Time Warner Cable is once again raising its broadband prices, reflecting the fact Internet access continues to be a “must-have” product with room to raise the cost without driving customers away.

On average Time Warner Cable customers in the northeast with broadband-only service will pay $3 more a month starting Aug. 9, according to public relations manager Joli Plucknette-Farmen. Customers now pay $51 a month for 15/1Mbps service. After the increase, customers will pay $54.99, not including the modem rental fee. In early 2010, customers were paying $39.95, around $15 less.

Time Warner Cable’s new broadband prices will range from $34.99 a month for Lite 1/1Mbps service to $104.99 a month for 50/5Mbps service.

The rate hike will likely spread across the rest of Time Warner Cable’s systems around the country over the summer and fall.

Plucknette-Farmen said the increase will help the company offer the best possible broadband service.

Not every customer will immediately face higher pricing. Customers on promotional pricing packages will remain unaffected until those offers expire.

Because Time Warner Cable increasingly prices its services on a customer-by-customer basis, assessing the full impact of rate changes is extremely difficult because customers can pay dramatically different rates for the same services. A Time Warner Cable customer paying regular prices for standalone Internet service will find their neighbors with bundled service packages paying much less and those with promotional/customer retention deals paying the lowest rates of all.

In 2012, Stop the Cap! wrote a guide for Time Warner Cable customers to negotiate a better deal for themselves. Readers report the method still works.

Just as in the United States, the promises made by satellite broadband providers are turning out to be too good to be true.

In Great Britain, commercial broadband providers have argued satellite Internet access is a better solution for rural residents because wiring out-of-the-way places is “too uneconomical.”

Despite promises of 20Mbps service from satellite operators, customers report actual speeds are well below 1Mbps at the times they actually want to use the Internet. Unlimited access is also increasingly a thing of the past, replaced with usage caps of 50-60GB, with unlimited usage from 11pm-7am.

Providers deny any serious problems, pointing to speed test tools developed and released by the ISPs showing speeds are theoretically great. But browsing the public Internet suggests otherwise.

Avonline customers have a very active ongoing discussion complaining that £65 satellite broadband should work better:

For past three weeks, the service takes a dive in the evening, I thought this started about 7pm but having tried it earlier, it’s more like 5pm and today about 4pm. Speed tests provided by Avonline suggest I am getting 20/5Mbps but all other tests suggest between 1 and 2Mbps download and ?? upload. Often their own speed test stalls on the upload altogether or eventually returns a result of 0.1Mbps or similar.

As a family, we come home from work and school and want to watch things online at a time to suit us as terrestrial TV is a bit dire. The service is unavailable at this key time and remains down until 1 or 2 am.

Unlimited customers paying £75 per month have been told they are “abusing” the service and that it has effectively run out of capacity and is oversold.

“Unfortunately we cannot do much about the bandwidth on the shared network during peak hours,” came one response from Tooway, another satellite ISP that recently disclosed it will only sell unlimited service to 20,000 customers and wants assurances customers are using their accounts for private, family, and personal use only before the overnight usage caps come off.

But even then, some customers say pervasive speed throttling accomplishes the same thing as a strict cap – it keeps customers away from the service. One Tooway customer shares his dissatisfaction:

The Fair Use policy posted by ToowayUK has only just been introduced. Prior to this there was just boilerplate language that boiled down to “we can do anything at any time” (not that different from the FUP language of any other ISP).

Of course what is really a joke here is that the “unlimited” service actually has a 60GB cap – the traffic management policy works just the same way if we go beyond 60GB as when a capped customer goes beyond their cap.

ThinkBroadband notes satellite ISPs may also have insufficient capacity back on earth, but later reports show satellite bandwidth capacity is also a growing issue:

The KA satellites carry many transponders, but these are usually spread out to cover the whole of Europe meaning that for any particular satellite there may only be 3 or 4 transponder beams for the whole UK, and as a transponder has a throughput limit of 475Mbps this could prove a bottleneck. Oddly the fact that the speed probe tests gave good results, suggests the issue may not be satellite capacity but rather the purchased amount of capacity from the ground station to the Internet at large.

The average Ohio household consumes 52 gigabytes of data per month — the equivalent of more than five million emails or surfing the Internet for about 100 hours monthly — up from 28GB in 2012.

Demand for broadband and mobile communications continues to skyrocket as consumers in urban Ohio dump traditional landline phone service at an accelerating rate.

