In the race to acquire spectrum and market share, AT&T and Verizon Wireless have already won most of the awards worth taking and have little to fear from smaller competitors. The U.S. government has seen to that.

The two wireless giants have benefited enormously from government spectrum auctions that award the most favorable wireless spectrum to the highest bidder, a policy that retards competition and guarantees deep-pocketed companies will continue to dominate in the coverage wars.

Winner-take-all spectrum auctions have already proven that AT&T and Verizon are best equipped to bid and win coveted 700MHz spectrum which provides the best indoor and fringe-area reception. This is why AT&T and Verizon customers often find “more bars in more places” than customers relying on Sprint or T-Mobile. Smaller carriers typically have to offer service over much-higher frequencies that don’t penetrate buildings very well. With a reduced level of service, these competitors are at an immediate competitive disadvantage. They also must spend more for a larger number of cell towers to provide uniform service.

Sprint and T-Mobile have two strikes against them at the outset — less favorable spectrum and much smaller coverage areas. Customers who want the best reception under all circumstances usually get it from the biggest two players. Those focused primarily on price are willing to sacrifice that reception for a lower bill.

The same story is developing in the wireless data marketplace. AT&T and Verizon Wireless have the strongest networks as Sprint and T-Mobile fight to catch up.

Where America Went Wrong: The Repeal of Spectrum Caps

Originally, the United States prevented excessive market domination with a “Spectrum Cap,” — a maximum amount of wireless spectrum providers could hold in any local market. The rule was part of the sweeping changes in telecommunications law introduced in the mid-1990s. Wireless spectrum auctions replaced lotteries or strict frequency assignments based on merit. The U.S. government promoted the auction system as a win for the U.S. Treasury, which has been promised $60 billion in proceeds from the wireless industry (not the amount actually collected) since auctions began in 1994.

The cost to U.S. consumers from increasing cell phone bills in barely competitive markets is still adding up.

After the auction system was introduced, the largest carriers acquired some of the most favorable, lower-frequency spectrum, easily outbidding smaller rivals. Most of the smaller regional carriers that ultimately won coveted 700MHz spectrum emerged victorious only when AT&T and Verizon felt the smaller markets were not worth the investment. In larger markets, spectrum caps were a gatekeeper against acquiring excess spectrum and, more importantly, rampant industry consolidation.

Under the pre-2001 rules, wireless companies couldn’t own more than 45MHz of spectrum in a single urban area or more than 55MHz in a rural area. That was when Verizon and AT&T competed with carriers that no longer exist — old familiar names like Nextel, Cingular, VoiceStream, Alltel, Centennial Communications, Qwest, and many others considered safe from poaching because the most likely buyers would find themselves over their spectrum limits.

As the largest carriers realized the caps were an effective merger/buyout firewall, the wireless industry began a fierce lobbying campaign against them. Leading the charge was Tom Wheeler, then-president of the CTIA Wireless Association, the nation’s top cellular industry lobbying group. Today he is chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

“Today, America faces a severe spectrum shortage for wireless services,” Wheeler said in 2001. “The spectrum cap is a legacy of spectrum abundance, not shortages; the inefficiencies it perpetuates cannot be allowed to continue. While the U.S. government is looking for ways to catch up to the rest of the world on spectrum allocations, removal of the cap can at least increase the efficiency of existing spectrum.”

Wheeler was backed by an intensive lobbying effort funded by the largest wireless companies itching to merge and acquire.

By the end of 2001, the new Bush Administration’s FCC was ready to deal, gradually repealing the spectrum caps and fueling major wireless industry consolidation in the process. Providers everywhere could now own or control 55MHz of spectrum in any market, with the promise the caps would be repealed altogether by March 2003.

The result was already foreseen by former FCC Commissioner Michael Copps in November 2001, when he strongly dissented to the Republican majority gung ho for dissolving spectrum caps.

