The U.S. government has filed a lawsuit to block a $39 billion dollar merger deal between AT&T and T-Mobile USA, citing substantially reduced competition for American cell phone customers.

“AT&T’s elimination of T-Mobile as an independent, low-priced rival would remove a significant competitive force from the market,” the Justice Dept. said in its filing.

“We are seeking to block this deal in order to maintain a vibrant and competitive marketplace that allows everyone to benefit from lower prices and better quality and innovative products,” said James M. Cole, deputy attorney general.

News that the merger could be ultimately blocked by the Justice Department caused AT&T and T-Mobile shares to lose as much as seven percent of their value.  But shares of competitor Sprint, considered the most vulnerable remaining competitor to AT&T and Verizon Wireless are soaring this morning by more than seven percent.

Cole’s statement was harsh in its condemnation of the merger’s benefits touted by AT&T:

The Department filed its lawsuit because we believe the combination of AT&T and T-Mobile would result in tens of millions of consumers all across the United States facing higher prices, fewer choices and lower quality products for their mobile wireless services.

Consumers across the country, including those in rural areas and those with lower incomes, have benefitted from competition among the nation’s wireless carriers, particularly the four remaining national carriers.   This lawsuit seeks to ensure that everyone can continue to reap the benefits of that competition.

Right now, four nationwide providers account for more than 90 percent of the mobile wireless connections in America, and preserving competition among them is crucial.   For instance, AT&T and T-Mobile currently compete head-to-head in 97 of the nation’s largest 100 cellular marketing areas.   They also compete nationwide to attract business and government customers.   Were the merger to proceed, there would only be three providers with 90 percent of the market, and competition among the remaining competitors on all dimensions—including price, quality, and innovation—would be diminished.

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Bloomberg News delivered the breaking news that the Department of Justice would oppose the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile on antitrust grounds.  (2 minutes)

The deal falling through would cost AT&T a $3 billion dollar failed deal breakup fee, and a parting gift of wireless spectrum to T-Mobile USA, a unit of Deutsche Telekom AG.

Observers suggest part of the reason for the rejection may have been an attempt by the Obama Administration to draw a line in the sand for the size of large mergers and acquisitions it will tolerate.  The antitrust division of the Dept. of Justice has recently become more aggressive in reviewing large corporate merger transactions, and had the Administration approved the deal between AT&T and T-Mobile, the acceptance of permitting two companies to control the majority of wireless customers would have arguably meant virtually any merger deal would have passed muster, regardless of the implications of concentrated market share.

Traditionally, opposition from the Dept. of Justice spells doom for most merger proposals.  But AT&T is no ordinary corporate entity.  In addition to being confident enough to agree to a $3 billion breakup fee and giving away valuable spectrum should the deal fail, AT&T’s lobbying efforts and legal budget are unparalleled, and the company may decide to fight to preserve the deal using political and legal channels.  The terms of the merger could also be renegotiated, agreeing to spin off more customers to reduce market share, or compromising on consumer protections or other givebacks.

But for most companies, opposition from the government’s antitrust division is a high hurdle to overcome, and many won’t even try.

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CNBC delivered the stunned reaction among its own anchors and telecommunications industry analysts about the Justice Department’s strong objections to the proposed merger.  Many on Wall Street predicted this was a ‘done deal.’  (12 minutes)

Should AT&T and T-Mobile abort the deal, that doesn’t necessarily guarantee Americans will still have four major carriers to choose from.  Deutsche Telekom maintains a strong interest in selling off T-Mobile USA, and has reduced investment in the company.  That could renew rumors of a merger deal between T-Mobile and Sprint.

AT&T executives as late as this morning seemed to have no advance warning of the Justice Department’s decision.  CEO Randall Stephenson spent much of his morning suggesting AT&T would hire thousands of call center workers as a result of the merger.

After learning of the impending lawsuit, AT&T released a statement: “We are surprised and disappointed by today’s action, particularly since we have met repeatedly with the Department of Justice and there was no indication from the DOJ that this action was being contemplated,” the statement said. “The DOJ has the burden of proving alleged anti-competitive affects and we intend to vigorously contest this matter in court.”

