Phillip Dampier

Now that the initial shock of an aggressive — some say “audacious” — move by the Justice Department to block a merger AT&T confidently called “a done deal” is past, analysts of all kinds are attempting to discern the inside reasons for the merger’s rejection, where the deal can go from here, and what signals this will send the rest of America’s telecom industry.

In short — was this one merger proposal too far over the line?

The Justice Department reviewed reams of data, document-dumped by AT&T, on the company’s rationale for wanting to absorb T-Mobile and its implications for employees, consumers, and the dwindling number of wireless competitors.

They quickly discovered they did not like what they were seeing:  an all-new AT&T with a combined 132 million wireless customers, completely dwarfing all of their competitors and signaling a full-scale retreat from the company’s historic landline network.  An unregulated, increasingly concentrated wireless marketplace, represents the Wild West of fat profits, ripe for the picking by those large enough to control the market.  Increasingly, that means two former Baby Bells — AT&T and Verizon.

The Wall Street Journal charted more than two decades of mergers and acquisitions, which reduced nearly two dozen players down to five supersized telecom companies.

The Politics

Decisions at Justice are hardly made in a vacuum.  Politics always plays a role, and it’s a safe bet Obama Administration officials well-above rank-and-file lawyers in the Antitrust Division sent clear signals to the Department about how it wanted the review handled.  After all, this same team of lawyers had almost no trouble approving a mega-merger between NBC-Universal and Comcast Corporation, not finding anything ‘antitrust’ about that deal.  But Justice officials hurried out their own lawsuit with a wide-ranging, harsh condemnation of the deal at yesterday’s press conference.  As most Americans already know, competition in the cable industry is hardly robust, but market concentrating mergers and acquisitions are approved regularly in that industry.  So why did the Justice Department have such a problem with AT&T?

America's Wireless Market: Beyond well-behind, third-place Sprint, no other carrier comes close to AT&T or Verizon Wireless.

Many analysts seem to blame the company’s “arrogance” in telling reporters the merger was a breeze to be approved, others point to spectrum issues, as well as complaints about AT&T’s poor service potentially ensnaring T-Mobile customers.  But above all, Justice lawyers believe that America’s wireless marketplace needs at least four national wireless carriers, particularly scrappy T-Mobile, which has a long history of being a disruptive player in the market, loathe to offer the kind of “identical twin”-pricing common at AT&T and Verizon Wireless.  Losing T-Mobile’s aggressive performance in the market would mean declaring open season for price increases and abusive business practices.  After all, where would wireless consumers go?

That “four national carrier”-test could be a big problem for T-Mobile, as it could mean Justice lawyers would also reject an presumed alternative — combining Sprint and T-Mobile,  rumored before AT&T moved in and stole the show.  A new entrant willing to buy-out Deutsche Telekom’s U.S. wireless interests may be the only palatable solution acceptable to Justice lawyers because it would keep T-Mobile intact and running, independent of other wireless carriers.

Justice also completely discounted the relevance of regional carriers like MetroPCS, Cricket, U.S. Cellular, and other smaller providers.  The reason is simple: roaming.  All of these smaller providers are completely dependent on the four large national carriers to deliver essential roaming services for their customers who travel outside of the regions where these smaller companies deliver service themselves.  All national carriers would have to do to control an overly-competitive “problem” carrier is withdraw roaming agreements or raise prices for them.

Sprint, among others, is obviously the most relieved by yesterday’s events.  Their long term viability as a national carrier dwarfed by AT&T and Verizon Wireless would have raised numerous questions about whether that company could survive in the long term.  Sprint would have also felt pressure to beef up its own operations, likely through acquisitions of several regional carriers, particularly MetroPCS and Cricket, which share its CDMA network standard.

Wall Street is livid, of course.