“Let’s not kid ourselves: This is, for some, more about corporate mergers than it is about anything else,” Copps wrote in his strong dissent. “Just look at what the analysts are talking about as the specter of spectrum cap renewal approaches – their almost exclusive focus is on evaluating the candidates for corporate takeovers and handicapping the winners and losers in the spectrum bazaar we are about to open.”

Just in case Copps might be making headway in his campaign to protect competition, Wheeler began complaining even louder about spectrum caps during the spring of 2003, just before their dissolution.

“The wireless industry fought long and hard to secure this spectrum for America’s wireless consumers,” said Wheeler. “Now we must tread carefully — in this era of rapid technological change, writing rules that are too restrictive would be irresponsible. In order to use this spectrum both efficiently and effectively, those who purchase this spectrum at auction must be allowed the freedom to grow and evolve with the demands of the market.”

Europe: Protecting Consumers from Giant Multinational Competition Consolidators (Some of the same ones AT&T reportedly wants to buy)

There is a reason Europeans are shocked by the costs of wireless service in the United States and Canada. North Americans pay higher prices for less service than our European counterparts. Most of the New World also has fewer choices in near-equivalent service providers.

Much of this difference can be attributed to European regulators maintaining focus on driving competition forward and disallowing rampant industry consolidation. But as Wall Street turns its attentions increasingly towards Europe to push for the next big wave of wireless mergers, the European system of “competition first” could be undermined if providers follow the North American model of high profits and reduced competition through consolidation.

Across much of Europe, at least four national carriers serve each EU member state, almost all controlling a share of the most valued, low-frequency wireless spectrum. European regulators do not allow a small handful of providers to maintain a stranglehold on the most valuable radio spectrum. Competitors have traditionally been offered a spectrum foundation to build networks that can stand up to their larger counterparts — the large multinationals or ex-state monopoly providers who had a head start providing service.

A report released by Finland market research firm Rewheel in May found clear evidence that the European model was benefiting consumers at the expense of rampant provider profits. Europeans in “progressive” markets that welcomed new competitive entrants pay lower prices for far more service. In some cases, the price differences between the five giant multinational providers that dominate Europe — Vodafone, KPN, France Telecom, Telefonica and Deutsche Telekom — were staggering. Competitors like Tele2, TeliaSonera, and “3” charge up to ten times less than the larger companies for equal levels of service.

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“Europe is ripe for competition,” reports Bloomberg News. Providers like AT&T may be preparing to embark on a European wireless acquisition frenzy, but Wall Street warns profits are much lower because of robust price competition in Europe that benefits consumers. (4 minutes)

The study also found a number of the largest European providers were following in the footsteps of Verizon Wireless, AT&T, Rogers, Bell, and Telus here in North America:

• Prices were enormously higher in markets that lack effective competition from an upstart competitor able to deliver a comparable level of service. Smaller cell companies with very limited infrastructure or with non-favored spectrum could not provoke dominant players to cut prices because reception quality was starkly lower and consumers would have to cope with a reduced level of service. In Europe, when new competitors were able to fully build-out their networks using favorable spectrum, incumbents in these progressive markets slashed prices and boosted services to compete. In North America, upstart competitors cannot access favorable spectrum for financial reasons and the investor community has dismissed many of these players as afterthoughts, starving them of much-needed investment.
• Large dominant European providers are now heavily lobbying for deregulation of merger and acquisition rules and want the right to acquire the competition entering their markets.
• In almost half of the EU27 member state markets spectrum is utilized very inefficiently by the largest incumbent telco groups who are keen to protect their legacy fixed assets and cement their European dominance with more consolidation at the price of competition. In the United States and Canada, many of the largest providers crying the loudest for more wireless spectrum have still not used the spectrum already acquired.

From the Finnish report:

The obvious question that needs to be asked is how is it technologically possible and economically viable for Tele2, 3 and TeliaSonera to offer four times more gigabytes of data usage at a fraction of the price charged by larger companies.

• Do independent challengers have privileged access to more efficient technologies (i.e. LTE) than the E4 group members?
• Do they hold relatively more spectrum capacity than the E4 group members?
• Do independent challengers have access to more radio sites and their spectrum reuse factor is higher than the E4 group members?
• Or are independent challengers (i.e. Tele2, DNA) unprofitable?

