Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

When Time Warner Cable introduced its SignatureHome service, the company claimed it wanted to deliver a comprehensive experience to its most premium-customers.  But oddly, the best broadband speeds, phone service, and digital cable TV lineup from the cable company didn’t include any premium movie channels.

“I was ready to sign up for SignatureHome, but I assumed it included major premium channels, and it didn’t,” says Stop the Cap! reader Liam in Los Angeles.  “I thought it would be a real money-saver but I would rather have the premium channels than their phone service, which I don’t actually use as I depend on my cellphone.”

Scott elected for a cheaper promotional bundle foregoing phone service and the fastest Internet speeds, choosing to stick with Road Runner Turbo service.

“Powerboost on their Turbo product is more than enough for me and I don’t need faster upload speed — if SignatureHome included the premiums I would have taken it,” he says.

Now Time Warner has introduced an addition to their super-deluxe package — SignatureHome Premium View, which bundles HBO, Showtime, Cinemax, The Movie Channel and Moviepass with everything else on offer for $30 more a month — $229.99.  The package excludes Starz!, a premium movie channel Time Warner has barely promoted over the years.

With many markets increasing prices to as high as $15 for channels like HBO, getting five premium networks for just under $30 isn’t a bad deal, assuming you watch them and benefit from SignatureHome‘s other features.

“When my promotion expires, I’ll consider this new option,” Scott says.  “Yes, I realize $230 for cable service should really be an outrage, but the way the company is pricing services these days, the more you bundle, the less you ultimately pay compared to trying to build your own package of services.”

That may be exactly the point.  For customers who rely on Time Warner for phone, broadband, and cable-TV, SignatureHome can be a reasonable value if you crave the company’s highest 50/5Mbps broadband speeds.  Building a comparable bundle on your own is much more expensive.  Now the same is true for premium movie channels, which run between $11-15 a month each a-la-carte.

[flv width=”534″ height=”320″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/NY1 Signature Home Arrives 12-9-10.mp4[/flv]

NY1, Time Warner Cable’s 24 hour news channel in New York City, talked about the introduction of SignatureHome last December.  (2 minutes)

Despite the loss of more than 128,000 video subscribers, Time Warner Cable more than made up the difference with rate increases on equipment, programming, and broadband to score a 23 percent increase in earnings in the second quarter of 2011.  For the period of April-June, Time Warner earned a profit of $420 million, nearly $80 million more than the same quarter last year.

Cable Television

Time Warner CEO Glenn Britt continued to blame the loss of video subscribers on the housing crisis and economy, suggesting the cable operator’s prices have gotten too high for some customers to handle, and they’ve disconnected cable television service as a result.  Britt also continues to downplay the impact of online video allowing for consumer cord-cutting, suggesting instead that increased competition from phone companies and satellite providers are creating a problem online video isn’t.

As a result, Time Warner is refocusing its efforts on marketing packages to three segments it particularly wants to attract — the very well-to-do, the Latino community, and the income-challenged.

Time Warner officials noted that many of their customers have continued to pare back their packages to cushion against the company’s rate increases.  For the last few years, consumers have cut premium movie channels and extra tier add-ons.  Now customers are targeting Time Warner’s DVR service as a route to a lower cable bill.  Many are returning their DVR boxes to save money, or are not keeping the service as a promotion expires.  Time Warner often bundles DVR service into new customer promotions for no additional charge.

For these income-challenged consumers, Time Warner is promising to develop new packages of services at reduced prices.  That likely means the expansion of the company’s “budget tier” — a package of selected basic cable networks, excluding expensive sports programming, currently testing in two markets for around $50 a month.

But the company is also reporting success with its wealthier customers, many who are adopting Time Warner’s super premium Signature Home service, from which the company collects an average of $220 per month per customer.  Time Warner is also ramping up promotion of its cable services to Spanish-speaking audiences in the Latino community — customers it may have under-served in the past.

The company also reported declines in video-on-demand revenue, principally adult pornography pay-per-view content consumers are now watching on the Internet for free.

Broadband

Among the brightest stars for Time Warner Cable continues to be broadband service, which is increasingly important… and profitable for the nation’s second largest cable operator.  With “pricing strength,” Time Warner has successfully adopted a series of rate increases for Road Runner service, increasing revenues along the way.  The company also reports success with its DOCSIS 3 rollouts, now reaching 60 percent of its cable subscribers.  CEO Britt says the cable company expects to complete DOCSIS 3 upgrades nationwide by the end of 2012.  A noticeable percentage of customers are upgrading to premium-priced, faster speed tiers as a result.

Despite the investment in DOCSIS 3, Time Warner Cable continues to slash the amount of capital it is investing in its network.  So far this year, capital expenditures are down 7.4 percent to $1.36 billion.  Chief Operating Officer Rob Marcus predicts Time Warner will spend no more than $3 billion on its systems in 2011, despite plans to continue broadband upgrades and convert their cable systems to all-digital operations.  So far this year, Time Warner has earned over $2.2 billion from its broadband division alone, up 9 percent from last year.  The company attributes most of that growth to rate increases and customers upgrading their service.

