Earlier this year, Gov. Sam Brownback (R-Kansas) signed legislation into law that allows AT&T to deregulate itself, and its rates, at will.  Kansas ratepayers are about to pay the price for that law as basic phone rates are expected to increase as much as $84 a year for residents that have few alternatives.

AT&T wants to eliminate price caps on landline service, which currently limit pre-tax prices to $15.70 in rural areas, $16.70 in larger Kansan cities with enhanced local calling areas.  After AT&T won similar deregulation in Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri and Arkansas, AT&T has been regularly raising basic phone rates, which are now $5 to $7 more a month for basic service than before deregulation.

AT&T intends to divert much of the additional revenue away from upkeep of its landline network, which in several states it has won the right to abandon in rural areas, and use the money to enhance its cell phone network instead.

AT&T spokesman Aaron Catlin told The Wichita Eagle AT&T intends to supply communities currently bypassed by AT&T DSL with heavily usage capped, and much more expensive, 3G wireless broadband instead.

AT&T currently sells that service for $60 a month with a 5GB usage limit and an overlimit fee of $50 per gigabyte.

Catlin told the Eagle AT&T was excited with the possibilities, although rural Kansans facing those prices might not be.

“A lot of bad things are going to happen long-term,” Steve Rarrick, an attorney for the Citizens’ Utility Ratepayer Board told the newspaper. “Over time, they (customers) are going to see their phone bills go up. That’s been the experience of other states.”

Losing customers.

A year after Frontier Communications assumed control of Verizon’s assets in the Pacific Northwest, customers are fleeing the company’s inherited fiber-to-the-home service FiOS, after announcing a massive (since suspended, except in Indiana) 46 percent rate hike for the television portion of the service.  A new $500 installation fee has kept all but the bravest from considering replacing customers who have left for Comcast and various satellite TV providers.

Frontier’s second-quarter financial results revealed the company has lost at least 14,000 out of 112,000 FiOS TV customers in the region (and in the Fort Wayne, Ind. market, where the service is also available.)

Early reaction to the original rate hike announcement started customers shopping for another provider — mostly Comcast, which competes in all three states where Frontier FiOS operates.  Even after the rate hike was suspended in some markets, intense marketing activity by Frontier to drive customers towards its partnership with satellite provider DirecTV managed to convince at least some of those customers to pull the plug on fiber in return for a free year of satellite TV, although an even larger number presumably switched to the cable competition.

D.A. Davidson, a financial consulting firm, told The Oregonian the message was clear.

“They would love to get rid of the FiOS TV customers,” Donna Jaegers, who follows Frontier, told the newspaper. “They’re programming costs are very high compared to the rates that they charge.”

Jaegers said Frontier Communications completely botched their efforts to transition customers away from FiOS TV towards satellite, because most of those departing headed for the cable competition, attracted by promotional offers and convenient billing.

Many others simply don’t want a satellite dish on their roof, and are confounded about Frontier’s message that satellite TV is somehow better than fiber-to-the-home service.

Frontier admits its FiOS service is now underutilized, but claims it will continue to provide the service where it already exists.

Wilderotter

Frontier Claims Its DSL Service is Better Than Cable Broadband

Frontier’s general business plan is to provide DSL service in rural areas where it faces little or no competition, and most of Frontier’s investment has been to upgrade Verizon’s landline network to sustain 1-3Mbps DSL service, for which it routinely charges the same (or more) for standalone broadband service that its cable competitors charge for much faster speeds.

But Frontier Communications CEO Maggie Wilderotter says their DSL service is better than the cable competition.

“A key differentiator between our network and cable competition is that you consistently get the speed you pay for,” Wilderotter told investors on a conference call. “There’s no sharing at the local level. High demand for bandwidth-intensive applications like video are putting pressure on all wired networks. To that end, we want to make sure that we have more than enough capacity to satisfy the expectations of our customers. We’re spending capital in all parts of the network with specific emphasis in the middle mile, which will enable us to consistently deliver a quality customer experience for our customers of today and tomorrow.”

