Tom Wheeler circa 1983, when he represented the cable industry. (Image: The Cable Center)

Skepticism persists over whether new FCC chairman Tom Wheeler, a former cable and telco lobbyist and venture capitalist, will have the interests of an industry he was a part of for decades ahead of the people he is supposed to represent.

The doubts are so significant, The Wall Street Journal’s ‘All Things D’ devoted an entire piece on the subject, interviewing Wheeler about his plans for the federal agency.

“My client today is the American people, and I am going to be the most effective advocate they could hope for,” Wheeler told AllThingsD in a phone interview on Wednesday. “I was (involved in) the early days of cable television when everybody was trying to squash it; I was a was champion for a diversity of voices and the competition that represented. I’m very proud of that period, but it was 30 years ago that I was in in cable, and 10 years ago that I was in wireless.”

Both periods were extremely important for both industries. When Wheeler was president of the National Cable TV Association (now the NCTA), his leadership helped enact the 1984 nationwide deregulation of the cable television industry. Wheeler promised the single national “hands-off” policy for cable television would put control “back in the hands of customers” instead of the local, state, and federal government. The cable lobby pushed hard for extra provisions in the law that would prohibit local or state governments or franchising authorities from reimposing controls the federal government eliminated.

The 1984 Cable Act contained three major provisions to strip away regulatory/rate oversight:

1. “Basic Cable” rate regulation was removed in any community where a cable company faced “effective competition” from at least three unduplicated over the air television stations. If your community received two fuzzy network affiliates and one local religious station, that was considered effective competition.
2. Local franchise authorities and cable TV commissions, often citizen-run, had most of their oversight and enforcement powers stripped away, including the most important power to deny a franchise renewal to a bad-acting local cable company, except in the most extreme cases. Cable operators effectively used this provision to launch costly lawsuits burying local communities in litigation expenses when they tried to find a different provider.
3. Granted local franchise authorities to right to demand cable systems set aside a few channels for Public, Educational, and Government (PEG) use.

The cable industry carefully lobbied for an effective definition of “competition” that made it into the final version of the bill. Estimates from congressional researchers predicted that 97 percent of the country’s cable systems would be deregulated when the law took effect Dec. 29, 1986.

In a 1984 C-SPAN call-in program, Wheeler noted that before deregulation, “the cities were in the driver’s seat” controlling the franchising process. Wheeler claimed cable operators competing for franchise agreements were forced to promise services and technology that ultimately proved too burdensome or expensive to actually deliver. Deregulation, Wheeler promised, would “keep cable rates low because you are not going to be paying for services that [the government says] have to be provided that nobody watches.”

In reality, after the passage of the 1984 Cable Act, cable systems were bought and sold in a frenzy that left control ultimately in the hands of a handful of operators. Soon after, cable rates skyrocketed and cable-industry-owned networks and channels were shoveled on to cable lineups. With every sale and every new channel addition, rates were raised even higher, whether customers wanted the extra programming or not.

Without oversight, cable service itself deteriorated in quality. In some cities, cable operators ignored rights-of-way and often refused to hang or bury cable lines left scattered on lawns. Customer complaints often went unresolved for days or weeks. Cable operators also rolled out new charges for monthly programming magazines and equipment, even as they continued to boost rates for basic cable itself. Prior to deregulation, customers usually paid less than $10 a month for basic cable. After, rates rapidly pushed towards the $20 a month mark. Today’s cable TV prices are much higher.

In the summer of 1984, Wheeler left the NCTA to pursue a new business – The NABU Network, a precursor to cable broadband that turned out to be a commercial failure. The NABU Network coupled a home computer system with a cable-based data service. The only significant North American trial of NABU was in Ottawa, Canada and required significant subsidies from the Canadian government. Wheeler said the NABU system would offer subscribers a mountain of software at a monthly subscription price. Canadians had to buy the NABU PC for around $950 and pay around $10 a month for software access.

The venture fell apart because cable systems in that era lacked two-way capability, making it cumbersome for users to interact with the NABU platform or manage applications. Ottawa Cablevision and Skyline Cablevision introduced NABU in 1983 and discontinued it in 1985.

