Goldman Sachs has reviewed the implications of Frontier Communications assuming control of millions of Verizon landline customers, and promptly downgraded their stock to a Neutral rating, telling investors the upcoming consolidation will hasten eroding revenues at Frontier.

“Consolidation of the underperforming acquired assets causes an immediate step-up in revenue erosion for FTR (-6.3% in 2010). In addition, the combined company’s initial EBITDA margins will be significantly below those of legacy FTR (pro forma of 48.0% in 2010, 470 bp below legacy FTR).”

Analysts added, “We expect longer term EBITDA margins of 50%-plus, driven by synergy realization (we forecast $450 mn/year by 2013), and moderating revenue declines, as FTR is able to bring a more localized focus to assets that were not a primary focus inside of a much larger Verizon entity. We forecast 2011/2012 FCF of $950 mn/$921 mn, as synergies and margin expansion only partially offset continued (but moderating) revenue erosion.”

In English, that means Frontier will benefit from its larger customer base in reducing expenses on a per-customer basis, and could become a big enough player to realize some benefits from rolling out services to a larger number of customers nationwide, but those benefits will be tempered by the ongoing loss of revenue as customers dump Frontier landlines for wireless and, where available, switch to a cable modem product to get better speeds and consistent service that Frontier DSL does not provide.  Losing that 5 GB monthly usage allowance won’t hurt either.

Frontier is betting a good deal of the company on expanding broadband service in its largely rural service areas, where many Americans are still stuck relying on dial-up or satellite fraudband, the service that promises a broadband experience but doesn’t come close to actually delivering one.

As long as Frontier doesn’t face competition in its markets, it can deliver 1-3 Mbps DSL service for up to $50 a month and bank those profits as a firewall against ongoing loss of landline revenue.  But if new players arrive, such as LTE wireless, WiMax, cable, or municipal fiber, Frontier’s business plan could go awry in a hurry.

Frontier also continues to pin its hopes on its enormous payout of dividends — sometimes exceeding 12 percent.  The stock is currently the best dividend payer in the S&P 500.  With dependable dividends and the ability to throw back free cash to investors, shareholders can’t ask for anything more.  In the first quarter alone, free cash flow amounted to $152 million and the company paid a dividend to shareholders representing 52 percent of that amount.  That’s $152 million Frontier won’t be spending to upgrade their service or have on hand to pay down debt.

For independent legacy landline providers like Frontier, reducing that dividend could spell disaster for the company’s stock price. Even investors understand this, which is why these kinds of cautionary notes are often attached to coverage about the company:

A cautionary note: telecoms companies with large fixed line exposure generally yield high dividends presently because investors do not believe their revenues and income levels are sustainable as people continue to substitute mobile phones for fixed lines.

LUS Fiber is a municipally-owned provider competing in Lafayette, Louisiana

Lafayette Utility Systems’ LUS Fiber has filed a formal complaint with the Federal Communications Commission accusing the cable industry co-op of blocking the company from getting the favorable discounts and access to cable networks its competitor Cox Cable receives.

LUS Fiber Director Terry Huval said the blockade against LUS Fiber could ultimately cost the city millions and deny subscribers access to popular cable networks.  Huval accused its rival, Cox Cable, of being behind the repeated denials of membership for the Louisiana municipal cable system.

The municipal provider issued a news release stating that its complaint to the FCC originally was joined by municipal providers in Wilson, N.C., and Chattanooga, Tenn., but the National Cable Television Cooperative has since admitted those systems, while keeping LUS Fiber out.

“The NCTC opened membership to two other municipally-owned telecommunications companies that are very similar to our own Lafayette operation and in the same week refused to admit us on the same terms and conditions,” Huval said. “The only difference among the three systems is that our major cable competitor is NCTC’s largest member as well as a member of NCTC’s board of directors.”

LUS Fiber's primary competitor is Cox Cable

The NCTC is critically important to many medium and small sized cable companies who together collectively bargain access and the best possible volume discounts for hundreds of cable networks and broadcasters.  Those discounts are substantial, considering only Comcast gets larger discounts than the NCTC’s group membership.  NCTC membership also frees members from the tedious one on one negotiations cable systems would otherwise be required to conduct to obtain and maintain agreements with cable programmers.

Keeping LUS Fiber out means the municipal provider could be left charging higher prices than Cox charges for cable-TV in Lafayette.

