alden called the mayor and threatened to turn the system off unless TCI’s franchise was renewed. TCI also filed an expensive lawsuit against Jefferson City regarding the way it handled its request for proposals.

By the fall of that year, TCI was meeting with city attorney Utterback in secret negotiations to renew its cable franchise, in direct violation of the city’s request for proposals  which required all negotiations to be open, as well as Missouri’s “sunshine laws.” By next spring, the mayor had privately notified council members he would veto any franchise renewal awarded to anyone other than TCI, which he later admitted was a condition imposed by TCI during its secret negotiations.

On January 25, 1982, the City Council provisionally awarded the franchise to… Central Telecommunications. TCI immediately refused to pay the city the prior year’s franchise fees, in excess of $60,000. It also reminded the mayor of his obligations to TCI as part of the secret franchise renewal negotiations held the prior fall. On April 20, 1982, the City Council passed the ordinance awarding a franchise to Central. The vote was six in favor and four against. The mayor vetoed the ordinance. The council then deadlocked five-to-five on awarding a franchise to TCI and the mayor cast the deciding vote in favor of that company. The next day, TCI dismissed its lawsuit against the city and paid the withheld franchise fees.

In the end, several courts upheld tens of millions in damages for Central Telecommunications, TCI’s lawsuit was dismissed at the company’s request, Mr. Alden was summarily dismissed by TCI after Malone referred to him as a “loose cannon,” and Jefferson City was stuck with several additional years of lousy service from TCI.

But TCI’s “bad corporate citizen” practices would come back to haunt the cable juggernaut, eventually failing to win assignments for two $800 million orbital slots for a direct broadcast satellite service the company proposed. After the Jefferson City experience, even the FCC could not, in good conscience, reward TCI with satellite slots it wanted for a “competing satellite service” it would sell through its own cable companies.

The memories of FCC officials are evidently short. Giving cable operators an inch has historically bought them a mile, paid for by consumers. Mandating easy to understand rules requiring cable operators sell programming to competitors on fair and reasonable terms is sound policy whether there is competition or not. Removing those rules or watering them down only promotes the kind of mischief that, when unchecked, leads to these kinds of horror stories. History need not repeat itself.

The Federal Cable-Protection Commission

Problem: Solved?

The Federal Communications Commission last Friday unanimously voted to free cable operators from their obligation to sell cable channels they own to rival satellite and phone companies.

In a bizarre justification, FCC chairman Julius Genachowski said ending the unambiguous rules would prevent anti-competitive activity in the market because the FCC would retain the right to review industry abuses on a case-by-case basis. Lawmakers called that an invitation for endless, time consuming litigation that will deprive consumers of competitive choice and favor the still-dominant cable television industry.

“The sunset of the program access rules could lead to a new dawn of less choice and higher prices for consumers,” said Rep. Ed Markey (D-Mass.), one of the original authors of the rules. “If we do not extend the program access rules, the largest cable companies could withhold popular sports and entertainment programming from their competitors, reducing the competition and choice that has benefited consumers. I urge Chairman Genachowski and the FCC commissioners to extend the program access rules that have helped to level the playing field in the paid television marketplace.”

The FCC’s decision could have profound implications on would-be competitors, particularly start-ups like Google Fiber that could find itself without access to popular cable networks at any price.

At a time when cable companies and programmers are constantly pitted against each other in contract/carriage disputes, the deregulatory spirit at the FCC is likely to irritate consumers even more.

Phillip “How nice of the FCC to think about poor cable companies” Dampier

The FCC claims it will continue to protect sports programming from exclusive carriage agreements — a potentially critical concession considering the history of “exclusive, only on cable” programming contracts was largely focused on regional sports channel PRISM.

Comcast successfully kept the popular Philadelphia-based network (today known as Comcast SportsNet Philadephia) off competing satellite services and cable operators by only distributing the network terrestrially. A controversial FCC rule (known as the “terrestrial exception”) states that a television channel does not have to make its shows available to satellite companies if it does not use satellites to transmit its programs. Cox Cable has its own implementation of that loophole running in San Diego.

Derek Chang, executive vice-president of DirecTV, says Comcast’s local market share dominance is a direct consequence of SportsNet. More importantly, Chang believes even if Comcast says it will sell the network to competitors, it is free to set prices for SportsNet as high as it wants.