Frontier Communications CEO Maggie Wilderotter defends anemic broadband additions during the 2nd quarter of 2011 and tries to convince investors DSL service is better than the cable competition. August 3, 2011. (4 minutes)
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Netflix Traffic Represents 25% of Frontier’s Broadband Traffic; Online Video — 50%

Wilderotter admitted Frontier’s broadband network is overcongested in many regions, which she partly blamed for the company’s anemic addition of new broadband customers.

She noted Netflix, which has itself consistently rated Frontier the worst wired broadband provider in the country for being able to deliver consistent, high quality access to their streaming service, represents one-quarter of all capacity usage of Frontier’s broadband network.

“Video is about 50 percent,” Wilderotter added.  In an investor conference call, she explained network congestion in more detail:

“In [the second quarter], we had many areas with unacceptable levels of network congestion, which negatively impacted our growth in net high-speed additions.” Wilderotter said. “We believe all of the major congestion issues will be fixed by the end of [the third quarter], and that will enable us to drive higher growth and net broadband activation in [former Verizon service areas.]”

“What we decided to do is to go for fixing the middle mile, which is the [central office] to the […] neighborhood and to expand that capability by 100-fold. And then also, expand from the [central office] out to the Internet and make sure that we have huge capacity to deliver and receive capability to our customers. So when we sell 6 meg, 10 meg, 25 meg, 50 meg, the customer gets what we sell them and that was extremely important for us.”

“So what we did is in the areas where we saw the congestion increase based upon usage increases, and we’ve built new households. We’ve held off on marketing to a lot of those new households until we fixed the congestion problem because we didn’t want to exacerbate what we had already. We’ve shifted capital in terms of the mix of how we’ve spent capital to fix this problem. I’d say we’re probably 75% of the way there in fixing congestion. This quarter is another big quarter for us to get all of the major issues out of the network, which will allow us in the back end of this quarter through the fourth quarter, to really start pushing the penetration levels where we’ve built new households in the areas that have been affected by congestion.”

Frontier Introduces Line Bonded DSL — Two Connections Can Improve DSL Speeds

Frontier Faster? Frontier announces line bonded DSL.

Frontier Communications also announced the introduction of Frontier Second Connect, a DSL line bonding product that delivers two physical connections to a single household.  Line bonding allows for improved broadband speeds.

“Second Connect gives our customers two exclusive connections in one household, and we’re the only provider in every market that can do that,” Wilderotter claimed.

In more urban markets, Frontier’s DSL speeds are woefully behind those available from most cable competitors.  Frontier has begun upgrading some of their legacy service areas and retiring older equipment in an effort to improve the quality of service.

“The real initiatives that we have underway are called middle mile, interoffice facilities, as well as some of the more aged equipment that’s in the network,” said Dan McCarthy, Frontier’s chief operating officer. “So as we go through, there’s about 600 projects that are underway today that will improve both the speed and capability.”

“We’ve inherited markets that there has not been upgrades to capacity in these markets for many years and fixes to the networks, plus the elements as the DSLAMs, even the DSLAMs themselves are old,” Wilderotter said. “So we’re replacing network elements in the neighborhood. We’re splitting them and moving customers to other network elements to make sure that they have a good experience.”

Frontier executives answer a question from a Wall Street banker about DSL speeds and congestion problems on Frontier’s broadband network. A detailed technical discussion ensues as the company tells investors it is redirecting some capital to fixing Frontier’s overcongested network. August 3, 2011. (5 minutes)
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Frontier Still Losing More than 8% Of Its Landline Customers Every Year

Despite broadband rollouts and incremental improvements, more than eight percent of Frontier’s landline customers disconnect service permanently every year.  Frontier called that disconnect rate an improvement over its line losses last year, which exceeded 11 percent in some areas.

