Netflix and the rise of online video has taken its toll on what used to be a household name in DVD rental.

DISH Network Corporation today announced its subsidiary Blockbuster will close its 300 remaining retail rental locations and end its DVD-by-Mail rental service in mid-December.

“This is not an easy decision, yet consumer demand is clearly moving to digital distribution of video entertainment,” said Joseph P. Clayton, DISH president and chief executive officer. “Despite our closing of the physical distribution elements of the business, we continue to see value in the Blockbuster brand, and we expect to leverage that brand as we continue to expand our digital offerings.”

At its peak in 2004, Blockbuster had nearly 60,000 employees and more than 9,000 video rental stores. The company’s inadequate response to the rise of Netflix, which rented out its DVD’s by mail, caused revenue to plummet and Blockbuster filed for bankruptcy in September 2010.

Legendary investor Carl Icahn called Blockbuster “the worst investment I ever made.” DISH may feel the same way.

After acquiring the remnants of Blockbuster for $233 million and assuming $87 million in debt and liabilities at a 2011 bankruptcy auction, DISH found itself quickly in retreat, closing 200 Blockbuster rental stores in 2011, 500 more in 2012, and another 300 this year. Despite efforts to compete head-on with Netflix, Blockbuster’s DVD-by-Mail business never achieved much success because Netflix maintained a better selection and faster delivery from a more extensive network of regional distribution sites.

Today’s announcement marks the end of Blockbuster’s retail rental experience and its DVD rental distribution centers will close by early January as customer DVD rentals are returned in the mail.

Over the past 18 months, Blockbuster has divested itself of assets in the United States, as well international assets, including operations in the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. DISH will continue to support Blockbuster’s domestic and international franchise operations, relationships and agreements.

DISH will keep licensing rights to the Blockbuster brand, and key assets, including the company’s significant video library. DISH will focus on delivering the Blockbuster @Home service to DISH customers, and on its streaming service, Blockbuster On Demand.

Armstrong

A Wall Street analyst that maintained a “buy” rating on Comcast stock for most of the past four years is leaving Goldman Sachs after 13 years to become Comcast’s head of investor relations.

Jason Armstrong, often heard on earnings conference calls of major telecommunications companies, will start his new job in January, although his job change has not been publicly announced.

Armstrong served as the investment bank’s lead analyst for the cable, telephone and satellite sector. He arrived at Goldman Sachs in 2000 after leaving Ernst & Young, LLP in Chicago.

Officials from both Goldman Sachs and Comcast declined to comment.

Verizon gets out the black marker to redact information it considers “confidential.”

The New York Public Service Commission Monday rejected most of Verizon’s request to keep secret the state of its landline network and details about the company’s plans to distribute Voice Link as an optional wireless landline replacement in the state.

Nearly two months after Verizon announced it was abandoning its original plan to replace defective landlines on Fire Island with Voice Link, Verizon is bristling over a Freedom Of Information Law (FOIL) request from consumer advocates and a union for disclosure of reports filed with the PSC regarding Verizon’s network and its upkeep — information the company considers confidential trade secrets. To underline that belief, Verizon provided the PSC with edited versions of documents it filed with the state considered suitable for public disclosure, one consisting of 330 pages of blanket redactions except for the page headings and page numbers.

“[These discovery requests] are designed solely to advance the Communications Workers of America’s self-serving efforts to prevent Verizon from offering its Voice Link product, even on an optional basis, and to investigate the relationship between Verizon and Verizon Wireless — matters that are beyond the scope of this or any other pending Commission proceeding,” wrote Verizon deputy general counsel Joseph A. Post. “On September 11, 2013, Verizon announced that it had decided to build out a fiber-to-the-premises (“FTTP”) network on western Fire Island, and targeted Memorial Day 2014 for the completion of construction and the general availability of services over the new network.”

The PSC disagreed with Post, ruling the majority of documents labeled “confidential” by Verizon were, in fact, not.

“[…] The information claimed by Verizon to be trade secrets or confidential commercial information does not warrant an exception from disclosure and its request for continued protection from disclosure is denied,” ruled Donna M. Giliberto, assistant counsel & records access officer at the Department of Public Service.

Verizon has until Nov. 14 to file an appeal.