The great gnashing of teeth has begun on Wall Street, evident as stock analysts begin raising questions about President Obama’s “anti-business” policies.  While executives at both AT&T and T-Mobile are at risk of losing substantial bonuses for pulling the deal off (and providing special retention packages to keep key talent from leaving), there is also a lot of money to be lost in New York and Washington should the deal collapse.  Take the “little people” that will be out tens of millions in deal fees and proceeds from extending credit, implementing the merger itself, and structuring the legal mechanics.  They include:

Arnold & Porter: The now infamous law firm that accidentally posted an un-redacted document on the Federal Communications Commission website that exposed, in AT&T’s own words, what consumer groups already strongly suspected: AT&T preferred the long term benefits of knocking pesky T-Mobile out of the marketplace, even though the $39 billion dollar price tag dwarfed the $4 billion estimated cost of building AT&T’s own 4G LTE network.  That’s the 4G network executives deemed “too expensive” earlier this year.  With a deal collapse, the firm can say goodbye to lucrative legal fees and perhaps more importantly, their reputation of properly managing their clients’ business affairs.

Greenhill & Co.: Greenhill is one of several all-star, platinum-priced advisory firms hired by companies acquiring other companies to structure and implement their mergers.  With Greenhill hoping for a substantial piece of at least $150 million set aside by AT&T to cover these specific costs, a merger-interrupted could cost key people some nice year-end bonuses.

JPMorgan (Chase): The House of J.P. Morgan handed over a check for AT&T worth up to $20 billion to help finance the deal.  JPMorgan doesn’t do that for free.  In addition to any interest proceeds, JPMorgan also charges a range of underwriting and administrative fees that could easily total $85 million dollars.  AT&T might have to send the check back.

Cable Business News & Business Media: One of the most ironic developments watching the Justice Dept. decision unfold was the unintentional amount of AT&T advertising promoting the merger that preceded video reports and appeared adjacent to AT&T-related stories.  Those ads may soon end, costing cable news and the business press substantial ad revenue.

Cable business news networks offered up scathing analyses. Among anchors and analysts upset with the news of the merger’s potential derailment, it didn’t take long for “couched questions” to begin, pondering whether President Obama was against big companies, jobs, or the concept of the private sector in general.  Completely missing: coverage of the benefits for consumers who potentially don’t have to endure a further concentration in the wireless marketplace.

Craig Moffett from Sanford Bernstein, who usually celebrates all-things-cable, today told the Wall Street Journal the actions at Justice will harm business at every U.S. wireless carrier.

“Put simply, the industry will be structurally less attractive than it would otherwise have been,” he said. “Pricing is likely to be less stable, and profound technological risks, including free texting and bandwidth arbitrage, that would be manageable in the context of a significantly consolidated industry now become much more threatening.”

Judge Ellen

In other words, a hegemony of AT&T and Verizon Wireless could play rough with third party developers trying to undercut text message pricing and deliver data plan workarounds. With more competitors, consumers could simply abandon abusive providers.  Without those competitors, consumers have to pay AT&T’s asking price or go without service.

The Law

AT&T may be hoping it scored one potential success in its anticipated legal challenge against the Justice Department’s antitrust case.

The judge assigned to hear arguments is Ellen Segal Huvelle, who has a track record of slapping down government overreach.  Huvelle previously rejected Justice Department objections to the merger of SunGard and Comdisco — two disaster-recovery businesses.  The government argued the merger would leave just two major players in that business.  Judge Huvelle dismissed that, claiming the government too-narrowly defined what a disaster-recovery business entailed.  If she finds AT&T’s arguments of robust competition from regional carriers, landlines, and Voice Over IP credible, Justice lawyers may have a problem.  So could consumers.

[flv width=”512″ height=”308″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/PBS Audacious Move to Block Merger 8-31-11.flv[/flv]

PBS Newshour explores where the AT&T/T-Mobile merger goes next, now that the Justice Dept. sued to stop it on antitrust grounds.  (7 minutes)

The U.S. Department of Agriculture has announced more than $103 million in federal grants and loans to 16 states to help expand broadband, or high-speed, Internet access to unserved and underserved areas of rural America:

The providers involved offer a mix of technology, ranging from traditional cable companies like Inter Mountain Cable and Crystal Broadband Networks — to Wireless ISPs like Wichita Online, serving southwestern Oklahoma, to rural telephone company DSL provided by companies like Hemingford Cooperative Telephone and the Coleman County Telephone Cooperative.