None of the above are true.

The answer is actually very simple. Independent challengers and incumbents such as TeliaSonera present mainly in progressive markets are utilizing the spectrum resources assigned to them. In contrast, incumbent telco groups […] rather than utilizing their spectrum resources instead appear to be more concerned about keeping the unit price of mobile data very high […] by restricting supply, the same way the lawful “cartel” of OPEC controls the price of oil by turning the tap off.

In progressive markets (where at least one independent challenger is present, triggering spectrum utilization competition) such as Finland, Sweden, Austria and the UK, mobile data consumption per capita is up to ten times higher than in protected markets.

In some European countries dominated by the biggest players, consumers are being gouged for service. Where robust competition exists, prices are dramatically lower.

The European nation where market conditions are most similar to the United States is Germany. Two large carriers dominate the market: Deutsche Telekom, the former state-owned telephone company and Vodafone, part owner of Verizon Wireless.

In Germany, consumers spending €20 ($26) end up with a data plan offering as little as 200MB of usage per month. In progressive markets in adjacent countries, spending the same amount will buy an unlimited use data plan or at least one offering tens of gigabytes of usage. In short, German smartphone service is up to 100 times more restrictive than that found in nearby Scandinavia or in the United Kingdom. These same two companies charge Germans double what English customers pay and a Berliner will end up with 22 times less data service after the bill is settled.

So what is going on in Germany that allows the marketplace to stay so price-distorted? The fact all four significant competitors have close ties to or are owned by the large multinational telecom operators mentioned above. Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefonica and E-Plus, the latter one belonging to the Dutch KPN Group are all members of a lobbying organization attempting to persuade the EU to invest public funds into improving Europe’s wired broadband networks. Playing against that proposition is a growing number of Europeans moving to wireless. By charging dramatically higher wireless prices in Germany, all four companies have successfully argued that wireless adoption is not a significant reason to stall public financing of private broadband projects. In fact, Germany’s wireless growth is well below other EU nations.

The Finnish researchers point out the evidence of informal provider collusion is pretty stark in Germany:

“One would expect these ‘European Champions,’ especially the ones with lower market shares (Telefonica and E-Plus), to look at the smartphone centric market transformation as an opportunity to secure or improve their market share, especially in light of the fact they should have plenty of unused radio spectrum capacities to make their offers more consumer-appealing,” the report finds. But in fact these new entrants have priced their services very closely in alignment with the larger two.

“Undoubtedly, multinational incumbent telco groups and their investors have good reasons to lobby EU decision makers to enact friendly policies that will protect their inherited oligopolistic high profit margins,” the report states. “But will the German model serve the best interest of consumers and business in other EU member states? In Rewheel’s opinion, clearly not. Enforcing an overly ‘convergent player friendly’ German model would severely limit competition in the mobile markets, leading to high prices for consumers and the Internet of mobile things and sever under-utilization of the member states’ scarce national radio spectrum resources.”

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Competition is brutal in Europe’s wireless marketplace — a factor Bloomberg News says could temper AT&T’s planned “European Wireless Takeover.” What makes the difference between enormous profits in North America and heavy price discounting in Europe? Spectrum policy, which gives European competitors a more level playing field. Bloomberg analysts speculate AT&T will bankroll its rumored European buyouts and mergers with the enormous profits it earns from U.S. subscribers.  (4 minutes)

Dr. John Malone is wasting no time reacquainting the cable industry with the kinds of classic power plays he used while running Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI), then America’s largest and most powerful cable operator. Malone’s latest salvo: proposing new broadband pricing schemes that run afoul of Net Neutrality by charging consumers higher broadband prices if they watch online video services like Netflix.

Malone, increasing his influence over Charter Communications before launching the next wave of cable company consolidation, implied the industry is hurting from the lack of power and dominance it used to enjoy when it had an unfettered, territorial monopoly back in the 1980s. Malone told an audience at the annual shareholder meeting of Liberty Global he advocates getting the industry’s mojo back by returning to “value creation” pricing models — code language for new ways to charge customers higher prices or add-on fees.