In 1992, Wheeler went on to become president of CTIA – The Wireless Association, the nation’s biggest cell phone industry trade group. Wheeler beefed up the association’s lobbying forces after joining, turning CTIA into “one of the most influential lobbying forces on Capitol Hill,” according to Connected Planet.

Once there, Wheeler presided over efforts to get government spectrum policies relaxed and keep cancer questions about RF energy leaking from cellphones under wraps:

In a 1994 memo, Wheeler raised objections to a draft of a mobile-phone manual that, among other things, advised consumers how to limit radio-frequency radiation from mobile phones. The book says Wheeler succeeded in getting the industry consumer safety document watered down.

In a September 1994 memo, Wheeler mapped out “a pre-emptive strike” on Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.) by highlighting to Markey the involvement of Harvard University. Wheeler, according to the book, even had a backup plan to curry favor with Markey that, if necessary, would “send all cash through Harvard.”

By 2000, Wheeler was being questioned about conflict of interest charges about his lucrative investments in businesses represented under the CTIA’s public policy umbrella, according to RTR Wireless:

But conflict-of-interest issues-real, perceived and otherwise-that flow from Wheeler’s lucrative ties to Aether, OmniSky and now, Metrocall, could have long-term consequences that CTIA and the wireless industry would rather not consider in these halcyon days of soaring stocks, consolidation and deregulation.

The unorthodox arrangement Wheeler has with outside wireless firms begs closer scrutiny by CTIA’s board. Do Wheeler’s money and management ties to firms he advocates set a bad precedent? Could it diminish CTIA’s credibility as an organization?

Wheeler claims to be committed to three principles that will govern how he looks at issues before the FCC:

1. Is it good for competition? “You can’t have economic growth if you don’t have competition. You can put me down as rabidly pro-competition,” Wheeler said.
2. Trust between those who run networks and those who use them must be maintained.
3. Opening up high-speed networks must include guarantees that content will be open and accessible to all. “I am pro-the ability of individuals to access an open network,” he said.

Wheeler asked for a review of all proposals before the FCC and expects that in two months.

Tom Wheeler, then retiring president of the National Cable TV Association (NCTA), appeared on this fascinating 1984 C-SPAN call-in program at the NCTA Convention with future president Tom Mooney. The NCTA promised deregulation would deliver many benefits to cable subscribers. They got higher bills and declining service instead. (June 5, 1984 – 39:00)

The next name of Time Warner Cable?

Charter Communications is laying the foundation for a leveraged buyout of Time Warner Cable before the end of the year in a deal that could leave Time Warner Cable’s broadband customers with Charter’s usage caps.

Reuters reported discussions between the two companies grew more serious after last week’s revelation a poor third quarter left TWC with 308,000 fewer subscribers.

Charter is relying on guidance from Goldman Sachs to structure a financing deal likely to leave Charter in considerable debt. Charter Communications emerged from bankruptcy in 2009 and is the country’s tenth largest cable operator, estimated to be worth about $13 billion. Time Warner Cable is the second largest cable operator and is worth more than $34 billion.

The disparity between the two companies has kept Time Warner Cable resistant to a deal with Charter, stating it would not be beneficial to shareholders. Charter executives hope to eventually win shareholder support for a buyout stressing the significant cost savings possible from a combined operation, particularly for cable programming.

The deal would likely end Time Warner Cable as a brand and leave Charter Communications CEO Thomas Rutledge in charge of a much larger cable company. Pricing and packaging decisions are usually made by the buyer, which could bring faster broadband speeds to Time Warner customers, but also usage caps already in place at Charter.

John Malone’s War on Customers

Malone

Cable billionaire John Malone, former CEO of Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) — America’s largest cable operator in the 1980s — believes consolidation is critical to the future of a cable business facing competition from phone companies and cord cutting. Malone’s Liberty Media, which now holds a 25% stake in Charter, is currently buying and consolidating cable operators in Europe. Malone’s post-consolidation vision calls for only two or three cable operators in the United States.

Malone’s quest for consolidation is nothing new.

Under his leadership, TCI eventually became the country’s biggest cable operator, but one often accused of poor service and high prices. More than a decade of complaints from customers eventually attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress, which sought to rein in the industry with the 1992 Cable Act — legislation that lightly regulated rental fees for equipment and the price of the company’s most-basic television tier.

