Staffers at the New York State Department of Public Service have recommended the Public Service Commission reject the merger of Charter Communications and Time Warner Cable unless significant concessions are made, largely because the alleged benefits are insufficient for New York cable customers.

Although cable operators are largely deregulated under federal law, state and local governments retain control over cable franchise agreements, which permit operators to sell cable television programming. To complete its merger, Charter Communications must win approval to transfer Time Warner Cable franchise agreements to the merged entity, dubbed “New Charter.” That gives state regulators leverage to win concessions and oversight mostly eliminated after the cable industry was deregulated by the federal government.

New York law requires cable operators seeking to join forces to prove the merger is in the public interest and that ratepayers will obtain a “net positive benefit” from the merger. In plain English, Charter must share the benefits of the merger with cable customers in New York, either from lower prices, better service, or both. Charter proposes to offer those benefits in the form of improved service:

• Additional investments in all-digital systems in Time Warner’s service areas by completing digitization within 30 months of the close of the proposed transaction. This would include faster (60 megabits per second (Mbps) minimum) broadband speed offerings;
• Merger-specific efficiencies, which would generate savings in a number of areas including combined purchasing power, overhead, product development, engineering, and information technology;
• Merging Charter’s New York assets, now isolated from the rest of its service territories, to create efficiencies through reduced costs, improved customer service and additional service offerings;
• Bringing overseas Time Warner jobs back to the United States and adding in-house positions;
• Expanding to New York, within three years of the close of the proposed transaction, Bright House Networks’ low-income broadband option (Connect2Compete) which partners with schools to provide a $9.95 low-cost Internet service, discounts on Internet-capable devices, and innovative digital literacy training;
• Promoting the deployment of advanced voice services and enhancing competition in the voice marketplace by creating a more robust competitor;
• Pledging not to block or throttle Internet traffic or engage in paid prioritization, whether or not the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) Open Internet Order is upheld. This commitment would continue for three years, without regard to the outcome of the ongoing litigation challenging federal reclassification.

The Public Service Commission staff looked at the reported annual “synergy savings” of $800 million anticipated by New Charter from streamlining operations and winning enhanced volume discounts to determine the “net positive benefit” for New York consumers from the merger. Here is the formula the PSC used:

• New York customers represent 10.879% of New Charter’s customer base — 2.6 million of New Charter’s 23,900,000 combined Charter and Time Warner Cable customers;
• The agency presumes customers and shareholders nationwide should each receive 50% of the $800 million in savings;
• Knowing New York deserves roughly 11% of that $800 million, divided equally between customers and shareholders, New Charter owes New Yorkers $43.5 million in benefits annually.

Staffers at the PSC prefer to deal in hard numbers and solid commitments when determining how New Charter intends to meet its obligation to New Yorkers, and all signs indicate the cable company was less than forthcoming. In colloquial terms, New Charter’s response to the PSC’s math can be summed up, ‘Whatever, you can trust us to work out the details after the merger.’

Alleged Deal “Benefits”

New Charter’s promises to invest more capital in New York than Time Warner Cable came with no specific investment commitments, despite repeated efforts to pin New Charter down on its spending plans. Some of the details about New Charter’s spending proposals are redacted in the document, but it isn’t difficult to discern reading between the lines New Charter has no plans to continue Time Warner Cable’s Maxx upgrade program beyond commitments already made, which in New York is limited to New York City, leaving all of upstate New York off the Maxx upgrade list. PSC staffers believe if Time Warner Cable remained independent, some or all of upstate New York would receive those Maxx upgrades in the near future.

New Charter claims another merger benefit is their plan to upgrade Time Warner customers with new and improved IP-capable ‘Worldbox’ equipment and DVR’s offering more recording capacity. While conceding there were some minor benefits from offering customers more capable equipment, PSC staffers were skeptical New Charter’s plan represented much of a “consumer benefit,” because the equipment is not cheap and New Charter’s plan to eliminate analog television signals will mean every customer will have to rent one of Charter’s new boxes or a near equivalent.