“They win either way,” Chang said. “They’re either going to gouge our customers, or they’re going to withhold it from our customers.”

Verizon FiOS has secured the right to carry the channel on its system, but won’t say how much it pays.

The PRISM case is today’s best evidence that exclusive agreements do hamper competition — Philadelphia is hardly a hotbed of satellite dishes, with a 40-50% reduced satellite subscriber rate attributable to the lack of popular regional sports on satellite.

FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s cowardly lion act is back. Will anyone at the FCC stand up to Big Telecom companies while busy watering down pro-competitive policies?

Historically, satellite dish owners and wireless cable customers were the most likely victims of exclusive or predatory programming contracts, with some cable networks refusing to sell their programming to competing technologies at any price.  Others charged enormous, unjustified mark-ups that made the technology non-competitive. Today, wireless cable television is mostly defunct and home satellite dish service has largely been replaced with direct broadcast satellite providers DirecTV and Dish.

Today’s programming landscape is more complicated. The FCC would argue that unlike in the 1980s, most cable programmers are no longer directly controlled by yesteryear’s Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) and Time Warner (Time Warner Cable was spun off into an independent, unaffiliated entity in March, 2009), which collectively controlled dozens of popular cable networks. But programmers’ know their best customers remain cable operators which maintain a dominant market share in every major American city.

Friday’s ruling has implications for telco-TV providers and satellite dish companies that may find programming negotiations more complicated than ever. AT&T U-verse and Verizon FiOS may find access to cable-owned programming difficult or even impossible to obtain if cable operators decide their unwanted competition is harmful to their business interests.

But an even larger challenge looms for the next generation of video competition: Google Fiber TV and “over the top” online video.

Nobody is complaining about Google’s robust gigabit broadband offering, but Kansas City residents originally expressed concern about the company’s proposed television lineup. As originally announced, Google Fiber TV was missing HBO and ESPN.

A competing cable system without ESPN is dead in the water for sports enthusiasts.

Google has since managed to sign agreements that expand their channel lineup (although it is still missing HBO). But nothing prevents channel owners from dramatically raising the price at renewal. That is a concern for smaller cable operators as well, who want protection from discriminatory pricing that awards the best prices to giant multi-system operators like Comcast and Time Warner Cable.

The most important impact of the FCC’s decision may be for those waiting to launch virtual cable systems delivering online programming to customers who want to pick and choose from a list of networks.

The FCC’s “new rules” give programmers who depend on tens of millions of cable subscribers even more ammunition to kill competing distribution models like over the top video. Start-up providers who cannot obtain reasonable and fair access to cable programming will have to depend on the vague policies the FCC claims it will enforce to prevent egregious abuse. But the FCC is not known for its speed and start-up companies may face enormous legal fees fighting for fair access that is now open to subjective interpretation.

The New York State Attorney General has argued that Sprint’s failure to pay at least $100 million in owed sales taxes to New York taxing authorities may leave its customers in the state on the hook for past taxes, interest, and fees the company never paid.

As the state continues its lawsuit against Sprint-Nextel for what it argues is deliberate underpayment of New York sales tax, Sprint’s lawyers argued Thursday that the entire case should be dismissed because the state is selectively interpreting state and federal law.

The case originally began as a whistleblower action through a private company, Empire State Ventures, which is seeking a 25% share of any lawsuit proceeds. N.Y. Attorney General Eric Schneiderman is seeking $300 million in damages from Sprint for knowingly violating tax laws.

A review of the lawsuit shows there are serious implications for Sprint’s customers in New York if the company loses the suit or fails to pay sales taxes the state claims are owed.

Over three million current and former Sprint customers could be liable for sales tax underpayments representing a portion of their monthly bills dating back to 2005, potentially including accumulating interest charged at 14.5% annually, and penalties amounting to double the amount of the unpaid taxes or up to 30 percent of the underpayment.

Sprint has also misled millions of New York customers who purchased Sprint flat-rate plans. In its customer contracts, on its website and elsewhere, Sprint represented that it would collect and pay all applicable sales taxes. Yet Sprint did not, and it concealed this fact from its New York customers. As a result, Sprint exposed these customers to the risk of having to pay the unpaid taxes, for they are also liable under the law if Sprint fails to pay.

Although Sprint misrepresented how it would handle sales taxes, it has locked its customers into contracts with early termination fees. The customers must remain in these contracts sold under false pretenses unless they pay hundreds of dollars to Sprint.