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CNBC reporters and analysts react to the impact the Justice Department’s objections are having on the entire telecommunications business sector.  The question now being pondered at AT&T: Will it fight for the deal or will it fold?  (5 minutes)

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

Cornell University students pay an average of $37,000 a year (before housing, student fees, and other expenses) to attend one of America’s most prestigious universities.  When they arrive on-campus, it doesn’t take long to learn the college has one of the nastiest Internet Overcharging schemes around for students deemed to be using “too much Internet.”

For years, Cornell limited students to less than 20 gigabytes of Internet usage per month, only recently increasing the monthly allowance to 50GB this summer.  Cornell’s overlimit fee starts at $1.50 per gigabyte, billed in megabyte increments.  Now some students are pushing back, launching a petition drive to banish the usage limits that curtail usage and punish the 10 percent of students who exceed their allowance.

Christina Lara, originally from Fair Lawn, N.J., started the petition which has attracted nearly 300 signatures over the past few weeks.

“Cornell students, along with students across the world, rely on the Internet to pursue their academics, independent research, and leisure activity,” Lara writes. “We should not be subjected to charges for our Internet usage, particularly because our curriculums mandate we use the Internet. Despite this, Cornell University continues to adopt NUBB (Network Usage-Based Billing), which charges students for exceeding the 50 gigabyte per month ‘allowance.'”

Lara incurred bills as high as $90 a month in overlimit fees last year, thanks to regular use of Netflix and Skype for online video chats with friends and family back home.

Internet fees for on-campus housing are included in the mandatory student services fee.  Although Time Warner Cable has a presence on campus, most residence halls don’t appear to be able to obtain service from the potential competitor, which sells unlimited Internet access in the southern tier region of New York where Cornell is located.  Instead, Cornell students on campus rely on the university’s wireless and Ethernet broadband network, and DirecTV or the university’s own cable TV system for television.

Lara

The apparent lack of competition makes charging excess-use fees for Internet usage easy, critics of the fees charge.

“It’s much easier if you live off-campus or in one of the apartment complexes students favor,” says Neal, one of our readers in the Ithaca area who used to attend Cornell.  “The only complication is getting access to the University’s Intranet, which is much easier if you are using their network.”

Neal says Verizon delivers landline DSL to off-campus housing, but not on-campus.  Because the service maxes out at 7Mbps, most who have other options sign up for Time Warner Cable’s broadband service instead.

“It’s cheaper on a promotion and much faster, and it’s still unlimited,” Neal says. “Hasbrouck, Maplewood and Thurston Court were the only residential buildings that offered the chance for Time Warner Cable on-campus, and only if the wiring was already in place.”

Neal notes many apartment complexes off campus have contracts with Time Warner Cable, which means cable TV and basic broadband are included in your monthly rent.  Some Cornell students who live on or near campus try to make do with a slower, but generally free option — the Red Rover Wi-Fi network administered by the University.  Others reserve the highest usage activities for computers inside university academic buildings, where the limits come off.

Lara complains Ithaca, and the southern tier in general, is hardly an entertainment hotbed, making the Internet more important than ever for leisure activities.

Time Warner Cable provides the rest of Ithaca with unlimited Internet.

“If Cornell was situated in a major metropolitan area with a vast nightlife that could accommodate the interests of most, if not all, our undergraduates, then many Cornellians wouldn’t be so inclined to stay in their rooms and get on the Internet,” Lara says. “But that’s not the case. Cornell’s Greek life dominates the social scene, making ‘nightlife’ a dividing factor in the community.”

Tracy Mitrano, Cornell’s director of information-technology policy, told The Chronicle the vast majority of students will never hit the cap, and those that do cannot be charged more than $1,000 a month in overlimit fees, regardless of use.  Those that do exceed the limit typically find a monthly bill for “overuse” amounting to $30.

“The approach that Cornell uses offers transparency and choice,” said Mitrano. She noted that Cornell provides students with clear information regarding their network usage by alerting them by e-mail when they are about to hit the limit and by setting specific rates for overuse fees.

“The choice seems to be using the university network or moving off-campus to buy Verizon or Time Warner Cable broadband to avoid the usage cap,” counters Neal. “I am not sure their ‘choice’ argument flies if students don’t have the option of signing up for Road Runner in their rooms on their own, bypassing the Internet Overcharging altogether.”