Federal law appears to be on the side of LUS Fiber as part of the 1992 Cable Act that consumer groups fought for:

It shall be unlawful for a cable operator, a satellite cable programming vendor in which a cable operator has an attributable interest, or a satellite broadcast programming vendor to engage in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the purpose or effect of which is to hinder significantly or to prevent any multichannel video programming distributor from providing satellite cable programming or satellite broadcast programming to subscribers or consumers.

The NCTC operates a spartan website at nctconline.org

As someone who personally was involved in the passage of that legislation, the ironic part is we were fighting -for- the NCTC back then.  Of course, those days the cooperative was made up of wireless cable providers, utility co-ops, municipal co-ops, and other independent cable systems that were constantly facing outright refusals for access to cable programming or discriminatory pricing.  Satellite dish-owners were also regularly targeted.  NCTC was a friendly group in the early 1990s but has since become dominated with larger corporate cable operators, especially Cox Cable and Charter Communications.

LUS builds a compelling case:

NCTC and its dominant members have not only grown significantly in size and power, but they have become increasingly anti-competitive themselves. They are now undermining Congress’s pro-competitive intent by using denial of membership in NCTC as an anticompetitive device to insulate NCTC’s existing members from competition by new entrants.

Specifically, in 2007 and 2008, NCTC imposed a “moratorium” on new members, claiming that it needed time to review its membership policies. In late 2008, NCTC supposedly lifted the moratorium, posting new application procedures on its website. These procedures, NCTC stated, would ordinarily result in admissions within 60-120 days. LUS promptly applied for membership, furnishing all of the information that NCTC required. In reality, NCTC only lifted the moratorium for private-sector cable operators, including Cox and Charter. For LUS and other municipal cable operators, NCTC’s claim to be open to new memberships turned out to be little more than a deceptive sham.

In short, as of April 2010, despite publishing procedures suggesting that new members would be admitted within 120 days, NCTC had not admitted a single new public communications provider during the year and a half since it supposedly lifted its moratorium.

Without access to programming at competitive prices, no one would consider switching to a municipal provider that charged higher prices than the incumbent.  The NCTC’s increasingly secretive and erratic admission of new municipal members provides ample ammunition for those on the outside looking in to accuse the group of unfair practices.

AT&T has made it a whole lot easier to learn who has bought Apple’s transformative iPad.  An AT&T security lapse permitted a third party to access and obtain the e-mail addresses and individual iPad ID’s of all 114,000 current owners of the device.  That third party, Goatse Security, then promptly handed over the entire list — some 2,000 pages long, to Gawker — who exposed some big name iPad owners last week.

More importantly, several high officials in government and the military were also identified as iPad owners, even as the security lapse could have given access to the exact location of any of them.

In the media and entertainment industries, affected accounts belonged to top executives at the New York Times Company, Dow Jones, Condé Nast, Viacom, Time Warner, News Corporation, HBO and Hearst.

Within the tech industry, accounts were compromised at Google, Amazon, Microsoft and AOL, among others. In finance, accounts belonged to companies from Goldman Sachs to JP Morgan to Citigroup to Morgan Stanley, along with dozens of venture capital and private equity firms.

Some of the movers and shakers exposed (Image: Gawker)

In government, affected accounts included a GMail user who appears to be Rahm Emanuel and staffers in the Senate, House of Representatives, Department of Justice, NASA, Department of Homeland Security, FAA, FCC, and National Institute of Health, among others. Dozens of employees of the federal court system also appeared on the list.

While Gawker considers the implications of a widespread security breach and whether Apple or AT&T is to blame, others are focusing more intently on AT&T’s role in the misadventure.

AT&T e-mailed every iPad owner notification of the security breach only after it became public news:

“On June 7 we learned that unauthorized computer ‘hackers’ maliciously exploited a function designed to make your iPad log-in process faster by pre-populating an AT&T authentication page with the email address you used to register your iPad for 3G service. The self-described hackers wrote software code to randomly generate numbers that mimicked serial numbers of the AT&T SIM card for iPad – called the integrated circuit card identification (ICC-ID) – and repeatedly queried an AT&T web address. When a number generated by the hackers matched an actual ICC-ID, the authentication page log-in screen was returned to the hackers with the email address associated with the ICC-ID already populated on the log-in screen.

The hackers deliberately went to great efforts with a random program to extract possible ICC-IDs and capture customer email addresses. They then put together a list of these emails and distributed it for their own publicity.

As soon as we became aware of this situation, we took swift action to prevent any further unauthorized exposure of customer email addresses. Within hours, AT&T disabled the mechanism that automatically populated the email address. Now, the authentication page log-in screen requires the user to enter both their email address and their password.”