“Total line losses improved to an 8.6% year-over-year decline, our lowest level since taking ownership when the pro forma loss rate was 9.7%,” reported Wilderotter. “We also improved [the] loss rate [in former Verizon service areas to] 10.1% compared to 11.4% in Q2 2010.”

Most of Frontier’s departing customers are switching to cable providers and/or cell phone service.

(Update 8-23-2011: We are now told in many areas, Frontier’s Second Connect service is not actually a bonded DSL product, but rather a “dry loop” second DSL line that carries the same speed as your primary line.  Presumably, household members can divide up who uses which DSL circuit for Internet access.  The charge for Second Connect in ex-Verizon service areas is $14.99 per month plus a second mandatory monthly modem rental fee of $6.99. If the web link does not work, it means the service is not available in your service area.)

The AT&T Document Dump

On Friday, the tech-wireless media was in a frenzy over news one of AT&T’s law firms accidentally posted an un-censored copy of “highly confidential information” regarding its merger proposal with T-Mobile on the Federal Communications Commission website.  Although nobody seems to have a complete copy of the notorious filing to share (it was quickly pulled down after Wireless Week — an industry trade publication — blew the whistle), it turns out if you are willing to plow through AT&T’s periodic publicly-available document dumps, you don’t really need “top secret” information to realize how AT&T is trying to sucker America into accepting its competition-busting merger deal with T-Mobile USA.

What AT&T is Telling the FCC’s Lawyers But Hiding from You

As part of the approval process, the FCC sent AT&T a significant homework assignment, demanding answers to some detailed questions about the justification for the merger, how AT&T intends to use both its existing and newly-acquired wireless spectrum from both Qualcomm and, presumably, T-Mobile, and what specific plans the company has to expand its next generation wireless data network to rural America.

Last week, we learned from the unredacted filing that AT&T will pay $39 billion for T-Mobile to expand a 4G network that AT&T refused to spend $3.8 billion dollars to build themselves.  You read that right.  AT&T says it can expand its own 4G network to an additional 55 million people for just under $4 billion, or buy T-Mobile for nearly $40 billion to accomplish the same thing.

And what exactly does AT&T get from T-Mobile?  A largely urban network running a 4G network that goes nowhere near the 55 million largely rural Americans AT&T claims it intends to serve if the merger wins approval.

So scratch AT&T’s claim that the acquisition of T-Mobile’s network will do anything directly for the rural Americans T-Mobile never directly served.

AT&T’s biggest selling point is that its acquisition of T-Mobile will allow it to reach “97 percent of America” with its improved 4G network:

Because of the spectrum gains and the overall economic benefits resulting from the transaction, senior management made a business judgment that the merger with T-Mobile USA allowed AT&T to expand its LTE build-out to 97 percent of the population. These economic benefits include incremental reductions in cost due to the addition of T-Mobile USA resources, greater scale economies, such as higher volume discounts on handsets and equipment, a larger customer base, and the expectation of a higher take-rate for its LTE service. In addition, the transaction will enable AT&T to re-purpose its existing capital budget allocated to spectrum acquisitions to be allocated for other uses. Overall, the scale and scope of the larger combined wireless business will permit the additional capital investment to be spread over a larger revenue base than would be the case absent the merger.

But the unredacted, “highly confidential” part of the same document exposes important facts AT&T didn’t want the public to know:

“AT&T senior management concluded that, unless AT&T could find a way to expand its LTE footprint on a significantly more cost-effective basis, an LTE deployment to 80 percent of the U.S. population was the most that could be justified,” wrote AT&T counsel Richard Rosen.

In other words, by collecting T-Mobile customers’ monthly payments, AT&T can utilize that additional revenue, earned mostly from T-Mobile’s urban customer base, and use it to pay for rural cell sites the company itself won’t spend the money to upgrade to achieve that 97 percent coverage.