Both Neal and Gregory A. Jackson, vice president of Educause, seem to be reaching consensus on whether or not universities should be charging students for Internet separately from room and board.  Jackson notes it is a discussion being held at an increasing number of universities.  Neal thinks having a wide open access policy to deliver competition could solve this problem in short order, and students should make the decision where to spend their broadband funds themselves.

“If Cornell’s IT bureaucracy faced unlimited-access competition from Verizon and Time Warner Cable, do you think they’d still have a 50GB usage cap, considering only a small percentage of their captive customers exceeded it,” Neal asks.  “Of course not.”

[Thanks to PreventCAPS for the story idea.]

AT&T “streamlined” its text messaging plans over the weekend for new customers, eliminating a less-expensive $10/1000 text budget plan in favor of unlimited texting plans that cost much more.

That means new AT&T customers who want to text will pay dearly for the privilege:

• $0.20 per text message sent/received,
• $20.00 Unlimited texting (individual line)
• $30.00 Unlimited texting (family plan)

So much for asking customers to ‘pay for what they use.’  AT&T is moving towards unlimited texting — at a very high price — while moving away from unlimited data.

AT&T released a statement about the changes:

“We regularly evaluate our offers and are making some adjustments to our messaging lineup. Starting August 21, we’re streamlining our text messaging plans for new customers and will offer an unlimited plan for individuals for $20 per month and an unlimited plan for families of up to five lines for $30 per month. The vast majority of our messaging customers prefer unlimited plans and with text messaging growth stronger than ever, that number continues to climb among new customers. Existing customers don’t have to change any messaging plan they have today, even when changing handsets.”

Gizmodo points out AT&T is charging customers who don’t have a text plan 100,000 percent more than what they charge for online data:

Here’s how it breaks down:

AT&T charges $25 for 2 gigabytes of mobile data, which states how much they think their bits and bytes are worth. That comes out to 80 megabytes per dollar. 80 megabytes will get you 500,000 text messages—assuming you’re writing the largest possible message, which you’re often not (i.e. “Hey” “Nothing” “lol”).

Now divide that dollar by the 500,000 potential texts. That comes out to $0.000002 per text—two ten thousandths of a cent. A very, very, very small amount of money.

Now, let’s say you send 5,000 texts a month. That’s a large, though wholly realistic number. Multiply that by the above worthless cost per text, and you’ve got—hold onto your wallet!—$0.01. A penny for five thousand texts, according to how much AT&T says its data is worth in a data plan.

But outside of the data plan? Oh boy! Things get very different very fast. And by very different, I mean inordinately overpriced. Those same 5,000 texts, at a rate of $0.20 per message, will cost you $1,000. Not a penny—a grand. Two very different prices for literally the exact same thing.

For customers who only send and receive occasional text messages, losing the $10 option means most will either pay the heavily marked-up $0.20 a-la-carte price, or pay double and not worry about how many messages they send.

Ultimately, AT&T’s new prices may drive an increasing number of users to alternative ways of communicating with friends and family, especially as prices keep rising.  Some AT&T customers remain grandfathered on text plans that offer 200 messages for $5 a month.  But for customers like Ben Chinn of San Francisco, even $5 is asking a lot.

“With everything with the mobile carriers, I feel I’m getting nickeled and dimed,” Chinn told the Los Angeles Times. “I resent paying so much for text messaging, and I feel that it’s not a reasonable price to pay for something that costs the carriers next to nothing.”

Free Press Research Director S. Derek Turner says AT&T’s new prices foreshadow the kinds of higher prices all Americans will pay if the wireless industry continues its march towards consolidation.

“This move is simply another example of AT&T passing off a price increase for consumers as a benefit,” Turner said. “If this were a truly competitive market, AT&T would offer its customers more choice and value, and no carrier would get away with a 10-million-percent markup on its services. This should serve as a warning to the Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission — if AT&T is already able to unilaterally increase prices, allowing the company to eliminate low-cost competitor T-Mobile will only make things worse.”

The Times notes Juniper Research has predicted that global revenue for text messaging will peak this year and begin to drift down. And in a recent report, UBS Investment Research warned that “customers could elect not to pay for texting as smartphones and third-party applications become pervasive.”