Malone sees raising prices for Internet service key to bringing the industry back to the golden profits it used to enjoy selling television subscriptions, even as customers faced massive rate increases that doubled, tripled, or even quintupled rates for certain services.

Malone’s assessment of the eight current largest cable operators wiring the country: Snow White (Comcast) and the Seven Dwarfs (Everyone Else). The disorganized agendas of various cable operators are troublesome to Malone, who wants the industry to act in lock step with a unified, cooperating voice. Consumer groups call this kind of friendly cooperation “collusion.”

Malone also thinks it is time to discard reliance on cable television to bring home the revenue and profits Wall Street expects. The industry should instead turn its earning attention to broadband, a product few Americans can live without. Malone believes the cable industry is not only positioned to control content distributed on its TV Everywhere online video platform for authenticated cable subscribers, but also have a say in competing content from Netflix, among others, which are totally reliant on the broadband pipes provided by ISPs.

With Netflix consuming a growing percentage of cable broadband resources, and possibly contributing to cable TV cord cutting, Malone does not advocate crushing its competition. Instead, he wants a piece of the action. How? By demanding online video providers pay for using cable broadband infrastructure. Consumers also face surcharges on their broadband accounts if they watch online video services like Netflix, Amazon, YouTube and other over-the-top-video. Malone also advocates the implementation of Internet Overcharging schemes like consumption billing and usage caps.

Malone’s “world of the future,” is, in reality, not much different from AT&T’s 2005 proclamation that use of AT&T’s broadband pipes should come at a cost to content producers.

Then-CEO Ed Whitacre’s public statements fueled support for Net Neutrality, which forbids broadband providers from traffic discrimination techniques like charging extra for certain content or artificially degrading service for producers who refuse to pay.

Malone’s incendiary ideas may be letting too much of the cat out of the bag, say some observers worried Malone’s rhetoric will remind people he was once labeled “the Darth Vader of Cable.” His statements could attract unnecessary attention that could be used to organize opposition.

Last week, the Wall Street Journal reported that broadband providers and content producers were already secretly cutting deals to exchange bandwidth for money without the public scrutiny Malone’s comments will generate.

The newspaper reports some of the biggest Net Neutrality proponents around, particularly Google, are quietly paying millions to large cable companies to guarantee their content reaches customers as quickly and smoothly as possible.

Among the top recipients: Comcast, which collects $25-30 million a year and Time Warner Cable, which nets “tens of millions of dollars” from Google, Microsoft, and Facebook.

The payments are buried in the murky world of “interconnection agreements” governing the backbone pipes carrying huge amounts of web traffic from popular websites and those owned by large telecom providers. Originally, content and broadband providers agreed to peering arrangements that would trade traffic without payment to each other. But as bandwidth-heavy online video began to turn those shared connections into lopsided floods of movies and TV shows headed into subscriber homes against a trickle of content coming back from broadband customers, the cable and phone companies began crying foul.

Netflix has so far navigated around paying Internet Service Providers directly to support their video content. Instead, it is building its own specialized content distribution network intended for ISPs to more effectively and efficiently deliver high bandwidth video. Connections to the Netflix network are free of charge to participating providers, but many ISPs are demanding to be paid.

Some content providers are fearful if they don’t pay, the free “peering” links will become hopelessly overcongested and slow web pages and services to a crawl.

For Verizon customers, that may have already happened as Netflix streams began stuttering and buffering earlier this month.

Cogent, which supplies Verizon with a considerable amount of Netflix traffic, immediately pointed the finger at the phone company for artificially degrading the Netflix viewing experience. Verizon promptly shot back:

Cogent is not compliant with one of the basic and long-standing requirements for most settlement-free peering arrangements: that traffic between the providers be roughly in balance. When the traffic loads are not symmetric, the provider with the heavier load typically pays the other for transit. This isn’t a story about Netflix, or about Verizon “letting” anybody’s traffic deteriorate. This is a fairly boring story about a bandwidth provider that is unhappy that they are out of balance and will have to make alternative arrangements for capacity enhancements, just like any other interconnecting ISP.