New Charter’s promises of faster Internet speeds and upgraded cable systems would normally be seen as a direct consumer benefit, except Time Warner Cable already committed to its own Maxx upgrade effort that often outperforms what New Charter is promising. “Digitalization and associated speed increases can only truly be considered a benefit if [New Charter] can adequately demonstrate that Time Warner would not have otherwise completed a similar transition to an all digital, faster network in a similar timeframe [roughly 30 months],” PSC staffers concluded.

New Charter’s promise to expand low-income Internet access to Time Warner Cable customers, utilizing Bright House Networks’ Connect2Compete program, comes with many of the same restrictions Comcast’s own Internet Essentials program include. That issue was hotly debated during Comcast’s attempt to acquire Time Warner Cable, and many public interest groups opposed the merger for that reason. New Charter has also made no commitments to continue Time Warner’s no-restriction/no-contract/no-prequalification affordable $14.99 Internet service. In fact, the merger may worsen the affordable Internet problem, not improve it.

New Charter’s proposed expansion of Time Warner Cable’s Wi-Fi hotspot program is vague and mostly undefined beyond a general commitment to deploy at least 300,000 new out-of-home Wi-Fi access points across its national footprint within four years. New York regulators want to know how many of those would be in New York. Using the same formula to find how many New Charter customers are located in New York, it seems reasonable that redacted sections regarding the Wi-Fi hotspot program included an inquiry if New Charter planned at least 30,000 new access points for New York. New Charter did mention that once the proposed transaction is complete, it expected to evaluate the merits of leveraging in-home routers as public Wi-Fi access points, much like Comcast is doing today. Because Time Warner Cable has no firm plans about its Wi-Fi hotspot deployment program beyond this year, PSC staffers found it difficult to determine which company had the better Wi-Fi proposal for New Yorkers.

New Charter’s plans for expanded business broadband were also found to be vague, making it difficult to measure how much benefit New Charter would bring commercial clients in New York.

Status Quo

Time Warner cable systems will become indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of New Charter. New Charter states that they are not seeking authority for the transfer of customers or for any changes in rates, terms or conditions of service and New Charter will also continue to provide Lifeline Discounted Telephone Service (Lifeline).

The PSC expects that customers will keep the same digital phone number they had with Time Warner; will have the same billing account information; and, other technology will continue to work seamlessly. In other words, the transaction should be technologically transparent for consumers.

The regulator also acknowledges that, after the proposed transaction, there should be no diminution in the number of service provider options available to consumers in the video market because Charter and Time Warner do not have overlapping service areas in New York. Since the potential for direct competition no longer exists, this assertion is in no way a benefit of the proposed transaction, it simply maintains the status quo.

The Bad and the Ugly

Despite claims from both cable companies there will be no negative impact as a result of the proposed transaction, PSC staff identified a number of serious issues that are likely to result if the merger is approved without any enforceable conditions or commitments:

Charter will be among America’s top junk bond issuers. (Image: Bloomberg News)

New Charter intends to load itself with massive debt to pay for the merger. As a result, the combined company’s credit rating will take a significant hit. PSC staffers fear New Charter will be vulnerable if economic conditions decline, even to the point of default or bankruptcy. But before that happens, New Charter’s need to cope with its debt could result in reduced investment in system upgrades.

“If the operating environment declines for cable companies […] New Charter will have more difficulty maintaining the investments necessary to bring expanded products and provide good service quality to its customers and, thus, this represents the single most substantial risk of the proposed transaction,” the PSC staff warns. “Accordingly, the Commission should seek to mitigate this risk and ensure that New York receives net benefits that are sufficient to offset this and the other potential harms.”

After requesting Charter disclose its often hidden regular, non-promotional prices most cable customers eventually pay, the PSC discovered contrary to Charter’s claims its prices are lower than Time Warner Cable, in fact they are often higher. Time Warner Cable customers typically also receive more cable television channels for their dollar than Charter customers do. Consumers who bundled multiple services together got the best savings, but even those deals were priced comparably to what Time Warner Cable charges. In short, promises of savings are illusory.

