Bell Canada Enterprises, Inc. announced Monday it extended its Fibe Internet and television service to most parts of Quebec City.

Unlike in most other Fibe-enabled Canadian cities, Bell’s network in Quebec City offers true fiber to the home service, not a combination of fiber to the neighborhood/copper wire.  That means increased broadband speeds — downloads up to 175Mbps and uploads of up to 30Mbps.  Quebec City was selected for true fiber service because of of the predominance of overhead aerial wiring, which is much easier and cheaper to replace with fiber than underground wiring.  For other major Canadian cities like Montreal and Toronto, Bell has made do with a lesser network that combines fiber and existing copper phone wiring that offers lower capacity for broadband and video services.

Bell says Fibe is now open for business in the region’s boroughs of Quebec, Beauport, Sillery, Ste-Foy, Cap-Rouge, Charlesbourg, L’Ancienne-Lorette, Loretteville, Sainte-Therese-de-Lisieux and Montmorency.  Service for Levis is expected shortly.

The company says it intends to reserve additional fiber to the home service primarily for multi-dwelling units and new housing developments in Ontario and Quebec, primarily between Windsor in the west and Quebec City in the east.

The company’s aggressive deployment of fiber is an effort to stem landline losses in eastern Canada.  Between cell phone providers and cable companies like Rogers, Cogeco, and Quebecor’s Vidéotron Ltee., Canadians have been hanging up permanently on Bell landlines at an alarming rate for the company.

Dvai Ghose, analyst at Canaccord Genuity told his clients, “Bell is now reporting amongst the worst residential line losses in North America.”  In the last quarter alone, 90,000 Bell customers said goodbye, perhaps permanently.

Bell has lost more than 1.2 million customers in the last two years.  Even Fibe may not be enough to stem the losses.  Canadians are not excited by the company’s video or broadband services, adding only around 27,000 new customers in the last quarter.  Bell’s notorious love of Internet Overcharging schemes like usage caps may be partly responsible.  The company enjoys a poor reputation among Internet enthusiasts for its wholehearted support for usage-limiting Canada’s online experience.

Financial analysts believe aggressive deployment of Fibe may be critical to the company’s long term survival.  Not only must Bell compete with a trend towards wireless phones, it has cable competitors selling triple play packages of phone, Internet and television service at prices that are frequently lower than what Bell charges.

Fibe is expected to be expanded to include the entire island of Montreal and some of the surrounding region by the end of 2012.

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Bell Entertainment Fibre Internet and TV in Canada.flv[/flv]

An extended length introductory commercial for Bell Canada’s Fibe TV and Internet.  (6 minutes)

Fibrant, a community-owned fiber-to-the-home provider in Salisbury, N.C., has discovered the importance of redundancy. A major service outage knocked out phone and broadband service for several hours Monday, due to a fiber cut between Concord and Salisbury.  Fibrant’s provider, DukeNet, restored service after four and half hours by rerouting around the cable cut, but the incident left Fibrant looking for a backup provider to reduce the chance such a service outage will occur again.

City Manager Doug Paris, who was instrumental in getting Fibrant up and running in Salisbury, said the incident underlined the need to have redundancy to keep customers online.  While the city asks DukeNet for an explanation of the most recent service outage, Salisbury is taking bids for backup service.

Redundancy is a lesson virtually every service provider learns — commercial or otherwise.  What company has not suffered a significant service outage from an errant backhoe or construction crew severing a vital fiber link? Without a backup provider, service fails and customers howl.  Those companies experiencing multiple outages soon learn having a second provider can keep service disruptions to a minimum and more importantly make them invisible to customers.

Salisbury is located northeast of the city of Charlotte, N.C.

Paris told the Salisbury Post the city’s intent to contract with a second supplier has its benefits. A large educational institution has now signed up for service, with several potential new business customers considering Fibrant as well.

Fibrant has won a 13% market share in Salisbury, supplying phone, Internet, and cable TV to more than 1,700 customers.  Fibrant offers the fastest broadband service in the city and competes primarily with Time Warner Cable.  It also faces perennial opposition from anti “government broadband” critics, many nipping at the provider for political reasons.

Opponent John Bare has compared Fibrant to welfare, opposing it because it is not operated by the private sector.

But Fibrant has kept its competitors on their toes, forcing both the local cable and phone company to offer cut-rate deals for new customers and those threatening to switch.  Those low prices and retention deals have cut into Fibrant’s projected share of business in the community, but city officials note the customers who do sign up stay with the provider.  Fibrant has a 99% customer retention rate.