Despite the fact consumer advocates didn’t win stronger consumer protection regulations, TCI was still incensed it faced a new regulatory environment that left its hands tied. One executive at a TCI subsidiary advocated retaliation with broad rate increases for unregulated services to make up any losses from mandated rate cuts.

A 1993 internal TCI memo obtained by the Washington Post instructed TCI system managers and division vice presidents to increase prices charged for customer service calls and add new fees for common installation services the company used to offer for free. TCI’s Barry Marshall recommended charging for as many “transaction” services as possible — like hooking up VCR’s, running cable wire, and programming remote controls for confused customers.

“We have to have discipline,” Marshall wrote. “We cannot be dissuaded from the [new] charges simply because customers object. It will take awhile, but they’ll get used to it. The best news of all is we can blame it on re-regulation and the government now. Let’s take advantage of it!”

Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation’s largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

The FCC’s interim chairman at the time — James Quello, charged with monitoring the cable industry, was not amused.

“It typifies the attitude of cable companies engaging in creative pricing and rate increases to evade the intent of Congress and the FCC,” Quello said. “There is little doubt that the cable industry has an economic stake in discrediting the congressional act they vehemently and unsuccessfully opposed.”

Marshall defended his internal memo, although admitted it was inartfully written and was not intended for the public. Revelation of a damaging memo like this would normally lead to a quiet resignation by the offending author, but not at John Malone’s TCI, a company with a reputation for being difficult.

Mark Robichaux’s 2005 book, Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business, was even less charitable.

Robichaux describes Malone as a “complicated hero,” at least for investors for whom he was willing to ignore banking rules and creatively interpret tax law. Robichaux wrote Malone’s idea of customer service was to ‘charge as much as you can, but spend as little as you can get away with.’

TCI’s top priority was to keep up the cable business as an “insular cartel.” The predictable result included accusations of “shoddy service” customers were forced to take or leave. In the handful of markets where TCI faced another cable competitor, TCI ruthlessly slashed prices to levels some would describe as “predatory,” only to rescind them the moment the competitor was gone. TCI’s intolerance for competition usually meant mounting pressure on competitors to sell their system to TCI (sometimes at an astronomical price) or face a certain slow death from unsustainable price cuts.

Among Malone’s most-trusted friends: junk bond financier Michael Milken and Leo Hindery, former CEO of Global Crossing.

Congressman Albert Gore, Jr., later vice-president during the Clinton Administration, was probably Malone’s fiercest critic in Washington. Gore’s office was swamped with complaints from his Tennessee constituents upset over TCI’s constant rate increases and anti-competitive behavior.

The cable industry’s biggest competitor in the 1980s-1990s was a TVRO 6-12 foot diameter home satellite system.

Gore was especially unhappy that TCI’s grip extended even to its biggest competitor — satellite television.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, cable operators made life increasingly difficult for home satellite dish owners, many in rural areas unserved by cable television. But things were worse for home dish owners that walked away from TCI and began watching satellite television instead. To protect against cord-cutting, the cable industry demanded encryption of all basic and premium cable channels delivered via satellite. It was not hard to convince programmers to scramble — most cable networks in the 1980s were part-owned by the cable industry itself.

To make matters worse, unlike cable systems that only leased set-top boxes to customers, home dish owners had to buy combination receiver-descrambler equipment outright, starting at $500. Just a few years later, the industry pressured programmers to switch to a slightly different encryption system — one that required home dish owners replace their expensive set-top box with a different decoder module available only for sale.

Gore was further incensed to learn TCI often insisted home dish owners living within a TCI service area buy their satellite-delivered programming direct from the cable company. Customers hoping to leave cable for good found themselves still being billed by TCI.

Sometimes the rhetoric against TCI and Malone got personal.

”He called me Darth Vader and the leader of the cable Cosa Nostra,” Malone said of Gore. “You can’t win a pissing contest with a skunk, so there’s no point in getting involved in that kind of rhetoric.”

“There’s a joke going around Washington,” John Tinker, a New York-based Morgan Stanley & Company investment banker who specializes in cable television said of Malone back in 1990. “If you have a gun with two bullets, and you have Abu Nidal, Saddam Hussein and John Malone in a room, who would you shoot? The answer is John Malone — twice, to make sure he’s dead.”