Since 2000, the industry group Ohio Telecom Association reports 64 percent of landlines have disappeared in the state since peaking in 2000. An additional 6-10 percent continue to cut the cord every year, either when elderly customers pass away or when consumers decide to switch to a wireless, cable telephone, or a broadband Voice over IP alternative like Vonage.

Some telephone companies, particularly AT&T and Verizon, argue the ongoing loss of landlines means the service is becoming technically obsolete — a justification to drop old copper phone networks in rural areas in favor of wireless and switching to fiber-fed IP networks like U-verse in urban and suburban areas. But copper landlines do more than just connect telephone calls.

Broadband usage statistics suggest rural customers in Ohio could find their Internet bills exploding if AT&T succeeds in forcing those customers, least likely to face competition from cable providers, to the company’s highly profitable wireless network.

AT&T currently sells rural landline customers DSL service starting at $14.95 a month. A usage cap of 150GB per month technically applies, but remains unenforced.

Customers switched to AT&T wireless service will pay much more for much less.

AT&T’s DataConnect plan, suitable for fixed wireless home use, starts at $50 a month and includes a usage allowance of 5GB per month. With the average Ohio resident now consuming 52GB a month, switching to wireless broadband is a real budget-buster. AT&T’s overlimit fee is $10/GB, so the average resident would face a monthly Internet bill of $520 a month this year. Assuming usage growth continues at the same pace, in 2014, AT&T customers will need to write a check for around $780 a month.

Ohio’s broadband and wireless usage statistics are familiar because they echo the rest of the country. According to Connect Ohio, wireless-only residents are 81 percent urban or suburban, where cell networks provide the best reception; 84 percent are under age 44; 58 percent have a college education; and 63 percent earn more than $25,000 annually.

Those affected by a forced transition to a wireless-only solution are least financially equipped to handle it.

“The least likely to convert to a wireless-only solution would be an older, rural, less educated, lower-income individual,” said Stu Johnson, executive director of Connect Ohio. “Those are probably also the most expensive copper customers.”

In the race to acquire spectrum and market share, AT&T and Verizon Wireless have already won most of the awards worth taking and have little to fear from smaller competitors. The U.S. government has seen to that.

The two wireless giants have benefited enormously from government spectrum auctions that award the most favorable wireless spectrum to the highest bidder, a policy that retards competition and guarantees deep-pocketed companies will continue to dominate in the coverage wars.

Winner-take-all spectrum auctions have already proven that AT&T and Verizon are best equipped to bid and win coveted 700MHz spectrum which provides the best indoor and fringe-area reception. This is why AT&T and Verizon customers often find “more bars in more places” than customers relying on Sprint or T-Mobile. Smaller carriers typically have to offer service over much-higher frequencies that don’t penetrate buildings very well. With a reduced level of service, these competitors are at an immediate competitive disadvantage. They also must spend more for a larger number of cell towers to provide uniform service.

Sprint and T-Mobile have two strikes against them at the outset — less favorable spectrum and much smaller coverage areas. Customers who want the best reception under all circumstances usually get it from the biggest two players. Those focused primarily on price are willing to sacrifice that reception for a lower bill.

The same story is developing in the wireless data marketplace. AT&T and Verizon Wireless have the strongest networks as Sprint and T-Mobile fight to catch up.

Where America Went Wrong: The Repeal of Spectrum Caps

Originally, the United States prevented excessive market domination with a “Spectrum Cap,” — a maximum amount of wireless spectrum providers could hold in any local market. The rule was part of the sweeping changes in telecommunications law introduced in the mid-1990s. Wireless spectrum auctions replaced lotteries or strict frequency assignments based on merit. The U.S. government promoted the auction system as a win for the U.S. Treasury, which has been promised $60 billion in proceeds from the wireless industry (not the amount actually collected) since auctions began in 1994.

The cost to U.S. consumers from increasing cell phone bills in barely competitive markets is still adding up.

After the auction system was introduced, the largest carriers acquired some of the most favorable, lower-frequency spectrum, easily outbidding smaller rivals. Most of the smaller regional carriers that ultimately won coveted 700MHz spectrum emerged victorious only when AT&T and Verizon felt the smaller markets were not worth the investment. In larger markets, spectrum caps were a gatekeeper against acquiring excess spectrum and, more importantly, rampant industry consolidation.