Time Warner Cable offers $14.99 to anyone without paperwork. Charter does not.

Broadband customers will also lose less-expensive broadband options they receive from Time Warner Cable. New Charter will drop Time Warner’s $14.99 “Everyday Low Price” 2Mbps Internet package, along with its Basic 3Mbps ($29.99) and Standard 15Mbps ($34.99) plans. New Charter’s least expensive broadband option for all consumers will be its Spectrum Internet 60Mbps plan, which carries an initial promotional price of $39.99 a month and a regular price just under $60.

“Time Warner’s lower priced offerings represent choices for New York consumers,” PSC staff concluded. “Any loss of these services would likely result in consumers paying more to ensure they have access to the same level of high-speed Internet service and its important resources.”

Jobs: New York is at risk of losing Time Warner Cable’s five call centers employing about 1,996 staff, 61 retail/walk-in centers employing 2,674 staff, nine corporate offices employing around 1,257 staff, nine service/maintenance locations employing approximately 1,687 staff, two media offices employing 435 staff, and 11 other service related functions employing about 1,003 staff, with total employment in the state of nearly 9,052.

PSC staffers have only received a commitment New Charter will not reduce the number of “customer facing” jobs in New York, but has said nothing about where the rest of its New York employees might be heading.

“There is a real danger that New Charter will look to gain operational efficiencies by moving/consolidating customer-facing jobs and other positions to out-of-state locations, despite any claims to the contrary,” the PSC staff reports. “Out-of-state service centers would make it difficult for it to maintain its current level of customer service. Longer wait times and lack of local knowledge could lead to increased frustration and dissatisfaction on the part of New York customers, and a significant decline in the overall level of service provided.”

What New York Regulators May Demand from New Charter to Approve a Merger

The PSC wants Charter to develop gigabit broadband for New York’s top-five cities.

When the PSC staffers added everything up it found the proposed merger offered little benefit to New Yorkers and would not result in a net positive benefit for New York. The staff recommended the merger be denied unless specific commitments are made to sweeten the deal for New York customers.

First, New Charter should be required to develop a strategic implementation plan to build-out its all-digital network to every remaining unserved or underserved Charter and Time Warner franchise area in New York. This would mean that any resident in a town serviced by either cable company would be able to buy service even if the company does not now offer it. Currently, areas considered unprofitable to serve within a franchise area are often bypassed. This would no longer be permitted, and New Charter would have to wire any commercial building, business, school, or home.

Second, Charter’s record of performance in New York is already less than impressive. In Columbia County, Charter operates an ancient one-way video service-only cable system serving Chatham, N.Y. The PSC staff recommends Charter be required to bring that cable system up to date. More broadly, the staff recommends Charter be forced to spend more money on system upgrades and improved service than Time Warner Cable would have on its own.

Third, qualifications to subscribe to Charter’s proposed $9.95 discount Internet program should be broadened to exclude fewer customers. Its speed should also be raised to at least 10Mbps. For everyone else not qualified to subscribe to Connect2Compete, the PSC staff recommends requiring New Charter to continue offering Time Warner’s Everyday Low Price $14.99 Internet tier at an enhanced speed of 3Mbps for a minimum of five years.

Fourth, Time Warner customers in New York should be granted promotional broadband pricing without modem fees for a minimum of three years, making New Charter’s ongoing price of its 60Mbps tier $39.99 a month, not the $59.99 a month Charter typically charges after one year.

Fifth, New Charter should be required to offer broadband service at speeds up to 100Mbps throughout its New York footprint within 30 months of the close of the proposed merger. New Charter should also be compelled to install infrastructure capable of offering 1,000Mbps (1Gbps) service in New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse and Albany by 2020.

Six, New York should require New Charter to change its current merger proposal to decrease leveraged debt and present a plan to restore the company’s credit rating to a level more comparable with Time Warner Cable.