Common Cause New York, the Communications Workers of America-Region 1, Consumers Union, the Fire Island Association, and Richard Brodsky used New York’s public disclosure laws to collectively request documents shedding light on their suspicion Verizon has systematically allowed its landline facilities to deteriorate to the point a wireless landline substitute becomes a rational substitute. They also suspect Verizon diverted funds intended for its landline network to more profitable Verizon Wireless.

“In spite of its obligations under New York law, in spite of the investment by ratepayers in the FIOS wireline system, in spite of the needs and expectations of the people, businesses and economy of the state, Verizon is intending to and has begun to shut down its wireline system,” declared the groups.

Many involved took note of Stop the Cap!’s report in July 2012 that warned then-CEO Lowell McAdam had plans to decommission a substantial part of Verizon’s copper landline network, especially in rural areas, where it intended to replace it with wireless service:

“In […] areas that are more rural and more sparsely populated, we have got [a wireless 4G] LTE built that will handle all of those services and so we are going to cut the copper off there,” McAdam said. “We are going to do it over wireless. So I am going to be really shrinking the amount of copper we have out there and then I can focus the investment on that to improve the performance of it. The vision that I have is we are going into the copper plant areas and every place we have FiOS, we are going to kill the copper. We are going to just take it out of service and we are going to move those services onto FiOS. We have got parallel networks in way too many places now, so that is a pot of gold in my view.”

Some consumer groups suspect Fire Island represented an opportunity to test regulators’ tolerance for a transition away from copper landlines in high cost service areas. As Stop the Cap! reported this summer, New Yorkers soundly rejected Verizon Voice Link, with more than 1,700 letters opposing the wireless service and none in favor on record at the PSC.

In early September, a well-placed source in Albany told Stop the Cap! Verizon’s request to substitute Voice Link where it was no longer economically feasible to maintain landline infrastructure was headed for rejection after a constant stream of complaints arrived from affected customers. Verizon suddenly withdrew its proposal on Sept. 11 and announced it would bring FiOS fiber optics to Fire Island instead.

Although Verizon now insists it will only offer Voice Link as an optional service for New York residents going forward, public interest groups still believe Verizon has allowed its landline network to deteriorate to unacceptable levels.

Verizon originally claimed 40% of its facilities on Fire Island were damaged beyond repair when they were assessed after Hurricane Sandy. But residents claim some of that damage existed before the storm struck last October. Some fear Verizon is engaged in a self-fulfilling prophecy, allowing its unprofitable copper wire facilities to fall apart and then point to the sorry state of the network as their principle argument in favor of a switch to wireless service.

Herding money, resources, and customers away from landlines to Verizon Wireless

“In fact, the vast majority of defective lines are a consequence of the failure and refusal of Verizon to maintain and repair the system over time,” the groups assert. “The Commission must make a factual determination of the cause of the 40% defect allegation as part of this proceeding. If, as asserted herein and elsewhere, the evidence shows a pattern of inadequate repair, maintenance and capital investment, the Commission can not and should not approve any loss of wireline service to any customer, as matters of law and sound policy.”

“We assert that Verizon has systematically misallocated costs thereby distorting the extent to which the wireline system has suffered losses, if any. […] It is fair to say that substantial losses in the landline system are repeatedly used by the Commission and the Company as a justification for rate increases and regulatory decisions affecting the scope, cost, adequacy and nature of telephone service provided to customers of Verizon NY.”

Verizon would seem to confirm as much.

In 2012, Verizon’s chief financial officer Fran Shammo told investors the company was diverting some of the costs of Verizon Wireless’ upgrades by booking them on Verizon’s landline construction budget.

“The fact of the matter is wireline capital — and I won’t get the number but it’s pretty substantial — is being spent on the wireline side of the house to support the wireless growth,” said Shammo. “So the IP backbone, the data transmission, fiber to the cell, that is all on the wireline books but it’s all being built for [Verizon Wireless].”

Funds diverted for Verizon Wireless’ highly profitable business were unavailable to spend on Verizon’s copper wire network or expansion of FiOS. In 2011, Verizon diverted money to deploying fiber optics to 1,848 Verizon Wireless cell towers in the state. In 2012, Verizon deployed fiber to an extra 867 cell tower sites in New York and Connecticut. Public interest groups assert the costs for these fiber to the cell tower builds were effectively paid by Verizon’s landline and FiOS customers, not Verizon Wireless customers.