Cable giants like Malone see the battle as one the cable industry will have a hard time losing, because it is the only technology present in most communities that can handle the traffic and the growing demand for faster speeds.

Cable operators think content companies have a license to print money, especially since their success is built partly on broadband networks they don’t own or pay for delivering content to customers. At the same time, content companies fear they could be forced out of business if the cable industry decides to give itself preferential treatment.

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Reporters from The Wall Street Journal discuss the secret payment arrangements between content producers and some of America’s largest ISPs. (4 minutes)

The best way the cable industry can grow revenue in the lucrative broadband business is to bring back the same type of collusion and control cable companies maintained over video programming 20 years ago.

Dr. John Malone did not want to sound nefarious in his recent interview with CNBC’s David Faber, but the new part-owner of Charter Communications has built a reputation as cable’s Darth Vader over the last 30 years. His detractors consider his way of doing business akin to a nationwide cable mafia, complete with exclusive, non-competitive territories that assure operators can charge sky-is-the-limit prices.

Malone is now back in the cable business in a big way, and analysts expect he will quickly amass influence in an industry he once led as CEO of the nation’s then-largest cable operator — Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI).

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Why is John Malone back in the cable business and why buy a piece of Charter Cable? Malone tells CNBC’s David Faber Charter is a company with enormous growth potential through mergers and acquisitions. CNBC says Malone could be targeting Time Warner Cable and Cablevision for acquisition by Charter as early as next year. “There is consolidation yet to be done,” Malone hints.  (7 minutes)

Malone notes the cable industry is on the cusp of transformative consolidation through collaborative agreements, mergers, and outright acquisitions both here and abroad. CNBC speculated that could begin with efforts to further reduce the number of cable operators in the United States, perhaps beginning with a deal by Charter Communications to acquire both Time Warner Cable and Cablevision, which could combine under Malone’s stewardship and Charter’s executive leadership to “compete” with Comcast.

CNBC reporters note Malone has high praise for Thomas Rutledge, CEO of Charter Communications. Rutledge’s earlier experience working for both Time Warner Cable and Cablevision could be an asset in combining all three companies into one. Analysts speculate such a deal could be pitched as early as 2014 when Time Warner Cable will undergo a management makeover with the departure of CEO Glenn Britt. CNBC also noted Cablevision’s imminent sale has been rumored for years, and current leader and family patriarch Chuck Dolan is 87 years old. With cheap credit and Malone’s business savvy, both companies could find themselves part of a Malone-engineered takeover that would vastly expand Charter Communications into the second largest cable operator in the country.

Malone sees the days of traditional cable television coming to an end as consumers turn to “over the top” online video for an increasing share of their viewing time. As cable television rates continue to increase, customers are cutting the cord. Malone believes today’s bloated cable packages are ripe for an upheaval from a-la-carte pricing or theme-based programming bouquets that break expensive sports programming or movie channels out of the traditional basic cable lineup. Malone even suspects a challenge to the industry’s current price models could surprisingly come from the programmers themselves.

Sports networks will be among the first to notice their affiliate revenue collected from cable and satellite companies (and passed on to customers in the form of higher rates) will stagnate as customers drop cable television. Declining viewer ratings also mean lower ad revenues. Malone believes at some point sports teams and/or programming networks will decide that the biggest barrier to winning new viewers is the $70-80 asking price for basic cable. If sports programmers find they can reach new audiences selling their programming online, direct-to-consumer, for $5-10 a month, the basic cable all-for-one-price model will quickly collapse.

“As the cable guys and the satellite guys start to lose customers to the over-the-top guys, some of those economics will be reflected back on the sports guys,” Malone said. “They’ll start losing advertising revenue. They’ll lose affiliate revenue. And they have to face reality that maybe you need to segregate your market like everybody else.”