Seven, New Charter should submit to oversight of its customer service performance by New York regulators, which will monitor how New Charter treats its customers. If the company falls below acceptable service standards, the PSC will have the authority to intervene based on an agreement with New Charter.

Finally, New Charter will agree to limit any significant changes to its New York call center or other customer-facing positions for at least two years and provide 90 days notice of any significant job relocations or reductions.

Zibelman

After the N.Y. Public Service Commission heard an earful about Verizon’s broken promise to deliver FiOS service to every resident in New York City, the head of the PSC has sent a letter to Verizon reminding them of their obligation and requesting an explanation:

At a recently conducted July 15, 2015 Public Statement Hearing held in the City of New York in the matter of the Study on the State of Telecommunications in New York State […] citizens of the City expressed concern over the pace of Verizon New York Inc.’s (Verizon) Fiber-to-the Premises (FTTP) build-out. Some of the commenters stated that they called Verizon to find out when FiOS would be available in their building and the Company could not provide a specific date or time. Others asked why some buildings had been wired for FiOS while others were still being served over the copper network.

Among the Commission’s minimum requirements and terms included in the approval of Verizon’s cable franchise agreement with the City, is the requirement to complete upgrading its wire centers to video serving offices (VSO) and have its FTTP network “pass all households served by [Verizon’s] wire centers within the Franchise Area” 1 by no later than June 30, 2014.

Audrey Zibelman, chair of the PSC, acknowledged Verizon’s repeated explanation that building owners have often been reluctant to let Verizon engineers into their buildings to initiate the FiOS upgrade, noting Verizon has filed more than 45 petitions for Order of Entry with the PSC over the past two years, identifying over 3,000 buildings with “access” issues of one type or another. Approximately 50% of the building access problems have been identified in Manhattan; about 20% each in Bronx and Queens; 13% in Brooklyn, and the rest in Staten Island and Long Island.

But Zibelman assumes at least some of those disputes have since been settled and now wants details about where Verizon is still unable to offer FiOS in New York City and why. She also wanted to make sure Verizon was not favoring certain areas over others for fiber service:

The agreement also provides that Verizon will conduct the build-out in a way that will prevent redlining, or discrimination based on income, by requiring Verizon to build-out simultaneously to all boroughs and in a manner relatively proportionate to household income. Specifically, the median household income of all homes passed shall not be greater than the average household income of all the households in the City.

“Indicate whether Verizon has achieved its six-year build-out in the cable franchise agreement,” Zibelman asked. “If Verizon has not achieved that build-out, please provide all documentation that Verizon provided to the City to justify the basis for any delay. In addition, please provide a current status of the FTTP build-out, by Borough, indicating the percentage and number of buildings served, and the remainder of buildings yet to be served. Provide a status update of the buildings identified in previous Verizon petitions for Orders of Entry.”

Zibelman reminded Verizon it has an absolute obligation under 16 NYCRR §895.5 to “provide service to any customer upon request.” To verify that, Zibelman wants Verizon to accept and record all requests for service and respond to all of her concerns within 14 days.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/WNBC NY Verizon FiOS Not Installing High-Speed Internet for 25 Percent of NYers Who Want It Audit 7-15-15.flv[/flv]

WNBC in New York reports a quarter of New Yorkers still cannot sign up for Verizon FiOS, despite a commitment from the company to wire the entire city. (2:01)

Waiting for Comcast and Verizon to offer cutting edge broadband to 620,000 Baltimore city residents and businesses appears to be going nowhere, so the city is hiring an Internet consultant to consider whether to sell access to its existing fiber network.

Baltimore officials spent at least a year trying to convince Google to launch its fiber network in the city only to be bypassed in favor of Kansas City, Austin, and Provo, Utah. Local unions and community groups have also attempted to embarrass the local phone company by publicly protesting Verizon’s lack of interest in expanding its fiber optic network FiOS in Baltimore. Comcast has proved a disappointment for many, with the latest technology going to other cities well before Baltimore gets improved service.