Since 2003, Verizon has been subject to special attention from the New York Public Service Commission because of an excessive number of subscriber complaints about poor service. As early as a decade ago, the PSC found Verizon’s workforce reductions and declining investment in its landline network were largely responsible for deteriorating service. Each month since, Verizon must file reports on service failures and its plans to fix them.

In September alone, Verizon reported significant failures in service in rural areas upstate, almost entirely due to the weather:

• Heuvelton: A summer filled with significant thunderstorms resulted in downed poles and service disruptions. Verizon reported the central office serving the community was in jeopardy in June. By mid-July, 7% of customers reported major problems with their landline service.
• Amber: Nearly 11% of customers were without acceptable service in May because a 100-pair cable serving many of the community’s 274 customers was failing.
• Chittenango: Nearly 9% of the community’s 1,059 landline customers had significant problems with service because Verizon’s central office switching system in the exchange was failing.
• Sharon Springs: Almost 11% of Verizon’s customers in this small rural office of 417 lines were knocked out of service in July.
• Elenburg Dept.: More than 8% of Verizon’s 324 lines in this rural Adirondack community were out of service, usually as a result of a thunderstorm passing through.
• Hartford: When it rains hard in this Adirondack community, landline service fails for a substantial number of customers. In September, 2.43 inches of rain left 12.4% of customers with dysfunctional landline service.
• Valley Falls: Nearly one-third of Valley Falls’ 722 landlines were out of service in September after lightning hit several Verizon telephone cables. Problems only worsened towards the end of the month.
• Kendall: Almost 9% of Verizon customers in the Rochester suburb of Kendall were without service after a rain and wind storm. When a cold front moves through the community, landlines service is threatened.
• Bolivar: More than 20% of customers lost service July 19th after heavy rain, winds, and power outages hit.
• Cherry Valley: Verizon blamed seasonal service outages in Cherry Valley on farmers that dig up or damage buried telephone cables. More than 7% of customers were knocked out by harvested phone lines in July.
• Edmeston: More rain, more service outages for the 801 landlines in this small community in area code 607. More than 13.5% of customers called in with complaints in July. Verizon blamed heavy rain.
• Clinton Corners: Service failures come after nearly every heavy rainfall due to multiple pair cable failures in the aging infrastructure. More than 9% of customers reported problems in June, 13.2% in July, 8.2% in August, and 12.5% in September.

Verizon’s landline trouble reports disproportionately come from rural communities, exactly those Verizon’s former CEO proposed to serve by wireless. Weather-related failures are often the result of deteriorating infrastructure that results in outages, especially when moisture penetrates aging cables. Rural communities are also the least-likely to be provided fiber service, exposing customers to a larger percentage of the same copper wiring critics charge Verizon is allowing to deteriorate.

The cable industry believes the majority of America not using the Internet remain offline by choice.

The National Cable Telecommunications Association (NCTA) says the digital divide is not their fault. Price have very little to do with it, according to an NCTA infographic showing just 6% cite “cost” as the main reason they are not signed up for Internet service.

“Cable has made extensive efforts to connect all Americans to the Internet. And while high-speed Internet adoption has rapidly increased in the United States, still too many low-income families remain unconnected and are at risk of falling behind in the global information economy,” writes NCTA blogger John Solit. “Connecting all Americans in order to bridge the digital divide and expand the availability of broadband service remains a national goal embraced by cable companies. In a recent blog post, David L. Cohen, Comcast Executive VP & Chief Diversity Officer said, “[I]n just over two years through our Internet Essentials program, Comcast has connected an estimated 1 million low-income Americans, or more than 250,000 families, to the Internet at home.”

The “digital divide” — broadband have’s and have-nots — has been a regular topic among regulators and legislators for more than a decade. A suspicion that cost is a major factor keeping people from signing up could result in legislation compelling providers to offer low-cost Lifeline broadband service to the income-disadvantaged. In the last three years, the cable industry has tried to fight off that type of approach with voluntary programs that selectively target non-customers.

Comcast’s Internet Essentials provides 5/1Mbps service for $9.95 a month, but signing up isn’t easy.