Schneiderman

Schneiderman’s office appears to have a strong case, with evidence showing Sprint allegedly conspiring to undertax customers using an arbitrary formula to gain a competitive advantage over other wireless carriers with the promise of a lower monthly bill, in part because the company was not collecting the proper amount of state sales tax.

The lawsuit claims Sprint repeatedly ignored warnings from state taxing authorities, including senior tax officials, that declared Sprint’s creative way of determining applicable taxes was putting the company at serious risk of adverse tax department action.

That adverse action came in April when the state filed the lawsuit against Sprint seeking back taxes and triple damages.

A careful reading of the lawsuit reveals just how much bureaucracy America’s wireless industry maintains to seek out any edge it can find against regulators, tax authorities, and local, state, and federal elected officials.

Sprint, the third largest wireless company in the country, can afford to maintain that bureaucracy with $33 billion in annual revenues partly at stake.

Wireless Industry’s Tax Employees Go to Vail to Ski Discuss Tax-Avoidance Strategies

The wireless industry employs hundreds of workers who spend their days pouring over tax laws in all 50 states looking for loopholes, strategies, and creative solutions to the ongoing problem of paying local, state, and federal taxes. Sprint, a considerably smaller wireless carrier than either Verizon or AT&T, still has the resources to maintain more than 100 workers in their State and Local Tax Group. It includes a well-defined management chain, with an assistant vice-president that runs the unit reporting to Sprint’s vice president of Tax, who, in turn, reports to Sprint’s chief financial officer.

These employees, and similar ones working at every other wireless phone company, try to figure out how to pay the least amount of owed tax possible, and kick tax strategies around in regular sessions and conferences at posh resorts in places like Vail (come for the corporate meeting, stay for the skiing), Colorado.

At the 2002 Communications Tax Executive Conference in Vail, Sprint executives told other wireless carriers that tax avoidance strategies like “unbundling” posed risks of audits by taxing authorities and litigation.

The wireless industry sends their tax experts to posh resorts in Vail, Colorado to discuss tax-avoidance strategies.

The following year, a Sprint executive turned up at another industry-backed conference run by “the Wireless Tax Group,”  alerting other wireless companies that “unbundling for taxes causes significant assessment risk.” He told the group that his “marching orders” at Sprint were to “mitigate tax issues by pursuing legislation or pre-audit agreements that allow for component taxing.”

In Schneiderman’s view, Sprint never followed those marching orders in New York.

In fact, the lawsuit argues even as Sprint was lecturing other phone companies about the importance of being conservative when dealing with tax authorities, the company was conspiring to use its own creative tax interpretations to undercut their competitors with a lower monthly cell phone bill.

How to Lower Your Prices Without Risking Profits

The technique Sprint uses to this day to hand customers that lower bill is based on selectively applying sales taxes only to certain portions of a customer’s voice plan. Sprint is the only company engaged in this practice in New York. Verizon, T-Mobile, Cricket, AT&T, and MetroPCS won’t go near the concept.

New York tax law says that phone companies must collect taxes on the monthly voice plans wireless companies sell customers. If Sprint sells you 450 minutes a month for $39.99 a month, New York taxing authorities expect customers will be charged the prevailing state and local tax rate on the fixed amount of $39.99 each month. Only Sprint does not do this. Sprint leverages federal rules which state that telephone calls placed to numbers outside of the state (also known as an “interstate call”) cannot be taxed. Therefore, in Sprint’s view, customers deserve a tax break for those interstate, non-taxable calls.

But Sprint does not actually review individual calling records to figure out what specific out-of-state numbers were called. Instead it created what New York officials argue is “an arbitrary formula” to guesstimate how much the average customer spends talking to in-state vs. out-of-state numbers. But those percentages varied wildly from 2005 to the present day, with different amounts for Sprint-Nextel customers living in upstate and downstate New York:

• July 2005-October 2008: Sprint did not pay state or local sales taxes on 28.5% of its fixed monthly voice service charge;
• April 2006-October 2008: Nextel of New York did not pay state or local taxes on 13.7% of its fixed monthly voice service charge;
• May 2006-October 2008: Nextel Partners of Upstate New York did not pay state or local taxes on 15% of its fixed monthly voice service charge;
• October 2009-Present Day: Sprint does not pay state or local taxes on 22.5% of its fixed monthly voice service charge.