What most rural providers have in common are much-higher prices for slower speed service over what urban customers pay, and a regular need for resources to update capacity and the number of potential customers served.  Most of these grants and loans are expected to cover some of those costs.

Ouch. Rural Americans pay substantially higher prices for broadband service than city-dwellers do. This is current pricing from Inter Mountain Cable, which serves parts of rural Kentucky.

Residents in greater Philadelphia overpaid Comcast more than $875 million dollars, thanks to the cable company’s alleged anti-competitive practice of building regional cable clusters that scare would-be competitors away.

Those are the primary allegations in a 2003 class action case brought against the country’s largest cable operator — a lawsuit Comcast has appealed, so far unsuccessfully.  A three-judge panel of the 3rd Circuit on Tuesday delivered the latest blow to the cable company, denying Comcast’s efforts to get the case thrown out.

At issue is the cable industry’s practice of acquiring and trading cable systems with each another to create regional “clusters,” — large geographic areas all served by the same cable provider — and what that practice does to cable pricing.  All the rage in the late 1990s and early 2000s, cable clustering largely put an end to multiple cable systems serving individual cities.  In the 1980s and 90s, it was not uncommon to find up to four different cable systems serving different sections of a community.  Philadelphia was no different, served by more than a half-dozen cable operators in the greater metropolitan region and surrounding counties.

In the late 1990s, the Court noted Comcast launched a major shopping spree to consolidate the entire area around one cable provider: Comcast.  The lawsuit claims subscribers have paid the price ever since.

Comcast’s Cable Swaps and Acquisitions

• April 1998: Comcast acquires 27,000 Marcus Cable customers in Harrington, Delaware, which is part of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area (DMA);
• June 1999: Comcast acquires 79,000 Greater Philadelphia Cablevision customers in the city of Philadelphia;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 1.1 million Lenfest Communications customers in Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania, and New Castle County in Delaware;
• January 2000: Comcast acquires 212,000 Garden State Cablevision customers in Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, and Salem counties in New Jersey, which is part of the Philadelphia DMA;
• December 2000: Comcast acquires 770,000 AT&T Cable customers in Eastern Pennsylvania (Berks and Bucks counties) and New Jersey, in return for trading 700,000 Comcast customers in Chicago with AT&T (Comcast would later win them back by acquiring AT&T Cable itself);
• January 2001: Comcast acquires 464,000 subscribers in Philadelphia and nearby communities in New Jersey in a subscriber trade with Adelphia Communications Corp., wherein Comcast obtained cable systems and approximately 464,000 subscribers located primarily in the Philadelphia area and adjacent New Jersey areas.  In return, Comcast turns over its subscribers in Palm Beach, Florida and Los Angeles, California to Adelphia.
• April 2001: Comcast wins another 595,000 subscribers in the region in a trade with AT&T Cable;
• August 2006: Adelphia implodes and cable companies including Time Warner Cable and Comcast pick over what’s left.  Comcast manages to pick up another 41,000 former Adelphia customers that were originally headed to Time Warner in yet another subscriber swap;
• August 2007: Comcast acquires Patriot Media and its 81,000 New Jersey customers located within the Philadelphia DMA.

When the acquisitions and transfers were complete, Comcast managed to build a major empire in southeastern Pennsylvania.  In 1998, the company had just a 23.9 percent market share in the Philadelphia DMA.  Comcast managed to control 77.8 percent of the market by 2002.  Despite competition from satellite television and one struggling cable competitor — RCN, Comcast still controlled nearly 70 percent of the market as late as 2007.

Who Pays for the Shopping Spree?  Comcast Customers, Say Plaintiffs

Six Comcast customers upset with the relentless rate increases that came with Comcast’s acquisitions joined forces and filed suit against Comcast in 2003.  The plaintiffs charged Comcast with anti-competitive business practices and violations of the Sherman Act for building a monopoly presence in the market that also helped keep competitors at bay.