The discounted service is available only to families with school-age children that qualify for the school lunch aid program. Comcast often promotes its discount program to legislators and others in the industry as an example of the voluntary effort the cable industry is making to solve the digital divide. Target customers who most likely qualify for the service are not going to learn about it through television ads or cable company mailers targeting low-income zip codes. Most of Comcast’s marketing effort is in cooperation with area schools.

Ironically, Comcast’s Internet Essentials actually forces some people to temporarily give up Internet access if they want to participate.

Customers must be current on their Comcast bills and must not have a subscription to any Comcast Internet service for the last 90 days to receive consideration. If you already have Comcast broadband service, you must disconnect it for at least three months before you can apply for Internet Essentials.

This requirement is designed to protect Comcast’s bottom line. Why offer a discount to customers already willing to sacrifice for home Internet service at Comcast’s regular price?

“How is this helping me and my family out,” asks one Tennessee customer who tried to sign up for Internet Essentials but couldn’t because they were already paying for Comcast Internet service. “The Comcast representative said that if I wanted to be enrolled in the program I would have to discontinue my Internet service for 90 days and then reapply. We have the Economy Internet Promotion and pay $19.95 per month. After the promotion ends our fee will increase to $26.95 a month. In our current economy and financial situation saving $17 per month would greatly help our family to keep our service. I will not rest until I find a solution to this problem. My children at least deserve that.”

Comcast also makes it its business to check your household to make sure at least one child still qualifies for the National School Lunch Program. The company reserves the right to immediately cancel service if you miss a payment or move. Participants also must not upgrade, alter or change Comcast service for any reason or risk being removed from the program.

Comcast’s Wi-Fi Ban

Shapiro

One of the most annoying conditions of the Internet Essentials program is that it does not allow Wi-Fi access.

Phil Shapiro, who refurbishes donated computers and distributes them to needy families regularly runs into Comcast’s Wi-Fi ban — a significant issue for larger families that need to be online concurrently.

“I’ve taken three donated computers to [one] family and I was expecting to get them all online with this cable modem service,” Shapiro tells The Hechinger Report.  “But not so fast. Comcast’s telephone tech support tells me that Internet Essentials users cannot use Wi-Fi with their cable modems. Nowhere in Comcast’s printed literature or on the website is this limitation mentioned. Naturally, families who sign up for Internet Essentials get confused about this, but they are not well positioned to advocate for their needs.”

Charlie Douglas, a Comcast spokesperson, confirms that Internet Essentials does not offer Wi-Fi service, although he noted a customer could theoretically buy a wireless router themselves and use that to provide wireless connectivity. But that isn’t what Comcast’s technical support team recommends. Any deviation from the terms of the service offered to Internet Essentials customers could lead to an immediate disqualification. Comcast defines Internet Essentials as a wired service, including one outlet and a basic (not wireless) modem.

“The family that I was helping patiently waited for me while I talked on the phone,” said Shapiro. “They could see that I spoke very politely with the tech support person. They also saw that I had reached the end of my patience.”

A representative told Stop the Cap! Internet Essentials accounts have insufficient bandwidth and speed for Wi-Fi service, so it is not offered.

Shapiro dismisses Comcast’s explanation. Many public Wi-Fi networks offer even slower service than Comcast.

Douglas defended Comcast’s policy noting families served by the program don’t miss Wi-Fi and don’t need it.

But those using tablets might disagree, and with an increasing number of students using them as school textbooks are gradually phased out, Wi-Fi will only grow in importance.

Many large school districts, including Los Angeles, are introducing Wi-Fi only tablets for student use because they are cheaper and easier to support. When Internet Essentials participants ask about Wi-Fi access with the discounted broadband service, Comcast representatives are trained to up sell customers out of the program and sign them to a more costly plan than includes built-in Wi-Fi support.

Customers can successfully, if covertly, connect a router with Wi-Fi capability to the basic cable modem supplied by Comcast and configure wireless Internet Essentials service. But there are no guarantees Comcast will not give customers grief about it, if they wish.

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Comcast Internet Essentials Key Milestones 11-13.mp4[/flv]

Comcast produced this video marking the start of the second year of its Internet Essentials program. Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel gushed Internet Essentials was “top of the line” Internet access. He was joined by other recognizable political leaders and the former chairman of the Federal Communications Commission Julius Genachowski. (2:47)

The next name of Time Warner Cable?