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John Malone predicts the demise of the traditional bundle of cable television programming within five years. The future is streamed video online, declares Malone, so it is important the cable industry move to manage that competitive threat by acquiring streaming competitors or launching their own services to assure video programming revenue can be protected.  (5 minutes)

Malone sees the future sustainability of the cable industry dependent on the high revenue broadband business.

“I think it is at a point in history when the most addictive thing in the communications world is high-speed connectivity,” Malone told CNBC. “Everywhere in the world that we operate, we’ve just seen the public want more and more data rate. Whether it’s wireless or wired. There’s a big appetite for it. Cable technology right now is the most cost-effective way to deliver that growth in speed.”

Malone believes there is also plenty of room for revenue growth and cost-cutting, which he said can best be accomplished by getting other cable operators together to “cooperate” and “coordinate” broad scale broadband projects that counter competitive threats from third parties.

Malone helped pioneer the cable industry business practice of “don’t compete in my backyard and I won’t compete in yours,” an informal agreement among operators to stay within their own specific territories, safe and secure from competition. In the 1980s and 1990s, Malone’s TCI was one among many cable operators buying and swapping cable systems to build large, regional system “clusters” where only a single cable company provides service, winning economy of scale and a formidable presence that discouraged other wired competitors from entering the business. In most cities, only the deep pockets of AT&T (U-verse) and Verizon (FiOS) have managed to shake things up.

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Bring back the cable mafia? CNBC’s David Faber gets John Malone to admit vertical and horizontal integration — controlling the content and the pipeline — are important factors to protect cable revenue and expand American dominance in cable internationally. Malone is also a big supporter of industry consolidation and believes mergers and acquisitions are necessary to shrink the number of cable operators in the United States. (5 minutes)

Malone wants broadband to be carefully managed under the industry’s own control and direction.

Faber asked if Malone wanted to bring back the days of the “cable mafia.”

“Yes, I think we do want to bring back the days of @Home, the days of Ted Turner, the days when we all got together, because together we provided national scale,” Malone said. “Now I think we have the opportunity to create global scale,” he said. “The goal is not to be bigger. The goal is to be more cost-effective.”

Dr. John Malone is a force to be reckoned with and the British are about to get an introduction with this morning’s announcement Liberty Global has acquired Virgin Media in a blockbuster $16.3 billion acquisition deal that will make Malone and Liberty one of the biggest broadband providers in the world. (The deal is valued at $23.3 billion after Liberty agrees to take on Virgin Media’s existing debts.)

Malone will take control of Britain’s largest cable operator and will now also control another 18 million broadband customers in Europe, particularly in Germany and Belgium. His biggest rival will be News Corp.’s Rupert Murdoch who controls BSkyB, Britain’s largest multichannel provider.

Malone’s reputation for ruthlessness precedes him. In the early 1990s, then Sen. Al Gore, Jr., called Malone the Darth Vader of the cable industry. Gore also referred to Malone as the head of a mafia-like “cable industry Cosa Nostra” best known for customer abuse, cold-hearted mergers and acquisitions, and endless rate increases. In the 1980s and 1990s, Malone appeared regularly at congressional hearings to discuss cable industry abuses. At the time, Malone was CEO of America’s largest cable operator Tele-Communications, Inc. (TCI). Today, most of those cable systems are known by another name — Comcast.

In the late 1980s, TCI got the ball rolling on massive rate increases for basic cable service. Other operators quickly followed. As rates exploded upwards, the phones began ringing in Washington from outraged constituents. Gore recounted several recent rate hikes in his own home state of Tennessee in one hearing:

• In three years, rates increased 71% in Memphis,
• 99% in Crossville,
• 113% in Nashville,
• 115% in Chattanooga,
• and 116% in Knoxville.

Under Malone’s leadership, TCI Cable raised rates 60 percent in 1992 alone, helping drive the enactment of the 1992 Cable Act which began to slow the pace of rate hikes. The bill was vetoed by then President George H.W. Bush but overridden in Congress after tens of thousands of constituent complaints poured into Washington. It was sweet justice for many elected officials who were on the receiving end of Malone’s hardball tactics for nearly 20 years. Malone was well known for retaliating against local officials who opposed his unfettered rate increases by suddenly cutting off service to customers and putting up on-screen messages in the place of favorite channels with the names and phone numbers of elected officials Malone claimed were responsible.