TCI itself was a four letter word in the many small communities that endured the cable company’s insufferable service, outdated equipment, and constant rate “adjustments.”

The New York Times reported John Malone’s TCI had a reputation for treating customers with “utter disdain,” and provided examples:

• In 1973, rate negotiations stalled with local regulators in Vail, Colo., the local TCI system shut off all programming for a weekend and ran nothing but the names and home phone numbers of the mayor and city manager. The harried local government gave in.
• In 1981, TCI withheld fees and vowed to go completely dark in Jefferson City, Mo., if the city failed to renew its franchise, while a TCI employee — “who turned out to have a psychological problem,” said Malone — threatened harm to the city’s media consultant. Again, a beleaguered local government renewed the franchise — although in a subsequent lawsuit, TCI was fined $10.8 million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
• In 1983, the small city of Kearney, Neb., also dissatisfied with poor service and rising rates, tried to give Malone some competition in the form of a rival system built by the regional telephone company. TCI slashed fees and added channels until the enemy was driven from the field.

“That’s the dark side, if you will, of TCI,” said Richard J. MacDonald, a media analyst with New York-based MacDonald Grippo Riely.

By mid-1989, Malone’s frenzied effort to consolidate the cable industry resulted in him presiding over 482 merger/buyout deals, on average one every two weeks. Among the legacy cable companies that no longer existed after TCI’s takeover crew arrived: Heritage Communications, United Artists Communications and Storer Communications.

To cover the debt-laden deals, Malone simply raised cable rates and shopped for easy credit. Bidding with others’ money, the per-subscriber price of cable systems shot up from $998 in 1983 to an astronomical $2,328 in 1989.

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found deregulating the cable industry cost customers through rate hikes averaging 43 percent. In Denver, TCI raised rates more than 70% between 1986 and 1989.

Malone’s attempt to finance a leveraged, debt-heavy buyout of Time Warner Cable seems to show his business philosophy has not changed much.

Broadband in the United States costs far more than in other countries — nearly three times as much as in the UK and France, and at least five times more than South Korea, according to BBC News.

The New America Foundation compared hundreds of available packages around the world and found customers in America’s largest cities are getting the biggest bills.

Customers in San Francisco with a discounted low-medium speed bundle including broadband pay $99 a month. A near-equivalent package costs London residents $38. New Yorkers get some savings from Time Warner and Cablevision facing down Verizon FiOS. But it isn’t enough. In the Big Apple, a promotional bundle averages $70 a month. “C’est la vie,” say Parisians. They only pay $35 for about the same. Even Washington, D.C. residents, which include the country’s most powerful politicians, pay Comcast its $68 asking price. In Seoul, South Korea, a comparable offer costs $15 a month.

High asking prices don’t buy better service. According to a report by the OECD issued over the summer, the United States ranks among the worst in terms of broadband-only pricing. With an average price of $90 a month for 45Mbps service, the U.S. ranked 30th out of 33 countries. Add phone and television service and the price spikes to around $200.

The BBC pondered why there is such a disparity in pricing. The answer was easy to spot: the lack of true competition.

“Americans pay so much because they don’t have a choice,” said Susan Crawford, a former special assistant to President Barack Obama on science, technology and innovation policy. “We deregulated high-speed Internet access 10 years ago and since then we’ve seen enormous consolidation and monopolies, so left to their own devices, companies that supply Internet access will charge high prices, because they face neither competition nor oversight.”

Although Americans can name the largest and deep pocketed providers — Comcast, AT&T, Time Warner Cable, Verizon, Cablevision, CenturyLink, Cox, and Frontier — most cannot choose from more than one cable provider and one telephone company. Comcast does not compete against Time Warner and AT&T does not compete against Verizon, except in the wireless world where both companies offer near-identical plans and pricing.

Comcast is quite the gouger in San Francisco.

Bay area customers told the BBC they get bills ranging from $120 a month for television and broadband (not including a $7 modem rental fee) to $200 a month for phone, TV, and Internet access. That same cable company is now testing a 300GB monthly usage cap on broadband in several American cities.

In contrast South Korea offers ubiquitous free Wi-Fi letting customers avoid usage charges. Home broadband is fast and cheap. Most pay $20 a month for 100Mbps.