Baltimore’s Board of Estimates voted to spend $157,000 to hire Magellan Advisors to produce a cost-benefit analysis of expanding the city’s current fiber infrastructure to deliver better Internet access.

“I’m paying more here for lesser service, so I think one of the things we want to try to do is look at that, look at what [current companies] offer and try to incentivize people to offer more,” Baltimore’s chief information officer Chris Tonjes told the Baltimore Business Journal. “In the short term, we’re going to do a study. In the medium run, we’re going to try to renegotiate the cable franchise agreement. In the longer run we want to make it more profitable for providers to come in here and offer the expanded service.”

Like many cities, Baltimore already owns and operates its own fiber ring, built with public funds to support the city’s public safety radio system. Like many municipal institutional fiber networks, Baltimore’s fiber ring is underutilized. Public safety and other institutional users often use just a fraction of available capacity. Despite the fact such networks are often oversized, they are rarely controversial because they do not typically compete with commercial providers and are usually off-limits to the public.

As Baltimore prepares to update their existing fiber infrastructure, Magellan will study the implications of leasing excess capacity to third-party providers that can sell broadband access to private businesses and individuals. Even Comcast and Verizon would be welcome to lease capacity.

Neither company has shown much interest, and the proposal received a strong rebuke from Maryland Sen. Catherine Pugh (D-Baltimore City):

Pugh

For the most part, municipally-built broadband networks have the economic chips stacked against them and, where tried, have saddled local taxpayers with a mountain of debt and half-built networks that are then sold at fire-sale prices to vulture investors. Taxpayers in Provo, Utah, for instance, spent $40 million to build a relatively small and modest network only to sell it for $1 a few years later because they underestimated the massive costs of operating, upgrading and maintaining it.

But Provo is just the latest exhibit in a long pantheon of such failed initiatives that include Groton, Conn., ($38 million taxpayer loss) and Marietta, Ga., ($35 million taxpayer loss). Cities as large as Philadelphia, New York and Chicago and as small as Lompoc, Calif., and Acworth, Ga., have also tried and failed to launch their own broadband networks — or simply gave up.

Pugh’s editorial, published in both the Wall Street Journal and The Baltimore Sun, failed to disclose Pugh has received political campaign contributions from both Comcast and Verizon. More importantly, Pugh did not bother to mention she is the president-elect of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, a group with close ties to both Comcast and Verizon Communications.

Among the “member corporations” of the NBCSL — companies who “weigh in” on the policies promoted by the group: AT&T, Comcast, CTIA – The Wireless Association, the National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Time Warner Cable, and Verizon.

Among the NBCSL’s roundtable members: AT&T, Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Verizon

For the fourth consecutive year, Verizon hosted its Black History Month open house at the Reginald F. Lewis Museum in downtown Baltimore. This year, among Verizon’s special guests: Maryland Senator and president-elect of the National Black Caucus of State Legislators Catherine Pugh. Comcast has also opened its checkbook to the NBCSL. Among the contributions — $50,000 to form the “NBCSL/Comcast Broadband Legislative Fellowship” to “increase efforts to conduct research and develop solutions regarding broadband adoption among African Americans.”

Opening up a competitive, lower-priced broadband alternative owned by the citizens of Baltimore is not one of Pugh’s favored solutions to be sure.

The NBCSL has been more than a little preoccupied with the business agendas of its corporate members. The group’s glowing endorsement of the Comcast-NBCUniversal merger was so positive, Comcast continues to present the group’s submission urging approval of the merger on its website. In 2011, the NBCSL signed on to the campaign to get government approval of the now-dead merger of AT&T and T-Mobile USA, claiming it was in the best interests of African-Americans. Just this month, Time Warner Cable quoted the group’s comments on the dispute between the cable company and CBS on its website.

Stop the Cap! has refuted claims that public broadband is a financial failure in the past. Read our fact check here.