You can read between the lines of AT&T’s public statements and come to the same conclusion Rosen made confidentially, but it helps when the company’s own lawyer says it out loud.

Karl Bode from Broadband Reports thinks there is something familiar about that 97 percent figure.  It just so happens to be Verizon’s existing 3G coverage area.  Verizon pointed to their more robust 3G coverage in a major ad campaign that began just prior to the Christmas shopping season in 2009.  It did enough damage to bring AT&T to court in an effort to stop the ads, and reacquainted America with Luke Wilson, who threw postcards on a floor map touting AT&T’s more robust, but considerably less speedy, last-generation EDGE data network.

Verizon completed their expansive 3G network without the benefit of a merger and is in the process of building their 4G LTE network on their own as well — capable of eventually reaching the majority of Americans without taking out the fourth largest wireless carrier in the country.  AT&T, on the other hand, spent its time in court and handing Wilson more postcards to throw  instead of investing appropriately in its network over the last three years.

AT&T’s Document Dump: More than 1 Million Documents Bury FCC and Justice Lawyers

Another important revelation that doesn’t require the accidental disclosure of redacted data is the fact AT&T is burying government lawyers at both the FCC and Department of Justice in virtual paper.  The company admits to sending at least 1.2 million documents to Justice alone.  Reviewing AT&T’s filings with the FCC exposes the use of the old legal trick of burying your opponents in paper, hoping they will miss important documents that could call into question the veracity of the company’s arguments.

With the FCC, AT&T’s lawyers love to use appendices and attachments as virtual dumping grounds, adding copies of virtually any company document that contain “key words” or “search terms” in response to the Commission’s questions.

Take this Q&A exchange:

FCC Question: Provide all plans, analyses, and reports discussing: (a) spectrum requirements for all band segments; (b) the average data transmission speeds that the Company expects customers will be able to obtain; (c) actual and forecasted traffic and busy hour analyses, (d) total data tonnage; (e) capacity utilization rate; (f) vertically integrated operations; or (g) other technical or engineering factors required to attain any available cost savings or other efficiencies necessary to compete profitably in the sale or provision of any relevant product or any relevant service.

AT&T’s Answer: To respond to this request, AT&T conducted key word searches of custodian files as detailed in the tables appended as Exhibit A. Documents responsive to this request are included in AT&T’s production.

It’s the equivalent of putting the phrase “data transmission speeds” into a search engine and then attaching every document that appears in the results and calling it “your answer,” relevant or not.

AT&T used the same approach in answering the FCC’s questions about how the merger would specifically bring improved 4G service to areas without service today, what impact the merger will have on roaming agreements and wholesale access to the combined AT&T/T-Mobile network, and even in response to a basic question about plans for targeting particular competitors, customers, or customer segments after the merger.

Reality: AT&T Doesn’t Care About T-Mobile’s Network

So what else does AT&T win from a nearly $40 billion investment in T-Mobile?  While the leak of confidential information continues to be largely protected by a trade industry publication that has not released it publicly in full, anyone versed in telecommunications can easily find plenty in AT&T’s public documents.

The most important point is that AT&T admits, publicly,  it has not determined exactly what it intends to do with T-Mobile’s most important asset — its network:

• “AT&T, however, will not be in a position to make any final determinations until it is able to obtain more detailed information about T-Mobile USA’s operations, which will occur later in the acquisition process.”
• “AT&T has not yet begun detailed integration planning efforts.”

Would you spend $40 billion to buy a cellular service provider and not have the first clue what you would do with it?

But it gets even sillier.  AT&T doesn’t even know, several months after the merger was announced, exactly where T-Mobile’s cell towers are and what kind of backhaul connectivity they have:

AT&T has not yet begun detailed integration planning and its knowledge of T-Mobile USA’s operations is necessarily limited at this early stage. The actual process of determining which specific T-Mobile USA sites to integrate and which to decommission will require substantially more data from T-Mobile USA regarding its network as well as a more thorough engineering analysis of each area’s characteristics and capacity needs, which could change by the time the Transaction closes. Consequently, AT&T has not yet determined the exact number or location of T-Mobile USA towers or other locations used for transmission of signals that will be integrated into the combined company’s network to increase network density.