Fibrant’s biggest challenge remains its start up costs and debt.  The provider spends nearly $1,350 for each residential installation, for which it charges customers nothing unless they depart within a year of signing up.  Fibrant recoups installation and network construction costs from customers over time.  But the company does have plans to more aggressively market its service to Salisbury’s 34,000 residents in light of competitive offers from cable and phone companies.  Fibrant manages to win around 30 new customers a week.

Salisbury’s fiber network does not pitch customers “teaser rates” that rise considerably after the promotion expires. It prefers to market its superior speeds and service, and notes all of the revenue earned by Fibrant stays in the local community instead of being pocketed by Wall Street banks and investors.

Sen. Linda Runbeck, a dues-paying member of ALEC, a corporate funded pressure group that advocates for legislation advantageous to ALEC's corporate sponsors.

Rural Minnesota is facing a full frontal assault on community broadband, courtesy of a state representative so proud of her involvement in a corporate front group, she’s actually a dues-paying member.

State Sen. Linda Runbeck (R-Circle Pines) introduced HF 2695, a bill to prohibit publicly-owned broadband systems:

A bill for an act relating to telecommunications; prohibiting publicly owned broadband systems; proposing coding for new law in Minnesota Statutes, chapter 237.

BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MINNESOTA: Section 1. [237.201] PUBLICLY OWNED BROADBAND SYSTEM; PROHIBITION.

(a) Notwithstanding section 475.58, subdivision 1, other state law, county ordinance, or any authority granted in a home rule charter, a city or a county may not use tax revenues raised within its jurisdiction or issue debt to construct, acquire, own, or operate, in whole or in part, a system to deliver broadband service.

(b) Notwithstanding sections 123A.21, 123B.61 to 123B.63, 125B.26, and 475.58, subdivision 1, no school district or service cooperative may use state revenues, tax revenues raised within its jurisdiction, or issue debt to construct, acquire, own, or operate, in whole or in part, a system to deliver broadband service.

(c) For the purposes of this section, “broadband service” means a service that allows subscribers to access information from the Internet by means of a physical, terrestrial, non-mobile, or fixed wireless technology.

(d) This section applies to a system to deliver broadband service whose construction begins after the effective date of this section, but does not apply to:

1. the city of Minneapolis, St. Paul, or Duluth; or
2. the maintenance or repair of a system delivering broadband service whose initial construction began before the effective date of this section, provided that the geographical area in which the system delivers broadband service is not expanded as a result of the maintenance or repair.

EFFECTIVE DATE. This section is effective the day following final enactment.

The public broadband option delivers the most bang for the buck, which is why some providers want to see it banned.

Runbeck is a dues-paying member of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a secretive corporate front group that lobbies lawmakers to introduce business-friendly legislation, often on the state level.  Runbeck told the Minnesota Independent via email that she paid $100 for a two-year membership in the organization, and says she’s never used ALEC’s “model legislation,” bills that are sometimes written by corporate members of the group and that pop up in state capitols across the country.

But Runbeck’s sudden interest in banning community broadband coincides with similar efforts in states like Georgia and South Carolina backed by big cable and phone companies.  Runbeck’s bill would directly target rural Minnesota, where broadband is the least robust, while exempting Minneapolis, St. Paul, and Duluth (and incumbent phone and cable companies) from the bill’s provisions.  Runbeck’s bill also constrains existing public broadband services from expanding, an important matter for providers still rolling out service to additional neighborhoods in their communities.

Community broadband is already hampered in Minnesota by laws that make such projects difficult to approve and build.  When projects do break ground, incumbent providers do everything possible to throw up roadblocks to delay or abort the progress being made.  In Monticello, TDS Telecom filed nuisance suits against that city’s public broadband network before finally deciding to upgrade service themselves.  Mediacom and Charter, two major Minnesota cable operators, have objected to public broadband projects that don’t even serve communities they’ve wired.

When the networks are in operation, providers like Charter work to undercut them by selling service at prices so low, they’re predatory.  But when competitors are driven out, prices rise… quickly.

 Runbeck’s $100 membership in ALEC is paying dividends, if you are a big incumbent cable or phone company. Consumers will pay much more than that if broadband competition is curtailed.

...some of that juicy 700MHz spectrum Verizon is getting from the nation's biggest cable companies.