Facebook has introduced Messenger, a free smartphone app that allows members to exchange text messages with friends, as well as anyone else who happens to have a cell phone.  Google Voice includes unlimited free texting, if those sending messages remember your Google Voice number.  Apple’s forthcoming iMessage will be pre-installed on most Apple devices, offering a ready-made opportunity to bypass high-priced text plans.  There are dozens of other apps that offload text traffic to your smartphone data plan, where the added traffic is so insignificant, it has largely no impact on even the lowest usage plans.

The preferred outcome of using any of these third-party apps is to cancel expensive texting plans from your phone carrier.  But there are obstacles:

1. Many friends may continue to text your primary cell phone number directly, incurring a-la-carte text messaging fees if you cancel your text plan;
2. Many require all of your contacts to run specific apps to exchange messages, which can quickly become a burden;
3. Apple’s iMessage assumes all of your friends are using Apple phones or devices.  Everyone else will have to hope for, find, and install another app to support the service.

The trade-off works for some, but not for others.

Hieu Do of St. Louis tells the Times he’s had to pay for individual text messages after dropping his text plan, but Google Voice has still helped him save money:

“At the beginning of every month I would lose a dollar here and there from people texting my old number, but it’s worth it more than paying $5 or $10 a month for a texting plan,” he said.

But Jim Jeffords, one of our readers, tried Google Voice for awhile and decided it was just too cumbersome for texting.

“I ended up getting text messages from a lot of business contacts that didn’t know about my Google Voice number, but had my cell phone number,” Jeffords says. “I was not about to throw a Google Voice number into the mix and come across as cheap and make them remember what number to text.”

Jeffords went back to a basic text plan with a few hundred messages a month included.

“It wasn’t worth the hassle to deal with,” he said.

Next time you wonder why you are paying substantially higher cell phone bills than your neighbors abroad, take note: just three cell phone companies control 94 percent of the wireless marketplace in Canada, with more than 23.5 million combined subscribers.  The four other significant carriers have a combined subscriber base of around 1.5 million, hardly worth noticing by the largest three:

Rogers Communications

The telecom giant Rogers controls the largest share of the Canadian wireless market with 9,127,000 subscribers as of the end of June.  Nearly 7.5 million of those customers are on two year contracts and pay an average bill of $70.07 per month.  Prepaid customers pay substantially less for their occasional-use phones: $16.14 a month.  Rogers adds more subscribers than it loses, picking up 591,000 new customers during the first quarter, while losing 456,000 current customers, winning a net gain of 135,000.

Data revenue is becoming increasingly important for Rogers, now constituting 35 percent of earnings for the company’s wireless division.

Bell

Coming in at second place is Bell Canada, with 7,283,000 customers.  Over 5.7 million are on contract, 1.6 million are using Bell prepaid phones.  Bell added just under 38,000 new customers last quarter, the smallest net add among the three largest providers.  The average contract customer pays Bell $63.18 a month; prepaid customers pay $16.88.

Telus Mobility

Telus, western Canada’s largest phone company, sells wireless service across the country and has become the third largest wireless provider with 5.8 million contract customers and 1.2 million prepaid clients.  Together, they pay an average of $58.88 a month.  Telus picked up 94,000 net additions last quarter, which is better than Bell but worse than Rogers.

Everyone Else

Among the rest, Saskatchewan’s phone company Sasktel had managed to reach 568,000 subscribers, mostly in the province, as of late March.  MTS Allstream Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of Manitoba Telecom came in with 489,722 customers.  Videotron, Quebec’s biggest cable company, had 210,600 clients, mostly in Quebec.

Among the newest entrants, Wind Mobile, subject to considerable controversy for its foreign financial backing, may one day be a much larger player in Canada’s wireless marketplace, but not today.  It had just 271,000 customers as of March 31st.

Even fewer customers rely on some of Canada’s regional providers, which include companies like Thunder Bay Telephone, Lynx Mobility (co-owned by an aboriginal partner with a mission to serve rural Canada), Calgary-based AirTel, which is popular with oil/gas workers for its “push to talk” service, and Ice Wireless, which is the largest GSM carrier in northern Canada, reaching 70% of the population of Nunavut and the Northwest Territories.

Canada’s largest three providers also own or control several “competitors” that mostly sell prepaid service.  Customers thinking they are escaping the big boys often really are not:

• Fido is owned by Rogers;
• Virgin Mobile Canada is owned by Bell;
• Koodo Mobile is owned by Telus