Because AT&T has not yet begun detailed integration planning and its knowledge of T-Mobile USA’s operation is necessarily limited at this early stage, AT&T does not have documents regarding the integration of the two companies’ switching facilities and backhaul.

These facts have made it impossible for AT&T to be responsive to specific questions from the FCC about the impact of acquiring and integrating T-Mobile’s operations into AT&T’s.  That left the company answering the Commission’s questions with statements like this:

Q. Provide all plans, analyses, and reports discussing any possible modification by the Merged Company of the terms, including prices, for providing backhaul for unaffiliated mobile wireless service providers to new or existing towers.

A. AT&T has not yet begun detailed integration planning, and its knowledge of T-Mobile USA’s operations is necessarily preliminary at this early stage. Any consideration regarding potential modification of terms and pricing for backhaul has not yet occurred. Thus, AT&T does not have any documents responsive to this request.

Good to know… or not know.

So if AT&T isn’t dwelling on the details of T-Mobile’s network, what do they expect to obtain from its purchase?

Here are AT&T’s “assumptions.”  That’s right, AT&T isn’t actually promising to do any of this.  It just “assumes” it will based on earlier planning — the same kind of planning that was supposed to deliver 4G upgrades without T-Mobile in the equation, until company executives changed their minds:

• Utilize the parties’ combined scale, spectrum, and other resources to extend AT&T’s deployment of LTE services to over 97% of the U.S. population, extending service to an additional 55 million Americans;
• Integrate AT&T’s and T-Mobile USA’s wireless networks, including:

1. Integrate T-Mobile USA cell sites into the AT&T wireless network, resulting in a more robust network grid;
2. Combine AT&T’s and T-Mobile USA’s GSM networks, eliminate redundant GSM control channels and maximize utilization efficiencies;
3. Combine AT&T’s and T-Mobile USA’s GSM spectrum holdings, resulting in channel pooling efficiencies and improved coverage;
4. Optimize usage of the parties’ combined spectrum holdings and deploy additional spectrum to support more spectrally efficient network technologies; and
5. Decommission redundant cell sites and reuse radios and other equipment from decommissioned sites to enhance network efficiency and performance.

• Make AT&T rate plans available to T-Mobile USA customers, while preserving rate plans for T-Mobile USA consumers who wish to maintain their existing plan of choice;
• Make AT&T services, smartphones, and other devices available to current T-Mobile USA customers;
• Integrate retail outlets, dealers, and marketing efforts under the AT&T brand;
• Integrate billing, customer care, and other support services;
• Integrate certain functional units, including, but not limited to human resources, general & administrative, information technology, finance, procurement, and legal.
• Achieve savings in network infrastructure investment and network and customer equipment purchases; and
• Achieve efficiencies in interconnection and transport costs.

During AT&T’s periodic communications with shareholders, the company has spent most of its time talking about cost savings made possible from closing redundant retail outlets, integrating networks, and the always-vague savings from job redundancies (read that major layoffs).  In fact, AT&T has said they will save up to $10 billion dollars in infrastructure expenses with the merger.  At the same time, its public relations efforts promise the company will spend a veritable fortune — up to $8 billion, improving AT&T’s own network.

You can be certain to the uninitiated, eight billion dollars sounds like a lot of money.  It’s a dollar amount that is sure to razzle-dazzle plenty of people.  That is, until you realize during the same period of time, T-Mobile itself would have been spending up to $18 billion of its own money upgrading its network.  Eighteen billion minus eight billion equals the aforementioned $10 billion — the savings AT&T will realize from continuing to under-spend on both its network and T-Mobile’s.