One plaintiff’s expert was able to calculate what he called “a conservative estimate” of how much Comcast has effectively overcharged customers in Philadelphia by preventing effective competition: $875,576,662.

That figure was hotly disputed in Comcast’s court appeal, but last Tuesday the Court rejected Comcast’s arguments.  In fact, the Court found merit in the formula used to arrive at the amount of overcharging Comcast has allegedly engaged in — in Philadelphia alone.  Comcast’s argument that customers enjoy lower pricing through promotions and other special pricing arrangements fell apart when the Court learned at least 80 percent of Comcast subscribers pay regular “list prices” for service, and the expert who created the ‘wallet damage‘ formula had taken that special pricing into account.

The plaintiffs suggest that had Comcast not engaged in system clustering, one or more of the area’s cable systems might have decided to compete against the other cable systems.  In that scenario, customers might have been able to choose from Comcast, Lenfest Communications, Marcus Cable, and/or Patriot Cable for cable service, resulting in increased price competition.  While there have been instances of traditional cable operators overbuilding into each other’s territories, those instances have been rare — a point Comcast made in an effort to have the case tossed out.  Comcast’s case is that the majority of Americans are served by a single cable provider, but that’s not a problem because the industry faces increasing competition from satellite TV providers and, as of late, large phone companies.

But the Court found the reason for this lack of competition could be, as plaintiffs argue, the successful outcome of the alleged anti-competitive, cable system-clustering strategy.

As an example, a railway monopoly from 100 years ago could claim it isn’t economical for more than one railroad to serve a particular community, but that isn’t a problem because other forms of transportation exist to move goods and people.  That argument would be based on a market reality created by the railway industry, which routinely bought out the competition through withering price wars, cross-subsidized by higher prices in other monopoly markets. The end effect was a shrinking number of competitive markets, increasing profits (and prices), and a strong deterrent for would-be competitors to enter the business.

A similar case has been brought by the plaintiffs struggling with high cable bills.  In their eyes, cable customers paid for the Monopoly game board on which cable properties were traded or sold.  When the shopping spree was complete, higher rates were the result, indefinitely.

The Case of RCN — Programming Denied

Most traditional cable companies do not compete in areas already served by another cable company.  It’s a tradition some liken to a cartel, where companies carve up territories and enjoy the market benefits afforded by a lack of competition.  But this model is also considered standard operating procedure by Wall Street and other private investors, who fear all-0ut price wars cutting revenues and destroying value and profits.  But there are some companies whose entire mission is to challenge this economic model: the cable overbuilders.  The business plan of the cable overbuilder is to challenge the status quo and deliver service where cable TV already exists and do so profitably.

One such overbuilder is RCN Corporation, which delivers competitive cable service in Boston, Washington, D.C., New York City, Chicago, and parts of the Lehigh Valley.  RCN began operations in 1996 in Boston, just before the cable industry’s quest for clusters went into hyper-drive.  Their plans to compete have been challenged by the ever-increasing concentration in the cable-TV marketplace ever since, and the company has had a particularly tough time attracting subscribers in the Philadelphia area.  Much of RCN’s service area these days is limited to multi-dwelling units like high-rise condos and apartments, where wiring costs are lower.

One of the most effective ways to keep customers from switching to a competitor is to develop or maintain exclusive programming rights.  If a Comcast customer discovered his favorite sporting events could only be seen with a Comcast subscription, that could be a deal-breaker for signing up with RCN.  Before the 1992 Cable Act, the cable industry which owned and controlled a number of popular cable networks refused to sell those channels to would-be competitors (or charged unreasonable prices for access).

When this lawsuit was filed in 2003, RCN found itself locked out of Comcast’s SportsNet, just one of several regional sports networks that cable operators withheld from satellite and cable competitors.  That’s because the 1992 Cable Act included a loophole: it applied only to networks distributed on satellite.  Several regional sports channels were not on satellite, so they could, and were, legally withheld from competitors like RCN.  That loophole was finally closed by the FCC last summer.  But for more than a decade, RCN had to convince sports fans to sign up for a competing service that didn’t have one of the most popular sports channels on the lineup.