Under the pre-2001 rules, wireless companies couldn’t own more than 45MHz of spectrum in a single urban area or more than 55MHz in a rural area. That was when Verizon and AT&T competed with carriers that no longer exist — old familiar names like Nextel, Cingular, VoiceStream, Alltel, Centennial Communications, Qwest, and many others considered safe from poaching because the most likely buyers would find themselves over their spectrum limits.

As the largest carriers realized the caps were an effective merger/buyout firewall, the wireless industry began a fierce lobbying campaign against them. Leading the charge was Tom Wheeler, then-president of the CTIA Wireless Association, the nation’s top cellular industry lobbying group. Today he is chairman of the Federal Communications Commission.

“Today, America faces a severe spectrum shortage for wireless services,” Wheeler said in 2001. “The spectrum cap is a legacy of spectrum abundance, not shortages; the inefficiencies it perpetuates cannot be allowed to continue. While the U.S. government is looking for ways to catch up to the rest of the world on spectrum allocations, removal of the cap can at least increase the efficiency of existing spectrum.”

Wheeler was backed by an intensive lobbying effort funded by the largest wireless companies itching to merge and acquire.

By the end of 2001, the new Bush Administration’s FCC was ready to deal, gradually repealing the spectrum caps and fueling major wireless industry consolidation in the process. Providers everywhere could now own or control 55MHz of spectrum in any market, with the promise the caps would be repealed altogether by March 2003.

The result was already foreseen by former FCC Commissioner Michael Copps in November 2001, when he strongly dissented to the Republican majority gung ho for dissolving spectrum caps.

“Let’s not kid ourselves: This is, for some, more about corporate mergers than it is about anything else,” Copps wrote in his strong dissent. “Just look at what the analysts are talking about as the specter of spectrum cap renewal approaches – their almost exclusive focus is on evaluating the candidates for corporate takeovers and handicapping the winners and losers in the spectrum bazaar we are about to open.”

Just in case Copps might be making headway in his campaign to protect competition, Wheeler began complaining even louder about spectrum caps during the spring of 2003, just before their dissolution.

“The wireless industry fought long and hard to secure this spectrum for America’s wireless consumers,” said Wheeler. “Now we must tread carefully — in this era of rapid technological change, writing rules that are too restrictive would be irresponsible. In order to use this spectrum both efficiently and effectively, those who purchase this spectrum at auction must be allowed the freedom to grow and evolve with the demands of the market.”

Europe: Protecting Consumers from Giant Multinational Competition Consolidators (Some of the same ones AT&T reportedly wants to buy)

There is a reason Europeans are shocked by the costs of wireless service in the United States and Canada. North Americans pay higher prices for less service than our European counterparts. Most of the New World also has fewer choices in near-equivalent service providers.

Much of this difference can be attributed to European regulators maintaining focus on driving competition forward and disallowing rampant industry consolidation. But as Wall Street turns its attentions increasingly towards Europe to push for the next big wave of wireless mergers, the European system of “competition first” could be undermined if providers follow the North American model of high profits and reduced competition through consolidation.

Across much of Europe, at least four national carriers serve each EU member state, almost all controlling a share of the most valued, low-frequency wireless spectrum. European regulators do not allow a small handful of providers to maintain a stranglehold on the most valuable radio spectrum. Competitors have traditionally been offered a spectrum foundation to build networks that can stand up to their larger counterparts — the large multinationals or ex-state monopoly providers who had a head start providing service.

A report released by Finland market research firm Rewheel in May found clear evidence that the European model was benefiting consumers at the expense of rampant provider profits. Europeans in “progressive” markets that welcomed new competitive entrants pay lower prices for far more service. In some cases, the price differences between the five giant multinational providers that dominate Europe — Vodafone, KPN, France Telecom, Telefonica and Deutsche Telekom — were staggering. Competitors like Tele2, TeliaSonera, and “3” charge up to ten times less than the larger companies for equal levels of service.