More Fun Facts: AT&T Cares More About Counting Your Usage Than Measuring Network Capacity & Utilization

Wading through AT&T’s filings has revealed another important fact pertinent to Stop the Cap! readers: AT&T obsesses about measuring your wireless data usage but doesn’t have much of a clue about how much network capacity it has at different cell sites, nor the utilization rates at those sites.  No wonder AT&T drops calls.  If the company isn’t carefully measuring network utilization at a granular level, it can’t hope to find overcongested sites that badly need upgrades to stop the problem of dropped calls and slow speed data:

AT&T does not maintain in the ordinary course of business a nationwide list of all CMAs where its individual network is underutilized. With regard to the areas where AT&T’s and T-Mobile USA’s networks may be underutilized relative to each other, AT&T does not have this information on a CMA by CMA basis, nor does AT&T have engineering data that would provide this granular information for T-Mobile USA.

Money - Better Earned Than Spent

However, when the opportunity to engage in highly-profitable Internet Overcharging exists, measuring customer usage takes a high priority, as we learn from AT&T in response to another question from the FCC:

The .csv file in Exhibit 19-1 contains current (as of March 11, 2011) data usage for each UMTS site (by USID) measured in kilobytes, during the monthly busy hour, and separately for the uplink and the downlink. The .csv file in Exhibit 19-2 contains current (as of March 11, 2011) data usage for each GSM site, measured in Erlangs, combined for the uplink and downlink, for the monthly busy hour. At the Commission’s request, AT&T also provides an estimate of GSM data usage in terms of Kilobytes, using a formula that converts Erlangs to Kilobytes. ll Both exhibits identify the CMA associated with each site. The .xlsx file in Exhibit 19-3 contains usage projections that are currently used by the network engineers for each of AT&T’s 27 regional clusters in the ordinary course of business.

AT&T doesn’t lose any money when it drops your call from an overcongested cell site (unless you grow weary enough of it to cancel service), but can lose plenty if it doesn’t measure customer data usage in hopes of limiting customer use or charging them an overlimit fee when they don’t.

AT&T’s Mother-of-all-Disclaimers: AT&T Has Not Verified It Has Produced All Requested Documents

The most flippant part of AT&T’s document dump is the revelation that despite the million plus documents thrown at two government agencies, AT&T isn’t willing to affirm it actually produced copies of the relevant documents the government wants as part of the review process.  In a host of disclaimers and AT&T’s own descriptions of how it defines the meaning of the government requests, the company notes:

Pursuant to discussions with the Commission staff, AT&T is submitting its Response consistent with the following qualifications:

• Custodian files were searched covering the period from January 1, 2009 through March 21, 2011, except for certain custodians, whose files were searched through early May, 2011.
• AT&T has not verified that it has produced “all other documents referred to in the document or attachments,” pursuant to instruction 4.
• AT&T has not searched backup disks and tapes for documents.

Nothing to slip through scrutiny there, right?

Dear Chairman Genachowski, Attorney General Holder and Commissioner Sandoval:

We write to urge you to reject AT&T Inc.’s proposed purchase of T-Mobile because it will without question lead to higher prices for consumers.

This is not conjecture; it is the lesson of history. Seven years ago, AT&T Inc.’s wholly owned subsidiary, AT&T Mobility LLC (then known as Cingular Wireless Corporation) requested permission to buy AT&T’s wireless network (then known as AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.) for $41 billion. At that time, AT&T and Cingular had the first and second largest share, respectively, of wireless communications providers in the U.S.

In order to get the merger approved, AT&T and an army of executives, lobbyists and allies assured regulators and consumers that the deal was in the public interest by making promises — the very same promises that we’re hearing from AT&T today:

What happened after the AT&T – Cingular merger? Once the Federal Communications Commission approved the deal (after negligible scrutiny), the newly merged company – which later renamed itself AT&T Mobility LLC– betrayed its promises. It abandoned the old AT&T network, deliberately degrading the network so that AT&T customers would be forced to migrate to Cingular’s own network, pay an upgrade fee of $18, buy new phones and agree to new and more expensive rate plans. These anti-consumer moves were enforced by an anti-competitive “early termination fee” of anywhere between $175 and $400, which prevented customers of AT&T from moving to another carrier.