Here comes the taxman.

In January 2005, an internal Sprint memo obtained by New York State found the company could save $4.6 million per month using this tax avoidance strategy, without costing the company a cent in profits.

It implemented the strategy later that summer.

New York’s lawsuit makes it clear the company was warned about the practice before the suit was filed:

Sprint continues to not collect and pay New York state and local sales taxes on the full amount of its receipts from its fixed monthly charges for wireless voice services, despite being specifically informed of the illegality of this practice by a field-auditor of the New York Tax Department in 2009, and then, in 2011, by a senior enforcement official of the New York Tax Department.

Customers Caught in the Middle?

As the case winds its way through court, New York has informally put Sprint customers on notice they could be held responsible for the unpaid taxes and penalties if Sprint reneges on the owed amounts. Schneiderman’s office recognizes customers are caught in the middle, partly because Sprint decided to keep the tax changes “secret” to keep customers off the phone to Sprint customer service:

[…] In its contracts with these customers, on its website and elsewhere, Sprint represented that it would collect and pay all applicable sales taxes on its calling plans. […] Sprint’s representations in the contracts, on its website and elsewhere were false because Sprint knew it would not collect and pay the applicable sales taxes in New York.

Contrary to its promises, Sprint failed to collect and pay sales taxes on substantial portions of the fixed monthly charges for voice services under its flat-rate calling plans. As a result of this non-payment, Sprint left its New York customers liable for those unpaid amounts of sales taxes under New York law.

At no point did Sprint disclose to its New York customers that it was leaving them liable for the sales taxes that Sprint failed to collect from the customers and pay to the government, as promised.

Before Sprint began unbundling, members of its State and Local Tax Group and its marketing group considered in the early part of July 2005 whether to communicate with customers about the fact that Sprint was unbundling and that the unbundling would affect taxes for some customers. They jointly opted not to communicate the change. Sprint’s Director of External Tax was concerned that disclosing the information would “drive too many calls” to Sprint’s customer care division.

In November 2005, just months after Sprint began unbundling, a Sprint employee in the Customer Billing Services department questioned a member of Sprint’s State and Local Tax Group about whether unbundling was “presented to the customer as part of the Subscriber agreement, shown in the invoice and/or available to Customer Care Rep.” The response was simply that “we have not educated our customers on how we are de-bundling transactions for their tax relief.”

Sprint continues to misinform its current and prospective customers about sales taxes, and to subject them to undisclosed sales tax liability even today.

Sprint’s position in court is that New York’s tax laws give the company the option of unbundling its tax obligations and that the state was trying to collect money it was not owed.

“The New York Attorney General’s complaint seeks to impose liability for practices that do not violate New York law,” said Sprint’s response to the lawsuit.

Luckily for Sprint’s tax experts, many states foreclose the possibility of creatively escaping taxes by imposing a “gross receipts tax” on the total gross revenues of a company, regardless of their source. That makes it difficult, if not impossible to escape the kind of sales taxes Sprint has been maneuvering around for nearly a dozen years in New York. With fewer loopholes to find, that leaves the wireless industry’s tax experts more time on the ski slopes.

It is safe to assume Sprint hopes for a positive outcome of the case, if only to avoid the inevitable avalanche of customer complaints from New York customers who might find a notice of apparent tax liability in their mailbox one day in the future.

Time Warner Cable and Viacom have ended their dispute over whether the cable company had the right to stream Viacom-owned cable networks over its lineup of streaming apps for portable devices and home computers.

This means the cable company will be restoring streams of Comedy Central, MTV, VH1 and other Viacom networks over the coming weeks.  In return, Time Warner Cable has agreed to carry/continue Viacom’s Country Music Television on its cable systems.

From the official statement:

Viacom and Time Warner Cable have agreed to resolve their pending litigations. All of Viacom’s programming will now be available to Time Warner Cable subscribers for in-home viewing via internet protocol-enabled devices such as iPads and Time Warner Cable will continue to carry Viacom’s Country Music Television (CMT) programming. In reaching the settlement agreement, Time Warner Cable and Viacom were also able to resolve other unrelated business matters to their mutual satisfaction. Neither side is conceding its original legal position or will have further comment.

The dispute had no effect on traditional cable carriage of these networks. Only online streaming was impacted.