AT&T’s damage control has been one-part victim, two-parts minimize the impact, sprinkled with “attack the messenger” all over the top.

AT&T’s characterization of the security team that exposed the security flaw as malicious hackers brought a swift response from Goatse:

AT&T had plenty of time to inform the public before our disclosure. It was not done. Post-patch, disclosure should be immediate– within the hour. Days afterward is not acceptable.

[…] The potential for this sort of attack and the number of iPad users on the list we saw who were stewards of major public and commercial infrastructure necessitated our public disclosure. People in critical positions have a right to completely understand the scope of vulnerability immediately. Not days or weeks or months after potential intrusion.

In addition AT&T says the person responsible for this went “to great efforts”. I’ll tell you this, the finder of the AT&T email leak spent just over a single hour of labor total (not counting the time the script ran with no human intervention) to scrape the 114,000 emails. If you see this as “great efforts”, so be it.

AT&T’s mistakes just keep on coming, ranging from ongoing billing errors amounting to hundreds of dollars to threatening customers with cease and desist orders just for e-mailing concerns to the company.

[flv width=”640″ height=”500″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/Bloomberg Goatse Owens Calls ATT Security Flaw Egregious 6-10-10.flv[/flv]

Bloomberg News ran this interview with a representative from Goatse Security that got a bit over-technical for the average Bloomberg viewer.  (4 minutes)

Bresnan Communications, the nation’s 13th largest cable operator with 308,000 customers in Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, and Utah, has been sold to Cablevision for $1.36 billion dollars — $4,300 a subscriber — well above the asking price of one billion dollars, including the company’s debt obligations.

Providence Equity Partners Inc. of Providence, Rhode Island, majority owner of Bresnan unloaded the cable company to help boost its earnings for clients.  Private equity firms like Providence have been suffering in the current economic climate, turning in their worst returns since 2000.  Many are selling off holdings to pay investors.

Bresnan spokesman Shawn Beqaj said the sale had nothing to do with founder William Bresnan’s death last November at age 75.

Bresnan, 30 percent owned by Comcast, today specializes in providing service in the sparsely populated mountain west states that have been ignored by larger companies.  At least 44 percent of Bresnan’s business is in Montana, where 688 of the company’s 1,300 employees work.  But the company’s founder, William Bresnan didn’t start out providing service in any of the states where the company operates today.

The acquisition by Cablevision, known mostly for its suburban New York City-area cable systems, would bring Bresnan’s current owners a considerable bonus over the asking price, and Cablevision (and the debt-financing banks) will pay in cash.

Other bidders included Suddenlink and a company controlled by former cable czar Dr. John Malone.

Cablevision managed to leverage the deal with less than $400 million of its own equity, financing the remaining $1 billion dollars between Citigroup and Bank of America Merrill Lynch in non-recourse debt.  That means if Cablevision’s buyout of Bresnan falters, the banks can only recoup their losses by seizing and selling the acquired Bresnan systems.  They can’t go after Cablevision’s other cable systems or sports ventures to make up the difference.

Considering Bresnan subscribers in the Northern Rockies face little prospect of robust competition, and Bresnan cable broadband can easily exceed broadband speeds offered by telephone rival Qwest, most analysts expect few problems from the deal.

[flv]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/CNBC Bresnan Acquired by Cablevision 6-14-10.flv[/flv]

CNBC explains the Bresnan-Cablevision Deal.  (3 minutes)

Bresnan Founder’s Story Is Echoed Across the Entire Cable Industry

The late William Bresnan -- Founder, Bresnan Communications

Bresnan’s journey through the cable industry over several decades tells the story of the often-ruthless deal-making, horse-trading, and customer-financed  mergers and acquisitions starting after cable deregulation in 1984.  Rates spiked to pay ever-increasing sums to buy and sell cable properties.  To own a cable system, it was said in the late 1980s, was a license to print money.

Bresnan’s involvement in the cable industry began with a job in the engineering department of a midwestern cable company and moved into management at a number of companies, most now long-gone after waves of consolidation.  Those with cable television dating back to the 1970s may even recall some of the names:

H&B American Cablevision: Operator of rural cable systems, most with around 12 channels, offering residents clear reception of over-the-air television signals.  They had a loyal customer base, stable earnings, but little potential for growth.