Although Comcast has been the dominant cable provider in Baltimore for years, its monopoly status is “de facto” only, because federal law prohibits exclusive cable franchise agreements. That being said, no other well-known cable provider will agree to offer service in competition with another. Overbuilders — small private entities that have business plans that depend on competing with incumbent operators, are few and far between. For most Americans, the only cable competition comes from satellite providers or the phone company. Satellite television lacks a broadband option and Verizon’s local broadband infrastructure is limited to providing DSL service.

Tonjes

Tonjes hopes the possibility of a public broadband alternative might shake up the city’s broadband landscape, but not every neighborhood is now passed by the city’s fiber ring.

Phillip “It worked for Qwest so why not community broadband” Dampier

While doing research on another story, I recently uncovered a fascinating legal case that set an important precedent on whether it is right for a community to hold a referendum before authorizing a new telecommunications provider to offer service in a community.

Opponents of community-owned broadband networks routinely claim such services are “undemocratic” because they can exist without the majority support of the community they propose to serve. In 2001, Qwest (now CenturyLink) ran into just such a “majority-rules” provision in Boulder, Colo. that companies like AT&T and Time Warner Cable advocate should be a law everywhere.

A provision in Boulder’s Charter required that voters in a municipal election approve any cable franchise before it was granted by the city. Wishing to avoid the cost of such an election, Qwest sued the City of Boulder and asked for summary judgment to declare the policy unlawful. Chief Judge Lewis Babcock found Qwest’s argument compelling enough to invalidate the city’s mandatory referendum provision.

Qwest argues that the language in [U.S. Federal Law] 47 U.S.C. § 541 regulating franchising authorities is in direct conflict with [Boulder’s] § 108’s mandatory election provision. I agree.

First, the Act provides guidance to, and restrictions on, “franchising authorities.” Section 541’s requirements are directed toward franchising authorities. See 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (3), (4). Under the statute, a “franchise” is “an initial authorization, or renewal thereof,” issued by a franchising authority to construct or operate a cable system. 47 U.S.C. § 522(9). A “`franchising authority’ means any governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to grant a franchise.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(10) (emphasis added).

Here, Qwest approached City officials to seek franchise approval. The City granted a revocable permit to Qwest, and agreed to “grant a cable television franchise authorizing [Qwest] to provide cable television service within the City for a term of years” once an affirmative vote by the qualified taxpaying voters occurred. There is no evidence that the City negotiated the franchise in any manner, or put any additional restrictions or caveats on the franchise beyond voter approval. City officials follow the will of the voters with no additional scrutiny or decision-making. Thus, the City has abdicated franchising authority to the City’s voting citizens. These voters cannot, by the plain terms of the statute, be a “governmental entity empowered by Federal, State, or local law to grant a franchise.” 47 U.S.C. § 522(10). Therefore, direct conflict between the federal and local laws exist, as it is impossible for the franchise to be granted by a governmental entity as required by the Act, and simultaneously granted by the voters as required in § 108.

Second, § 541 imposes numerous and specific requirements on franchising authorities. The statute forbids exclusive franchises, see § 541(a)(1); unreasonable refusals to award additional competitive franchises, see id. at (a)(1); requirements that have the purpose or effect of prohibiting, limiting, restricting, or conditioning the provision of a telecommunications service by a cable operator, see id. at (b)(3)(B); ordering a cable operator or affiliate thereof to discontinue the provision of a telecommunications service, discontinuing the operation of a cable system by reason of the failure of a cable operator to obtain a franchise or franchise renewal, see id. at (b)(3)(C)(i)-(ii); or requiring a cable operator to provide any telecommunications service or facilities as a condition of the initial grant of a franchise. See Id. at (b)(3)(D).

A franchising authority has affirmative requirements as well. It must assure that access to cable service is not denied to any group of potential residential cable subscribers because of the income of the residents of the local area in which such group resides, see id. at (a)(3); and allow the applicant’s cable system a reasonable period of time to become capable of providing cable service to all households in the franchise area, see id. at (a)(4)(A).