Charter Communications is laying the foundation for a leveraged buyout of Time Warner Cable before the end of the year in a deal that could leave Time Warner Cable’s broadband customers with Charter’s usage caps.

Reuters reported discussions between the two companies grew more serious after last week’s revelation a poor third quarter left TWC with 308,000 fewer subscribers.

Charter is relying on guidance from Goldman Sachs to structure a financing deal likely to leave Charter in considerable debt. Charter Communications emerged from bankruptcy in 2009 and is the country’s tenth largest cable operator, estimated to be worth about $13 billion. Time Warner Cable is the second largest cable operator and is worth more than $34 billion.

The disparity between the two companies has kept Time Warner Cable resistant to a deal with Charter, stating it would not be beneficial to shareholders. Charter executives hope to eventually win shareholder support for a buyout stressing the significant cost savings possible from a combined operation, particularly for cable programming.

The deal would likely end Time Warner Cable as a brand and leave Charter Communications CEO Thomas Rutledge in charge of a much larger cable company. Pricing and packaging decisions are usually made by the buyer, which could bring faster broadband speeds to Time Warner customers, but also usage caps already in place at Charter.

John Malone’s War on Customers

Malone

Cable billionaire John Malone, former CEO of Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) — America’s largest cable operator in the 1980s — believes consolidation is critical to the future of a cable business facing competition from phone companies and cord cutting. Malone’s Liberty Media, which now holds a 25% stake in Charter, is currently buying and consolidating cable operators in Europe. Malone’s post-consolidation vision calls for only two or three cable operators in the United States.

Malone’s quest for consolidation is nothing new.

Under his leadership, TCI eventually became the country’s biggest cable operator, but one often accused of poor service and high prices. More than a decade of complaints from customers eventually attracted the attention of the U.S. Congress, which sought to rein in the industry with the 1992 Cable Act — legislation that lightly regulated rental fees for equipment and the price of the company’s most-basic television tier.

Despite the fact consumer advocates didn’t win stronger consumer protection regulations, TCI was still incensed it faced a new regulatory environment that left its hands tied. One executive at a TCI subsidiary advocated retaliation with broad rate increases for unregulated services to make up any losses from mandated rate cuts.

A 1993 internal TCI memo obtained by the Washington Post instructed TCI system managers and division vice presidents to increase prices charged for customer service calls and add new fees for common installation services the company used to offer for free. TCI’s Barry Marshall recommended charging for as many “transaction” services as possible — like hooking up VCR’s, running cable wire, and programming remote controls for confused customers.

“We have to have discipline,” Marshall wrote. “We cannot be dissuaded from the [new] charges simply because customers object. It will take awhile, but they’ll get used to it. The best news of all is we can blame it on re-regulation and the government now. Let’s take advantage of it!”

Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI) was the nation’s largest cable operator. Later known as AT&T Cable, the company was eventually sold to Comcast.

The FCC’s interim chairman at the time — James Quello, charged with monitoring the cable industry, was not amused.

“It typifies the attitude of cable companies engaging in creative pricing and rate increases to evade the intent of Congress and the FCC,” Quello said. “There is little doubt that the cable industry has an economic stake in discrediting the congressional act they vehemently and unsuccessfully opposed.”

Marshall defended his internal memo, although admitted it was inartfully written and was not intended for the public. Revelation of a damaging memo like this would normally lead to a quiet resignation by the offending author, but not at John Malone’s TCI, a company with a reputation for being difficult.

Mark Robichaux’s 2005 book, Cable Cowboy: John Malone and the Rise of the Modern Cable Business, was even less charitable.

Robichaux describes Malone as a “complicated hero,” at least for investors for whom he was willing to ignore banking rules and creatively interpret tax law. Robichaux wrote Malone’s idea of customer service was to ‘charge as much as you can, but spend as little as you can get away with.’

TCI’s top priority was to keep up the cable business as an “insular cartel.” The predictable result included accusations of “shoddy service” customers were forced to take or leave. In the handful of markets where TCI faced another cable competitor, TCI ruthlessly slashed prices to levels some would describe as “predatory,” only to rescind them the moment the competitor was gone. TCI’s intolerance for competition usually meant mounting pressure on competitors to sell their system to TCI (sometimes at an astronomical price) or face a certain slow death from unsustainable price cuts.