Digging deeper, the BBC found clues why robust broadband competition delivers savings for consumers in Europe and Asia while Americans pay more.

Rick Karr, who made a PBS documentary in the UK comparing broadband costs at home and abroad, said the critical moment came when the British regulator Ofcom forced British Telecom to open its network and allow other companies to sell broadband over its copper telephone wires. In the United States, regulators never forced cable operators to open their networks, and after a 6-3 Supreme Court decision upheld the cable industry’s insistence it need not share access with competitors, telephone companies quickly called for parity.

A 2005 Supreme Court decision upheld the cable industry’s right to keep competitors off its cable broadband network.

Some argue the ruling promotes more competition by provoking competitors to build their own networks. But current conventional wisdom among the investment community teaches one cable and one phone company is considered good enough. Additional providers would erode the standing of all and force price cutting to compete.

There are exceptions. Although Google’s fiber to the home service has drawn national attention for its inexpensive gigabit fiber broadband network ($70 for broadband-only service), at least 150 cities are served by the public sector — co-op or publicly owned utility companies that offer broadband, often delivered over fiber optic networks.

Those networks often charge considerably less than the incumbent cable operator or phone company, a fact that has driven many privately run operators to seek legislative bans on community broadband.

In response to the report, telecommunications companies avoided the topic of prices and focused instead on value for money and the future.

Lowell McAdam, CEO of Verizon Communications, said Europe was replete with a decade of underinvestment, leaving many with less than 30Mbps service. The National Cable and Telecommunications Association said it was difficult to make international comparisons on price and Scott Cleland, part of the industry-funded NetCompetition website claimed although people may pay higher bills, they can at least choose among phone, cable, wireless or satellite.

“We may be paying more in your eyes today but we are building for tomorrow and the long-term,” said Cleland.

AT&T is hunting for buyers of its massive network of 10,000 cell towers worth about $5 billion to defray the costs of Wall Street-pleasing stock buybacks and fund potential acquisition deals in Europe.

The company first signaled a willingness to sell its towers and other ancillary assets at an investor meeting in March according to Bloomberg News. AT&T has hired TAP Advisors LLC and JPMorgan Chase to help coordinate the sale.

After the sale, AT&T would lease access to the network of cell towers from its new owner, potentially winning AT&T certain tax benefits. In return, the company will give up about $326 million in annual revenue now earned from other companies that pay to lease space on AT&T’s towers.

The sale could help competing carriers seeking to improve coverage. An independent owner will any wireless company to lease access to a site’s tower, something AT&T did not always permit for competitive reasons. That could cut a lot of red tape for companies seeking to build new tower sites and meeting objections from area residents.

Tower company consolidation has already reduced the number of potential buyers to three major likely contenders: Crown Castle International, SBA Communications, and the largest tower owner in the United States – American Tower Corp.

Cell tower sales are no longer unusual. T-Mobile USA agreed to sell the rights to operate 7,200 cellular towers to Crown Castle for $2.4 billion last September and other companies are buying wireless network assets in Brazil and Mexico.

Verizon Communications spent Labor Day weekend putting the final touches on a carefully crafted deal to attain full ownership of its wireless unit, buying out its British partner’s 45 percent share in a deal valued at $130 billion.

The long talked-about buyout of Vodafone has been on the table for years, but became a priority for Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam, who spent much of his career overseeing Verizon Wireless. Since McAdam took over from predecessor Ivan Seidenberg in 2011, he has refocused priority on Verizon’s wireless business, at the cost of landlines and Verizon’s fiber optic network FiOS.

The transaction dwarfs (by nearly four times) the $33 billion annual budget of the entire state of New Jersey. Verizon has agreed to pay Vodafone $58.9 billion in cash and $60.2 billion in Verizon shares, and finance another $5 billion of the deal in loan notes. Verizon has also agreed to sell its 23 percent ownership in Vodafone Italy worth around $3.5 billion and take on $2.5 billion of Vodafone’s debt.

A deal this large would normally generate tens of billions in tax revenue payable to HM Revenue & Customs in England and the Internal Revenue Service in the United States, but creative accounting at both companies makes it all but certain Vodafone will pay nothing in British taxes and only $5 billion to the IRS, despite its $130 billion windfall.