Satellite competitors DirecTV and DISH Network were in the same boat, and the legal case recognizes the impact: satellite TV competition in Philadelphia has a below-average percentage of the market, when compared to other cities.

Plaintiffs argued RCN never had fair access to programming, leaving them to compete with one hand tied behind their back.  Even worse, they allege Comcast compelled local contractors into non-compete contracts agreeing not to work for any Comcast competitor, and signing customers up to unusually long contract terms with hefty cancellation penalties in RCN service areas.

All of these accusations were deemed credible by the Court, much to the objection of Comcast, which argued RCN was in serious financial distress and would never be a strongly viable competitor in Philadelphia.  Last week’s Court decision found that ironic, accepting that RCN’s present condition could be, as plaintiffs allege, the result of the anti-competitive, unfair business practices Comcast is charged with.

The evidence on the record “demonstrates that Comcast’s alleged clustering conduct indeed could have reduced competition, raised barriers to market entry [by other competitors] … and resulted in higher cable prices to all of its subscribers in the Philadelphia Designated Market Area,” the court ruled.

Comcast: A Competitive Marketplace Begins And Ends Only at Home

One of the most-disputed elements in the case is determining how much, if any, damage was done to consumers in the greater Philadelphia area.  Much of the plaintiffs’ case rests on pricing anomalies found in the Philadelphia region, where customers are alleged to be paying significantly higher prices for cable service and not enjoying a significant amount of competition.  To build that case, lawyers measured cable rates and available competitors in the various counties in and around the city of Philadelphia.

This is also critical for determining the size of the “class” in the class action lawsuit.  The larger the class, the greater risk of significant damages if the court rules against the cable company (or if the case reaches a settlement.)  Plaintiffs claim their case should include all cable television customers who subscribe or subscribed at any time since December 1, 1999, to the present to video programming services (other than solely to basic cable services) from Comcast, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates in Comcast‘s Philadelphia cluster.

They specifically defined the cluster as “areas covered by Comcast‘s cable franchises, or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, located in the following counties: Berks, Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Kent and New Castle, Delaware; and Atlantic, Burlington, Camden, Cape May, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer and Salem, New Jersey.”

Comcast counters the geographic market is exactly the size of one, single household.  They argue that subscribers can only choose among video providers serving that customer’s specific home, so what cable competition exists in other counties or communities isn’t relevant.

The side effect of such an argument would be the end of a class action case, since the class size would be reduced from a number in the millions to just one, requiring every impacted consumer to file their own case.

The three judge panel was wholly unimpressed with Comcast’s argument, throwing it out and allowing the case to proceed.

When Time Warner Cable introduced its SignatureHome service, the company claimed it wanted to deliver a comprehensive experience to its most premium-customers.  But oddly, the best broadband speeds, phone service, and digital cable TV lineup from the cable company didn’t include any premium movie channels.

“I was ready to sign up for SignatureHome, but I assumed it included major premium channels, and it didn’t,” says Stop the Cap! reader Liam in Los Angeles.  “I thought it would be a real money-saver but I would rather have the premium channels than their phone service, which I don’t actually use as I depend on my cellphone.”

Scott elected for a cheaper promotional bundle foregoing phone service and the fastest Internet speeds, choosing to stick with Road Runner Turbo service.

“Powerboost on their Turbo product is more than enough for me and I don’t need faster upload speed — if SignatureHome included the premiums I would have taken it,” he says.

Now Time Warner has introduced an addition to their super-deluxe package — SignatureHome Premium View, which bundles HBO, Showtime, Cinemax, The Movie Channel and Moviepass with everything else on offer for $30 more a month — $229.99.  The package excludes Starz!, a premium movie channel Time Warner has barely promoted over the years.

With many markets increasing prices to as high as $15 for channels like HBO, getting five premium networks for just under $30 isn’t a bad deal, assuming you watch them and benefit from SignatureHome‘s other features.