In short, AT&T policyholders were railroaded into spending hundreds of dollars more in order to maintain their cellular service – a colossal rip-off by the same corporate executives who are now asking for permission to do it all over again.

Nothing in the terms of the proposed merger bars AT&T from engaging in a repeat performance against helpless T-Mobile customers if this deal is approved. Indeed, even as the companies mount a massive public relations campaign to win your approval, T-Mobile executives are already implicitly acknowledging that once the merger is approved, AT&T will make changes in the T-Mobile network:

T-Mobile has no plans to alter our 3G / 4G network in any way that would make your device obsolete. The deal is expected to close in approximately 12 months. After that, decisions about the network will be AT&T’s to make. That said, the president and CEO of AT&T Mobility was quoted in the Associated Press saying “there’s nothing for [customers] to worry about… [network changes affecting devices] will be done over time… ”

Moreover, AT&T has publicly admitted that if the merger goes through, T-Mobile subscribers with 3G phones will have to replace their phones to keep their wireless broadband service. AT&T plans to “rearrange how T-Mobile’s cell towers work” so that T-Mobile’s airwaves can be used for 4G service rather than 3G. Even though AT&T will be altering T-Mobile’s 3G cell towers to operate 4G services, Ralph de la Vega, president and CEO of AT&T Mobility and Consumer Markets, said that after the merger, T-Mobile 3G phones will need to be replaced with AT&T 3G phones, which “will happen as part of the normal phone upgrade process.” Once AT&T forces the T-Mobile subscribers with 3G phones to buy AT&T 3G phones, it is only a matter of time before AT&T pushes all of its subscribers over to the 4G network.

T-Mobile customers who are forced to migrate to AT&T’s network will have to buy new phones, agree to more expensive rate plans, or cancel their contracts and pay a termination fee.

Once known for its low prices, T-Mobile has already begun increasing its rates and decreasing options in anticipation of the merger. On July 20, 2011, T-Mobile discontinued its unlimited data plans, replacing them with plans that cap the amount of data a customer can use; once the customer hits the data cap, T-Mobile will substantially slow down their network speed. Nine days later, AT&T, which stopped offering new unlimited data plans last year, announced it would similarly start throttling data speeds even for customers on “grandfathered” unlimited data plans. AT&T is attributing its slow-down to the “serious wireless spectrum crunch.” In another implicit promise sure to be broken, AT&T has told its customers and regulators that “[n]othing short of completing the T-Mobile merger will provide additional spectrum capacity to address these near term challenges.”

Finally, T-Mobile was recently named one of the world’s most ethical companies for 2011. It was the only U.S. wireless telecommunication service provider that made the list. By contrast, complaints about AT&T’s service and prices are legion. Indeed, the views of millions of AT&T customers have been summarized by an online campaign known as “#attfail.” This merger will eliminate a U.S. wireless company that at least seemed to care about its customers.

To this day, the AT&T customers who were misled and overcharged by AT&T’s actions after the 2004 merger are still fighting in the courts for refunds and other remediation arising from the merger. In 2006, lawyers for Consumer Watchdog, joined by a group of private law firms, filed a national class action lawsuit against AT&T on behalf of the millions of customers who were victimized by the merger: Coneff v. AT&T Corp., et al., No. C06-0944 (W.D. Wash). In response, AT&T’s lawyers claimed that when AT&T customers were forcibly moved to the new network, they simultaneously agreed to waive their right to seek refunds from AT&T in court because of a provision buried in the fine-print of AT&T’s contract that required arbitration of all disputes and barred customers from joining together in an arbitration. Throughout the litigation, AT&T changed its arbitration clause several times, each time modifying various terms while retaining the arbitration clause that prohibited customers from bringing or participating in a class action, regardless of whether it is brought in arbitration or in court.