However, by allowing voters unfettered and unreviewed discretion to grant or reject a franchise, § 108 is in conflict with virtually every provision in § 541. Because only WOWC has received a franchise, voters could effectively grant WOWC an exclusive franchise simply by refusing to vote affirmatively for a second operator. See id. at (a)(1). Voters could unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise, as they could deny a franchise for any reason or for no reason. See id. Qwest correctly argues that § 108 “provides voters with the unfettered and unreviewable discretion either to grant or deny a cable television franchise for any reason, or for no reason at all.”

In brief, the judge found cable franchises are granted or denied at the municipal level by local government, not through referendums. The City of Boulder was effectively abdicating its responsibility under federal law to manage the franchising process itself. There is no provision in federal law that allows citizens to directly vote a cable franchise agreement up or down, although voters can use the ballot box to remove local officials who do not represent the will of the majority.

More importantly, the judge recognized that turning the process over to local citizenry could unintentionally hand an incumbent provider a monopoly just by voting down any would-be competitor. Why would local citizens oppose competition? As we’ve seen in the fight for community broadband, incumbent providers will spend millions to keep would-be competitors out with a variety of scare tactics and propaganda. Providers have suggested community networks are guaranteed financial failures, will result in yards being torn up to install service, might result in local job losses, and will raise taxes whether residents want the service or not.

Judge Babcock also found that laws that could limit effective competition to incumbent cable companies are in direct conflict with the 1992 federal Cable Act:

The legislative history clearly supports the proposition that Congress was focused on fostering competition when passing the 1992 Act. The Senate Report regarding the Act states, “[I]t is clear that there are benefits from competition between two cable systems. Thus, the Committee believes that local franchising authorities should be encouraged to award second franchises.”

[…] Given the clear intent of Congress to employ § 541 as a vehicle for promoting vigorous competition, I conclude that § 108 is in conflict. Section 108 serves only to provide a significant hindrance to the competition that Congress clearly intended to foster. It forces the potential franchiser to spend money, time, advertising, and logistical support on an election. Thus, § 108 “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”

Perhaps the time has come to raise similar challenges in states where legislatures have passed community broadband bans or placed various impediments on providing service. If Qwest can successfully argue that such rules are designed to limit competition, local communities can certainly argue the panoply of anti-competition laws that were written by and for incumbent cable and phone companies deserve the same scrutiny.

Referendums are an inappropriate way to approve the entry of new competitors.

Susan Crawford’s new book, “Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age,” is on the receiving end of a lot of heat from industry lobbyists and those working for shadowy think tanks and “consumer groups.”

Most of the critics have not disclosed their industry connections. Stop the Cap! will.

Crawford’s premise that Americans are suffering the impact of an anti-competitive marketplace for broadband just doesn’t “add up,” according to Zack Christenson and Steve Pociask, both with the American Consumer Institute Center for Citizen Research.

Christenson and Pociask’s rebuttal of Crawford’s conclusions about broadband penetration, price, and its monopoly/duopoly status relies on industry-supplied statistics and outdated government research. For instance, the source material on wireless pricing predates the introduction of bundled “Share Everything” plans from AT&T and Verizon Wireless that raised prices for many customers.

Their proposed solutions for the problems of broadband access, pricing, and competition come straight from AT&T’s lobbying priority checklist:

• Free up more wireless spectrum, which is likely to be acquired by existing providers, not new ones that enter the market to compete;
• Allow AT&T and other phone companies to abandon current copper-based networks, which would also allow them to escape legacy regulations that require them to provide service to consumers in rural areas.

One pertinent detail missing from the piece published in the Daily Caller is the disclosure Pociask is a a telecom consultant and former chief economist for Bell Atlantic (today Verizon). The “American Consumer Institute” itself is suspected of being backed by corporate interests from the telecommunications industry. ACI has closely mirrored the legislative agendas of AT&T and Verizon, opposing Net Neutrality, supporting cable franchise reform that allowed U-verse and FiOS to receive statewide video franchises in several states, and generally opposes government regulation of telecommunications.

Critics for hire.