In an ironic turnabout, Deutsche Telekom’s T-Mobile USA, last year an acquisition target of AT&T, has filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission opposing Verizon’s spectrum purchase from the nation’s largest cable companies as “contrary to the public interest.”

Verizon Wireless is seeking to acquire a substantial block of unused AWS spectrum that is unlikely to provide any near-term benefits to Verizon Wireless customers (indeed, the company already holds other AWS spectrum and has not even put it to use yet). Rather, the principal impact of the acquisition would be to foreclose the possibility that this spectrum could be acquired by smaller competitors – such as T-Mobile – who would use it more quickly, more intensively, and more efficiently than Verizon Wireless. The acquisitions will limit the deployment of LTE by competitors of Verizon Wireless and the bandwidth available for such deployments.

If these transactions go forward, the end result will be less LTE capacity available overall and reduced competition in the provision of LTE, which would be contrary to the public interest.

T-Mobile, in particular, is upset because it owns no spectrum in the valuable 700MHz range — frequencies that can travel longer distances and easily penetrate buildings.  Verizon Wireless does, and will acquire much more if the FCC approves the deal to transfer spectrum from Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Cox. [Correction: As one of our readers pointed out, the spectrum being acquired is in the AWS band, which T-Mobile argues in its filing is still suitable for a 4G network deployment.]  T-Mobile argues Verizon does not need the spectrum, and will effectively “warehouse” the frequencies to keep them off the open market.  Without prime spectrum, T-Mobile argues, it will be difficult for the company to deliver a 4G experience to its customers.

T-Mobile also has a bone to pick with Verizon Wireless and the cable industry over what it suspects is a non-compete agreement:

At least in effect, this has all the hallmarks of a pure horizontal allocation of markets.

From the limited information available, it appears as though Verizon, the majority owner of Verizon Wireless, has agreed (tacitly if not expressly) to halt its extensive efforts to expand into the cable business and the cable companies have, in turn, traded their control of valuable spectrum in exchange for this protection of their cable markets.

It has been publicly reported that, coincident with acquiring the cable companies’ spectrum, thereby eliminating potential new competition in mobile wireless, Verizon ended its FiOS build out plans and terminated its agreement to resell satellite television. This series of acts appears to limit Verizon’s activity as a potential competitor in the video market and limit the cable companies’ role as potential competitors in the wireless market, while at the same time foreclosing competing providers from one of the only available sources of spectrum.

As a result of this “triple play,” competition in both markets will be substantially reduced. The antitrust laws have long condemned such agreements, even among potential competitors.

Not All Frequencies Are Created Equal

Will Verizon ultimately warehouse its newest acquired spectrum?

Unless you are well-acquainted with the wireless industry, all most people know about their cell phones is that they turn them on and a signal strength meter indicates what kind of reception quality you are getting.  In fact, wireless companies use a range of frequencies across several different frequency bands to handle voice calls and data.  As an end user, you never know the difference.  But if your wireless company is forced to use higher frequencies, they often have a harder time penetrating buildings or provide only limited distance coverage.  That’s why AT&T and Verizon customers have a better chance of making and receiving calls in the middle of a supermarket or office building while others lose reception.

Clearwire has an extensive holding of very high frequencies at its disposal — frequencies the company cannot effectively use because they require considerably more infrastructure (ie. more cell towers) to provide an effective service to customers.  Clearwire customers already complain about poor reception inside buildings, a problem exacerbated by the very high frequencies the company has to use for its service.  Verizon and AT&T collectively control the majority of the best, more robust spectrum — the 700MHz band.  Verizon’s LTE network, for example, relies on spectrum that used to be used by high numbered UHF television channels.

Companies like T-Mobile rely on frequencies in the 1700MHz and 1900MHz bands.  While certainly adequate in urban and suburban areas, T-Mobile has to spend more on cell tower deployment and be especially concerned with rural coverage, especially in areas where the terrain makes “line of sight” reception from cell towers more difficult.

While today’s 2G and 3G networks have made due with current spectrum, companies like T-Mobile are having a hard time finding space to launch the next generation — LTE/4G technology — on their current spectrum.  Without LTE, T-Mobile (and others) will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage.  The company argues it should have the right to acquire some of the frequencies Verizon intends to capture from the cable industry, especially if Verizon has no immediate plans to use the spectrum.