Other facts:

• Time Warner’s wireless mobile broadband has failed to spark much interest from consumers, perhaps because they realize it comes from Clearwire, a company Time Warner CEO Glenn Britt seemed unimpressed with in today’s conference call.  He made a point of telling investors the cable company is under no obligation to invest anything else in the venture;
• Time Warner Cable is taking a new interest in Wi-Fi, deploying networks in New York and Los Angeles, in the hope the company can boost interest in a “quad-play” of cable, phone, Internet, and wireless broadband/Wi-Fi that consumers have taken a pass on thus far;
• The company’s new super data center in Charlotte, N.C., will provide a national “head-end” for IPTV video, currently supplied from a facility in Denver.  This will principally benefit iPad users using the company’s app to stream online video.  The company hopes to eliminate regional and local distribution efforts as a cost-savings measure, consolidating national distribution through Colorado and North Carolina;
• The company’s next version of TWCable TV — the aforementioned iPad app, is due out in a few weeks and will include text searching for individual shows.  Whether it corrects the ludicrous inability for the app to consistently stream video is another question;
• Competition for new customers has been responsible for a number of disconnects.  One satellite provider is pitching Time Warner customers on a $30 a month video package that includes the NFL Sunday Ticket for free.  Verizon FiOS has increased its marketing of Time Warner customers, offering its own triple-play package for $99 a month.  AT&T U-verse has their own triple play packages as low as $89 a month, with a substantial mail-in rebate offer good for over $100.  But Britt warns the lack of change in the “average revenue per subscriber”-numbers from competitors probably means consumers are paying substantially more thanks to fine print-surcharges and fees;
• Time Warner is still trying to sign agreements for its TV Everywhere project, particularly for HBO Go, but the terms are evidently still not acceptable to the cable company.

Our earlier coverage, seen below, covers Britt’s remarkable comments about usage-based pricing.  He was certainly off the usual industry playbook today, even going as far as telling investors what we knew all along: bandwidth costs bear almost no relationship to the prices charged for broadband service.  That’s one we’ll tuck away and remember.

Time Warner Cable CEO Glenn Britt highlights the results from the second quarter, covering cable-TV, broadband, and other products. July 28, 2011. (6 minutes)
You must remain on this page to hear the clip, or you can download the clip and listen later.

News Corp.’s Fox television network has announced it will erect a pay wall that will delay access to popular Fox shows for eight days after airing… unless you are an authenticated cable-TV or other pay television subscriber.

The announcement is the first among the major broadcast networks to keep cord-cutters and those who don’t pay for their television entertainment from conveniently watching shows online.  With most Fox shows formerly available for free on Hulu one day after airing, many viewers simply watch programs online, enjoying a reduced number of commercials along the way.

Now, viewers will have to wait a week before those shows become accessible.  Or, they can pay Hulu $7.99 a month for a Hulu+ subscription and watch right away.  Or sign up for cable television.

The pay wall will be introduced Aug. 15 and was constructed at the behest of the nation’s largest cable, phone, and satellite companies to stop consumers from watching shows online for free.  Local Fox stations don’t mind the change either, if it means you will watch your favorite shows on local stations instead of a national website.

Michael Hopkins, Fox’s president of affiliate sales released a statement explaining the change was designed to “enhance the value” of cable, satellite, and telco-TV subscriptions.  Cable companies have been upset about paying retransmission rights fees for Fox’s local affiliate stations, only to see the network give away programming, for free, online.

Hopkins

“We’re concerned that cord-cutting is going to be a problem,” Mike Hopkins, Fox’s president of affiliate sales, said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. “The more you enable it by putting content out there for free without any tether to a pay-TV subscription, the bigger that danger becomes.”

If Fox is the first broadcast network to erect a pay wall, it likely won’t be the last.  Disney’s ABC is exploring adopting a similar strategy, and CBS had withheld much of its programming from online ventures precisely because it believes it dilutes the value of its shows.  It will likely favor a similar pay television approach.

For consumers, the details of how the pay wall will work could become problematic depending on their pay television provider.  DirecTV is quickly working to keep free access to Fox shows for its subscribers after the pay wall takes effect.  But some cable companies like Time Warner Cable have dragged their feet on TV Everywhere online projects, and subscribers, even with cable TV packages, could still find themselves locked out behind the wall, unless they also have a Hulu+ subscription.

The risk of annoying viewers by keeping them away from their favorite shows could easily spark a renewed interest in piracy.  With a commercial newsgroup account, access to peer-to-peer software or file storage sites like Rapidshare or Megavideo, bypassing the industry’s pay-walls is as easy as finding the shows viewers want to watch, legally or otherwise.

Hawaiian Telcom on Friday won a 15-year non-exclusive franchise to develop and market cable television service on the island of Oahu.

The telephone company will be the first major competitor to Oceanic Cable in at least a decade, at least where HawTel plans to provide service.

“We are very pleased to have reached this important milestone in the development of our exciting new video service and will have more details to share about our plans in the next several weeks,” said spokeswoman Ann Nishida Fry.

Many HawTel-watchers predict the phone company will choose an IPTV platform over a hybrid fiber-copper network to support the service, much like AT&T’s U-verse.  HawTel plans a gradual rollout as neighborhoods are “upgraded” to support the service.

Oceanic Cable president Bob Barlow said he wasn’t too concerned with HawTel’s entry into the market.  He told the Hawaiian Star-Advertiser customers should not expect any dramatic savings or price cuts.

“Most of our customers don’t bundle services, and more than 60 percent of our video costs come from programming,” he said.

Barlow expects the fiercest level of competition will come from who delivers the best customer service.

[flv width=”480″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/KHON Honolulu Hawaiian Telcom to Offer Cable TV 6-24-11.mp4[/flv]

KHON-TV in Honolulu leads their newscast with HawTel’s approval for a cable television franchise on Oahu.  (2 minutes)