TelePrompTer: The nation’s largest urban and suburban cable operator through much of the 1970s, but a 1972 bribery scandal for a cable franchise agreement in Trenton, N.J., lead to bribery and perjury charges for TelePrompTer’s principal owner, Irving Berlin Kahn.  The famous songwriter’s nephew ordered the company to spend nearly everything to help mount his defense.  The TelePrompTer scandal would ultimately force the company to sell itself to…

Group W Cable: Westinghouse acquired the financially-troubled TelePrompTer in 1981.  Group W itself would exit the business by 1986 with an acquisition feeding frenzy among four other cable operators — American Television and Communications Corp.; Tele-Communications Inc.; Comcast Corp. and Daniels & Associates Inc.  Ironically, only Comcast would survive merger-mania intact.  ATC systems eventually became a part of Time Warner Cable.  TCI systems were acquired by Comcast.  Daniels was itself a buyer and seller of cable systems.

Bresnan Communications was founded in 1984, not in the mountain west, but in the upper peninsula of Michigan where Bresnan acquired and ran several small cable systems thanks to the help of cable czar Dr. John Malone, CEO of Tele-Communications, Inc., (TCI).  Millions of Americans are familiar with TCI’s own journey through consolidation, first becoming AT&T Broadband and then later as a part of Comcast.

Over the next 14 years, Bresnan expanded operations with Malone’s help.  At one point Bresnan jointly operated cable systems with TCI in northern Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, Georgia and Mississippi serving approximately 660,000 customers. The company even bought cable systems in post-Communist Poland and in Chile, the latter eventually sold outright to TCI.

Bresnan Customers Benefit from Founder’s Technical Background

What set Bresnan Communications apart from the rest of the smaller players in the industry was the founder’s in-depth understanding of cable technology.  Bresnan understood where the industry was going, and had an insatiable appetite for new technology that would also leverage additional growth in the business.

Bresnan spent heavily to upgrade his cable systems, deploying the hybrid fiber-coaxial cable architecture (HFC) in 1997 which is still in use at most cable systems today.  HFC would set the stage for Bresnan to compete with satellite television’s multi-hundred channels, and would let him sell telephone and broadband service to his customers.

That was unprecedented for smaller cable operators.  In the 1990s, it was still common to find small cable systems running only a few dozen channels.  If these legacy cable systems didn’t upgrade, DISH and DirecTV could eat them for lunch.  For those that would raise the necessary money, upgrades were performed.  For those that couldn’t, many would exit the business, selling their cable systems to larger, better-equipped enterprises.

Buy Low, Sell High

Beyond anything else, Bresnan was a businessman.  He had a track record of acquiring cable systems at fire sale prices and selling them for a tidy profit.  So during the height of the dot.com boom, he could hardly ignore a 1999 call from Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen.  Flush with cash to spend, Allen saw cable systems as a key component of his dream for a “wired world.”  Cable companies owned dozens of networks brimming with content that he believed could help drive people to broadband.  Owning both the content and the pipeline to deliver it could drive up the value of both, and Allen could control both.  He had already established himself as owner of Charter Communications, itself a medium-sized cable operator.

Allen’s cable acquisition shopping spree inflated values of cable systems to all-time highs, finally reaching nearly $5,000 per subscriber in crazed bidding wars.  Allen offered $3.1 billion dollars for Bresnan’s small cable empire.  Bresnan sold.

Bresnan Communications Recreated

By 2003, the dot.com boom was well over and done with, and those high-spending online tycoons saw the value of their acquisitions and enterprises erode away.  For Allen, his much-treasured vision had become a cash-sucking albatross.  Charter Communications’ stock by then had lost 95 percent of its original value.  Consumer protection regulation had also arrived in 2003, putting a stop to subscriber rate increase-fueled bidding wars.  Cable rates had risen 61 percent from the time the industry was deregulated in 1984 until legislative relief took effect in early 2003.  When the Money Party ended, stock prices for cable operators crashed.

Bresnan saw the deflation in the industry as an opportunity to buy his way back in, and started shopping.  That year AT&T Broadband, formerly TCI, found itself considering an acquisition offer from rival Comcast.  AT&T owned cable systems large and small, several of which were in the Northern Rockies, hardly cable’s fast lane.  While Comcast had big plans for AT&T cable systems in larger areas, it would be willing to part with smaller systems acquired as part of the deal.

By the time Bresnan arrived with an offer in hand, cable system values dropped further, and his bid for the roughly 300,000 subscribers that comprise today’s Bresnan Communications would be accepted at the fire sale price of $2,100 per subscriber.

Since the acquisition, Bresnan upgraded its systems, offering speeds up to 15/1 Mbps in its rural service area and maintains a reputation in the industry for running well-managed cable operations.