Some of the wrangling by T-Mobile seems especially ironic because parent company Deutsche Telekom has indicated it wants to sell T-Mobile USA and leave the American wireless market.  It has shown little interest so far investing in a LTE/4G network upgrade.  Additionally, as part of AT&T’s failed merger bid, T-Mobile is expecting to receive frequencies from AT&T as part of the “failed transaction” clause in the original merger proposal.

Sen. Chip Rogers, a new-found friend of Comcast, AT&T, Charter Cable, Verizon, and the Georgia state cable lobby.

A new bill designed to hamstring local community broadband development with onerous government regulation and requirements has been introduced by a Republican state senator in Georgia, backed by the state’s largest phone and cable companies and the astroturf dollar-a-holler groups they financially support.

Sen. Chip Rogers (R-Woodstock), is the chief sponsor of the ironically-named SB 313, the ‘Broadband Investment Equity Act,’ which claims to “provide regulation of competition between public and private providers of communications service.”  The self-professed member of the party of “small government” wrote a bill that creates whole new levels of broadband bureaucracy, and applies it exclusively to community-owned networks, while completely exempting private companies, most of which have recently contributed generously to his campaign.

SB 313 micromanages publicly-owned broadband networks, regulating the prices they can charge, the number of public votes that must be held before such networks can be built, how they can be paid for, where they can serve, and gives private companies the right to stop the construction of such networks if they agree to eventually provide a similar type of service at some point in the future.

Even worse, Rogers’ bill would prohibit community providers from advertising their services, defending themselves against well-financed special interest attacks bought and paid for by existing cable and phone companies, and requires publicly-owned networks to allow their marketing and service strategies to be fully open for inspection by private competitors.

Rogers’ legislation is exceptionally friendly to the state’s incumbent phone and cable companies, and they have returned the favor with a sudden interest in financing Rogers’ 2012 re-election bid.  In the last quarter alone, Georgia’s largest cable and phone companies have sent some big thank-you checks to the senator’s campaign:

• Cable Television Association of Georgia ($500)
• Verizon ($500)
• Charter Communications ($500)
• Comcast ($1,000)
• AT&T ($1,500)

A review of the senator’s earlier campaign contributions showed no interest among large telecommunications companies operating in Georgia.  That all changed, however, when the senator announced he was getting into the community broadband over-regulation business.

It is difficult to see what, besides campaign contributions, prompted Rogers’ sudden interest in community broadband, considering Georgia has not been a hotbed of broadband development.

Rogers claims cities like Tifton, Marietta and Acworth have tried unsuccessfully to be public providers and that the legislation “levels the playing field for public and private broadband providers.”  Hardly, and the senator’s dismissal of earlier efforts fails to share the true story of broadband expansion in those communities.

The new owner of Tifton's CityNet carries on the tradition the city started providing broadband to a woefully underserved part of Georgia.

Tifton: Either the city provides broadband or no one else will

Tifton’s misadventure with the city-owned CityNet, eventually sold to Plant Communications, was hardly all bad news.  When city officials launched CityNet a few years ago, much of the community was bypassed by broadband providers.  Today, the new owner Plant continues competing with bottom-rated Mediacom, which admitted in 2001 it bought an AT&T Broadband cable system that “underserved” the residents of Tifton.  At the same time, the Tifton Gazette, which has loathed CityNet in editorials from its beginnings, freely admits the network brought lower prices and competition to Tifton residents over its history:

At the same time, having CityNet here has meant increased competition and therefore lower service rates for residents. We would probably have had to wait longer for high-speed Internet to make it to Tifton, and the system makes it possible for local governments to receive services here.

That’s a far cry from Rogers’ claim that the “private sector is handling [broadband] exceptionally well.”

“What they don’t need is for a governmental entity to come in and compete with them where these types of services already exist,” Rogers added.

In fact, in Tifton they needed exactly that to force Mediacom to upgrade the outdated cable system they bought from AT&T.

The Curious Case of Marietta FiberNet: When politics kills a golden opportunity

On track to be profitable by 2006, local politics forced an early sale of the community fiber network that was succeeding.

In Marietta, the public broadband “collapse” was one-part political intrigue and two-parts media myth.

Marietta FiberNet was never built as a fiber-to-the-home service for residential customers.  Instead, it was created as an institutional and business-only fiber network, primarily for the benefit of large companies in northern Cobb County and parts of Atlanta.  The Atlanta-Journal Constitution reported on July 29, 2004 that Marietta FiberNet “lost” $24 million and then sold out at a loss to avoid any further losses.  But in fact, the sloppy journalist simply calculated the “loss” by subtracting the construction costs from the sale price, completely ignoring the revenue the network was generating for several years to pay off the costs to build the network.