The so-called consumer group’s website links primarily to corporate-backed astroturf and political interest groups that routinely defend corporate interests at the expense of consumers. Groups like the CATO Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Koch Brother-backed Heartland Institute, and the highly free-market, deregulation-oriented James Madison Institute are all offered to readers.

The Wall Street Journal trotted out Nick Schulz to handle its book review. Schulz is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, which is funded by corporate contributions to advocate a pro-business agenda.

Schulz attempts to school Crawford on the definition of “monopoly,” eventually suggesting “oligopoly” might be a more precise way to state it.

“Washington’s fights over telecommunications—and just about every other industrial sector—could use a lot less militancy and self-righteousness and a lot more sound economics,” concludes Schulz, while ignoring the fact interpretation of what constitutes “sound economics” is in the eye of the beholder. All too often those making that determination are backed by self-interested corporate entities with a stake in the outcome.

Hance Haney from the Discovery Institute claims Crawford’s conclusions are “misplaced nostalgia for utility regulation.” Haney cites AT&T’s breakup as the spark for competition in the telecommunications sector and proof that monopolies cannot stand when voice, video, and data service from traditional providers can be bypassed. That assumes you can obtain those services without the broadband service sold by the phone or cable company (that also likely owns your wireless service provider and controls access to cable television programming).

Haney also ignores the divorce of Ma Bell has been amicably resolved. AT&T and Verizon have managed to pick up most of their former constituent pieces (the Baby Bells) and today only “compete” with one another in the wireless sector, where each charges identically-high prices for service.

Crawford’s critics often share a connection with the industry she criticizes in her new book.

Haney places the blame for these problems on the government. He argues exclusive cable franchise agreements instigated the lack of cable competition and allowed “hidden cross-subsidies” to flourish, causing the marketplace to stagnate. Haney’s argument ignores history. In the 1970s, before the days of USA, TNT and ESPN, the two largest cable operators TelePrompTer and TCI nearly went bankrupt due to excessive debt leverage. With a very low initial return on investment, exclusive cable franchise agreements were adopted by cities to attract cable providers to wire their communities. Wall Street argues to this day that there is no room for a high level of competition for cable because of infrastructure costs and the unprofitable chase for subscribers that will be asked to cover those expenses. Government was also not responsible for the industry drumbeat for consolidation, not competition, to protect turfs and profits.

The cable industry repeated that argument with cable broadband service, claiming oversight and regulations would stifle innovation and investment. The industry even won the right to exclude competitors from guaranteed access to those networks, claiming it would make broadband less attractive for future investment and expansion.

Haney never discloses the Discovery Institute was founded, in part, to support the elimination of government regulation of telecommunications networks. Broadband Reports also notes the Discovery Institute is subsidized by telecom carriers to make the case for deregulation at all costs.

The Discovery Institute is essentially a PR firm that will present farmed science and manipulated statistics for any donating constituents looking to make a political point.

Broadband for America, perhaps the largest industry-backed astroturf telecom group in the country and itself cited as a source by the American Consumer Institute, seized on the criticism of Crawford’s book for its own attack piece. But every book critic mentioned has a connection to the telecom industry or has ties to groups that receive substantial telecom industry contributions.

NetCompetition chairman Scott Cleland, who accused Crawford of cherry picking information, does not bother to mention NetCompetition is directly funded by the same telecom industry Crawford’s book criticizes. Cleland in fact works to represent the interests of his clients: large phone and cable operators.

Randolph May’s criticism of Crawford’s book is unsurprising when one considers he is president of the Free State Foundation, a special interest group friendly to large telecom companies. FSF also supports the work of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group with strong ties to AT&T.

Richard Bennett, who once denied to Stop the Cap! he worked for a K Street lobbyist (he does), attacked the book on behalf of his benefactors at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a group Reuters notes  receives financial support from telecommunications companies. He also received a $20,000 stipend from Time Warner Cable.

In fact, Broadband for America could not cite a single source criticizing Crawford’s book that does not have ties to the industry Crawford criticizes.