Under Malone’s leadership, city officials and consultants working to bring a competing cable operator into Jefferson City, Mo., got a taste of TCI’s ruthlessness when Paul Alden, TCI’s vice president and national director of franchising personally threatened the mayor and a consultant working on the project.

“We know where you live, where your office is and who you owe money to. We are having your house watched and we are going to use this information to destroy you. You made a big mistake messing with TCI. We are the largest cable company around. We are going to see that you are ruined professionally.” Alden warned.

TCI later also claimed it had a First Amendment right to provide service wherever it wanted, with or without a cable franchise. It also threatened any would-be competitor with ruin. In Jefferson City, that would-be competitor eventually won $35 million in damages in a jury trial over TCI’s tactics.

Malone has made no secret he believes government officials are simply getting in his way. In 1999, The Guardian noted Malone is a big believer in telecom oligopolies:

He is scathing about regulatory attempts to prevent monopolies and mergers. Governments, he says, are “antediluvian” in their approach to the emerging new world economic order. Instead of trying to prevent mergers and collusion between media and communications companies, Malone says governments should actually promote the creation of “super-corporations” (such as his own) with enough capital to exploit the potential of new technology.

Malone has plenty of money to throw around. He engineered the sale of TCI Cable to AT&T and personally earned billions from the transaction. Three years later, AT&T sold those systems to Comcast.

Liberty Global has stayed on the sidelines of the cable business domestically, preferring to invest in cable networks and programming. Malone’s firm owns Starz!, which gave Netflix considerable trouble when the online video service lost the rights to a large number of recent movie titles. Netflix had negotiated a $30 million yearly deal with Liberty in 2008 which expired in early 2012. Renewal talks fell through when Liberty demanded $200 million annually to let Netflix keep streaming its movies.

Consumers in the United Kingdom may experience Dr. Malone’s idea of finesse soon enough, if shareholders and British regulators approve the buyout deal.

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BBC News reports the blockbuster deal will pit Dr. John Malone against his biggest rival, Rupert Murdoch. Virgin has five million customers in the UK and provides the country’s fastest broadband service. (2 minutes)

Susan Crawford’s new book, “Captive Audience: The Telecom Industry and Monopoly Power in the New Gilded Age,” is on the receiving end of a lot of heat from industry lobbyists and those working for shadowy think tanks and “consumer groups.”

Most of the critics have not disclosed their industry connections. Stop the Cap! will.

Crawford’s premise that Americans are suffering the impact of an anti-competitive marketplace for broadband just doesn’t “add up,” according to Zack Christenson and Steve Pociask, both with the American Consumer Institute Center for Citizen Research.

Christenson and Pociask’s rebuttal of Crawford’s conclusions about broadband penetration, price, and its monopoly/duopoly status relies on industry-supplied statistics and outdated government research. For instance, the source material on wireless pricing predates the introduction of bundled “Share Everything” plans from AT&T and Verizon Wireless that raised prices for many customers.

Their proposed solutions for the problems of broadband access, pricing, and competition come straight from AT&T’s lobbying priority checklist:

• Free up more wireless spectrum, which is likely to be acquired by existing providers, not new ones that enter the market to compete;
• Allow AT&T and other phone companies to abandon current copper-based networks, which would also allow them to escape legacy regulations that require them to provide service to consumers in rural areas.

One pertinent detail missing from the piece published in the Daily Caller is the disclosure Pociask is a a telecom consultant and former chief economist for Bell Atlantic (today Verizon). The “American Consumer Institute” itself is suspected of being backed by corporate interests from the telecommunications industry. ACI has closely mirrored the legislative agendas of AT&T and Verizon, opposing Net Neutrality, supporting cable franchise reform that allowed U-verse and FiOS to receive statewide video franchises in several states, and generally opposes government regulation of telecommunications.