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Bloomberg ATT Takeover List of European Wireless Carriers 7-15-13.flv[/flv]

“Europe is ripe for competition,” reports Bloomberg News. Providers like AT&T may be preparing to embark on a European wireless acquisition frenzy, but Wall Street warns profits are much lower because of robust price competition in Europe that benefits consumers. (4 minutes)

The study also found a number of the largest European providers were following in the footsteps of Verizon Wireless, AT&T, Rogers, Bell, and Telus here in North America:

• Prices were enormously higher in markets that lack effective competition from an upstart competitor able to deliver a comparable level of service. Smaller cell companies with very limited infrastructure or with non-favored spectrum could not provoke dominant players to cut prices because reception quality was starkly lower and consumers would have to cope with a reduced level of service. In Europe, when new competitors were able to fully build-out their networks using favorable spectrum, incumbents in these progressive markets slashed prices and boosted services to compete. In North America, upstart competitors cannot access favorable spectrum for financial reasons and the investor community has dismissed many of these players as afterthoughts, starving them of much-needed investment.
• Large dominant European providers are now heavily lobbying for deregulation of merger and acquisition rules and want the right to acquire the competition entering their markets.
• In almost half of the EU27 member state markets spectrum is utilized very inefficiently by the largest incumbent telco groups who are keen to protect their legacy fixed assets and cement their European dominance with more consolidation at the price of competition. In the United States and Canada, many of the largest providers crying the loudest for more wireless spectrum have still not used the spectrum already acquired.

From the Finnish report:

The obvious question that needs to be asked is how is it technologically possible and economically viable for Tele2, 3 and TeliaSonera to offer four times more gigabytes of data usage at a fraction of the price charged by larger companies.

• Do independent challengers have privileged access to more efficient technologies (i.e. LTE) than the E4 group members?
• Do they hold relatively more spectrum capacity than the E4 group members?
• Do independent challengers have access to more radio sites and their spectrum reuse factor is higher than the E4 group members?
• Or are independent challengers (i.e. Tele2, DNA) unprofitable?

None of the above are true.

The answer is actually very simple. Independent challengers and incumbents such as TeliaSonera present mainly in progressive markets are utilizing the spectrum resources assigned to them. In contrast, incumbent telco groups […] rather than utilizing their spectrum resources instead appear to be more concerned about keeping the unit price of mobile data very high […] by restricting supply, the same way the lawful “cartel” of OPEC controls the price of oil by turning the tap off.

In progressive markets (where at least one independent challenger is present, triggering spectrum utilization competition) such as Finland, Sweden, Austria and the UK, mobile data consumption per capita is up to ten times higher than in protected markets.

In some European countries dominated by the biggest players, consumers are being gouged for service. Where robust competition exists, prices are dramatically lower.

The European nation where market conditions are most similar to the United States is Germany. Two large carriers dominate the market: Deutsche Telekom, the former state-owned telephone company and Vodafone, part owner of Verizon Wireless.

In Germany, consumers spending €20 ($26) end up with a data plan offering as little as 200MB of usage per month. In progressive markets in adjacent countries, spending the same amount will buy an unlimited use data plan or at least one offering tens of gigabytes of usage. In short, German smartphone service is up to 100 times more restrictive than that found in nearby Scandinavia or in the United Kingdom. These same two companies charge Germans double what English customers pay and a Berliner will end up with 22 times less data service after the bill is settled.

So what is going on in Germany that allows the marketplace to stay so price-distorted? The fact all four significant competitors have close ties to or are owned by the large multinational telecom operators mentioned above. Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone, Telefonica and E-Plus, the latter one belonging to the Dutch KPN Group are all members of a lobbying organization attempting to persuade the EU to invest public funds into improving Europe’s wired broadband networks. Playing against that proposition is a growing number of Europeans moving to wireless. By charging dramatically higher wireless prices in Germany, all four companies have successfully argued that wireless adoption is not a significant reason to stall public financing of private broadband projects. In fact, Germany’s wireless growth is well below other EU nations.

The Finnish researchers point out the evidence of informal provider collusion is pretty stark in Germany:

“One would expect these ‘European Champions,’ especially the ones with lower market shares (Telefonica and E-Plus), to look at the smartphone centric market transformation as an opportunity to secure or improve their market share, especially in light of the fact they should have plenty of unused radio spectrum capacities to make their offers more consumer-appealing,” the report finds. But in fact these new entrants have priced their services very closely in alignment with the larger two.

“Undoubtedly, multinational incumbent telco groups and their investors have good reasons to lobby EU decision makers to enact friendly policies that will protect their inherited oligopolistic high profit margins,” the report states. “But will the German model serve the best interest of consumers and business in other EU member states? In Rewheel’s opinion, clearly not. Enforcing an overly ‘convergent player friendly’ German model would severely limit competition in the mobile markets, leading to high prices for consumers and the Internet of mobile things and sever under-utilization of the member states’ scarce national radio spectrum resources.”