“When my promotion expires, I’ll consider this new option,” Scott says.  “Yes, I realize $230 for cable service should really be an outrage, but the way the company is pricing services these days, the more you bundle, the less you ultimately pay compared to trying to build your own package of services.”

That may be exactly the point.  For customers who rely on Time Warner for phone, broadband, and cable-TV, SignatureHome can be a reasonable value if you crave the company’s highest 50/5Mbps broadband speeds.  Building a comparable bundle on your own is much more expensive.  Now the same is true for premium movie channels, which run between $11-15 a month each a-la-carte.

[flv width=”534″ height=”320″]http://www.phillipdampier.com/video/NY1 Signature Home Arrives 12-9-10.mp4[/flv]

NY1, Time Warner Cable’s 24 hour news channel in New York City, talked about the introduction of SignatureHome last December.  (2 minutes)

Ford, Jr.: Making his former public service pay-off with dollar-a-holler advocacy on behalf of Big Telecom.

Former U.S. Senator John Sununu and former U.S. Congressman Harold Ford, Jr., share several things in common:

1. Voters tossed them out of their elected offices (or refused to elect them to higher ones) for poorly representing their interests;
2. Both are honorary co-chairs of Broadband for America, the country’s largest Big Telecom-industry-funded astroturf effort;
3. They don’t understand the concept of content provider traffic-hosting, and the traffic expenses they already pay.

Both jointly penned a letter in the San Jose Mercury News accusing Netflix of enjoying undeserved streaming profits, “subsidized” by large cable and phone companies that deliver broadband Internet service to paying customers:

Netflix’s current pricing model allows unlimited downloads for $7.99 per month. Netflix saves, with every download, approximately 40 cents that would otherwise be paid to the U.S. Postal Service. If the average customer downloads 10 movies and TV shows a month, Netflix will save $4 a month for each of its 23 million customers.

Obviously these massive transmissions over the Internet are not really free. Someone is paying for them. That “someone” is the millions of broadband subscribers, whether or not they are Netflix customers.

How is that fair?

Netflix argues that the marginal cost to the network providers of streaming a half-hour TV show to a residential customer is “one penny.” This ignores the hundreds of billions of dollars in sunken network investments needed to create that one-penny marginal cost efficiency at the customer’s end.

[…] It hardly seems fair to make users of these services pay more in order to subsidize Netflix’s costs of delivering their videos online.

This call for a fairer pricing model and a more realistic long-term investment strategy has bipartisan support. In 2010, the FCC said government policy should not discourage “broadband providers from asking subscribers who use the network less to pay less, and subscribers who use the network more to pay more.”

Neither former elected official comes to the debate with any direct experience as a telecommunications specialist, but since when does that matter.  They know how to deliver talking points-on-demand.

Sununu: New Netflix Math

Netflix, like every content producer on the Internet, pays hosting and content delivery fees to place their content online.  Netflix hires a content delivery network to regionally distribute its video streaming to ensure the best, and most efficient route to ensure an uninterrupted viewing experience.  While Netflix’s incremental costs may seem low, they still amount to millions of dollars annually in transport costs.  And the online video streamer already pays extra additional fees to some of the largest broadband providers in the country, including Comcast.

The other factor Ford and Sununu ignore is the bill at the other end — the inflated cost for broadband service consumers already pay.  For $40+ per month, consumers pay for service precisely to obtain the content of their choosing, and millions choose Netflix.  That monthly broadband fee, far in excess of the actual cost to provide the service, more than compensates providers for the “network investments” that are now declining at a rapid rate, even as broadband bills keep rising.

No doubt part of your broadband bill goes to pay for industry astroturf operations like Broadband for America, which doesn’t represent a single consumer, even though you are paying for it.  Of course, the marginal cost to hire industry lobbyists and their former legislative friends who today represent their interests (not yours), is pretty low on a per subscriber basis.  It hardly seems fair to us that subscribers should be footing the bill for groups like Broadband for America, who regularly advocate against consumers’ best interests.

If providers are looking for more money to improve their networks, perhaps they can start by cutting off Broadband for America, an industry mouthpiece that cannot even get its core arguments anywhere near actual facts.