In 2009, the U.S. District Court in Seattle, Washington, held that AT&T’s arbitration clause was unconscionable because most AT&T customers would never obtain redress without the ability to bring a class action. The case is presently before the 9th Circuit. In its briefing, AT&T now contends that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 563 U.S. __ (2011) should be interpreted by the courts to apply to the egregiously unfair and one-sided mandatory arbitration clauses like the one struck down in Coneff in 2009, which, in our case and unlike in Concepcion, has been shown to preclude customers’ basic due process rights.

Albert Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. Considering AT&T’s track record, it is irrational to expect that the AT&T and T-Mobile merger will yield different results. If the merger is approved, millions of T-Mobile customers will be subjected to the same costly and unfair practices that AT&T customers experienced after the 2004 Cingular merger. Moreover, permitting AT&T to swallow a competitor will leave the American cellular marketplace controlled by a duopoly that, through the artifice of termination fees and arbitration agreements, will effectively eliminate competition between them.

This is a bread and butter test of the federal government’s commitment to American consumers versus the Wall Street and corporate interests that too often seem to be the winners every time the federal government takes action.  The Administration should ignore the lofty pronouncements of the corporate-funded academics and allies who provide cover for the glib promises of two cellular giants, along with the Wall Street firms that will reap millions in fees for providing the merger paperwork, in favor of the average American family, who, after all they have been forced to sacrifice these last few years, should not be required to pay more of their dollars for the ability to use a cell phone.

Harvey Rosenfeld

Laura Antonini

You can find documented footnotes accompanying this letter here.

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/ATT T-Mobile Merger Ad.flv[/flv]

AT&T is blanketing the airwaves with claims of improved service in its advertising promoting the merger with T-Mobile.  (1 minute)

A very pricey upgrade

Frontier Communications’ DSL modem rental fee is now as high as $6.99 a month in some of the phone company’s service areas, $14.99 a month if you want the convenience of a wireless router built-in.  That’s $84 and $189 a year, respectively, for equipment that cost the company a fraction of that.

“Lymelizzard,” a would-be Frontier DSL customer in Robbinsville, North Carolina, considers that highway robbery.

“I can go and buy the modem at a store and it would be less than one year of rental,” he wrote on Broadband Reports’ Frontier forum.

Frontier Communications’ regular monthly prices are not exactly aggressive in North Carolina, charging up to $50 a month for 3Mbps DSL, $55 for up to 7Mbps, before the modem rental fee and other charges are included.  A customer with Frontier’s wireless router would pay more than $70 a month, just for 7Mbps DSL service:

Frontier's No-Contract Prices for New Customers Only. Prices less for 1-2 year contracts that include $165 early termination fee for Double Plays and up to $120 early termination fee for High-Speed Internet only plans. One-time charges up to $60. Additional charges, taxes and terms apply.

Frontier has quietly increased equipment fees over the years.  Back in 2010, the company raised the rental fee to $4.50 a month.  Some service areas have been paying $6.99 a month since 2009, but now face even higher prices if they want a home “Wi-Fi” hotspot included.

Something else has changed at Frontier as well.  The company is making it more difficult for customers to purchase their own modems and use them instead, skipping the modem rental fee.  Customers trying to save several dollars a month now face a brick wall when contacting customer service.

“The salesman on the phone even said [the modem rental fee] wasn’t a good deal but he could not waive it,” Lymelizzard wrote.  He declined to become a Frontier DSL customer, considering the modem rental fee a deal-breaker.

“I’m surprised that all the Joe Customers out in Frontier-land haven’t complained,” he said. “This is merely a money grab on Frontier’s part. I could see the fee for a year, maybe two, but for the life of the account that’s bogus.”