Among Malone’s most-trusted friends: junk bond financier Michael Milken and Leo Hindery, former CEO of Global Crossing.

Congressman Albert Gore, Jr., later vice-president during the Clinton Administration, was probably Malone’s fiercest critic in Washington. Gore’s office was swamped with complaints from his Tennessee constituents upset over TCI’s constant rate increases and anti-competitive behavior.

The cable industry’s biggest competitor in the 1980s-1990s was a TVRO 6-12 foot diameter home satellite system.

Gore was especially unhappy that TCI’s grip extended even to its biggest competitor — satellite television.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, cable operators made life increasingly difficult for home satellite dish owners, many in rural areas unserved by cable television. But things were worse for home dish owners that walked away from TCI and began watching satellite television instead. To protect against cord-cutting, the cable industry demanded encryption of all basic and premium cable channels delivered via satellite. It was not hard to convince programmers to scramble — most cable networks in the 1980s were part-owned by the cable industry itself.

To make matters worse, unlike cable systems that only leased set-top boxes to customers, home dish owners had to buy combination receiver-descrambler equipment outright, starting at $500. Just a few years later, the industry pressured programmers to switch to a slightly different encryption system — one that required home dish owners replace their expensive set-top box with a different decoder module available only for sale.

Gore was further incensed to learn TCI often insisted home dish owners living within a TCI service area buy their satellite-delivered programming direct from the cable company. Customers hoping to leave cable for good found themselves still being billed by TCI.

Sometimes the rhetoric against TCI and Malone got personal.

”He called me Darth Vader and the leader of the cable Cosa Nostra,” Malone said of Gore. “You can’t win a pissing contest with a skunk, so there’s no point in getting involved in that kind of rhetoric.”

“There’s a joke going around Washington,” John Tinker, a New York-based Morgan Stanley & Company investment banker who specializes in cable television said of Malone back in 1990. “If you have a gun with two bullets, and you have Abu Nidal, Saddam Hussein and John Malone in a room, who would you shoot? The answer is John Malone — twice, to make sure he’s dead.”

TCI itself was a four letter word in the many small communities that endured the cable company’s insufferable service, outdated equipment, and constant rate “adjustments.”

The New York Times reported John Malone’s TCI had a reputation for treating customers with “utter disdain,” and provided examples:

• In 1973, rate negotiations stalled with local regulators in Vail, Colo., the local TCI system shut off all programming for a weekend and ran nothing but the names and home phone numbers of the mayor and city manager. The harried local government gave in.
• In 1981, TCI withheld fees and vowed to go completely dark in Jefferson City, Mo., if the city failed to renew its franchise, while a TCI employee — “who turned out to have a psychological problem,” said Malone — threatened harm to the city’s media consultant. Again, a beleaguered local government renewed the franchise — although in a subsequent lawsuit, TCI was fined $10.8 million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages.
• In 1983, the small city of Kearney, Neb., also dissatisfied with poor service and rising rates, tried to give Malone some competition in the form of a rival system built by the regional telephone company. TCI slashed fees and added channels until the enemy was driven from the field.

“That’s the dark side, if you will, of TCI,” said Richard J. MacDonald, a media analyst with New York-based MacDonald Grippo Riely.

By mid-1989, Malone’s frenzied effort to consolidate the cable industry resulted in him presiding over 482 merger/buyout deals, on average one every two weeks. Among the legacy cable companies that no longer existed after TCI’s takeover crew arrived: Heritage Communications, United Artists Communications and Storer Communications.

To cover the debt-laden deals, Malone simply raised cable rates and shopped for easy credit. Bidding with others’ money, the per-subscriber price of cable systems shot up from $998 in 1983 to an astronomical $2,328 in 1989.

The General Accounting Office, the investigative arm of Congress, found deregulating the cable industry cost customers through rate hikes averaging 43 percent. In Denver, TCI raised rates more than 70% between 1986 and 1989.

Malone’s attempt to finance a leveraged, debt-heavy buyout of Time Warner Cable seems to show his business philosophy has not changed much.