The so-called consumer group’s website links primarily to corporate-backed astroturf and political interest groups that routinely defend corporate interests at the expense of consumers. Groups like the CATO Institute, the Competitive Enterprise Institute, the Koch Brother-backed Heartland Institute, and the highly free-market, deregulation-oriented James Madison Institute are all offered to readers.

The Wall Street Journal trotted out Nick Schulz to handle its book review. Schulz is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, which is funded by corporate contributions to advocate a pro-business agenda.

Schulz attempts to school Crawford on the definition of “monopoly,” eventually suggesting “oligopoly” might be a more precise way to state it.

“Washington’s fights over telecommunications—and just about every other industrial sector—could use a lot less militancy and self-righteousness and a lot more sound economics,” concludes Schulz, while ignoring the fact interpretation of what constitutes “sound economics” is in the eye of the beholder. All too often those making that determination are backed by self-interested corporate entities with a stake in the outcome.

Hance Haney from the Discovery Institute claims Crawford’s conclusions are “misplaced nostalgia for utility regulation.” Haney cites AT&T’s breakup as the spark for competition in the telecommunications sector and proof that monopolies cannot stand when voice, video, and data service from traditional providers can be bypassed. That assumes you can obtain those services without the broadband service sold by the phone or cable company (that also likely owns your wireless service provider and controls access to cable television programming).

Haney also ignores the divorce of Ma Bell has been amicably resolved. AT&T and Verizon have managed to pick up most of their former constituent pieces (the Baby Bells) and today only “compete” with one another in the wireless sector, where each charges identically-high prices for service.

Haney places the blame for these problems on the government. He argues exclusive cable franchise agreements instigated the lack of cable competition and allowed “hidden cross-subsidies” to flourish, causing the marketplace to stagnate. Haney’s argument ignores history. In the 1970s, before the days of USA, TNT and ESPN, the two largest cable operators TelePrompTer and TCI nearly went bankrupt due to excessive debt leverage. With a very low initial return on investment, exclusive cable franchise agreements were adopted by cities to attract cable providers to wire their communities. Wall Street argues to this day that there is no room for a high level of competition for cable because of infrastructure costs and the unprofitable chase for subscribers that will be asked to cover those expenses. Government was also not responsible for the industry drumbeat for consolidation, not competition, to protect turfs and profits.

The cable industry repeated that argument with cable broadband service, claiming oversight and regulations would stifle innovation and investment. The industry even won the right to exclude competitors from guaranteed access to those networks, claiming it would make broadband less attractive for future investment and expansion.

Haney never discloses the Discovery Institute was founded, in part, to support the elimination of government regulation of telecommunications networks. Broadband Reports also notes the Discovery Institute is subsidized by telecom carriers to make the case for deregulation at all costs.

The Discovery Institute is essentially a PR firm that will present farmed science and manipulated statistics for any donating constituents looking to make a political point.

Broadband for America, perhaps the largest industry-backed astroturf telecom group in the country and itself cited as a source by the American Consumer Institute, seized on the criticism of Crawford’s book for its own attack piece. But every book critic mentioned has a connection to the telecom industry or has ties to groups that receive substantial telecom industry contributions.

NetCompetition chairman Scott Cleland, who accused Crawford of cherry picking information, does not bother to mention NetCompetition is directly funded by the same telecom industry Crawford’s book criticizes. Cleland in fact works to represent the interests of his clients: large phone and cable operators.

Randolph May’s criticism of Crawford’s book is unsurprising when one considers he is president of the Free State Foundation, a special interest group friendly to large telecom companies. FSF also supports the work of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), a group with strong ties to AT&T.

Richard Bennett, who once denied to Stop the Cap! he worked for a K Street lobbyist (he does), attacked the book on behalf of his benefactors at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, a group Reuters notes  receives financial support from telecommunications companies. He also received a $20,000 stipend from Time Warner Cable.

In fact, Broadband for America could not cite a single source criticizing Crawford’s book that does not have ties to the industry Crawford criticizes.