[flv width=”640″ height=”380″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Bloomberg ATT Entry in Europe Not Seen as Competitive Threat 7-15-13.flv[/flv]

Competition is brutal in Europe’s wireless marketplace — a factor Bloomberg News says could temper AT&T’s planned “European Wireless Takeover.” What makes the difference between enormous profits in North America and heavy price discounting in Europe? Spectrum policy, which gives European competitors a more level playing field. Bloomberg analysts speculate AT&T will bankroll its rumored European buyouts and mergers with the enormous profits it earns from U.S. subscribers.  (4 minutes)

Comcast’s discounted Internet service for the poor forces customers to jump through hoops to get the service and considers protecting revenue from existing customers more important than expanding the service to reach those who need it most.

Those are the views of John Randall, program manager at the Roosevelt Institute/Telecommunications Equity Project.

For $9.95 a month, those that can meet some complicated eligibility requirements and prove they are not existing Comcast customers are qualified for 3Mbps broadband service with a 768kbps upload rate. It represents a $30 savings off Comcast’s regular price — a considerable amount of revenue that Comcast is effectively forfeiting for the benefit of poor families who live in Comcast’s footprint.

Except Comcast isn’t actually “out” that much at all, argues Randall.

Of the 2.6 million households eligible for Internet Essentials from Comcast, only 150,000 have taken Comcast up on their offer. That represents only 5.8 percent of those eligible. In Comcast’s hometown — Philadelphia — there are just 3,250 families hooked up, which represents only 3.3 percent of those eligible.

Randall calls the program ineffective and says the onerous requirements to qualify (and re-qualify) are such a hassle, few families bother. What is worse, those families already sacrificing something else in their lives to get broadband service for the benefit of their school-age children are punished for their noble efforts — they are completely ineligible for Internet Essentials regardless of income or need because they are existing customers. Randall argues Comcast carefully constructed the program more as a public (and government) relations exercise than a charitable endeavor. Comcast zealously protects its existing revenues from being cannibalized by customers switching to the discount plan.

Some might argue that Comcast is managing the program with costs in mind, but Randall dismisses that as nonsense.

“Within its footprint (which spans 50 million households in 39 states– 45 percent of the US population), the cost for Comcast to connect additional households is vanishingly low,” says Randall. “With no additional network build needed, Internet Essentials represents almost pure profit for Comcast.”

Randall claims Comcast’s gross profit margin on its broadband service is around 95 percent where the network has already been built. At that rate, Comcast’s cheap Internet still delivers almost $18 million in additional income, and there is a promise of much more as soon as a customer defaults on a bill, misses a qualification deadline, or their children graduate. When any of these occur, Comcast will reset customers to regular rates.

“While most observers might assume that the program is an act of corporate generosity, it was originally conceived in the fall of 2009 as a way to turn a profit by offering slower connections to certain low-income households,” said Randall.

“These plans were temporarily tabled at the direction of Comcast lobbyist David Cohen, who knew that this type of program would be attractive to the FCC and thus useful as a bargaining chip. When the time came for negotiations over Comcast’s $13.75 billion takeover of NBC Universal, Comcast was able to offer something it was planning on doing anyway. In the end, the FCC was able to claim credit for forcing Comcast to implement a program to combat the digital divide, while in reality no arm-twisting was needed,” he added.

One of the biggest challenges of America’s digital divide is making affordable Internet access available. Cable companies in particular are prepared to wring even more money from their Internet customers in the form of higher prices, new and increasing equipment rental fees, and consumption billing schemes that charge more for less service.

But that isn’t the story elected officials receive from Congress.

The potential public relations benefits far outweigh any costs to offer the service. Randall notes Comcast had delivered the Internet Essentials message to over 100 members of Congress and more than 2,000 state and local officials. To broaden its outreach effort, Comcast also engaged leading intergovernmental associations at the state and local level such as the National Governors Association, National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Conference of Mayors, and various other organizations of elected officials. On top of that, Comcast says that the impressions generated by media coverage of Internet Essentials launch events earned it “millions of dollars” worth of media.

What message don’t these public officials hear?

America is subjected to local broadband monopolies and duopolies that guarantee the lack of competition for high-speed Internet access.

“It earns Comcast good press while distracting regulators and public officials into thinking that changes in policy aren’t needed and that digital divide problems will somehow work themselves out on their own as a result of corporate generosity. In the long run, Comcast Internet Essentials will do no more than contribute to the delay of much-needed regulation,” concludes Randall.