Vodafone is structuring the deal through a Dutch holding company, transferring assets to Verizon in a way that minimizes the tax bite. As proposed, the deal is exempt from taxes in both the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/CNBC Verizon Wireless Vodafone McAdam Merger 9-3-13.mp4[/flv]

CNBC had this exclusive interview with Verizon CEO Lowell McAdam discussing why Verizon is willing to spend $130 billion to end its partnership with Vodafone and how Verizon Wireless will change as a result. (12 minutes)

Wall Street investment banks will do better than American and British tax authorities, dividing at least $1.3 billion in financing, merger, and legal fees surrounding the Verizon deal. Many of New York’s largest investment banks are taking part in the transaction.

Vodafone is depending heavily on guidance from Swiss-based UBS and Goldman Sachs. The latter has earned $438 million so far this year advising companies on mergers and acquisitions.

Verizon is relying on advice from J.P. Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley. Bank of America Merrill Lynch and Barclays have joined to offer their help with the enormous debt-funding package required for the deal.

Verizon customers will notice little to nothing different about their wireless service after the deal is complete in the first quarter of 2014. Many customers had no idea Vodafone was part owner of the largest wireless company in the United States. Verizon always maintained effective control of the U.S. operation and plans no immediate changes as a result of assuming outright control of the company.

Little controversy is expected in getting the deal approved by regulators for the same reason.

Shareholders are likely to reap most of the rewards. Vodafone stockholders are expecting the bulk of the proceeds from the sale will be returned to them in the form of dividends. Verizon shareholders also expect better returns in the future now that Verizon’s profitable wireless unit will no longer have to set aside costly dividend payments intended for Vodafone and its shareholders.

[flv width=”512″ height=”308″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/BBC Vodafone will not pay tax on 84bn sale to Verizon 9-2-13.flv[/flv]

The BBC reports the sale of Vodafone’s 45% share of Verizon Wireless has been structured so that both companies can entirely avoid British and Dutch capital gains taxes and limit the American tax bite to less than $5 billion.  (1 minute)

Verizon hopes being the master of its own destiny will allow the company to innovate its wireless network towards future revenue opportunities, especially in the machine to machine connectivity business. Both AT&T and Verizon Wireless are racing to enable medical devices, home appliances, electric meters, and automobiles to communicate over their respective wireless networks. Both companies are concerned that the cell phone marketplace has become saturated in the United States, with most people desiring cell phone service already having it. With Wall Street demanding ongoing growth quarter after quarter, new revenue sources are more important than ever.

“Even in the saturated market, (Verizon Wireless) continues to post growth figures,” Bill Menezes, an industry analyst at research firm Gartner told USA Today. “They’re looking at a world where growth is coming from these ancillary devices.”

Many Verizon shareholders expected a deal this year, but some are concerned Verizon has offered too much to buy out Vodafone. Many Wall Street analysts had expected Vodafone would part with its 45 percent ownership of Verizon Wireless for around $100 billion, but Vodafone clearly held out for more.

The corporate deal is the world’s third largest after Vodafone’s $203 billion takeover of Germany’s Mannesmann in 1999 and AOL’s 2000 $181 billion acquisition of Time Warner.

Vodafone is planning to use some of the proceeds not returned to shareholders to bolster its European business, which has suffered from the economic downturn and robust wireless competition that have kept prices low. Wall Street analysts predict the European market is ripe for a wave of consolidation similar to what happened in the United States over the last decade. Vodafone may need more financial resources to protect its market position or have the flexibility to buy out competitors.

The European wireless giant has been a quiet partner of Verizon Wireless for almost 14 years. Verizon Wireless was launched in 2000 as a joint venture of Bell Atlantic and Vodafone. As the venture was being launched, Bell Atlantic merged with GTE, forming Verizon Communications.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/CNBC Discussing the media deals 9-3-13.mp4[/flv]

CNBC reports historically low interest rates and cheap credit for corporations made it an ideal time to structure a deal so important to J.P. Morgan Chase, the bank sent CEO Jamie Dimond to persuade Verizon board members to approve it. Investment banks will split more than one billion dollars in deal fees.  (7 minutes)