In reality, Marietta FiberNet had been generating positive earnings every year since 2001 and was fully on track to be in the black by the first quarter of 2006.

So why did Marietta sell the network?  Politics.

Marietta’s then-candidate for mayor, Bill Dunway, did not want the city competing with private telecommunications companies.  If elected, he promised he would sell the fiber network to the highest bidder.

He won and he did, with telecommunications companies underbidding for a network worth considerably more, knowing full well the mayor treated the asset as “must go at any price.”  The ultimate winner, American Fiber Systems, got the whole network for a song.  Contrary to claims from Dunway (and now Rogers) that the network was a “failure,” AFS retained the entire management of the municipal system and continued following the city’s marketing plan.  So much for the meme government doesn’t know how to operate a broadband business.

Acworth: Success forces the city to sell to a private company that later defaults

Acworth CableNet: Too popular for its own good?

But of all the bad examples Rogers uses to sell his telecom special interest legislation, none is more ironic than the case of Acworth, Ga.  The Atlanta suburb suffered for years with the dreadfully-performing MediaOne.  Throughout the 1990s, MediaOne spent as little as possible on its antiquated cable system serving the growing population, many working high-tech day jobs in downtown Atlanta.  MediaOne had no plans to get into the cable broadband business, while other cable systems around metro-Atlanta had already begun receiving the service.  That left Acworth at a serious disadvantage, so local officials issued $6.8 million in tax-exempt bonds to construct Acworth CableNet.  Demand was so great, the city simply couldn’t keep up.

As Multichannel News reported in 2002, “the Atlanta suburb of Acworth, Ga., isn’t selling because business is bad. Rather, officials said they’ve received so many requests for service from outside the city limits that they’ve decided to sell the operation to an independent company that may expand beyond Acworth’s borders.”

That is where the trouble started.  The city contracted with United Telesystems Inc. of Savannah, Ga., a private company, first to lease and then eventually buy the cable system, maintaining and expanding it along the way.  But in 2003, United Telesystems defaulted on its lease-sale agreement, forcing the city to foreclose on the system and ultimately sell it to a second company.

Acworth’s “failure” wasn’t actually the city’s, it was the private company that defaulted on its contract.

So much for Rogers’ record of municipal broadband failure.

The Hidden Problems of Industry-Funded Research Reports

In fact, many of Rogers’ talking points about his new bill come courtesy of the industry-backed astroturf group, the “Coalition for the New Economy.”  With chapters in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida, this tea-party and AT&T/Time Warner Cable-funded group takes a major interest in slamming community broadband.

Most of their findings come courtesy of a shallow dollar-a-holler study, The Hidden Problems with Government-Owned Networks, by Dr. Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., professor of economics at Widener University.  The report, mostly an exercise in Google searching for cherry-picked bullet points highlighting what the author sees as weaknesses and failures in community broadband, even slams success stories like EPB Fiber.  The Chattanooga, Tenn., network just earned credit for helping to attract hundreds of millions in new private investment and jobs from Amazon.com, but Fuhr’s conclusion is that EPB operates without any “real business plan concerning EPB’s investment.”

Fuhr and his friends at Heartland Institute even misrepresent EPB as delivering only 1Gbps service at $350 a month in an attempt to illustrate municipalities are out of touch with the private broadband marketplace.

Christopher Mitchell at Community Broadband Networks dismisses the bill as more of the same from a telecommunications industry that wants to tie down community broadband networks in ways that guarantee they will fail:

In short, this bill will make it all but impossible for communities to build networks — even in areas that are presently unserved. The bill purports to exempt some unserved areas, but does so in a cynically evasive way. The only way a community could meet the unserved exemption is if it vowed to only build in the least economical areas — meaning it would have to be significantly subsidized. Serving unserved areas and breaking even financially almost always requires building a network that will also cover some areas already served (because that is where you can find the margins that will cover the losses in higher expense areas).

The bill is presently in the Senate Regulated Industries and Utilities committee.  Stop the Cap! urges Georgia residents to contact state legislators and ask they oppose this special-interest legislation that is designed primarily to protect the broadband status quo and provider profits in Georgia, instead of allowing communities to manage their broadband needs themselves.  After all, they are accountable to the voters, too.